ML19347B140

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Responds to IE Bulletin 80-17,Suppl 3,re Partial Loss of Control Air Pressure Causing Partial Opening of Scram Outlet Valves W/O Rod Motion.Various Procedural Changes Implemented to Satisfy Requirements of Bulletin
ML19347B140
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 08/29/1980
From: Finfrock I
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IEB-80-17, NUDOCS 8010010652
Download: ML19347B140 (2)


Text

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y-GYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION N

  • M'A%'jg (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388
  • FORKED RIVER
  • 08731 c 7en=b<uwes<uem August 29, 1980 Mr. boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 I. E. Bullet % No. 80-17 Supplement 3 The purpose of this lctter is to respond to the directives set forth in I. E. Bulletin No. 80-17 Supplement 3 which is concerned with gradual or partiel loss of control air pressure which could cause partial opening of the scram outlet valves without rod motion.

Item descriptions will not be repeated.

However, item numbers correspond to those given i7 the original bulletin.

Item 1 A.

The opening pressure of the scram outlet valves, a-determined by General Electric through functional testing, is 40 + 2 psig.

Plant emergency procedu es were revised to require a manual scram in the event that Instrument Air System pressure decreases to 60 psig.

Plant emergency procedures addressing the control rod drive instrument air header low pressure alarm, which is set at 75 psig, will also require a manual scram if instrument air pressure decreases to 60 psig downstream of the air filters in that header.

All of the above changes were completed and in effect within five days of receipt of NRC I.E.Bulletin 80-17 Supplement 3.

Item 1 B.

(1.) Plant emergency procedures addressing the rod drift alarm have been revised to require a manual scram in the event of multiple rods drifting in.

The above changes were completed and in effect within five days of receipt of NRC I.E.Bulletin 80-17 Supplement 3.

80)o olog

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director August 29, 1980 (2.) Plant emergency procedures addressing the control rod drive high temperature alarm have been revised to require a manual scram in the event that three (3) or more control rod drive temperatures rise rapidly to temperatures in excess of the alarm setpoint (250F).

The above changes were completed and in effect within five days of receipt of NRC I.E.Bulletin 80-17 Supplement 3.

Item 2 Plant startup procedures were revised to require a functional test using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block, and scram switches after each scram event, before returning to power.

The above changes were completed and in effect within five days of receipt of NRC I.E.Bulletin 80-17 Supplement 3.

Af Ivan R. Finfr k, J.

Vice Preside Generation IRF:PFC:JMD:AR:dh cc:

NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

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