ML19347A772
| ML19347A772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1980 |
| From: | Rausch T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-20, NUDOCS 8009300200 | |
| Download: ML19347A772 (6) | |
Text
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'O-Commonwealth Edison O
C -- ?s one First Nationc.! PL n. Chicago. Illinois O 7 Addr;ss R: ply 12: Post Offic2 Box 767 j
Chicago, lihnois 60690 September 15, 1980 Mr. James G. Keppler, Director Directorate of Inspection and Ecforcement - Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
Dresden Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Zion Station Units 1 and 2 LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Response to IE Bulletin 80-20
" Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches" NRC Docket Nos. 50-10/237/249, 50-254/265, 50-295/304, 50-373/374, 50-454/455, and 50-456/457 References (a):
J. G. Keppler letter to C. Reed dated July 31, 1980 (b):
W. F. Naughton letter to J. G. Keppler dated July 13, 1980
Dear Mr. Keppler:
Commonwealth Edison Company has reviewed the subject Bulletin transmitted by Reference (a) and has determined that no Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches are used in safety related systems at Dresden Station Units 1, 2 and 3, Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 and LaSalle County Units 1 and 2.
Therefore, no further action is required for these stations.
Approximately twenty (20) manhours were expended for this portion of the review.
The responses for Zion Station Units 1 and 2 and Byron and Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2, including manpower estimates, are provided in Enclosures 1 and 2 respectively.
8009300 g
'SEP 16 1980
Commonwealth Edison Mr. James G. Keppler, Director September 15, 1980 Page 2 Please address any questions you may have in this regard to this office.
Very truly yours, ThomasJ.Rau[sch ewy guac[
Nuclear Licensing Administrator Special Projects cc:
Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 6720A 6
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Commonwealth Edison Company Response to IE Bulletin 80-20 Zion Station Units 1 and 2 The subject bulletin addressed the failure of a Westinghouse W2 switch here at Zion Station used in the control circuit of 1A Service Water Pump.
This bulletin has been reviewed at Zion Station and the following responses are provided for each of the below listed actions 7aquired by the bulletin.
1.
Determine whether Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches with spring return to neutra) vosition are used in safety-related applications at your facility.
If so, identify the safety-related systems using these switches and the total number of switches so used.
If no such switches are used in your facility, you should indicate tnat this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
Westinghouse W-2 switches are used in the following safety related systems:
Auxiliary power, component cooling, containment spray, auxiliary feedwater, residual heat removal, reactor ventilation, safety injection, service water and volume control.
The total number of switches used for both units in these systems is forty-seven.
2.
Licensees of operating plants using Type W-2 spring return to neutral control switches in safety-related applications shall perform continuity tests on all such switches.
These tests shall be performed with the switch operator in the neutral position and completed within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin.
In addition, this continuity test shall be repeated at i
least every thirty-one (31) days after the initial test I
and af ter each manipulation of the switch from its neutral position.
These continuity tests may be discontinued subsequent to implementing the longer term corrective measures described below.
These switches were checked on 8-7-80, 8-15-80 and 9-3-80 for both Unit I and II.
The individual switches that are actuated are checked daily in accordance with 8-15-80 Telecon agreement between L. Spessard, NRC, RIII and T. Rausch, CECO. NLA.
These switches will continue to be checked on a daily and monthly basis until the long term corrective action is implemented.
3.
Licensees of operating plants and holders of construction permits shall describe the longer term corrective measures planned and the date by which such measures will be implemented by actual installation or by design change, as appropriate.
As a minimum, the longer term corrective measures should include rewiring the indicating light shown in Figure 1 provided the light is readily visible to the control room operator.
If not, failures of the neutral position contacts should be annunicated in the control room.
A modification has been initiated to rewire the indicating lights so both the green and red lights are used for continuity checkers of the auto start contacts.
This modification should be implemented by 12-31-80.
There have been no failures of these switches observed in any of the checks that have been completed to date.
Approximately 40 manhours have been expended in the review and preparation of this report and in planning the modifications.
Testing has required about 50 manhours to date, and 100 manhours are anticipated for modification implementation.
Commonwealth Edisoa Company Response to IE Bulletin 80-20 Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 The following responses are provided for each of the actions identified in the subject bulletin:
1.
Determine whether Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches with spring return to neutral position are used in safety-related applications at your facility.
If so, identify the safety-related systems using these switches and the total number of switches so used.
If no such switches are used in your facilJty, you should indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
Thirty-nine (39) Westinghouse Type W~2 switches per unit (style number 508A264G02) are employed in safety-related systems at the Byron and Braidwood Stations.
The systems and number of switches used in each system are listed below:
System Number of Switches Primary Containment HVAC (VP) 8 Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) 2 Essential Service Water (SX) 2 Component Cooling (CC) 4 Containment Spray (CS) 2 Safety Injection (SI) 2 Residual Heat Removal (RH) 2 i
Boron Thermal Regeneration (BR) 1 Chemical and Volume Control (CV) 3 Boric Acid Processing (AB) 1 Reactor Coolant (RC, RY) 12
)
2.
Licensees of operating plants using Type W-2 spring return to neutral control switches in safety-related j
applications shall perform continuity tests on all such switches.
These tests shall be performed with the switch operator in the neutral position and completed within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin.
In addition, this continuity test shall be repeated at least every thirty-one (31) days after the initial test and after each manipulation of the switch from its neutral position.
These continuity tests may be discontinued subsequent to implementing the longer term i
corrective measures described below.
4.
This item is not applicable to Byron and Braidwood Stations.
3.
Licensees of operating plants and holders of construction permits shall describe the longer term corrective measures planned and the date by which such measures will be implemented by actual installation or by design change, as appropriate.
As a minimum, the longer term corrective measures should include rewiring the indicating light shown in Figure 1 provided the light is readily visible to the control room operator.
If not, failures of the neutral position contacts should be annunicated in the control room.
Byron Station reported failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 switches in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report on July 23, 1980 (Re ference (b)).
In our report we stated that we are not implementing the recommended interim wiring fix at this time. We will continue to monitor Westinghouse's efforts to formulate a permanent fix for this problem.
If it becomes evident that no permanent fix will be available six (6) months prior to fuel load (currently scheduled for April 1, 1983 for Byron Unit 1) the interim wiring change will be implemented.
Approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> were required to prepare this response.
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