ML19347E042
| ML19347E042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1981 |
| From: | Carlson D NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347E039 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104150043 | |
| Download: ML19347E042 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE AT0!!!C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
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(Proposed Renewal of Facility CALIFORNIA
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License)
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(UCLA Research Reactor)
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AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD M. CARLSON I
I, Donald M. Carlson, being duly sworn do depose and state as follows:
i 1.
I am employed as a Plant Protection Analyst by the U.S. Nuclear
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Regulatory Commission in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety
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and Safeguards, Division of Safeguards, Physical Security Licens-(
ing Branch. My professional qualifications are attached to this affidavit.
2.
I am responsible for the review of all non-power reactor security plans, including that of the U.C.L.A. research reactor.
3.
As part of my review responsibilities, I visited the U.C.L.A.
research reactor at Nuclear Energy Laboratory (NEL) in Boelter Hall on the University of California Campus at Los Angeles in Fe brua ry, 1980.
4 During my visit to the NEL and Boelter Hall, I toured the reactor room, the Tokamak Fission Laboratory, the fresh fuel storage vault, the rooms adjacent to the reactor room, the second floor high bay area containing the reactor control panel, and areas adjacent to the second story of the reactor room.
5.
During my tour of the areas described, I reviewed the physical pro-tection system used by the University to protect special nuclear material, noting the intrusion detection devices and procedures used 1
to detect unauthorized access; the key and lock systems used to con-trol access to areas where special nuclear material was used and/or stored; and the personnel access authorization program.
6.
I have personally reviewed the UCLA security plan submitted with the application for renewal of the license for the research reactor at the NEL.
7 11y affidavit explains the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 which are applicable to research reactors and also addresses the 810.4150O'/3
-2 allegations made by the Intervenor, Committee to Bridge the Gap, in Contention XX adnitted as an issue in this proceeding, which reads as follows:
XX. Applicant has in the past and is at present taking inade-quate fixed site physical security precautions to protect against radiological sabotage as well as protection against theft and diversion of the special nuclear materials it possesses, thus indicating that the Appli-cant's physical security plan is inadequate and its imple-nentation of said plan is inadequate.
Applicant has failed to demonstrate in its recerit performance any l
evidence that its physical security measures can reason-ably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration grant of an operating license and a SNM license cannot be made without undue threat to public health and safety.
1.
Applicant has at its facilities areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear materials, areas which should be adequately protected against possible acts of radiological sabotage or attempts at theft or diversion of SNM, and to which access should be adequately controlled. Specifically:
a.
the reactor room, b.
the control room, c.
the third floor equipment roon, d.
the fresh fuel storage area, and the " restricted area" immediately surrounding e.
the reactor stack and exhaust fan on the eighth floor of Boelter Hall.
2.
There exist areas adjacent to the above-nentioned vital and material access areas which should be sufficiently isolated and secured to prevent then from being used as penetration points or staging areas for penetration of the vital and material access areas.
Specifically:
a.
The " access court" used for truck loading and unloading, located between the reactor building and the Engineering Building to its west, i
b.
the Tokamak lab adjacent to the reactor room, c.
the main entrance (reception lobby) to NEl, l
d.
the presently unrestricted roof areas of Boelter and Math Sciences adjacent to the " restricted area" around the reactor stack, e.
the rooms within Math Sciences whose windows open to the " restricted area" around the reactor stack, and f.
the entryway for the single locked door to the
" restricted area" around the reactor stack.
3.
Applicant's physical security measures for its vital and material access areas and the areas adjacent to then have been in the past and are at present inade-quate to properly protect, isolate, and control access to those areas in that a.
presence of guards and watchnen is too infro-quent; b.
nethods for detecting concealed guns, explo-sives, or incendiary devices that could be i
carried by people entering these areas, and SNM that could be carried by people leaving these areas, are inadequate; i.
Applicant lacks mechanical devices to detect firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or SNM, and ii.
Applicant fails to routinely search visitors and staff for firearms, explo-sives, incendiary devices, or SNM c.
physical barriers to penetration are inadequate; i.
fences and walls are too short, lack barbed wire at the top, and otherwise fail to fully enclose the area to be protected ii. windows and doors in walls that are to act as physical barriers are made of construc-tion and fastening of insufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is lessened by the opening provided by the windows and doors iii dual or redundant barriers are lacking; penetration of these areas can be made by breaching a single barrier 1
d.
security neasures with regard to keys and locks are inadequate; and i.
doors that should be kept locked nave been left open 11.
locks are of insufficient construction and strength to prevent tampering and penetra-tion iii. too many keys to areas that are supposed to be locked have been given out iv. control of those keys is inadequate in that copies can be nade, keys can be lent to unauthorzed personnel, and keys that are signed out are not required to be returned when not in use e.
procedures to control access are inadequate.
i.
groups that are too large for adequate supervision are given tours of the facility by one or two staff people alone ii.
these tours include visits to vital and naterial access areas iii. NEL personnel unassociated with the reactor have ready access to vital and naterial access areas through egresses connecting their parts of the NEL complex with the parts o' the complex utilized by the reactor.
Applicable Regulations Based on the type and quantity of special nuclear material in use or storage at the UCQ Nuclear Energy Laboratory, the prescriptive portions of 10 CFR Part 7F that apply to this facility consist of 5 73.37 (pro-tection of spent fuel in transit), and 5 73.67 (specific requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance at fixed sites).
In this regard, I have reviewed the physical protection plan submitted by UCLA against 5 73.67 to determine (i) if all requirements have been addressed in the plan and (ii) if the security aeasures described in the plan are adequate implemen-tation of the requirenents.
1/
Tnere are no explicit NRC regulations for the protection of non-power reactors against radiological sabotage; 5 73.55 applies only to power reactors. Preliminary results of studies performed for the NRC staff indicate that the sabotage potential of non-power reactors is very limited and except for certain high power, tank type reactors, sabotage protection is probably not necessary.
. Analysis of Contention XX The Intervenor incorrectly describes certain areas of Boelter Hall sur-rounding the research reactor as areas of controlled access in subpart 1 and subpart 2.
While the Intervenor is correct in considering the reactor room and the fresh fuel storage area as aleas of controlled access according to the requirements of Part 73, the Intervenor is incorrect in defining the control room, the third floor equipment room and the stack area as areas containing vital equipment and special nuclear materials, because there is no equipment in these areas which could endanger the public health and safety by its destruction or failure to function as defined by 10 CFR 573.2(i) and thus are not vital areas as defined by 10 CFR 73.2(h) nor do they contain special nuclear material.
The areas adjacent to the reactor room listed in subpart 2a.-f. do not contain vital equipnent or SNM and are not required to be controlled access i
areas.
Subpart 3 of Contention XX incorrectly alleges defects in the Applicant's security measures for controlled access areas.
In allegation 3a, the Intervenor asserts that " presence by guards and watchmen is too infrequent." 10 CFR 73.67(d)(3) states that licensees shall monitor controlled access areas with either intrusion alarms or other de-vices or procedures, so that guards are not a requirement if TTcensees choose alternate methods of monitoring (i.e. alarm systems or other devices).
Subpart 3b. states that UCLA must provide explosive and metal detectors and routine searches of personnel, but Section 73.67(d)(10) requires only random searches of vehicles and packages leaving the controlled access areas.
No requirement for the detection devices or searches described in XX.3.b.
exists in 10 CFR 73.67.
(The 573.55 requirement for detection devices does not apply to non-power reactors).
Subpart 3c. asserts that " physical barriers to penetration are in-adequate" and alleges deficienciee in fences, walls, windows and doors but no requirements for fences exist in Section 73.67 nor for " dual or re-dundant barriers" stated in 3.c.iii.
2 Subpart 3d. states that inadequate doors and locks are installed.
I observed the doors and locks and found them adequate to comply with 10 CFRSS 73.2(m) and 73.67 I have also noted the procedares used in con-trolling the keys and have found them to be adequate.
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6-Subpart 3.e. refers to procedures to control access; tour groups which are taken by reactor personnel into vital and material access areas and NEL personnel access to vital and material access areas. Tours of controlled access areas are permissible under, conditions of 10 CFR 73.67(d)(7) so that no safeguards regulation is raised by the allegation here. NEL personnel cannot enter the reactor room through connecting doors since they are se-cured by lock and alarmed when unoccupied. The doors described in XX.3.e.iii.
are emergency exits for reactor personnel, but are secured entrances.
In summary, I hereby attest that the only areas in or around Boelter Hall which require controlled access to comply with 10 CFR 573 are the reactor room and the fresh fuel storage area, since only these areas contain vital equipment and special nuclear material. The security system in use by UCLA, namely, the lock and alarm system is sufficient to comply with 10 CFR 573.67; and no re-quirement exists for guards, metal or explosive detectors or routine searches or redundant physical barriers.
I also attest that the physical protection plan submitted by UCLA in total satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.
I swear the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
a. e. -c l,f' w -
u Donald it. Carlson Subscribed and sworn to before' i
me this /' day of April,1981 b[y Dublicm._h Owc _
Nota i
My Commission Expires:
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i PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS DONALD M. CARLSON My name is Donald M. Carlson.
I am a Plant Protection Analyst in the r
Physical Security Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-uission(NRC).
I am responsible for reviewing and assessing the adequacy of licensee security programs designed to protect reactor and fuel cycle facilities against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM).
In conjunction.with this, I prepare NRC license amendments regarding the protection of various quantities and types of SNM used and/or stored at these facilities.
I am also responsible for evaluating NRC inspection reports to determine if NRC regulations and license conditions are per-forming their intended safeguards functions.
I am currently participating as a member of the American Nuclear Society 15.14 (Physical Security of Research Reactors) working group.
I have represented the NRC at nonpower reactor conferences for the purposes of discussing NRC licensing programs and policies.
Prior to my current position, I was a Reactor Safeguards Analyst with the Reactor Safeguards Development Branch, Division of Operating Raactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC.
I was primarily responsible for reviewing and assessing the adequacy of nonpower reactor licensee security programs.
I was also responsible for identifying and suggesting research and development programs for improsing physical protection pro-grams; assisting in the conduct and coordination of in-depth safeguards research and technical assistance prograr..s; recommending and participating in the development of standards and criteria for the physical protection of licensed facilities; developing guidance to establish explicit and uni-form acceptance criteria for plant security; and drafting and reviewing guidance developed to implement new reactor safeguards regulations and requirements.
Subsequent to the above position I was a Physical Security Specialist with the Security and Investigation Section of the Safeguards Branch, Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC.
I implemented the NRC's security i
inspection program relating to the protection of SNM and facilities.
I was responsible for independently reviewing and assessing licensee security programs and procedures to determine their ccnformance with applicable physical protection regulations and requirerents.
I also conducted special security related investigations.
Before employment with the NRC (then called the AEC) I was employed by the United States Property and Fiscal Office of the Illinois Army National Guard as a Battery Commander of a nuclear capable missile firing unit. As such, I supervised all operational and adainistrative activities of the unit, to include supervision of site security measures required to insure a safe and secure environment for nuclear weapons.
Collectively, I have eighteen years of professional experience in nuclear related safeguards.
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