ML19347D117
| ML19347D117 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/23/1981 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D118 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103110091 | |
| Download: ML19347D117 (13) | |
Text
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E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
'f WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 e
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cs CHAINMAN CO IGN rEE ?. 3 $
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The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chaiman g
Subcomittee on Energy and the Environment p~
C U.S. House of Representatives u.u#s[ p
.l Com.ittee on Interior and Insular Affairs '
l.mn04ggggy Washingten, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
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This is in response to your letter of January 5,1981 regarding the Com.ission's first monthly status report on efforts to carry out our licensing and regulatory duties, prepared in response to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY 1981.
Enclosed are the Com.ission's answers to the questions ycu raised.
I trust they are responsive to your request.
Sincerely,
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jJo/'F.AhearneEWub'
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Enclosure:
'As stated-cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan o
8108u0 09/
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OUESTI0tt 1.
The following questions relate to comments on emergency planning and preparedness in the fiRC monthly status report.
1.1 Does the Commission believe that the " centralization of emergency planning and response in a single federal agency (FE!'A)" has, in fact, improved the state of planning and preparedness for emergencies at nuclear plants?
ANSWER.
The Commission believes that the state of planning and preparedness for radiol-ogical emergencies at nuclear power plants has been significantly inproved since TMI-2 as a result of a number of activities.
The President's statement of December 7,.1979, directed FEMA to take the lead in offsite emergency planning and response and to delineate Federal agency assignments for emergency planning and respons9 based or, capabilities and responsibilities.
Section 304 of the fiuclear Regulatory Commission FY 80 Appropriation Authorization directed the President to prepare and publish a National Contingency Plan to provide for expeditious, efficient and coordinated action by appropriate Federal agencies to protect the public health and safety in the case of accidents at utilization facilities licensed under section 103 or 104 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
FEMA has coordinated with the NRC and the other Federal agencies in preparing the Federal agency assignments, 44 CFR Part 351, and National Contingency Plan.
The agencies have sorted through their overlapping authorities and responsi-bilities, and have laid out guidance for effective coordination and response in a radiological emergency.
In support of the National Contingency Plan (or Master Plan), each cf the key Federal agencies is developing its own agency plan.
The NRC agency plan was also developed in response to FY 80 Authorizat' ion Appro-priation requirements. The NRC and FEMA have further detailed their planning and preparedness and their emergency response roles in the two Memoranda of Understanding they have developed between them.
The Commission believes that the clarification of Federal agency roles, the delineation of responsibilities, and the identification of coordinating mechanisms has -improved the Federal agencies' state of planning and preparedness for emergencies at nuclear power plants.
Furthermore, this clarification of Federal agenc.' responsibilities provides the States and local governments with a better under standing of where they can obtain a particular type of radiological emergency preparedness and planning assistance among the Federal agencies. The Federal agencies must assure that adequate resources are committed to meet their emergericy preparedness responsibilities.
Transfer of lead responsibility for development and evaluation of offsite emergency plans to FEl'A has the advantage of using established relationships between the Federal government and States to improve the state of preparedness around nuclear power plant sites with a maximum of sensitivity to State needs.
It also has the advantage of having emergency planning, preparation ar.d, if necessary, coordination in actual cases, done by an agency whose sole mission is to handle emergencies. This is a wise use of national resources and good government.
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QUESTION 1.
l.2 What is the Commission's assessment of the adequacy of the present state of planning and preparedness for
- emergencies at nuclear plants?
ANSWER A report on the status of emergency planning and preparedness in support of nuclear power plants was recently prepared in response to Sectior.109 of Public Law 95-295.
The report, NUREG-0755, "A Report to Congress on Status of Emergency Response Planning for Nuclear Power Plants" will be transmitted to Congress shortly.
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O'JESTION 1.
1.3 To what extent is the Commission confident that FEMA now has the capability to adequately evaluate off-site emergency planning and preparedness for emergencies at nuclear plants?
A';SWER The Commissicn is confident that with the capability that FEMA has in its regional offices and the com-itment to further staff both these offices and the FEMA headquarters Division of Radiological Emergency Preparecness, tnat FEMA can in the future adequately evaluate off-site emergency planning and preparedness for emergencies at nuclear power plants.
FEMA has developed a reasonable procedure for the " Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness" which was published in the Federal Register as a proposed rule June 24, 1980, 45 FR 42341.
As described in this procedure, FEMA regional staff are made available upon request to assist States and localities in the development of the plans.
In addition, the Regional Assistance Committees (RAC) that exist in each of the ten Federal regions (chaired by FEPA with members from DHHS, DOE, DOT, EPA, NRC and DOA) assist the State (s) and local governments in preparing and revising the radiological emergency plans and preparedness.
The RAC's, under FEMA's leadership, observe and evaluate exercises of the State and local plans and identify any deficiencies in the planning and preparedness effort.
The FEMA Regional Director may make suggestions to the States based upon the observations of the RAC.
After providing an opportunity for public participation, the FEMA Regional Director will prepare an evaluation of the adequacy of the State and local plan, and forward that evaluation to the Associate Director at FEMA headquarters.
The Associate D"ector will initiate a headquarters review and will seek the comments of the raderal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) members on the plan and the evaluation of Regional Director.
The Associate Director will then prepare a set of findings and determinations on the adequacy of State and local emergency preparedness, based on the Regional Director's evaluation, the FRPCC comments, and the headquarters review.
Although there has been some delay in staffing the Regional offices and the FEPA Headquarters Division of Radiological Emergency Preparedness due to diffi-culties in reprogramming and budgeting resources, positions have now been established in the Headquarters Division and FEMA is committed to filling these positions as quickly as possible.
The Commission notes that although the FEMA review procedure and the NRC emer-gency preparedness rule are relatively recent, the experience to date nas been success ful.
With the approach of the implementation date, April 1,1981, of the NRC rule, there is an associated peak workload anticipated.
In a letter to James T. McIntyre, Director 0FS, dated January 16, 1981, John W. Macy, Director FEMA, requested that 77 full-time positions be assigned to Radiological Emergency Preparedness at FEMA, with 19 of the positions at headquarters and 58 at the regions. This is 40 positions above the 37 positions presently identified in FEMA's FY 1982 budget submission.
We believe that to meet the anticipated work-load, FEMA will need the full staff. complement at the hea'dquarters, as well as at the regional levels.
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1 ENCLOSURE Ouestion 2 These questions relate to comments on implementation of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 contained in the NRC monthly status report.
Please provide the following information:
Ouestion 2.1 A description on each methodology currently under consideration by the Commission for determining the extent to which operating plants comply with those rules and regulation: having particular signifi-cance for public health and safety.
Ansker The staff has recently provided the Commission with revised clans to implement the reauirements contained in Section 110 of the NRC FY 1980 Authorization Act.
- ' a: proved by : _ Cc--ission, tne s a'# intencs tn irpleren : a: ::-:::n c' :ne pec;rar relatir.; to cperatirg clants by reviewing tncse :la.:
grc-acs cf 10 to 15 piants per year over the next eigh: years.
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te placed in a group cesencing on wqen the olant is schedulec f:r 5~; at:
IEED/NREP review.
Tre first groups of plants to be reviewed in accordante to tne -e:.
-t s.ts cf Section 110 are those that are no..being reviewed under Pnase :: :' t r.e SED program.
For subsepuent SEP and IEEP/NREP reviews, plants iii :s gr:uped based on such factors as the age of the plant, populati:9 cc :it near the plant site, and design similarities.
T.he major steps in the review of each group of plants to comply wit!
- E requirements of Section 110 of the FY 1980 Authorization Act are:
1.
The staff will identify the list of the most significant safety issues based upon the experience gained from the current Systemati: Es a ". ;a :i on Program on -the eleven oldest reactors.
Our experience to cate i.dicates that the list will be sr. aller thar. the present 137 safety issues reir.g evaluated as part of SEP II.
As experience is gained fror :REF/NEEF 1
reviews,_ frcr operating experience or from knowledge gaine: f rc -
additional SEP reviews; safety issues of particular signif t:ance ra,. be adced to the list and safety iss.es of lesser significance 2
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e'.eted from the list.
The list of safety issues cf particular si;-ifi:a :t will be reviewed ar.ually.
Generic Issues, such as TM1 Action r at :eI anc L1 Y
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Unresolved Safety Issues, and new Issues whicn re:uire promp resciution will continue to be evaluated an: imolerented on all reactorsincepencen cf ne SEP and will.not be inciuced on the list.
2.
Frc-the list of safety issues, ne staff will ceveic: :ne lis: of Current rules and regulations, c: :liance wit nri:- ::e C0rmissier.
ceter.ines :: be of articular significan:e :: :ne :r::e::icn Of :ne
- utii: neal n and safe;y.
Tne lis w:;it te lir.i e: :: :n se rules an:
reg;iations that are related i. w.:le :r in :ar: :: : e safe y ist.es
- :e evaluatec uncer ne Systemati: Evaluation Progra
'5EF) for :na croup of plants.
2.
For each rule and regulation identified in Step 2, each licensee for the plants in a given group will be asked to describe the extent to whi:h its plant com: lies with these rules and regulati ns, in iuding an acceptance criteriapp compliance was achieved by use cf the SRP indication where su related to tnese rules and regulations, and where compliance was achieved by equivalent means.
4.
Oni~v for those SRP acceptance criteria related specifically to issues developed from SEP, IREP/NREP reviews identified in Ste: 1, will eacn licensee for the plants in a civen group be asked c identify any cescribe differences between.the design and/or pro:edurai measures actually used in the plant and these SRP acceptance criteria.
The licensee will aise be asked to discuss whetber and how the alternative measures used provide an acceptable method of complying with the regulation (s) or portion (s) thereof that are related to the SEP safety issues.
5.
Tne staff will evaluate the licensee responses deceic;ed in steps 3 and 4 to determine the extent to which each operation facility complies with each rule or regulation identified in 2 above anc the need for design or pro:edural changes in the plant.
Tne SEP, IREP/NREP and Section 110 reviews for each group cf plants will be coordinated as shown on Attachment i.
Eased upon the current status of SEF Phase II reviews, an integrated assessment should start on the first plant this summer.
By August 1981, the staff will be able to propose a list of the rest significant safety issues from SEP Phase II reviews and would also identify the first group of plants for SEP Phase III.
Frc: this list of 1/
A revisec SRP, seneculed for c mpletion in April 1951, will consist of
- ne May 1950 version of the SEF, redified to reference a'.1 a;;1icable sa'ety and safecuards regulations ar.d tr.:se Divisior. ~ reg;iatory guices.
staff ::sitions, and other do:urer.:s currently used b; :ne staff c interpret the intent of these regulations, including re:Jirerents resulting frc-the TMI accicent.
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E safety issues, tne staff would develop the list of relate: rules ar.:
regJlations of particular significance.
The first grou; cf SEP Pnase !!!
licensees wouic, over a periot of 9 months to 1 year, provi:E the cc:uren-tation, co sa-iser c SP.P criteria and analysis recaire: r;. 5:e;3 2 en: 2 a:c,e.
0,-in: :*.i s same perior t r.e sta f' a:.'. : Cor:lete
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Tne list of re;slations of : articular ti;ricance tc
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of Dublic health and safety develc;ed in Ste I will not be an immutable list.
As the SEP and IREP/fREP reviews are carried out for a group of plants and data are collected on actual plant designs and their significance to safety, changes can and will be made to the safety issue list and the list of related regulations to be apolied to the next group of plants to reflect their importance to overall reactor safety.
The Commission has yet to act on this plan.
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Question 2.2 A description of the procedures and criteria the Commission will employ to select the methodology that will be used to detennine the extent to which operating plants comply with those rules and regulations having particular significance for public health and sa fe ty.
Answer The criteria used by the staff to develop tne proposed plan, including the me:nodology, described in the response to Question 2.1, were:
1.
The requirements of Section 110 of Public Law must be satisified.
The ability to integrate the Section 110 requirements with the ongoing 2.
Systematic Evaluation Program, the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program, and the Generic Issues Program.
3.
Enhancement of nuclear power plant safety should be maximized.
Expenditure of NRC and licensee resources should be minimized.
4.
The time required to meet the requirements of Section 110 and to resolve 5.
any resulting identified safety concerns should be minimized.
6.
Public understanding of the program should be maximized.
The staff plan is currently being evaluated against criteria 1-5 by the Commis-The Comnission intends to have a draft plan published for public com-sion.
Review of the comments received will be utilized to both modify.the plan ment.
as appropriate and to judge how well the plan satisfied Criterion 6.
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Question 2.3 Section 110 requires the Commission to identify rules and regu-lations which have "particular significance" for public health and safety. With regard to implementation of Section 110, the NRC monthly status report states:
"In December 1980, the staff plans to issue for public com-ment a list of rules and regulations which are considered potentially significant to the protection of the public nealtn ano safety.
Lemphasis added)
How does the Commission differentiate between rules and regulations which are "potentially significant" and regulations which have "particular significance" for public health and safety?
Answer
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"Potentially Significant" was used only to indicate that the list of rules and reculations was subject to potential change pending review of public comments (See answer to question 2.4). Therefore the Commission does not intend to differentiate in technical substance between a "potentially significant" list and a list of items having "particular significance".
It should be noted that the designation of a rule as "particularly signifi-cant" does not mean that all deviations from SRP acceptance requirements relating to that rule are actually of safety significance.
Such a deter-mination of safety significance can only be made by considering the specific deviation in' the context of overall plant design.
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Question 2.4:
Wnat is the purpose of differentiating between " potential" and "particular" in this regard?
Answer Tne cnly reason for using the word " potential" instead of "particular" was o indicate that public ccarents, which are expected on the craft, would be considered by the ComT.ission and could result in changes in the list of these rules and regulations thought to be particularly significar.t.
Perhaps a better phrase than "potentially significant" would hsve been " currently considered by the staff to be particularly significant."
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i Ouestion 3.1:
n'ny have attempts during the past several months to hire additional examiners "not been fruitful"?
Answer:
Co nission requirements regarding the staffing of coerating plants and i
increased emphasis on training of personnel has resulted in intense competition fer individuais with extensive operating and training experience by utilities, l
vendors and trainin; cr;ani:ations.
The demand for these individuals with I
i tne qualificatiens enumerated a ove is exceeding the supply.
i Also, those that have jobs find that the costs associated with relocat1tn, primarily mortgage interest rates, are prohibitive even though they find the job attractive.
Finally, the examiners' job involves extensive travel which makes it less attractive for a large number of qualified applicants than a position at a training site.
It is expected that the current freeze on hiring, extending back to November 5,1980, could lead to losing at least 4 candidates to who: v.e have offered jobs.
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Question 3.2:
The report notes on page 11 that " consideration is being given to contracting for additional examiners through the National Laboratories."
To what extent does the Commission believe that delegation of this regulatory function to National Laboratory personnel creates for these personnel a conflict as they sought to carry out a portion of NRC's regulatery nission in a laboratory whose primary nission is to fulfill DOE's goals, one of wr.ich is pro..;otion of nuclear power.
Answer:
The NRC has contracted with the National Laboratories via DOE for personnel to provide dire:t assistance on a part time basis to the Operator Licensing Branch; Laboratory employees have assisted in operator licensing since the 1950's during periods of heavy work load.
Individuals at laboratories have years of reactor operating experience and can be readily trained and oriented to assist Operator Licensing Branch. The contracts provide for the Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, to provide training to the lab personnel as necessary, make direct assignments and review each individual's examin-ations and results.
Laboratory personnel may recommend issuance of a license or denial of an application, but the Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, makes the final determination on whether to issue a license or not.
Performance of the lab employees is very similar to that of the NRC licensing examiners.
We intend to continue to monitor the efforts of laberatory personnel and to retain control of the final actions regarding this program, therefore licensing of operators is not being delegated to the National Laboratories.
Moreover, because of this oversight, we do not believe that this situation presents a conflict of interest for the lab personnel.
The Commission does not believe that contracting with the national labora-tories results in delegation of a regulatory function, since the NRC will make the decisions on licensing actions.
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