ML19347C974
| ML19347C974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347C972 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103100417 | |
| Download: ML19347C974 (5) | |
Text
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p*M%e fe, UNITED STATES y
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMhw m
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION AMENDMENT NO.68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46 COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT DOCKET NO. 50-298 I.
INTRODUCTION By letters dated January 30, 1980, October 15, 1980, and January 6, 1981, Nebraska Public Power District (.the licensee) has requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-46 for the Cooper Nuclear Station. The changes involve administrative changes and the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements in direct respoitse to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2,1980.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION The changes 1 thru 4, 6 and 7 in the January 30, 1980 letter addressed by this amendment involve administrative changes to the technical specifications to correct oversights in previous amendments and inconsistencies resulting from previously approved station modifications and changes in station reporting requirements and therefore require no further evaluation.
Item 5, relating to MAPLHGR, has been addressed in Amendment 67 issued January 30, 1981.
By our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the l
TMI-2 accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee j
prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to Nebraska Public Power District dated April 10, 1980.
In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their TSs to, incorporate additional Limiting l
Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate.
This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1980. Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
The licensce's October 15, 1980 application is in direct response to our rer,uest. However, subsequent discussions with the NRC staff necessitated l
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. TS revis.ionse in the areas-Qf Yalye Position Indication, Shift Technical Advisor, System Integrity Program, and Improved Iodine Measurements Program which were provided by the licensee in their January 6,1981 amended submittal letter. Each of the issues identified by NRC staff and the licensees response is discussed in the evaluation below.
III. EVALUATION 1.
Emergency Power Supply / Inadequate Core Cooling As we have indicated, water level instrumentation is important to post-accident monitoring in Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and surveillance of this instrumentation should be performed. The licensee's response to this request stated that the current surveillance requirements for the reactor water level instrumentation at Cooper Station meet or exceed our guidance.
We have reviewed the current specifications (contained in Tables 3.2F (page 65) and 4.2F (page 80) and determined that water level instru-mentation is included. The specifications provide ACTION statements for inoperable instrument channels. Surveillance requirements for instrument checks and calibration are also included. The frequency of surveillance meets or exceeds our guidelines. Based on this review, we conclude that no changes are required to satisfy our request.
2.
Valve Position Indication Our requirements for installation of a reliable position indicating system for relief and safety valves was based on the need to provide the operator with a diagnostic aid to reduce the ambiguity between indications that might indicate either an open relief / safety valve or a small line break. Such a system did r<ot need to be safety grade provided that backup methods of detennining valve position are available.
The licensee's request would add to the TSs for the relief valves both a primary (indicating system (pressure switches) and a secondary indicating system thermocouples); and to the safety /alves a thermocouple indicating system for primary and backup indication. Actions for the condition of inoperability of both the primary and backup detector channels for the relief valves have been specified. The safety valves discharge into the drywell. If the position indicators for these valves are inoperative drywell pressure and temperature instrumentation,which are sensitive to safety valve leakage, provide a backup means of moni-toring the position of these valves. These instruments are covered by a LCO which insures operability. Therefore, no additional actions
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. for the condition of inoperability of the safety valve thermocouple indicating system has to be included in the TSs. Additionally surveillance requirements have been included for both the safety and relief valves. Based on our review we find the licensee's recommended changes satisfy our guidelines and are acceptable.
3.
Containment Isolation Our request indicated that the specifications should include a Table of Containment Isolation Valves which reflect the diverse isolation signal requirement of this Lessons Learned issue.
The licensee's request stated that the current specifications include a requirement for diverse isolation signals and that no changes are required.
We have reviewed the current specifications Table 3.2A (pages 50, 51, 52, 52a and 52b), Table 3.2.D {page 63% Table 4.2A (pages 68 and 69),
Table 4.7.D.I.a (page 166) and Table 3.7.1 (page 168). These Tables include a listing of valves, operability requirements for the contain-ment isolation instrumentation, surveillance requirements, and actuation signals. Based on this review we have determined that the cJrrent specifications satisfy our request and that no changes are necessary.
4.
Our renuest indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The STA function includes both accident and operating experience assessment.
The licensee proposed in a letter from Nebraska Public Power District
-(J. Pilant) to NRC (H. Denton) dated January 11, 1980e that shift manning will be augmented by assigning an engineer frma the normal plant engineering staff to each shift to satisfy the accident assessment function of the STA. uAt the NRR/IE site visit of March 26 and 27, 1980, the licensee indicated that he would like to exercise the option of assigning an additional SRO to the minimum shift manning to perform this function should the lack of availability of qualified engineers dictate.
Our evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's actions to provide STAS, including the interim period from January 1,1980 to January 1, 1981, was contained in our letter dated April 10, 1980. That evaluation concluded that it.was acceptable-for the interim period to use, as STAS, qualified normal plant engineering staff or SR0's if necessary.
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. 5.
Integrity of Systeps Outside Containment Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a Systens Integrity Measurements Program. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment.
The licensee's October 15, 1980, application did not address this iss ue. However, in discussions between members of our staff and the licensee's representatives on December 16, 1980 it was indicated that they did not object to including such provisions. They suggested that they be incorporated into the Administrative Controls Section of the specifications. These were included in the licensees January 6, 1981 amended submittal. Accordingly, we have determined that our request has been satisfied.
6.
Iodine Monitoring Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas re.; iring personnel access under accident conditions.
The licensee's October 15, 1980 application did not address this issue.
However, in discussions between members of our staff and the licensee's representatives on December 16, 1980, it was indicated that they did not object to including such provisions as part of the Administrative Controls Section of the TSs. These were included in the licensees January 6,1981 amended submittal. Accordingly, we have determined that our request has been satisfied.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS We have determined that the amendment does not involve a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d){4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be pre-pared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
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. V.
CONCLUSIONS We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequencer of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the by operation in the proposed manner, and (3)public will not be endangered such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: February 23, 1981
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