ML19350F159
| ML19350F159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1981 |
| From: | Colbert W DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EF2---53464, NUDOCS 8106240290 | |
| Download: ML19350F159 (6) | |
Text
.
O Detroit Ecison Eii!!"4" June 23, 1981 p
EF2 - 53464 V,o 9 4, e_
,y Mr. L. L. Kintner Division of Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Kintner:
Reference:
Enrico Fetui Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Subj ect:
Addijienal Requests of Information Attached are copies of:
Item 1 LPCI Diversion (RSB-10)
Additional information is provided in Enclosure 1, as verbally requested.
Item 2 Recire. Pump Coastdown Test (RSB-7) l Additional information is provided in Enclosure 2, as verbally requested.
Item 3 Crack in RHR Line l
Additional information is provided in Enclosure 3, as verbally requested.
Boo /
S Ii 8106240290
s Mr.
L~. L. Kintner EF2 - 53464 June 23, 1981-Page Two j
Item 4 Filled ECCS Lines (RSB-2)
I l
Additional information.is provided in Enclosure 4, as verbally requested.
{
Sincerely,
.. /
k, W. F. Colbert Technical Director Enrico Fermi 2 Project WFC/mhb.
Enclosures
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ENCLOSURE 1 4
LPCI - DIVERSION Fermi 2 Emergency Procedures will contain adequate caution to deter the operator.from premature LPCI flow diversion.
The Emergency Procedures caution the operator against diver-sion unless 'hdequate core cooling is assured."
Lou pressure coolant injection is secondary to core cooling requirements except.in'those instances outside the design envelope in-volving multiple failures, for which maintenance of contain--
ment integrity-is required to minimize risk to the environment.
Therefore, ' itis the position of Detroit Edistn that the Fermi-2 Emergency Procedure will provide adequate caution to deter the operator from premature LPCI flow diversion.
/N h.
.eora
/dk 6-22-81 l
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SAVANNAH REIVER QUESTION NO. 13 A)
In the-applicant's proposed preoperational test of the recirculation system, the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation pumps apparently would be obtained by tripping the breakers of the drive motors for the motor generator sets.
This would result in a slower
~coastdown whicP would not represent the ATWS recircula-tion pump trip in which circuit breakers open the genera-tor field.
We require that the preoperational test of recirculation pump coastdown include a test involving the ATWS trip to verify that sufficiently conservative values of pump inertia were used in the analyses of the consequences and mitigation effects of this type of trip.
The time delay for recirculation pump trip should also be verified during the test.
B)
What is the Level-2 trip for?
(For NPSH protection only?)
RESPONSE (f.GVl5GD)
A)
Detroit Edison Company will perform an ATWS recir-culation pump trip test in which circuit breakers open the generator field to verify that sufficiently conservative values of pump inertia were used in the analyses where such a trip occurs.
The time delay for the trip will also be confirmed.
B)
The primary function of the low-water level (L2) trip of the recirculation pumps is to provide the NPSH protection for the recirculation pumps.
-s
,./ A O -
M. K. Deora
/dk 6-19-81
kd-7 ENCLOSJRE $
EVALUATION OF A CRACK IN THE RHR LINE DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING A plant specific analysis has not been performed on Fermi 2 for the'RHR line crack external to containment as was done for LaSalle.
However, based on the assumptions used and the plant size similarity (764 bundle core), the results of the.LaSalle analysis, should be representative and similar results would be expected for Fermi 2 with the e.4pected peak clad temperature being safely below 2200 F for the subject incident.
24.%
M.
K. Deora
/dk
'6-22-81 I
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h June 22,.1981 FILLED ECCS LINES - (RCIC & HPCI)
The HPCI and RCIC pump suction lines from the condensate storage tank (CST) each have one swingcheck located downstream of the first motor operated HPCI/
- RCIC gate' valves. The design data for each swingcheck is as follows:
Tag 4 Location Type Vendor Size Approx. Disk Wt V8-2192 HPCI Fig. No. 3061-A W.E.
Wm. Powell 16" f: 110 lbs.
V8-2222 RCIC Sim. to Fig. No.
Wm. Powell 6"
( 16 lbs.
3061-A W.E.
During standby conditions, the HPCI/RCIC pump suction lines from the CST up to the normally closed HPCI/RCIC fajection valves are kept full of water due to the static head provided by the CST..The pressure differential,from the top of the core spray standpipe (el. 594') to the HPCI/RCIC injection valves is approximately 3 psi.
This available pressure is adequate to keep the pump suction swingchecks open. The pressure required to lift the HPCI/RCIC swingchecks disc in the open position is l
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shown below for each valve.
I Tag 4 Location Pressure Required V8-2192 HPCI d.60 psi V8-2222 RCIC d.55 psi i
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