ML19347E945
| ML19347E945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-SQN-EEB-800, NUDOCS 8105140382 | |
| Download: ML19347E945 (2) | |
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May 8, 1981 e
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- 4 P 41 Mr. James O'Reilly, Director
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Office of action and Enforcement
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8mung U.S. Nuclear R 1 story Connaission q,
Region II - Suit 3100 101 Marietta Stree
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Atlanta, Georgia 30 03
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - WIDE KANGE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TRANSMITIERS - NCR SQN EB 8005
_ REVISED F1NAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-CIE Inspector C. R. McFarland on May 28, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). A final m port was submitted on June 26, 1980. Enclosed is our revised final report as discussed with R. V. Crlenjak on May 7,1981.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AlffHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure j
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)V Office of Inspecticut and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 619 GI (
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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 WIDE RANGE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL TRANSMITTERS NCR SQN EEB 8006 10 CFR 50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL REPORT Description of Condition During the review required by NUREG-0588, it was found that the wide range steam generator level transmitters (LT-3-43, -56, -98, -111) are not qualified for a post accident environment. These transmitters provide level signals for the post accident monitoring indicators and must, therefore, be qualified for post accident environment.
Safety Implications The side range steam generator water level indication is part of the information necessary to enable the operator to perform the required functions following a LOCA. Had this condition gone uncorrected, the post accident environment could have prevented these transmitters from performing their intended safety function and thereby adversely affect the safety of the plant.
Corrective Action The transmitters will be replaced by properly qualified transmitters.
At the present time, two of the four transmitters listed have yet to be replaced (2-LT-3-43 and 2-LT-3-56).
The condition has been evaluated to determine its significance to plant safety. Based on the results of this evaluation, we have concluded that fuel loading at Sequoyah unit 2 may proceed. However, before system heatup after fuel loading, TVA will replace the remaining two transmitters with qualified trcnsmitters.
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