ML19347D462
| ML19347D462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1981 |
| From: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D463 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103170731 | |
| Download: ML19347D462 (3) | |
Text
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The Honorable Morris K. Udall vi Cnairman Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U. S. House of. Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Congressman Udall:
In your January 30 letter, you asked for individual commissioner's views regarding the withholding of information during the accident at Three Mile Island.
I should note at the outset that the Commission did not fully endorse the recent NRC investigation recommendation on this point and did, on Mr. Stello's recommendation, impose additional citations in which the investigators now concur.
It has been my position since October,1979, that the failure of certain information (most notably the high thermocouple readings) to reach the NRC and the authorities in Pennsylvania justified the revo-cation (rather than suspension) of the TMI 1 and 2 licenses, regardless of whether the withholding was deliberate.
In the TMI case, revocation would have had little practical consequence since one of the plants cannot be operated and the license of the other has been suspended pending a hearing.
However, Commissioner Gilinsky and I believed that the more drastic revocation action would have been the correct response to the inexcusable failure immediately to pass on temperature information strongly indicating that the core was uncovered, that it had heated past the point at which fuel cladding would fail and release radioactivity and hydrogen, and that the company did not have the situation under
. control.
I believe that evacuation measures, probably more extensive than those that were later unnecessarily recommended for the first weekend of.the accident, might well have been the correct response if the thermocouple readings had been known to outside authorities.
Failure to pass on information of that magnitude runs a risk that must not be repeated, whatever its cause.
I am liagreement with the investigators' conclusions that informa-tion was not adequately analyzed or conveyed-on March 28.
My personal conclusion may go somewhat further than the staff's in that I believe that it is fair to say that there was a conscious desire within the company not to disclose facts that would have alarmed the public.
To some extent, this may have flowed from a reasonable desire to avoid causing panic.
To some extent, it well may have flowed from a desire to minimize the damage both to the company's image and to nuclear power.
I cannot determine which of these or other-possible motives was dominant
'and to what extent these motives operated consciously or sub:onsciously in particular individuals _ at particular times.
M0817o h r
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1 I would not have reached the investigation's cccclusion that none of the conflicts in testimony is the result of lying.
This conclusion may be correct, but it depends heavily on some assumptions about motives for testimony that is at times not factually accurate and at times difficult to reconcile with other testimony.
My own conclusion is to the effect tnat, while lying cannot in all cases be ruled out, tne evicence as to who may have lied does not justify eitner a firm conclusion that lying occurred or further prosecutions based on conjecture.
this coint.
On I have attached a set of memoranda tnat I sent to the staff together with a summary of the staff oral response to the questions that I raised.
I should note that I believe the staff effort in this most defic'ient in the areas that led to my subsequent questions.rece
- However, the initial NRC and Special Inouiry Group investigations did not pursue these issues adequately, and the recent enforcement actions would not have been taken in the absence of the continuing oversight of your subcommittee.
I am mindful that something very different than a true picture of what was going on in the reactor was conveyed to the Ccmmission, to the people in tne surrounding area, to the state of Pennsylvania and to the Congress during the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the accident.
It is difficult to conclude that such a widespread set of misperceptions can have existed withheld significant information.without any individual having told a delib
.Such a pattern of lies without liars has in other contexts been called "a process of immaculate deception,"
and I have been reluctant to swallow it here.
To accept it to the extent of rat pursuing further sanctions against individuals, one must also accer ; both that the accident really was not generally well undcr:tood may be surmised, the surmise is not strong enough to su enfor ement action.
I think that these two conclusions are correct.
1 I have found that I cannot prove that individual acts of omission in reporting information flowed from a conscious desire to mislead rather than a failure to appreciate the information's significance.
am willing to give the individuals involved the benefit of the doubt I with regard to this conclusion in part because it is so clearly appli-
'1 cable to the NRC, where inadequate appreciation of the i
inform your Committee fully on the morning of March 29.
In the end, I cannot prove that Met Ed's failings, any more than our own, flowed from the available data or a pervasive tendency to be too optimist
- s clearly an unacceptable attitude for us a d f This n
or a licensee (which is wr:y I would like to have established a precedent in favor of revocation),
but I cannot find sufficient grounds for proceeding against the in-dividuals.
_(specifically Messrs. Herbein and Miller) had access to suffic information by the early afternoon of March 28 that they had to at least w
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have considered the possibility of an uncovered core and a more serious accident than they acknowledged in their meeting with Lieutenant Governor Scranton.
They did not voice any such possib41ity in that meeting.
They should have, even if (as may well be the case) they oelieved that the accident was coming under control oy the :ine of the meeting.
Did they withhold their full rar.ge of concerns over what had happened early in the day?
I believe so.
DeHberately?
I think perhaps.
Am I confident that my beliefs could be proven? No.
That they are correct?
Only moderately.
Is there reasonable doubt about them based on the investigations as they stand?
Certainly. Have I personally interviewed any of the witnesses? No.
Could I responsibly recommend further prose-cution or censure of individuals on the basis of my conclusions? No.
I should close by noting in rescense to your earlier inquiry that I do not think that new legislation is required here. We have already modified our regulations to impose clear reporting duties.
Beyond that, I would hooe that we would be much more alert to the need for cetailed investigation of points such as these in the days and weeks immediately following any sucn event in the future.
Sincerely, m
WC N
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Peter A. Bradford Commissioner Attachments:
As stated
.