ML19347C116
| ML19347C116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/09/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-0788, NUDOCS 8010160623 | |
| Download: ML19347C116 (76) | |
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10/9/80 ACRS j
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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v
3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
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FULL COMMITTEE 5!
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Room 1046, j
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Washington, D.C.
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Thursday, 9 October 1980.
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11l The General Meeting of the Full Committee met, a
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pursuant to notice, at 4 : 25 p.m., with Dr. Milton Plesset, j
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Chairman, presiding.
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DR. MILTON PLESSET, Chairman E
JEREMIAH RAY, Member y
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DAVID OKRENT, Member PAUL SHEWMON, Member N
17 WILLIAM MATHIS, Member 5
HAROLD ETFERINGTON, I1 ember E
18 l MAX CARBON, Mer".be r 3
WILLIAM KERR, Member 19 ll i
l DADE MOELLER, Member
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MYER BENDER, Member 20 '
STEPHEN LAWROSKI, Member CHESTER SIESS, Member 2Il J.
CARSON MARK, Member j
JEREMIAH RAY, Consultant
/7 22 1 JAMES JACOBS, Consultant j
RAYMOND FRALEY 23 j 1
ALSO PRESENT:
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Messrs. S tello, Bickel, Libarkin, Minners, Bassett, 25 ;
and Weiss.
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MR. PLESSET:
We should get started with our next (1
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In response to a request from Commissioner
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and I think copies of that letter are being distributed, or z
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It was proposed to have a capability A
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Cost estimates at the time of our first review were a
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The ACRS wrote a letter to Commissioner Gilinsky
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and operated at first in order better to define the character-tJ 3
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The NRC Staf f and the Commission were apparently not E
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information from the staf f -- the Commission has at least given d
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the necessary funds.
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tion to the Committee might be helpful in our better understanding I..
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21 Dr. Bickel has looked in some detail at some of the r
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I think one of the -- to me, at least -- more serious
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informed and up-to-date -- that effort spent by the Staf f in a l
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specification of an appropriate system, would be a good invest-12 E
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Experience with even so simple a system as the " red
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systems -- must be given to what phones themselves are to be 1
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order that their use be effective.
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the proposed data link.
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own misgivings about the system, and I think we probably have' sV,
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available to me, and insights which can assist the Committee as 5
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Are there other comments, following 5
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When you say " licensing," you don't 5
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Is that what you have in mind?
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Yes.
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Are there any othe r questions or j
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MR. MOELLER:
In terms of the analysis of the system 3
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Control commenting on the plant.
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I don't.
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I do not.
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Mark, do you know anything in this z=
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No.
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Pres umably, "no."
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MR. MOELLER:
Well, see, in this commentary which ~ is ez d
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the need for meteorological data to be part of the data link --
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But before we go to
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Well, if not, before ti, go to Vic 25 ;
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j Stello, I would like to express the Committee 's congratulations to him for his award.
We are very proud of you, and we think it 2
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Othe rwis e, the floor is yours, now
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MR. STELLO:
That was the good news, and now comes e
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I don' t ever feel the need to have armour Y
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I understand there have been about 20 individual 21 comments that have been received, and they were received as l
22 part of the comments on, what was th a t, 0696, Warren?
23 MR. MINNERS:
Yes.
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And if the Conmittee wishes, we will 25j make sure that they get a set of the conments that have come in i
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thus f ar.
I don ' t see any reason at all why we can' t get them y
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And maybe, if you would like, we could have Warren in a bit characterize what those comments are.
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I. don't know what they are.
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Can anyone here address the comments ?
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I can clarify it perhaps a little bit.
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Whether it's good enough or 21 not, when.you s tart to ask the question of incorporating the i
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But again, recall that you'll be isolating something
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that we impose on the facility in terms of seismic design,
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studies that have been done at Sandia.
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them at the press to provide the Committee with copies at this
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How it is conceived, and there are
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One that I can rec'all is the use of the voice-link to 16,
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Th at 's fine.
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And then af ter we have an understanding
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question of what we are going to do with that information, 24 whether it is with this sys tem or any other system.
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It seems to me that each of those issues 4
is important, yes.
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Is there an issue I missed?
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We are not going to operate any nuclear plants from
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I don' t know many times I need to say that so that j
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I've got it tattoed on my back; I'd be happy to a
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So, you know --
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I can tell you that there has never h
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then that 's not " operating the plant. "
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Let me try to go through this --
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Well, I guess you didn't know about this 4
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counterfeit organization that's been writing these reports,
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say it at. least another half-a-dozen times -- that there is no O(
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think it is even possible that you could ever literally "take
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My name is Bassett.
I am the Staff A
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Thank you.
Cun you hear me all right?
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I will point out how it relates to the other j
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three subsystems :
A data acquisition system at each reactor
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support center, a safety parameter display system, and the a
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The basic idea is that there would be one data d"
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10 listed in Reg Guide 197, about 100 data items.
Those data
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parameter display sys tem, and the NDL.
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and, Victor, I'm not sure where the reques t i
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25 instance that you go in there routinely and the phones are c
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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ringing every five minutes.
There are a lot more calls on there 2
than I would like to see there, but every five minutes is not 3
an accurate characterization.
4 MR. S HEWMON :
Is there one?
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MR. WEISS :
Six to ten a day.
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6l MR. STELLO:
The number Bernie just gave me is six
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to ten calls over the red line per day.
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8l MR. BENDER:
How many lines are tied into the data e
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I know it's all of them, but how many are there?
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Projecting up to 1984, I think it's on iG f
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With six to ten per phone?
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Six to ten calls over the red phone per w
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2 15 MR. KERR:
I thought that earlier you said that w
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16 each morning a phone call came?
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17 MR. STELLO:
That's the other way.
He calls to check ti 5
18 l out the line back to each plant every day, that he makes as part 4
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Bernie was referring to how many incoming, f.
5 20 MR. WEISS :
We designed the system for 30 plants.
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21 MR. PLESSET:
Well, I think that we have -- I thank I
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22 l you again, Vic.
And we will have a recess at this point, b rie f.
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(Whe reupon, at 6:20 p.m.,
the meeting was adjourned.)
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l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!' MISSION 1.
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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 9
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j Proposed Nuclear Data Link j
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Cate of Proceeding:
October 9, 1980 l
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? lace of Proceeding:
Washington, D.
C.
were held as herein appeers, and that this is the original transcript I
thereof for the file of the Cccaission.
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