ML19350A219
| ML19350A219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103130095 | |
| Download: ML19350A219 (8) | |
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',j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 g
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Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 FEB 2 c 1981 D1 V),,
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Mr. R. J. Gary
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Executive Vice President and C
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Texas Utilities Generating Company 7"0 L
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A9 2001 Bryan Tower
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Dear Mr. Gary:
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SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 Enclosed is a request for additional information which we require to complete our evaluation of your application for operating licenses for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.
This request for additional information is the result of our continuing review of the fire protection design at nuclear plants. Your response will be evaluated by the Power Systems Branch.
Please amend your FSAR to include the infomation requested in the Enclosure.
Your response to the enclosed request.for additional information should be submitted within six (6) weeks. Should you have questions concerning this request for additional information, alease contact us.
Sincerely,
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Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 8108180o95 p
a Mr. R. J. Gary Executive Vice President and i
General Manager t
Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 7S201 cc: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Mr. Richard L. Fouke Debevoise & Liberman Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation 1200 Seventeenth Street 1668-8 Carter Drive Washington, D. C.
20036 Arli5ston, Texas 76010 Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.
Resident Inspector / Comanche Peak Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels Nuclear Power Station 2001 Bryan Tower c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dallas, Texas 75201 P. O. Box 38 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Manager - Nuclear Services Texas Utilities Services, Inc.
2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. H. R. Rock Gibbs and Hill, Inc.
393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 Mr. A. T. Parker Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230
. David J. Preister Assistant Attorney General j
Environmental Protection Division i
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station l
Austin, Texas 78711 Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Citizens Association for Sound l
Energy l
1426 South Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Geoffrey M. Gay, Esq.
West Texas Legal Services 100 Main Street (Lawyers Bldg.)~
_ Fort Worth, Texas 76102 ~~~
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ENCLOSURE FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW COMANCHE PEAK UNIT NOS. 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 & 50-446 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 040.0 Pf'ER SYSTEMS BRANCH 040.139 Fire Protection Review In ac::rdance with section 9.5.1, 3 ranch Tecnnical Fosi:icn ASS 9.5-1, ::sitten C.4.a.(1) of NRC Standard Ri: view Plan and section III.G cf new A;pendix R ::
10 CFR Par: 50, it is :ba s:aff's ;:sitien that cabling f r redundan: safe shutdown systems should be se;arated by walls having a three-hcur fire rating or equivaien: pro:ecti:n (see sectica III.G.2 of A;pendix R).
That is, :abling required for or assscia:ed witn the ;rimary ze: hod of shutd:=n. should :e physically separa:ed by the equivaient of a three-hour rate: fire barrier free cabling required f r or associated with the redundant or ai:ernate =eth:d of shutd:wn. To assure that redundant shutd:wn cable systems and all c:her cable systems that are associated with the shutdown cable systems are separa ad frem each other so that doth are not subject to damage fr:m a single fire ha:ard, we require the felicwing information for each syhte: needed to bring the piant to a safe shutdewn.
1.
Provide a tasle that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support syste equip =ent required to achieve and maintain h:: and/:r c:ld shutd wn.
For each equip =ent listed:
a.
Differentiate between equipment required := achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equi; ent required :s achieve and :aintain c:Id shutd:wn, b.
Cefine each equipment's location by fire area, c.
Cefine each equipment's redundant c:un:arpart, P00RORGNAL
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Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumentation, control, and power). For each cable identified: (1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separatui by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables $mr any redundant shutdown system, and List any problem areas identiff Ed by item 1.d.(2) above that will e.
be corrected in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R (i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown capability).
2.
Provide a table that lists Class 1E and Non-Class 1E cables that are associated with the essential sa fe shutdown systems identified in itas1 a bove.
For each cable listed:
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a.
Define the cables' association to the safe shutdown system (ccoman power source, common raceway, separation less than Regulatory Guide t
l 1.75 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),
i b.
Describe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source l
l to termination, and c.
Identify each location where the associated cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables t
required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.
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3-5 3.
Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in item 2.c above:
(a) The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, gr
.3d, or hot short of cables will not affect it's associated shutdcwn sy' stem, (b) Identify each circuit requiring a solution in accordance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or i
(c) Identify each circuit meeting the requirements of section III.G.2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wall, 20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).
To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be 4
provided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdcwn method for other fire areas (as identified by item 1.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G'.3 of new Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50, the following information will also be required for each of these plant areas.
e.
A table that Ifsts ali equipment including instrumentation and vital support system epipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintain,ng hot and/or cold shutdewn.
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A tab 1' that lists all equipment i'ncluding instrumentation and vital b.
e support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
c.
Identify each alternate shutdown equipment If sted in item 4.6 above with essential cables (instrumentation, control, and power) that are located in the fire area containth'g the primary shutdown equipment.
For each etuipment listed rovide one of the fillowing:
(1) Detailed electrical schematic crawings that show the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and are electrically isolated from the subject fire areas, or i
(2) The results of an analysis that deconstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and maintain hot or l
cold shutdown.
d.
Provide a table t.'.at lists Class 1E and Non-Class 1E cables that are f
associated with the alternate, dedicated,or remote method of shutdown.
For eae.h item ifsted, identify each associated cable located in the fire l
area containing the primary shutdown equipment. For each cable so identified provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate. dedicated.or re..ote method of shutdown.
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5-5.
The residual heat removal-syste5 is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant sy; tem. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance 'ith the recer.:enda-tions of Branch Technical position RSB 5-1.
Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical position ICSB 3.
These two motor operated valves and their associated cable may be subject to a single fire ha:ard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface.
To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
e t a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant l
boundary.
b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination.
Identify each location where t,he identified cables are separated c.
by.less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from. cables for the redundant devica.
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d.
For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if any), provide the bases and justification as to the acceptability of the existing design or any proposed modificati:ns.
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