ML19347G047
| ML19347G047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105280203 | |
| Download: ML19347G047 (3) | |
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May 21, 1981
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fegion II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAM NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - NRC-OIN REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/81-16 AND 50-328/81 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS The subject inspection report dated April 27, 1981, cited T7A with one Severity Level IV and one Severity Level V Violation. Enclosed is our response as discussed with E. J. Fu d on May 21, 1981.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at ITS 857-2581.
To the best of my knowled6e, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Ecciosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisson Washington, DC 20555
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ENCLOSURE NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/81-16 AND 50-328/81-16 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT RESPONSE T0' VIOLATIONS Violation 327/81-16-01 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII, requires that measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality shall be properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted to maintain accuracy within necessary limits. This requirement is implemented by Sequoyah Operational Quality Assurance Manual Part III, Section 4.5, page 3 and Part III, Section 3 1.
Contrary to the above, on March 4, 1,981, che licensee performed a surveillance test required by Technical Specifications on the hydrogen ignitor system with an optical pyrometer (TVA No. 495342) which was not calibrated.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.).
Admission or Denial of Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
Reasons for the Violat' ion if Admitted Post Modification Test, PMT-2, Operational Test of the Interim Controlled Hydrogen Ignition System, Rev.1, was issued by Engineering Design February 4, 1981. At this time, proposed draft of paragraph 6.2 5.7.1 of the SNP FSAR (.id not consider the ignition system to be safety related. The necessity for calibration records for optical
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pyrometer (TVA No, 49531'2) were therefore overlooked.
After the issuance of revision 10 to the technical specification dated March 5,1981, the interim controlled hydrogen ignition system was considered safety related. At this time plant maintenance personnel arranged to use the data collected from PMT-2 to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 4.6.4.3 of the technical specification. Upon review of the data on March 6, 1981, it was discovered that calibration records for the optical pyrometer (TVA No. 495342) did not exist.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved Special Maintenance Instruction, SMI-1-150-1, was generated to verify the accuracy of the optical pyrometer (TVA No. 495342). Accuracy was verified to be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 4.6.4.3 of the technical specifications.
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Corrretiva Steps Which Uill Ba Taken To Avoid Furth r Violations Calibration equipment has been ordered to properly call'a ste optical pyrometers. Sufficient administrative controls already exist to prevent the use of a non-calibrated instrument on safety-related systems. The requirements of,PMT-2 were issued before the upgrading of the interim controlled hydrogen ignition system to safety-related status.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved We are now in full compliance.
Violation 327/81-16-02 Technical Specification 3 7.8.1 requires that two independent auxiliary building gas treatment filter trains shall be operable in mode 1 power operation.
Contrary to the above, on March 24, 1981, with unit 1 at 98-percent power both trains of auxiliary building gas treatment system ( ABGTS) were inoperable for approximately twelve hours. The licensee identified this problem at 0030 on March 25, 1981 and returned the A train ABGTS to service at 0125. The B train ABCTS was inoperable in that its backup diesel g; aerator was tagged out for periodic surveillance testing.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supple =ent I.D.3.).
. Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
Reasons for the Violation if Admitted Shift engineer (SE) incorrectly interpreted operability of the ABGTS.
The 2B-B diesel generator was removed from service for the performance of SI-102. Then train A of the ABGTS was removed for performance of a workplan. The SE interpreted Technical Specification 3.0 5 to mean that B train of ABGTS was operable with the emergency diesel out of service.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved The A train ABGTS was restored to operation within the time requirements of L.C.O. 3.0.5.
This action terminated the violat,lon of Technical Specification 3 7.8.1.
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations The requirements of L.C.O. 3 0.5 have been discussed with all shift engineers, assistant shift engineers, unit operators, and shift technical advisors.
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved We are now in full compliance.
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