ML19347F212
| ML19347F212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/30/1981 |
| From: | Brickley R, Hale C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347F211 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900519 NUDOCS 8105150483 | |
| Download: ML19347F212 (6) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900519/81-01 Company:
Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg Power Division 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20706 Inspection Conducted:
March 3-6, 1981 Inspector:
TM3 O!Jo[f/
R. H. Brickley, Contra @ r Inspector
' Date' Reactor Systems Sectio'rf' Vendor Inspection Branch Apr: roved by:
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C. J. fra!, Chief
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Octe Reactor yttems Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on March 3-6, 1981 (99900519/81-01)
Areas Inspected:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B in the areas of design inspection -
control of computer programs, background verification of technical employees, and action on previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved 25 inspector hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
There were ne nonconformances, unresolved, or follow up items identified.
8105150 N
e 2
DETAILS SECTION A.
Persons Contacted P. P. Anas, Chief Plant Design Engineer A. J. Di Perna, Assistant Group Supervisor, Centrol Systems
- R. H. Flugrath, QA Manager, Audits R. R. Ganti, Stress Engineer M. A. Harris, Computer Program Maintainer, Nuc' ear Staff C. M. Herbst, F'thanical Group Supervisor D. C. Patton, Engineer, Nuclear Staff
- C. L. Reid, Assistant Chief Nuclear Engineer D. R. Wynkoop, Personnel, Supervisor
- Denotes ettendance at the exit interview.
B.
Action on Previous Insoection Findings 1.
(Closed) Seviation (Report No. 99900519/80-03)
Failure to initiate a Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) as required by internal procedures.
The inspector verified the corrective actions and preventive measures committed in Bechtels letter of response dated January 14, 1981, i.e.
the MCAR was initiated and QARs generated since July 1980 were reviewed and found to be in compliance with internal procedures.
2.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 99900519/80-03) An evaluation of a design change made to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) was not documented.
The inspector examined the records maintained on this design change which included documents not previously examined, and concurs with Bechtels positicn as stated in their January 14, 1981 letter that the design change was processed consistent with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11 and therefore a deviation did not exist.
C.
Control of Computer Programs 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to determine that:
a.
Computer programs have been developed, verified, qualified, and are being used in accordance with procedures which have been prepared, reviewed, and approved by authorized management.
l u
3 b.
A computer program custodian has been designated and has the responsibility for raaintaining the security of the program.
c.
Each computer program that has been authorized for use has been qualified, has an appropriate users manual, and this manual (or another manual) provides a detailed description of the mathematical model(s), empirical data (if any), assumptions used, and applicable references.
d.
The computer program has been verified /qualifiec and that docu-mentation exists which includes:
(1) A description of the program version and option (s) validated, (2) A detailed description of the test (benchmark) problem (s),
including boundary conditions, mathematical model, and all key parameters.
(3) A listing of the test (benchmark) problem input data checks and a reprint of the program input and output, or reference to the location where this is stored.
(4) The comparison of solutions, evaluation of the program validity, and an analysis of any identified errors.
e.
Technically qualified individuals have reviewed and approved the verification / qualification of each computer program prior to its use in safety related applications.
f.
Revisions and modifications have been subjected to the same review and approval as the original version of the program.
g.
Errors identified in computer programs are promptly corrected and appropriately verified prior to use.
h.
Errors which could result in significant deficiencies in nuclear plant design are reported to the NRC under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, 10 CFR Part 50.55(e), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, as appropriate.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of the Users Manual, Theoretical Manual, and Verification Report for computer programs ME913, ME916, and NE100.
In addition the inspector examined applicable procedures from the Engineering Department Procedures Manual.
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4 3.
Findings a.
Computer program ME913 (Class 1 Piping Stress Analysis) verifies that Nuclear Class 1 piping satisfies the requirements of NB-3650 of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, 1971 to 1977.
The version in effect at date of this inspection, 0-1, was examined.
b.
Computer program ME916 (Local Stress Analysis at Lug Supports on Pipe) calculates the local stresses at the pipe lug interface for Class 1 and Class 2 lug attachments according to Section II of the ASME B&PV Code.
The version in effect at the date of '.nis inspection, A-1, was examined.
c.
Computer program NE100 (Containment Pressure / Temperature Transient Analysis) provides capability for calculating the pressure and temperature within the reactor containment building as a function of time following the release of reactor coolant water to the containment due to a pipe rupture.
The analytical model was developed from the basic CONTEMPT code.
The version in effect at the date of this inspection, F-3, was examined.
d.
Engineering Department Procedure 4.36 (Standard Computer Programs) was found to define the requirements for verification, documentation and control of Standard Computer Programs (SCP) used by engineering for calculations and analysis.
Revision 1 of this procedure was found to impose the applicable requirements identified in paragraph E.1 above.
Bechtel SCPs are controlled by a Program Sponsor assigned by e.
Engineering Maragement who is responsible for overall direction of program activities.
A Technical Specialist is assigned by the Program Sponsor and is responsible for the technical integrity of the program, i.e. theoretical basis, accuracy of results, adequacy and completeness of documentation, and recommendations for modifications.
In c.ddition, a programmer is assigned to maintain and make changes to the program as required.
f.
Data Processing war found to be the custodian of the program with responsibility for document control, distribution, certifi-cation of the compu:er operating system, release of an SCP into production status.
g.
The examination of the manuals identified in paragraph C.2 above revealed that they contained the applicable elements described in paragraphs C.1.c. through C.1.g. above.
5 h.
There were no nonconformance, unresolved, or follow up items identified.
D.
Background Verification of Technical Personnel 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that measures have been established and are being effectively implemented that assure:
a.
The education and work experience ir. formation contained in employee's job applications are being verified by the employing organization, b.
There is objective, documented evidence records tnat attest to the employee's education and experience.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an extaination of:
a.
The applicable Personnel Policy and Administrative Procedure.
b.
The background verification records maintained on five permanent employees.
The records maintained on " job shop" applicants for temporary c.
employment.
3.
Findings a.
Bechtel policies and procedures were found to require that the background information on all applicants be verified prior to an extension of an offer of employment.
b.
Documentation of the results of this verification was found on standard forms maintained by the Personnel Department i.e. New Hire File Checklist and Requesting Confidential Personnel Information.
c.
In the case of temporary employees Bechtel follows four steps:
(1) Resume review.
(2) A technical interview of the applicant by telaphone.
(3) A technical interview of the applicant in person.
6 (4) An evaluation of the temporary employees work performance through close supervision and review by a permanent employee.
d.
The results of steps (1) through (3) are informally documented on the applicants' records.
The evaluations (4) are documented in accordance with standard Bechtel personnel practices.
Bechtel received 1614 applications from " job shoppers" of which 83% were rejected.
uf the 17% hired, 44% resigned, 22% were terminated, and 34% either
- e on board or due to report in March.
Reportedly Bechtels contract with " job shop" agencies requires e.
the agecy to verify the background information on their clients.
Bechtel has not audited those agencies to verify compliance with this requirement.
They instead rely on the four step program described in c above to verify the individuals competence.
f.
There were no nonconformance, unresolved, or follow up items identified.
E.
Sit Interview An exit interview was held with management representatives on March 6, 1981.
In addition to those individuals indicated by an asterisk in paragraph A, those in attendance were:
J. C. Judd, Chief Nuclear Engineer B. K. Kanga, Division Manager of Engineering D. C. Kansal, Division QA Manager H. C. Nelson, Quality Engineering Staff The inspector discussed the scope and fin 6;ng" of the inspection. Manage-ment comments were generally for clarification only, or acknowledgement of the statements by the inspector.
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