ML19347B408
| ML19347B408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1980 |
| From: | Laverty J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Hirsch D COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010150003 | |
| Download: ML19347B408 (17) | |
Text
.
Distribution:
J.Laverty J. Gray S.Treby October 10, 1980 HKS/TFE/ ESC ELD FF (2)
H. Bernard, 330-Phil R.Reid, 330-Phil T.Novak, P-1132 Chron.
Mr. Daniel Hirsch Connitteeto Bridge the Gap 1637 Butler Avenue, #203 Los Angeles, CA 90025 In the Matter of The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor)
Docket No. 50-142 (Proposed Renewal of Facility License)
]
Dear Mr. Hirsch:
I are forwarding a copy of the Draf t Stipulation I prepared which reflects our meeting on September 25, 1980, and our telephore conversation of October 2, 1980. I emphasize that this document is a draf t.
You should note any changes you wish to suggest, especially with regard to repetition of one concern in several contentions, so that these etanges can be con-sidered during our next conference call on October 22.
Although we did tentatively agree to the admissibility of certain parts of Contention V.18, I wish to discuss this contention again in the interest of securing language which more cl.early apprises the Staff of the nature of your concern. Additionally, I have not yet renumbered the contentions because of the tentative nature of this listing. I hope this draft assists your preparation for our next conference call.
I am also enclosing a copy of the service list we agreed to at our meeting of September 25.
Sincerely, Jessica H. Laverty Counsel for NRC Staff Enclosures cc w/o enclosures:
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.'l. /.8 0 1,0/;,/80 N7;C FORM 318 (9-767 NRcM 0240 TTU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFeCE: 1979 289 % 9
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION BIFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
)
)
(Proposed Renewal of Facility j
)
License)
(UCLA Research Reactor)
)
DRAFT STIPULATION The NRC Staf f (Staff), the Regents of the University of California (Appli-cant), and the Committee to Bridge the Gap (Intervenors), by their respective attorneys or authorized representatives, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
1.
A hearing having been granted with respect to the above appli-cation and Intervenors having been admitted as parties to the proceeding i
by the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order dated Interverurs agree that the sole contentions they are asserting in this pro-ceeding are those set forth in Attachment A (Stipulated Contentions) and Attachments B and C (Unstipulated Contentions), subject to the reservation set forth in paragraph 6 below. The renumbering and wording of the con-I l
tentions set forth in Attachments A, B and C supercede that set forth in Intervenor's Supplement to the Petition to Intervene dated August 25, 1980.
2.
Except as set forth in Attachments A, B and C, the Intervenors hereby withdraw all other contentions subnitted by them in all of their i
previous petitions and filings.
3.
The parties to this Stipulation agree that the contentions set forth in Attachment A meet the requirements of 10 CFR 62.714 as to specificity and
. basis, raise appropriate issues for determination in this proceeding, and thus constitute admissible contentions herein.
4 The Intervenors assert that the unstipulated contentions set forth in Attachments B and C are also proper contentions which should be admitted as matters in controversy and will file by _, _
, or such other date as is set by the Licensing Board, such statement of position as they deem necessary and appropriate with respect to these contentions.
5.
The Staff and/or the Applicant do not agree that the contentions set forth in Attachments B and C are proper contentions to be admitted as matters in controversy. The Staff and/or the Applicant will file statements of position with respect to these contentions by
, or such other date as is set by the Licensing Board.
6.
Nothing in this Stipulation shall be deemed to prevent the Inter-venors from filing new or amended contentions upon a showing of good cause as required by 82.714 of the Commission's regulations.
7.
Nothing contained in this Stipulation:
(a) shall be deemed an admission by the Staff or the Appli-cant of the merits of any contention or the validity cf any allegation of fact or law stated in any contention;
- nor, (b) shall be construed as a waiver by any party to this Stipu-lation of any rights with respect to the admissibility of evidence pursuant to 10 CFR 92.743 of the Commission's regulations-1 1
3-8.
Each party to this Stipulation expressly reserves any right to move for summary disposition pursuant to 10 CFR 92.749 of the Commission's regulations in regard to any contention advanced by Intervenors and admitted by the Licensing Board.
(Date)
Dan: 1 Hirsch Representative of Committee to Bridge the Gap (Date)
Jessica H. Laverty Counsel for NRC Staff I
l l
(Date)
Christine Helwick Counsel for Applicant
\\
i L_
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i ATTACHMENT A*
i l
Stipulated Contentions I.
The application - including the supporting appendices - is so substan-tially flawed that it fails to meet even minimal standards for such applications and fails to adequately demonstrate that the health and safety of the public will be properly protected if the license is i
granted.
Specifically:
2.
UCLA failed to submit an original application as shown by 1
a.
its submission of a.1980 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) l j
which repeats virtually verbatim its 1960 Hazards l
Analysis, and b.
its submission of an environmental impact agp;21 sal which repeats virtually verbatim the language of a t
1974 AEC memorandum on " Environmental Considerations Regarding the Licensing of Research Reactors and Critical Facilities."
3.
The application contains misleading and inaccurate statements I
such as a.
the statement that the reactor will be used to i
support research at the M.S. and Ph.D level, b.
the statement that no structural weaknesses (earth-quake vulnerability) have ever been identified, c.
the statement that no attempt has been made to alter the content and provisions of the earlier Technical Specifications, e.
the statement that accidents ranging from failure I
of experiments to the largest core damage and fission product release considered possible result in doses of only a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 guide-lines and are considered negligible with respect to the environment, j
- The Staff, Applicant, and Intervenor stipulate to the admission of the contentions set forth in Attachment A.
It should be noted that the contentions of Attachment A are comprised of contentions set.forth in l
Intervenor's Supplement to the Petition to Intervene dated August 25, 1980,,which have been reworded pursuant to a meeting between the Staff, Applicant, and Intervenor held on September 25, 1980 and to subsequent telephone conversations between the parties on October 2, 1980 and The contentions of Intervenor's Supplement from which the contentions of Attachment A are derived are indicated in brackets following each contention in Attachment A.
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. Attachment A 4.
The application contains unsupported and/or unsupportable state-l ments as evidenced by a.
the statement there are no suitable or more economical alternatives which can accomplish both the educational and the research objectives of the facility, and b.
the statement that the SPERT and BORAX tests showed that plate type fuel elements survived step radio-activity insertions of $3.54 II.
The Applicant has applied for the wrong class of license. Applicant has applied for a Class 104 license despite the fact that in the past, more than fifty percent of reactor funding and more than fifty percent of the hours of reactor usage have been devoted to the sale of services, rather than research or education. Given this history, and without any indication that Applicant intends to change reactor usage, Applicant under 10 CFR 850.21(b) and 10 CFR 850.22 should have applied for a Class 103 license.
Specifically:
Applicant should apply for a Class 103 license because a.
Applicant's financial statements indicate that more than half of the reactor funding comes from sources other than the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and b.
the application indicates more than half of the reactor operating time is spent on commercial, non-educational proj ects,
i l
III. Applicant has failed eo demonstrate adequate managerial and administra-tive controls in the application, as required by 10 CFR 850.34(b)(6)(ii),
and further, has demonstrated throughout its operating history grossly inadequate controls. These inadequacies make it impossible to find that Applicant's managerial and administrative controls are adequate to responsibly protect the public health and safety.
Specifically:
1.
Applicant failed to provide the information required in 10 CFR 650.34(b)(6)(ii).
2.
Applicant failed to get prior approval from the Reactor Use Committee or the Reactor Director for changes in reactor systems and for non-standard experiments.
3.
Applicant failed to get prior Commission approval for facility changes.
i
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- Attachment A 4.
The Lab Director and/or Assistant Director were absent for extensive periods of time and provided inadequate supervision.
5.
Unlicensed visitors to the reactor facility were invited to operate the reactor controls in violation of 10 CFR 89 50.54j, k, 1; 55 2; 55.3a and b; 55.d and f; and 55.9a and b.
l 6.
Applicant kept inadequate records and lost a maintenance log, i
and i
j 7.
Applicant failed to hold admintstrative meetings and conduct l
reviews required by the Technical Specifications.
i 4
IV.
Applicant has been consistently cited for violations of ERC regulations as well as violations of the provisions of its own Techr.ical Specifi-cations.
This consistent pattern of regulatory non-cor.pliance and the lack of assurances that the pattern will not continue in the future indicates that the Applicant cannot adequately demonstrate that future j
operation of the facility will comply satisfactorily with the regu-j lations to protect the public health and safety.
V.
The amount of excess reactivity which is permitted by the Technical Specifications to be installed in this reactor is too great in that it is potentially sufficient to cause a serious power excursion which could bring about =elting of the fuel cladding and significant release of fission products, seriously endangering the public health and safety.
Specifically:
2.
The reactor has lost several significant self-limiting features in that a.
the level of excess reactivity has been changed so that it is now higher than that needed for prompt criticality, 4
i I
b.
a deflector plate which prevented repeated excursions has been removed, c.
the assumption that there is a large negative temperature coefficient appears to be wrong in light of information regarding a positive graphite temperature coefficient, and d.
'the reactor's power level has been increased from 10 Kw 4
to 100 Kw.
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. Attachment A 4.
The licensed amount of excess reactivity (2.3% a k/k) could causing melting of the fuel cladding according to the 1960 Hazards Analysis.
5.
The reactor's void coefficient has changed since the initial calculations were done.
6.
Through the conversion of 2.3% a k/k as the excess reactivity limitation in the current Technical Specifications to $3.54 in the proposed Technical Specifications and the use of S different from that used in the Hazards Analysis, the Applicant may have changed the limitation frem 2.3% to 2.62%, thus pre-senting the potential for a serious excursion and melting of the cladding.
7.
The assumption that Borax I test results can be extrapolated to the UCLA reactor is questionable, particularly in the absence of error bars for the Borax I data.
10.
Applicant's Hazards Analysis regarding excess reactivity is based on unverified and unidentified assumptions which can be used merely to estimate a range of excess reactivity additions and their possible hazard. Additionally, Applicant has not provided error bars for its computations and analyses.
11.
The reactor now uses a pneumatic " rabbit" system for rapid inser-tion of excess reactivity which it did not use when the reactor was built.
12.
The licensed limit on combined experiments --
$3.54 or 2.3%
a k/k -- could cause a catastrophic accident.
13.
Removal of a beam tube could cause insertion of excess reactivity into the reactor because neutron absorption would be removed and reflection savings would be increased.
15.
Applicant has violated excess reactivity limits suggesting it is impossible to prevent possible excursions.
1 17.
Applicant failed to analyze the possibility of euctetic melting.
VI.
Applicant has in the past and is at present emitting exceasive radiation, violating radiation standards, and conducting inadequate monitoring.
Applicant has failed to demonstrate in its application or in its recent performance any evidence that these conditions can reasonably be expected to improve in the future, in the absence of which demonstration grant
. Attachment A of an operating and SNM license cannot be made without undue threat to public h alth and safety. Specifically:
1.
Past and present emissions are excessive.
2.
Several conditions which cause present emissions to be excessive have not been changed; therefore, excessive emissions can be expected in the future.
3.
Applicant has not in the past nor in the present application been able to reasonably demonstrate that exposure in un-restricted areas is not excessive because it lacks an ade-quate radiation monitoring system.
4.
Applicant presently does not comply with the radiation standards in 10 CFR 98 20.lc, 20.106(b)(1) and (2), and Part 20, Appendix B.
VII. The reactor has in the past experienced a persistent pattern of numerous j
unscheduled shutdowns, abnormal occurrences, and accidents. These occur-i I
rences are so pervasive that they evince a pattern of unreliability which makes it impossible for Applicant to reasonably assure that the reactor can be operated in a manner which does not endanger the public health and safety.
VIII. The analysis of an accident and the calculations regarding the resultant radiation exposure to the public contained in the Applicant's Safety Analysis Report is based on unrealistic assumptions which tend to mininf.ze the expected public exposure. However, despite the minimi-zatica of the hazard the conclusion of the analysis postulates an unacceptably high public radiation dosage of 1800 rems thyroid.
2.
The safety analysis is flawed because a.
Applicant assumes a release limited to only 107. of the volatile fission products and none of the non-volatile products, b.
Applicant assumes the reactor has been operated at 10 Kw long enough to have attained equilibrium cer.-
centrations of relatively short-lived fission products, c.
Applicant assu=es the reactor is in a two-story building with possible exposure to the public occurring outside the building,
4 j
- Attachment A l
d.
Applicant assumes a building leakage rate of 20% of the reactor room volume per hour for a 30 mile per hour I
vind, assumed to be directly proportional to wind
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velocity, and i
j e.
Applicant has not tested any of the assumptions upon which the analysis is based and new dose and dispersion models are now available.
i 4
i f
XI.
The UCLA research reactor lacks key intrinsic and engineered safety features and other safety features are substantially inadequate; parti-1 cularly lacking are features that are redundant and independent.
j Furthermore, a number.of safety features built into the reactor initially are no longer existent.
Specifically:
2.
The engineered safety features are inadequate to protect the public health and safety. For example, i
a.
the reactor is surrounded by a housing rather than j
by an adequate containment structure, 4
b.
the high level radiation monitor system is inadequate, l
l c.
the reactor does not have an adequate boron-injection system, a radioactivity removal system, emergency liquid and gaseous emissions holding tanks, HEPA filters, an emergency core cooling system, an emer-l.
gency set of control blades, or spare contrcl blade j
- motors, 1
l d.
the reactor lacks adequate shielding and access restrictions in areas where the public might be
)
exposed to radiation, e.
the reactor has inadequate or non-existant interlock
- systems, f.
the reactor lacks missile shields, particularly for j
control blade drives, t
I g.
graphite used in reactors has a tendency to swell and thus poses a hazard, h.
the reactor has a history of fuel failures, parti-j cularly tie bolt failures.
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, Attachment A XIII. Problems inherent in the design of Argonaut type reactors have been identified at other Argonaut reactor facilities, and until Applicant has demonstrated that these problems have been adequately resolved at UCLA, the Applicant tannot assume that the operation of the reactor vill not be inimical to the public health and safety. Specifically:
3.
Because the University of Florida's Argonaut coolant system has had water pressure problems, UCLA's reactor coolant j
system should have a pressure compensation system installed.
1 XV.
The reactor in question is so old that it poses an unacceptable hazard should it be relicensed, particularly for a twenty-year period. The f
key equipment is already so aged as to be unreliable and other equip-ment is antiquated and outdated. Because of the age of the reactor it is very difficult to obtain spare parts and key safety features required of newer facilities are lacking in this facility. The reactor is thus too old to function safely and reliably now, let alone at the beginning of the next century.
Specifically:
1.
The reactor was built in 1959 by a company which is no longer in the reactor business.
2.
The age of the reactor makes instrumentation unreliable, difficult to repair, and difficult to replace.
I l
i r
ATTACHMENT B*
Unstipulated Contentions I.
The application - including the supporting appendices - is so substan-tially flawed that it fails to meet even minimal standards for such applications and fails to adequately demonstrate that the health and safety of the public will be properly protected if the license is granted.
Specifically:
1.
The application omits essential information with regard to a.
experimental vibration of the reactor.
3.
The application coatains misleading and inaccurate statements such as d.
the statement that no deep wells have been drilled on the campus or in the vicinity of the campus.
V.
The amount of excess reactivity which is permitted by the Technical Specifications to be installed in this reactor is too great in that it is potentially sufficient to cause a serious power excursion which could bring about melting of the fuel cladding and significant release of fission products, seriously endangering the public health and j
safety.
Specifically:
1 9.
Applicant's data is twenty-five years old and thus, by virtue of its age, creates more uncertainties.
- The Staff and/or the Applicant believe that the contentions set forth in Attachment 3 are not proper issues for this proceeding and, as such, oppose admission of these contentions as issues in controversy. Freci-fically, the Applicant opposes admission of contentions Of these, the Stuff believes contentions should be admitted as issues in controversy but opposes admission of con-tentions The Staff, Applicant, and Intervenor stipulate, however, to the language of these contentions as set forth in Attachment B in the event that these contentions are found to be admissible by the Board.
l Attachment B i
VIII. The analysis of an accident and the calculations regarding the resultant l
radiation exposure to the public contained in the Applicant's Safety i
Analysis Report is based on unrealistic assumptions which tend to l
minimize the expected public exposure. However, despite the minimi-zation of the hazard the conclusion of the analysis postulates an unacceptably high public radiation dosage of 1800 rems thyroid.
i I
3.
The 1800 rems thyroid dosage esiculated by the Applicant is far in excess of the guidelines set forth in 10 CFR 100 of 300 rems thyroid.
IX.
The Applicant in the past has not adequately maintained its equipment ner calibrated its instruments properly, thereby increasing the chances
]
of equipment failures and erroneous instrument readings. Applicant has failed to demonstrate that its maintenance and calibration effort will improve in the future. This failure precludes the conclusion that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the public 1
health and safety.
j X.
The relicensing of the UCLA nuclear reactor is a major federal action which will significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore an Environmental Impact statement must be prepared by j
the NRC.
a 4
y The document entitled Environmental Impact Appraisal submitted as part X.
of the Application for relicensing contains inadequate information to support a finding of no significant impact by the Board.
l.
The application lacks an original environmental impact appraisal for the UCLA reactor.
2.
The analysis of the environmental effects of facility operation is inadequate.
3.
The analysis of the environmental effects of accidents is inadequate.
4 1
4.
The application does not contain a discussion, analysis, or description of alternatives to the reactor's operation.
5.
The application's discussion of the reactor's long-term effects is conclusory and inadequate.
i 5.
The application's discussion of the reactor's costs and 4
benefits is inadequate and conclusory.
. Attachment B XI.
The UCLA research reactor lacks key intrinsic and engineered safety features and other safety features are substantially inadequate; particularly lacking are features that are redundant and independent.
Furthermore, a number of safety features built into the reactor initially are no longer existent. Specifically:
2.
The engineered safety features are inadequate to protect the public health and safety. For example, (9) the reactor has a history of control blade problems.
XII The Applicant's equipment, facilities, and procedures for handling and using special nuclear materials are inadequate to protect health and minimize danger to life and property and therefore, cannot support the issuance of a special nuclear material license. Specifically:
2.
That information which Applicant has provided regarding the special nuclear materials license is inadequate and does not fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR Hs 70.22 and 70.33.
3.
Applicant's general safety, security, and operating history suggest that the license for bomb-grade (93% enriched) uranium should not be granted.
For example, a.
Applicant's failure to notify local authorities and its inability to keep information secret when it shipped spent fuel on June 21, 1980, indicates that Applicant is unqualified to handle either fresh or spent fuel.
XIII. Problems inherent in the design of Argonaut type reactors have been identified at other Argonaut reactor facilities, and until Applicant has demonstrated that these problems have been adequately resolved at UCLA, the Applicant cannot assume that the operation of the reactor will not be inimical to the public health and safety. Specifically:
2.
Other Argonaut facilities have had control rod motor problems and therefore UCLA should have replacement motors on site.
I l
ATTACHMENT C*
l Unstipulated Contentions V.
The amount of excess reactivity which is permitted by the Technical Specifications to be installed in this reactor is too great in that it is potentially sufficient to cause a serious power excursion which could bring about melting of the fuel cladding and significant release of fission products, seriously endangering the public health i
and safety. Specifically:
i 1.
The amount of excess reactivity must be limited in such a way as to provide a large margin of safety, 18.
The problem of excess reactivity is exacerbated by other related safety and operation problems such as Applicant's history of inaccurate instrument a.
calibration, b.
Applicant's history of unscheduled shutdowns, c.
problems with the pneumatic tube system, i
d.
Applicant's history of lax administrative and managerial controls, 1
Applicant's history of bypassing interlock and e.
safety systems, i
f.
problems with the control blades, l
l g.
positive temperature coefficient of graphite moderation negates reactor's inherent self limiting features, l
h.
lack of adequate containment and siting in a nrowded building on a crowded, campus, 4
l
- The Scaff and/or the Applicant believe that the contentions set forth in Attachment C are not proper issues for this proceeding and, as such, oppose admission of these contentions as issues in controversy. More-over, the Staff, Applicant, and Intervenor have not reached agreement as to the language and proper form of these cententions in Attachment C in the event that contentions of this nature are found to be admissible by the Board.
l i
, Attachment C 1.
presence of only four control blades and the lack of back-up blades, j.
heat balance problem and long-term stabilization of neutron channels problem, k.
graphite swelling and cracking, 1.
fuel blade warping, and m.
lack of a deflector.
XIV. The site characteristics of this reactor such as population density and seismic activity are such, and have changed sufficiently over the period of the first license, that the reactor cannot be operated in such a manner as to assure that the public healt* and safety will be protected.
Specifically:
1.
The population density immediately surrounding the reactor and in the general vicinity of the reactor has increased substantially since the reactor was licensed.
2.
The application does not contain the information required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(1).
3.
The reactor is sited in a seismically active area and has been damaged by seismic activity in the last twenty years.
XV.
The reactor in question is so old that it poses an unacceptable hazard should it be relicensed, particularly for a twenty-year period.
The key equipment is already so aged as to be unreliable and other equip-ment is antiquated and outdated.
Because of the age of the reactor it is very difficult to obtain spare parts and key safety features required of newer facilities are lacking in this facility. The reactor is thus too old to function safely and reliably now, let alone at the beginning of the next century. Specifically:
6.
Age has severely reduced the reactor's usefulness.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY A';D LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSIiT OF
)
)
(Proposed Renewal of Facility
)
License)
(UCLA Research Reactor)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE J
l Elizabeth S. Bowers, Esq., Chairman Christine Helwick, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Glenn R. Woods, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office af General Counsel Washington, DC 20555 2200 University Avenue 590 University Hall Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke, Member Berkeley, CA 94720 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Steven R. Tekosky Washingten, DC 20555 3:nvironmental Section 200 North Main Street Dr. Oscar H. Paris, Member City Hall East, Room 215 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Los Angeles, CA 90012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Counsel for NRC Staff Office of the Executive Legal Director Mr. Daniel Hirsch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Committee to Bridge the Gap Washington, DC 20555 1637 Butler Avenue, #203 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel William H. Cormier, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Administrative Vice Washington, DC 20555 Chancellor University of California at Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Los Angeles Panel 405 Hilgard Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Los Angeles, CA 90024 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. John Bay Docketing and Service Section 1633 Franklin Street Office of the Secretary Santa Monica, CA 90404 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
__