ML19350D241
| ML19350D241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1981 |
| From: | Sholly S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350D242 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104140443 | |
| Download: ML19350D241 (17) | |
Text
. .
SHOLLY, 4/9/81
. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA /N A:- s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NN" yv ,ss ,N a
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINL, BOARD d ,
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a .C' In the Matter of ) N ,G,
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50-28 M 3(/
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, -ET AL. ) Docket No.
) (RESTART) 'CM#
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
INTERVENOR STEVEN C. SHOLLY MOTION TO THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD TO REJECT THE NRC STAFF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL ON TMI-l RESTART OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO SEEK LEAVE FROM THE BOARD TO RAISE NEW CONTENTIONS At the Special Prehearing Conference on 9 November 1979, the NRC Staff counsel informed the parties to this proceeding that the Staff intended to prepare an " environ-mental impact appraisal" on the proposed restart of TMI-1.
Staff counsel projected that the " environmental impact appraisal" (EIA) would be completed on the same schedule as the Staff's " safety review" and projected a completion date of " January" 1980 (Tr. 375).
In response to an Interrogatory from this Intervenor (Interrogatory 12-1) , the Staff responded in a filing dated 29 February 1980 that there was no schedule set for the filing of the EIA (response of Jan Norris- NRC-Staff, to Sholly Interrogatory 12-1, 2/29/80). f:&WK s
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i By letter dated 30 March 1981, over sixteen months after the Staff committed to providing an EIA on TMI-l ,
restart,.the Staff transmitted an undated report entitled ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL BY DIVISION OF ENGINEERING EVALUATING THE PROPOSED RESTART OF THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1, DOCKET NO. 50-289.
Upon reviewing this document, this Intervenor found it to be an incomplete, superficial, and meritless recanting of conclusions drawn over eight years ago by the NRC's predecessor agency in the original NEPA evaluation of TMI
. (NUREG-0552, December 1972), conclusions which bear only the most tangential relationship to the issues being'investi- -
gated in this proceeding. While discussing such matters as the inpact of restart on fish (through impingement and entrain-ment at the plant intake and discharge piping), the Staff's EIA refuses to substantively address three crucial issues:
- 1. The EIA refuses to address the environmental consequences of accidents beyond the design basis of TMI-l (" Class 9" accidents).
- 2. The EIA fails to even mention, much less address, the potential impact of the cleanup of TMI-2 (or the lack thereof) on the operation of TMI-1, which is located adjacent to TMI-2.
- 3. The EIA fails to discuss socioeconomic impacts
, arising from the restart of TMI-1, despite a set of socioeconomic circumstances which has clearly been altered in fundamental ways since i TMI-l was originally licensed.
l i
1
l The most glaring inadequacy of the EIA is its failure '
to discuss in a substantive manner the environmental impacts ,
of so-called " Class 9" accidents, or accidents which are beyond the design basis of TMI-1. A discussion of such accidents and their environmental impacts is central to an EIA on TMI-l restart, particularly with respect to those accident sequences which have a close nexus to the TMI-2 accident.
It is ironic and incredible that the NRC Staff has taken the position in the EIA that it need not consider such impacts. Were it not for the occurrence of just such a
" Class 9" accident at TMI-2 on 28 March 1979, there would be no restart proceeding and there would be no EIA on the restart of TMI-1. As it is, the central theme of this proceeding, indeed the only " thread" which ties together the seemingly diverse issues being considered in this proceeding, is a consideration of those issues which require re-examination as a result of the TMI-2 accident. Every issue which has been litigated in this proceeding had to have a demonstrated nexun to the TMI-2 accident before the Board accepted the issue in contention form.
There exists no real reason why the Staff's EIA excluded a discussion of the environmental impacts of " Class 9" accidents.
The Staff, in relying on a single sentence from the Commission's 13 June 1980 " Statement of Interim Policy" on " Nuclear Power r ~
_4_
Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969" (45 F.R. 40101), clearly misconstrues the ,
intent of the " Statement of Interim Policy." The Staff has excluded a discussion of the environmental impacts of
" Class 9" accidents from the EIA on the basis of a quote from the " Statement of Interim Policy" (.the entire " Statement" is appended to this motion for the Board's reference) :
"This change in policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence om conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in previously issued Statements, nor, absent a showing of special circumstances, as a basis for opening, reopening, or expanding any previous or ongoing proceeding."
The Staff leaps from this sentence to the conclusion that the restart of TMI-l does not pose "special circumstances" of the " types referred to in the policy statement". A fair reading of the policy statement would show that the examples used by the Staff as " types" of special circumstances which would warrant a deviation from the Commission's policy as embodied in the quote above were actually included in the policy statement as an explanation of why the environmental impacts of Class 9 accidents were not evaluated in previous NEPA reviews, except in the examples listed in the policy statement.
Had the Staff fully discussed the environmental impacts
, . - . _ . . o
of Class 9 accidents in the EIA, this would not have resulted in an " opening, reopening,' or expanding any previous or ongoing ,
proceeding" unless the discussion disclosed impacts which were clearly unacceptable. Rather, such a discussion would simply have represented the Staff fully discharging its responsibility under NEPA and the Commission's implementation of NEPA. Now, by completely failing to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard, the Staff has created the very real possibility that the completion offthis proceeding will be delayed, a delay which was completely avoidable if the Staff had performed its task successfully.
The Staff has been promising this EIA for nearly a year and a half, all the time. claiming (with the consent of the Board) that NEPA contentions were premature pending the issueance of the EIA. After receiving this worthless EIA, this Intervenor cannot help but wonder if this was not a cynical maneuver intended to place intervenors in the position of having to take what would appear to be " obstructionist" actions on the eve of the completion of the hearings in order to challenge the adequacy of the Staff's NEPA evaluation. It is difficult to postulate an " innocent" explanation for why this EIA took sixteen months to complete.
Rather tlian provide any basis whatsoever for failing to fully discuss the environmental impacts of " Class 9" accidents in the staff's EIA, the Commission's 13 June 1980 .
" Statement of Interim Policy" provides ample good cause for-including such a discussion in the EIA on TMI-l restart. There e is no "previsouly issued Statement" which! evaluates the environmental impact of TMI-l restart--in fact, the EIA was to have represented just such an evaluation. In the policy statement, the Commission clearly set forth its 4
position:
"It is the intent of the Commission in issuing this Statement of Interim Policy that the staff will initiate treatments of accident considerations in accordance with the foregoing guidance, in its ongoing NEPA reviews, i.e., for any proceeding where a Final Environmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued " .
Since an FES has not yet been issued in this proceeding, and since the EIA is an exploration of whether in-fact such an FES should be prepared, the Staff.can hardly take the position that the Commission intended for the Staff to ignore the environmental impacts of Class 9 accidents in its NEPA review of TMI-l restart. The policy statement is quite explicit in stating just how Class 9 accident considerations are to be handled in the Staff's NEPA reviews:
"It is the position of the Commission that its 4
Environmental Impact Statements, pursuant to Section~ 102 (c) (i) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, shall include a reasoned consideration of the environmental risks (impacts) l l
attributable to accidents at the particular facility or facilities within the scope of each
~
such statement. In the_ analysis and discussion of such risks, approximately equal attention shall be given'to the probability of occurrence of releases and to the probability of the environ-mental consequences fo those releases. Releases refer to radiation and/or radioactive materials entering environmental exposure pathways, including air, water, and ground water."
" Events or accident sequences that lead.to releases shall include but not be limited to those that can reasonably be expected to occur. In-plant accident sequences that can lead to a spectrum of releases shall be discussed and shall include sequences that can result in inadequate cooling of the reactor fuel and to melting of the reactor core. The extent to which events arising from causes external to the plant which are considered possible contributors to the risk associated with the particular plant shall also be discussed.
Detailed qualitative considerations that form the basis of probabilistic estimates of the releases need not be incorporated in the Environmental Impact Statements but shall be referenced therein.
Such references shall include, as applicable, reports on safety evaluations."
"The environmental consequences of releases whose probability of occurrence has been estimated shall also be discussed in probabilistic terms.
Such consequences 7shall be characterized in terms of potential radiological exposures to individuals, to population groups, and, where applicable, to biota. Health and safety risks that may be associated with exposures to people shall be discussed in a manner that fairly reflects the current state of knowledge regarding such risks.
Socioeconomic impacts that might be associated with emergency measures during or following an accident should also be discussed. The environ-mental risks of accidents should also be compared to and contrasted with radiological risks asso-ciated with normal and anticipated operational occurrences."
(from " Statement of Interim Policy", emphasis added)
This Board should accept nothing less from the Staff in the EIA on TMI-l restart. Although the lengthy quote ,
above refers at the beginning to " Environmental Impact S ta tements" , it would be irrational to assert that the policy is inapplicable to NEPA reviews, such as an EIA, which may be a predecessor to a full EIS.
The Staff refers in the EIA at page 13 to testimony on' Class 9 accidents given by Staff witnesses at the restart hearings. Although the Staff could arguably be found to have complied with the portion of the Commission's policy statement regarding accident probabilities, it should be remembered that the Staff testimony discussed accidents in the manner of a safety analysis, not environmental impact analysis which is what is called for by NEPA and the Commission policy statement. In any event, written testimony at a hearing is no substitute for a full disclosure of environmental impacts and probabilities in an EIA. In short, the EIA should be able to stand on its own merits and not have to rely on other documents. It is quite clear that the Staff has fallen far short of its obligations in discussing the environmental impacts of Class 9 accidents.
The Staff's failure to address the potential environ-mental impacts of the effects of cleanup of TMI-2 (or the lack thereof) on the operation of TMI-l is a recond major deficiency in the EIA. The mere prcximity of TMI-2 to TMI-l makes this a unique situation whose environmental risk must
r I
be fully disclosed by the Staff in the EIA on TMI-l restart.
As the Board has observed in the First Special Prehearing ,
Conference Order:
"[I]n fact this very hearing is a form of NRC investigation into the relationship between the TMI-2 accident and the operation of TMI-1."
(First Special Prehearing Conference Order, 18 December 1979, Sl. op. at page 8)
It is illogical to conclude, as the Staff has apparently done, that the EIA on TMI-l restart need not consider the issue of impacts on TMI-1 from the TMI-2 cleanup (or lack thereof) . There is no other place where such issues are addressed. The FES on TMI (NUREG-0 5 52, December 1972) and the Final Supplement to the FES on TMI-2 (NUREG-Oll2, December 1976) fail to address these issues in even a general sense, and the Final PEIS on TMI-2 cleanup (NUREG-0683, March 1981) expressly does not address such issues on the basis that such a discussion is to be found in "a separate environmental review." This Intervenor is aware of no such " separate environmental review". unless the reference is to the EIA, in which case the reference is clearly mistaken since the EIA utterly fails to address this issue. It should be noted that consideration of this issue inevitably leads to a consideration of the impacts of accidents during the TMI-2 cleanup, including
accidents which might be viewed as " Class 9" accidents. A possible example of how such an accident might affect TMI-l ,
is the operation of the Submerged Dominerailzer System in the TMI-2 spent fuel pool. The pools for TMI-1 and TMI-2 are physically separated, but the atmosphere above the pools is not (I know this from a recent tour of the TMI facility during which I discuss,ed this with the Deputy Director of the TMI Program Office and viewed the lack of separation on my own; the separation was apparently not extended to the air above the pools so that both pools could make use of the overhead crane). Should an accident occur during operation of SDS while refueling operations are underway at TMI-1, such an accident could result ~in the need to evacuate the spent fuel handling building, thus risking an accident involving TMI-l spent fuel. Other such sequences could also be postulated. The point is that the EIA should have evaluated such consequences and has failed to do so.
The third and final major deficiency in the EIA is the lack of discussion on possible socioeconomic impacts arising from TMI-l restart. Such impacts might include impacts on housing, the economy of the local area, the marketability of farm products and seafood products from the Chesapeake Bay, impacts on local governments (from both a cost and a change in past practices standpoint) , impacts
- m. . . . . . . - + _. -- .. .
arising from increased emergency planning activity (including tests of the siren warning system), and the impacts arising ,
,- from the psychological effects of restart of TMI-1.
Although the Commission, in CLI-80-39, precluded the discussion of such issues within the context of the litigation of issues in the restart proceeding, the Commission took no such position on the consideration of such issues in environmental impact analyses performed pursuant to NEPA. Indeed, both the Draft PEIS on TMI-2 cleanup (Draft NUREG-0683, July 1980) and the Final Environmental Assessment on the Krypton-85 venting from TMI-2 (Final NUREG-0662, May 1980) include discussion of psychological stress issues, and both were published before the Commission's order in CLI-80-39. The Staff's pursuit of these issues continued after the publication of CLI-80-39 in the Final PEIE on TMI-2 cleanup (Final NUREG-0683, March 1981), which was published well after CLI-80-39. It is clear that the Staff has included discussion of psychological stress issues in its NEPA reviews both before and after CLI-80-39 and that the Commission has reviewed all of these documents (the review of Final NUREG-0683 is continuing) . Had the Commission desired that the Final PEIS not deal with such issues, a simple directive to the Staff could have accomplished the Commission's wishes; no such directive was given to the Staff and we are forced to conclude that the Commission 4
_ , - . _ . . , ~.- -
intended the Staff to continue to include analyses of psychological stress issues in its NEPA reviews were appropriate. It is e certainly appropriate in the context of the Staff's EIA on the restart of TMI-1. It should be noted that the Commission's order in CLI-80-39 is under appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals by petitioner People Against Nuclear Energy. It also bears noting that not only was psychological stress discussed in the Environmental Assessment on venting (NUREG-0 6 6 2, May 1980), the alleged " alleviation" of psychological stress by quickly venting the Krypton-85 was cited by the Commission in its venting orders as a benefit of the venting procedure.
On the basis of the clear incompleteness and inadequacy of the Staff's Environmental Impact Appraisal on the restart of TMI-1, this Intervenor hereby moves the Board to issue an Order which rejects the Staff EIA which was transmitted to the Board and parties by letter dated 30 March 1981 and which directs the Staff to prepare either a new EIA or a supplement which fully discusses the issues raised in this motion (the environmental impact of Class 9 accidents, the environmental impact of TMI-2 cleanup on the operation of TMI-1, and the socioeconomic impacts of restart of TMI-1) .
Alternatively, should the Board find that it lacks juris-diction to consider this motion, or should the Board rule against the motion, the Intervenor hereby seeks leave from
the Board to pose new contentions related to the EIA (the contentions are attached to this motion as Appendix B). '
An alternative which the Board may consider, but which this Intervenor would urge against, would be for the Board to certify a question or questions to the Commission on the issues set forth in this motion. This Intervenor would be opposed to such a response to this motion on the grounds that this process has the clear potential for significant delay in the consideration of the issues presented herein, that it would delay this proceeding unnecessarily, and finally on the ground that the Board is properly empowered with construing the Commission's " Statement of Interim Policy" (13 June 1980, 45 F.R. 40101) and other standards referenced herein in responding to this motion.
DATED: 9 April 1981 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, Jhh% '
Steven-C. Sholly /
- 1725 I Street, N.W., suite 601 Washington, D.C. 20006 Affiliation is for identification and mailing purposes only; the views expressed herein and the relief sought hereby do not necessarily represent the views of the Union of Concerned Scientists. This Intervenor is representing himself on a pro se basis; UCS is represented by General Counsel Ellyn R. Weiss.
i I
i l
l
APPENDIX A POLICY ST ATE M ENTS e
p , lead to releces of radiatinn and/or r
(
pu beheat and safety, and wi- one-half hour to alhoun[ radin ctive materials. includme e w arene. 2f the chokes ahee. Ve are have warr g f[in which to impl nt sequences that can result in madequate the pro tive actions befor - release of coohng of reactor fuel and to meltmg of d:rechn; proFra. natic,ur staff to include ennronment: . [mpett ra oactivity to the a 5phere. the reactor core. In this regard. attention ,
state nt on the decontar. .ation and / he chemical and sical shall be given both to the probabihty of ,
l dist al of TMl-2 waste n os erall aracteristics of tF e" radionuclides occurrence of such releases and to the ;
de ription of the planr J mctivities and which contribute at significantly to environmental consequences of such e .hedule for their cr .pletion along human exposure re presented, releases This statement ofinterim
.th a discussion of .tematave s policy is taken in coordination with EPA pol.cy other ongoing safety.related activities (onsidered and the at2anale for cho: :s made. We are ab direcittw our si, to EPA con"us in and endorses for e that are directly related to accident icep us adsise? ,f their progress the guida. a contained in the task arce considerations in the areas of plant these matters report. I' .tU be EPA's policy i design. operational safety. sitmg pohcy, incorp ate its recommendati, into aU and emerFency planning The EPA aergency response gp ance to Commission in: ends to continue the Sta and local officials. rulernakmg on this matter when new
, g 3, siting requirements and other safety ous.m %o .
related requirements incorporating mM m&am m s @c EP 'olicy Statemer Plannir>g Basis i
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Pubt.shed s/13/a0 dates: This statement of interim policy I mergency Ree nses to Nuclear is effective June 13.1980 Comment Com*'at p"'od '"p"es 9/11/80
.wer Reactor Ar idents penod espires Seplember 11.1980.
10 CFR Parts $0 and 51 aoonesses: The Commission intends This is a s' ment of policy w the interim policy Fuidance contained regard to a zwironmental Prr . tion Nuclear Power Plant Accident herein to be immediatelv effectne.
Agency (F - ) and Nuclear Re latory Considerations Under the National Ho all memed' persons who Commu sn (NRC) task forr report on Environmental Polief Act of 1969 desire to submit wntten comments or guidar . for use in State g local acENcy:U.S Nuclear Regulatory suggestions for consideration in rade gical emergeticy re7ponse plans Commission connection with this statement should
^
at Jear power piect acTiow: Statement of Interim Policy. send them to the Secretary of the Commission. U S Nuclear Regulatory.
ckground svuu any: The Nuclear Regula tory Commission. Washineton. D C. 20555.
Commission (NRC)is revismg its pohey Attention. Docketmg and Sernce l Tne NRC receiW a request from thy for considermg the more sewere kinds of gConference of Phation Controle f , Branch s my I w probability accidents that are rca runtsca womario= cc= Tact:
. State Preg-am ofEciaD: rec 6(o ". an organizationmde a deterr#
physically possible aticin environmental R Wavne Houston. Chief. Accident were accident ba for impact assessments required by the Nate nal Environmental Pohey Act Evalua' tion Branch Office of Nuclear
!cf whichthe mos sogical emergene ponso
[NEPA). Such accidents are commortly Reactor Regulation. U.S. Nuclear
- M!ans s -
Id be devt Eed ffsite gulatory Commission. W.ashirFinn.
cs a stab! c referred few to as Class F an accident clas<ific 9 accident tion [sD C 20555. Telephone (301) cc-7n3.
hp scherne proposed by the Atumic Energy su ntuthrau m cCADor red a report entit 2 "P arming i ent of State and Commission (predecessor to NRC) m Ac cident Considerations in Past NEPA s for the Devel 1971 f r purposes ofimplementing E cal Covernmen diolcpeal g ,,;,,,
' Emergency Res e Plane in Suppor*
NEPA.* The March 28.1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear The proposed Annex to Appendix D iught Water N plant has emphasm d the need for of 10 CFR Part 50 [hereafter the INUREM3 Aat5:0ft-78-016.
Power Plants). .ed ,
changes in NRC pohcies regarding the Annex ) was published for comment
$ ecember ~ -. Singe copies of on December 1.1971 by the [former)
"D to thi c nseanons to W spen to serious I report ca e obtained by wTF 3 accidents from an environmental as well Atomic Energy Commission. It proposed Directe irision of Technic . I specify a set f standardized accident b
Infor- ao;i ard Document entr ol, as a ?a ety p mt f view, This statement of interim policy assumptions to be used in l Nu/ Regu'atoTY Cec- sion. announces the withdrawal of the Environmental Reports submitted by i D.-'; M,K Ey amoE B a s,is proposed Annex to Appendiu D of 10 applicants for construction permits or CFR part 50 and the suspension of the operatmg licenses for nuclear power The major reme .=dation of the rulemaking proceeding that began with reactors. It also included a system for I -ncy Pinaning Zone the publication of that proposed Annex classifying accidents accordIng to a on December 1.1971.11 is the graded scale of seventy and probability k(report is that Em EPZ'alsbedd 5 esJeblished amun ght 'w star av ar power planta. CImmission's position that its of occurrence Nine classes of accidents IEPZ for air e exposare has a us EnvironmentalImpact Statements shall weredefined. ranFinFfrom trivial to "of about 1/Siles, the EPZ for includr considerations of the site- s ery senous 11 direcMd that "for each
' ed food has a radi of abot specific environmental impacts class. except classes 1 and 9. the
! centam[
M mi Predetermined pro' aive attributable to accident sequences that enuronmental consequences shall be
' 2e EPZ's, esaluated as indicated." Class 1 esents
..cti S'!ans
'P ct size andareshaneedeJF
( ea ch EPZ [*g"',"g y [ ' g'cC de" d
PA.
were not to be Considered because of
%. be decided by e ency pimnina their trivial consequences. w t.ereas in
.Cicials after they . der the specifi< ..,:, ,, niee..ud is iirai .,,, ,, ge4 . rum io ,coa,,,,,
r.ri gsigb.i
,9.i reFard to Class 9 everits. the Annex (
[, .. that time the Comes.og no ed s thei "The Proposed A nne s .e anH vnder cons,dere e.on * * ' 39 FR stated as foIlows; p ue a August 1,1980 PS 30 i
POUCY STATEMENTS '
c The wc urrences in Chis 9 involve within a 50-mile radius of the plant. and, body on which the plant floats. Here the sequences of postu:aied succemve fadures some differences between boihng water staff emphasized its focus on risk to the more snere than those postulated for the reactors IBWR) and pressurized water environment but did not find that the dre.pn t. asis for proicen e sysiems and reactors (PWR) Beyond these few probabihty of a core meh event snemeered safen festates Th spec fics. the discussions have occurring in the first place was reiterated the Fuidance of the Annex essentially any different than for land.
occ fr enceso i ma!
po bt the based plant. In its Memorandum and that their enuronmental risk is entremely and hase rehed upon the Annex's ,
low Defense in depth [ multiple physical conclusion that the probabihty of Order in the Matier of Offshore Power -
ktriers). quality assurance for design. occurrence of a Class 9 event is too low Systems.' the Commission concurred in manuf acture. and operation. conunued to warrant consideration. a conclusion the staft's judgment. Thus, the Reactor serveillance and testing and conservauve based upon generally stated safety Safety Study and NRC experience w.th hsign are au apphed to provid. and considerations. these cases has served to refocus mmiain the required high degree of With the publication of the Reactor attention on the need to reemphasize tssurance that potentia! accidents in this Sdete Study [ WASH-1400). in draft that environmental risk entails both eks: are and wiH remain. sufficiently remote form in August 1974 and final form in probabihties and consequences, a pomt October 1975. the accident discussions that was made in the pubhcation of the streme v or th anon ts ot Annex.but was not given adequate nrcessary to discuss such events in in EnvironmentalIrnpact Staments began to refer to this first det. td study emphasis.
a pplicants' Enuronmenial R eports of the risks associated with nuclear In July 1977 the MC commissioned a A footnote to the Annex stated: , Risk Assessment Review Croup "to power plant accidents, particularly Although this annes refers to applicant's everits which can lead to the meltmg of c!arify the achievements and limitations Environmental Reports, the current the fuelinside a reactor.8 The references of the Reactor Safety Study."One of the assumpnons and other provisic's thereof are to this study were in keeping with the conclusions of this study. published in appocab;e. encept as the centent ma intent and spirit of NEPA "to disclose September 1978. as NUREC/CR 0400.
relevant information but it is obvious " Risk Assessment Review Group Report eta d State ents to the U.S Nuclear Regulatory that WASH-1400 did not form the basis Dunng the pub!ic comment per.a that for the conclusion expressed in the Corrmission." was that "The Review fo!! owed pubhcation of the Annex a Annex in 1971 that the probabihty of Group was unable to determine whether number of criticisms of the Annex were the absolute probabilities of accident occurrence of Class 9 events was too received. Principal among these were low to warrant their (site specific) sequences in WASH-1400 are high or
'I I IIO*i"8' consideration under NEPA. I w.but beheves that the error bounds (1) The philoscphy of prescribm.g . The Commission's staff has, howeser, n those estimates are in general.
sisumptions does not lead to objective identified in certain cases unique greatly understated." This and other nahsis. findings of the Review Croup have also c reumstances which it felt warranted subsequently been referred to in (2)It failed to treat the probabilities of more extensive and detailed eccidents in any but the most general EnsironmentalImpact Statements. along consideration of Class 9 events. One of "4 with a reference to the Commission's these was the proposed Chnch River (3) No tupportir:g analysis was given Breeder Reactor P! ant (CRSRP). a hquid p licy statement n the Reactor Safety to show that Class 9 accidents are Study in hght of the Risk Assessment metal cooled fast breeder reactor very sufficiently low in probability that their Reew Group Report, published on different from the more conventional January 18. 979. The Commission's consequences in terms of environmental light water reactor plants for which the statement accepted the fmd:ngs of the risks n,eed not be discussed. safetv experience base is much broader' (4) No guidance was gisen as to how Review Group both as to :he Reactor in the Fina! Environmental Statement ucident and normal re. cases of 5 WI. Study's achiew c.-Ms .nd as to for the CRERP.8 the staff included a in hmitations.
r dioactive effluents during plant . .
operation should be factored into the discussion of the consideration it had A few Draft Environmental cost-benefit analysis. given i Class 9 events. Statements have been published (5)The accident assumptions are not in the early site review for the subsequent to the Three M.le Island Perryman site. the staff performed an accident. These were fcr conventiona'.
Fenerally applicable to gas cooled or liquid metal cooled reactors. enf rmal assessment of the relarne land-based light water reactor plants (6) Safety and environmental risks are differences en Class 9 accident and continued to reflect the past c mqwnees among the alternative not essentially differeni co:isiderations. practice with respect to accidents at Neither the Atomic Energy sites (SECY-78-137) such plants. but noted that the Commission nor the NRC took any In the case of the application by experience gained from the Three Mile further action on this rulemaking except Offshore Power Systems to manufacture Island accident was not factored into in 1974 when 10 CFR part 51 was 6 ating nuclear power plants. the staff the discussion.
promulgated. Over the inters ening years tudged that the environmental risks of Our experience with past NEPA the accident considerations discussed in s me Class 9 events warranted special reviews of accidents and the TMI Environmental !mpact Statements for c nsideration. The special accident clearly leads us to believe that proposed nuclear power plants reflected circumstances were the potentia!!y a change is needed.
seri us consequences associated with Accordingly. the proposed Annex to th2 Fu: dance of the Annen with few water [hquid) pathways leading to s uceptions. Typically, the discussions of Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50. published cccident consequences through Cless S radioloS iC8I e5posures if a molten on December 1.1971. is hereby (design basis accidents) for each case reactor core were to failinto the water withdrawn and shall not hereafter be htwe reDected specific site used by appbcants nor by the staff. The
" 5 S ch:racteristics associated with ,,7,',,(l, ;'l',',',[,'['(',",',* ''g,*,j 'L ,'i reasons for the withdrawal are as meleoroicgy (the dispersion of releases a% mis ie-en .o ccmv.*onh e,eed as looseh ollows:
of rad.cactive materialinto the eu.. .iem to . wie men .cc. dent.
Mmesphere). the actual population 'NUREG4n39 Febewery isr7. 'Dodei Ne STN w.e3*.5,pener is. jerg Au;ust 1,1980
/ .
POLICY STATEMENTS
- 1. The Annex proscribes The environmental consequences of issued Statements. nor, absent a /
consideration of the kinds of accidents releases whose probabihty of occurence showmg of similar special (
(Cirss 91 that. according to the Reactor has been estimated shall also be circumstances. as a basis for opening.
Strety Study, dominate the accident discussed in probabilistic terms. Such reopening. or expanding any previous or risk. consequences shall be characterind in onFoing proceedmg.'
- 2. The defmition of Class 9 accidents terms of pniential radiological lionever,it is also the intent cf the ,
in the Annex is not sufficientiy precise exposures to individuals. lo populatitin Commission that the staff take steps to ;
to warrant its further use in Commission groups. and. where applice ble. to biota. identify additional cases that might policy rules. and regulations. not as a Health and safety risks that rnay be warrant early consideration of either dtcision criterion in agency practice. associated with exposares to people additional features or other actions
- 3. The Annem's prescription of shall be discussed in a manner that which would prevent or mitigate the assumptions to be used in the analysis fairly reflects the current state of consequences of serious accidents.
of the environmental consequences of knowledge regarding such risks. Cases for such considerasico are those accidents does not contribute to Socioecono me impacts that might be for whicn a Final Environmental obuctive consideration. assocSted with emergency measures Statement has alreadv been issued at
- 4. The Annex does not give adequate during or following an accident should she Construction Permit stage but for cor: sideration to the detailed treatment also be discussed. The environmental which the Operating License review cf measures taken to present and to risk of accinents should also be stage has not yc! been reached. In mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to and contrasted with carr%ng out this dircuive, the staff in the safety review of each application. radiological risks associated with should consider relevant site features.
The classification of accidents norrnal and anticipated operational including population density, associated proposed in that Annex shall no longer releases. with accident risk Ir. comparison to such be used. In its place the following in promclgating this interim Fuldance. features at presently operating plants.
Intenm Fuidance is given for the the Commission is aware that there are Staff shoulJ also consider the likelihood trestrnent of accident risk and willlikely remain for some time to that substantive changes in plant design considerations in NEPA reviews. come many uncertainties in the features which may compensate further Accident Considerations in Future application of risk assessment methods. for adverse site features may be more NEPA Reviews and it expects that its Envh onmental easily incorporated in plants when impact Swements will identify major co..struction has not yet progressed very it is the position of the Commission uncerta es in its pr baMshe far.
thzt its EnvironmentalImpact
""**tes. On the other hand the Environmental Reports submitted by Stataments. pursuant to Section 102(c)(i) .
mmssinn beheves that the state of of the National Environmental Pohey applicants for construction permits and the art is sufficiently advanced that a for operating licenses on or after July 1.
Act of 1969. shal: Include a reasoned braning should now be made in the consideration of the environmental risks 1980 should include a discussion of the use f these methodologies in the ensironmental risks associated with (impacts) attributable to accidents at the reFulatory process. and that such use accidents thatfollows the guidance particular facihty or facili%es within the will represent a contructive and rational scope of each such staiement. In the gis en herein.
analysis and 6scussion of such risks.
fcrward tep in the discharge ofits d P di g h n L' a spproximately equal attention shall be rePonsi H es. .
. . Consideration givin to the probabihty of occurrence of it is the m ient of tne Comrn.ssion m relesses and to the probabihty of issuing this Staternent of Intenm Policy In addition to its responsibilities occurrence of the environmental that the staff willinitiate treatments of under NEPA. the NRC also bears en sequences of these releases. arc! dent considerations. in accordance rnponsibility under the hmic Energy Relesses refer to radiation and/or "ith the foregoing guidance. in its Act for the protection of the p:.bbc radioactive materials entering orgoing NEPA reviews.1 e for any health and safety from the hazards environmental exposure pathways. proceeding at a licensing stage where a associated with the use of nuclear includmg air, water. andFround water. Final Environmenta! Impact Statement energy. Pursuant to this responsibility Events or accident sequences that has not y et been issued. These new the Commission notes that there are lead to releases shallinclude but not be treatmeras, which will take into account currently a number of onroing activities limited to those that can reasonably be significant site. and plant specific being considered by the Commission expected to occur. In. plant accident features, will result in more detailed and its staff which intimately relate to sequtnces that canlead to a spectrum of discussions of accident risks than in the " Class 9 accident" question and relesses shall be discussed and shall previous environmental statements, which are either the subject of current include sequences that can result in particularly for those related to rulemakin2 or are candidate subjects for insdequate cooling of reactor fuel and to conventional light water plants at land. rulemaking.
melting of the reactor core. The extent to based sites. It is espected that these On December 19.1979 the which events arising from causes revised treatments willlead to Commission issued for public comment
- enttrnal to the plant which are conclusions regarding the environmental a proposed rule which would considered possible contributors to the risks of accidents similar to those that siFairi:antly revise its requirements in risk associated with the particular plant would be reached by a continuation of to CFR Part 50 for emergency planning shsil also be discussed Detailed current practices, particularly for cases for nuclear power plants. One of the quzniitative considerations that form involving special circumstances where considerations in this rulemaking was ths basis of probabilistic estimates of Class 9 risks have been censidered by relacies need net be incorporated in the the staff, as described above. Dus. this a com......on. ct,n..s and e. dre,d d,..srn change in policy is not to be construed - h uw ro ...n er the p ,ced.ns ,.. ..nienc,.
Environmental lmpact Statements but as any lack of confidence in conclusions l
shall be referenced therein. Such rslerences shallinclude as applicable. regarding the environmental risks of y",y",,,((*,'lQ'y'j,'j',"j'1',"l*",*['*"'
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l reports on safety esaluations. accidents expressed in any previously *.4 ni rus7 i
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August 1.1980 PS.32 l
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D P00R ORIGINAL POLICY STATEMENTS r ._
a 8 the pniential consesuences of Class 9 b a5 FR e1738 their reports) accidents in a genene sense.' ( pubinn.4 soo/so , m W ns b arn d a%W In AuFust 19'9. purw.nt to the to NUREC478. "IY 2 lessons
. Learned Task Forc" tatus Report and Commission's request. a Siting Pohey end a tions" and Short. Term Rec Task Force mode recummendations . FurtherwithCor '{ . essun Guidance f NUREG-0585. " &2 lessons Learned ,
respect to possible changes in NPC , Power Rea or Operating U ..e e; Task Force i Report" The reactor silmg pohey and criteria ' I Staterne. of Polecy' Commissi dressed these reports in currently set forth in 10 CFR Part 100. As meetinp September 6. September steled therein. its recommendations I 1. Back imd Octobe" 4. and October 16.1979.
were made to accomphsh (amon8 A' r the March 1979 a ident at FoHo ng release of the report of
- others) the follow nE Foal: TF e Mde Island. Unit the Pre ential Comrnis sion. the To la.e inio consideration m siteng the nsk r smission directed s technical C anission provided a preli .ary set au cisted mih ecodenis beyond the des'F" view resources le ssuring the safety . responses to the recc=rrpations in b sis (Class 9) by establis5ng Population af operating powe. cacters rather than ne report.*This response .ovided density and distnbuhon craiena. to the issuance e new bcenses. broad policy directions r deselopment This matter is currently before the Furdermore, t' Commission decided of an NRC Action P!u' work on which Commission. that power r7 tor licensing should rc was begun in Nove- er 1979. Dunng the
.U development of ' Act2on Plan the This and other recommendations that C ".tmued rbeen accident 6e annsment substantiaHy of 6e have been rnade as a resull of the special Inquur , coup Report was compic- and comprehensive received. w. . bai the benefit of invest'Fations into the Three Mile is!and impr nents in both the op ion and review by aels of outside consultant
.ccident are currently beinF brought tecether by the Commission's staff m nr in Inue ear p we nts had repres en* g a cross section of techn:
th'e form of proposed Action Plans?
b . set in motion. and p .c view s. His report pros" i AmonF other matters. these incorporate I* " ""I ""*I ' addit nal recommendations. ,
recommendations for rulemaking related r uclear eNat y Cp.nion etwd T60 Action P;an'was deveb d to t issue p bcy guida addres sing riMde a comprehensive a to degraded core cochng and core melt "E
TI an for the actions judge ' p..terated p propriate accidents The Commission expects to
"""" E""'
deersions and to vide specific b the Nuclear Regu!at ocumssion issue decisions on these Action P ans m Fuidance for near. term operating license I C riect r improve reg,1gation an3 the near future It is the Commission's l cases >!n NoJ .ber 1979. the Nuclear . ,
E"* "
pohcy and mient to desole NRC's maior resources to matters which the Regulatory dmmission issued the pohey Fu nee in the form of an f h t O 2 and th .cial tud; s a d Commission bereses wih mane cuistin8 d amen t to 10 CFR Part 2 of it and fuiure nuclear power plants safer, reFuhdns.'desenbing the op to inwnHFaW . W acciden in and to present a recurrence of the kmd be i fen bv the Co . mission;mardmg desetopmp' g"
"' Action P'as '"
" " ' " F" the sarious of accident that occurred at Three Mile '1 . sing o'f power reacto s M ' I*U island in the interim. howeser, and ticular, the Commissmri#noted that it E
- E *' """ E ' "I
- W pendmg completion of ruiemaking
.ctivities in the areas of emergency aould "be providmg cas/by-case anhfafd , (l .
[elopment and review pr(ss for the planmng sitmg cntena. and desi6n and [ guidance pohcies. The Co onjssion change has now gfreFufatory etion P!an is provided in' JFKMe94 operational safety, all of which .nvolve p acted on three oye.tmg licenses has .. M R dated W r w < h Fm %* m ,
considerations of serious accident given extensiv nsideration to iasues > .
.f pmential. the Commgsion finds it arising as a re,' It of the nrve Mile f
"'[,7 p 6 of4 of /
cuential to improse its procedures for j Ishnd accMif t. and is able to proud g .,g q describmg and d.sclosing to the public p neral ance. / dM g# e Lu n u'y the basis for arnvinF at conclusions Foll g the accident at U .. file regardmg the environmental risks due to Isla the President estabb=- a !=:n e & a t e)5,,..tu thetilacca.hm t A c,.
and, d ay accidents at nuclear power plants On Cc ission to make recoma'# . dations rdmg changes necess . to improve {uld no*
completion of the ruiemaking activities su tv, ,,..ently included in the A on m these areas. and based also upon the clear safety. In May F o. the Nuc! ear empenence gained with this statement of Regulatory Commissi established a ,
mienm pobey and guidance. the Commiss.on intenjs to pursue possible j Lessons Learned Ta Force.* to determine what aoes were required
/
changes or additions to 10 CFR Part 51 to cndify ts pcsition on the role of E chartered for new aopera'#c. e licenses ial Inquiry Croup andto accident risks under NEPA. " e x a mine acets of the accident a. . , ,,,,n or e, p. ,, , em ,, , , ,,m,,
" its caus< 4 ese groups have pub sed A wdeni em Le 1.:.o.1 me swa tr.e C.arwe ne t .y of TML" Odober te J (11 %d a arda'oey Cc=muice, mr I.e..ons t ed T A Foere 5 ShonS Recoes:,md t oav'esa M;pfpei n, t Jojy it'r l o
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