ML19347C510

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Hazards Analysis Supporting Proposed Change 46 to Tech Specs
ML19347C510
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 11/07/1963
From: Bryan R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML19347C509 List:
References
NUDOCS 8011200054
Download: ML19347C510 (2)


Text

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UNITED STATES A7OMIC ENERGY CCIMISSION E L E S ANALYSIS BY THE RESEARCH AND POWER REACTOR SAFETY BRANCH DIVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATION IN L.r MATIER OF YANKEE AIOMIC EIF TRIC COMPANY PROPOSED CHANGE NO. h6 DOCFET NO. 50-29 Introduction Pursuant to the provisions of Section 50 59 of the Co= mission's regulations, Yankee Atomic Electric Company in Proposed Change No. 14, dated September 26, 1963, requested authorization of a change in the Technical Specifications attached as Appendix A to License No. DPR-3.

This Proposed Chac6e vould provide for modifications which would allov blending of demineralized vater and borated safety injection water to form a diluted borated feed water solution of the proper concentration for use in the low pressure surge tank.

Discussion The charging pumps of the Yankee reactor can take a suction on the reactor low pressure surge tank and discharge water from the tank as mahc-up vster to the primary coolant system. When boric acid is used in the primary system, as is planned during Core III operation scheduled to co =ence in the necr future, it is necessary that the water.in the lov pressure surge tank be of the proper concentratien for use in the pr* mary systen.

Tne proposed modifications vould allow borated vater frem the safety injection system storage tank to be mixed with deminer-alized vuter in the proper proportion to insure that the feedvater to the icv pressure surge tank contains the correct concentration of boric acid.

The principal item of concern M garding the Proposed Change is that inproper functioning of the mixing system could result in too dilute a solution of boric acid in the lov pressure surge tank.

Injection of such a solution into the primary system would cause dilution of the b:ric acid in the system and result in an increase in the reactivity of the core.

However, because of the slow rate at which the charging pu:ps can inject vnter, the rate of reactivity change vould be very slov and ample time would be available for the reactor operator to tche remedial action.

In view of this, it is our opinion that the Prcpesed Chance vould not result in a significant change in the safety rf cperation.

80112000h

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.c.am. lusicn We have concluded that the Proposed Change does not present signif-icant hazards considerations not described or implicit in the hazards eu=ary report, and that there is reasonable assurance that the Lealth l

nnd cafety of the public will not be endangered.

1 CQ!d !!:"d i

1; 2^.;d H. C'y:7 Robert H. Bryan, Chief Research & Power Reactor Safety l

Branch Division of Licensing & Regulation ROl' 7 1333 4

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