ML19346A141
| ML19346A141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002909 |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1981 |
| From: | Donelson C AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106050257 | |
| Download: ML19346A141 (17) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
^
In the Matter of APPLICATION OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORI0 RATION FOR A SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DOCKET NO. 70-2909 g8%
LICENSE FOR THE ALABAMA W
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b gh({1)!S) '4 NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION 2
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PLANT (ANFFP) TO BE LOCATED NEAR PRATTVILLE, ALABAMA J3 0 41981 * ;-9 c
t REVISED CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER CATHALYNN 00 NELSON h-CCa*Ml13 08 A
a s. mui namost f Comes now Petitioner Cathalynn Donelson and offers as valid th'e,'.
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enclosed contentions, which are marked as Attachments A and B, in her 'Md petition to intervene in the above-captioned proceedings.
Contentions set forth in Attachment A are renumbered and revised by the Petitioner from the original filed contentions, following conferences with the attorneys of the NRC Staff and Westinghouse Electric Corporation
( Appl icant).
Pages 1 through 6 of Attachment A have been misplaced and will be forthcoming within 10 days. The situation was reported to Administrative Judge John F. Wolf who orally granted a 10-day extension.
1 Petitioner asserts that, though the Applicant has declined to stipJlste to any contentions, these contentions in Attachment A are admissible con-tentions which meet the requirements of 10 CFR 2.714 as to specificity and basis.
Contentions set forth in Attachment B (Deferred Contentions) may be refiled and reformulated by the Petitioner upon submission by the Applicant No3 of pertinent material to the NRC Staff.
g Respectfully submitted by,
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ADD' W*1 TP
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Cathalynn Op'Alstra '
855 Park A Wnue Montgomery, Alabama 36106 On this, the 29th day of May,1981
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' Attachment A,
8.
HEALTH PHYSICS ENGINEER UN0VALIFIED (Contention XII.A.3.c)
Applicant cannot comply with Commission ALARA regulations'in 10 CFR 20.1(c) nor regulations concerning exposure limits in Part 20 because the training, ::perience and tecIinical qualifications of the health physics engineer are inadequate to protect workers and the environemnt.
By giving ALARA responsibility (License Application, 4-1.3.6, pages -
S-15 and S-16) to an unqualified individuil the applicant--which has not complied with ALARA and exposure limit regulations at it extant nuclear fuel fabrication plant--cannot comply with Comission regulations at the ANFFP.
An unspecified baccalaureate degree is not sufficient training nor l
technical qualification for the health physics engineer nor is vague general experience in radiation protection and evaluation assignments adequate
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l experience to establish and conduct ALARA program at a r.uclear fuel plant utilizing a new process.
9.
NO ALARA AUTHORITY (Contention XII.A.3.c(1))
Applicant--which has demonstrated non-compliance at extant nuclear fuel fabrication facility--cannot comply with Commission ALARA requirements in 10 CFR 20.1 (c) and exposure limits in Part 20 because the ANFFP health physcis engineering discipline is not given authority comensurate with the responsibility for radiation protection and ALARA program (License Applica-tion, 4-1.3.6, page S-15). Responsibility without authority
..,0 is vested in an unspecified designee and this discipline cannot ensure ALARA--only j
advise the Regulatory Compliance Component which r.as no expertise in radiation protection but is responsible for incorporation of radiation protection requirements into equipment and procedura (License Application 4-1.3.4, page S-14).
Attachment A - ~
- 10. INADECUATE AUDIT AND REVIEW (Contentien XIII.R.1)
Installation, modification and relocation of equipment to handle, process and store special nuclear material (License Application, 2-4, pages S-17 and S-18) will not receive adequata review and analysis for nuclear criticality safety and radiation protection to prevent exposures and relesses in excess of levels permitted by Commission regulations in'10 CFR Part 20 because:
--unspecified designee (not health physics or nuclear criticality-engineers) will review changes which could result in violations;
--only some (not all) of the changes relating to nuclear critka:1ty safety and radiation protection will be reH.wed and audited, which could result in no audit and review and consequent violatiens;
- the Regulatory Compliance Component lacks the expertise in nuclear' criticality. safety and radiation protection to approve design safety analysis, since health physics and nuclear criticality engineers are not merhers of the component, only advisors. This system is a clear indication of failure to make a reasonable effort to comply with ALARA,10 CFR 20.1(c).
11.
INADEQUATE SAFETY EQUIPMENT TESTS (Contentions XIII.B.2.(a), XIII.B.16.b)
Tests of safety equipment will be inadequate, resulting in violations of Commission regulations because tests are limited to emergency evacuation signals and permanently mounted air sampling equipment (Lictnse Application, 4-4.2, page 5-21) and fire and hazard alarms only (License Application 5-1.9.2, page S-32) omitting tests ef:
--air monitors which applicant may use in lieu of fixed-location air samplers (License Application 5-3.1.2.A, page S-41);
--nuclear criticality detection system, though License Application
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states (5-3.4.4.C, page S-64) work will continue during nuclear criticality detection outage;
--confinement and containment monitors (License Application, 5-3.4.4.8, pageS-62);
--and safety-related process and service alarms (5-1.9.3, page S-32),
except after installation and major repairs.
J These safety alarms cculd therefore be inoperable for long periods of time and without operable air monitors, nuclear ~ criticality detection systems, confinement and containment monitors, and process and service alarms the applicant cannot comply with the Comnission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 20.1(c),102,103,106 nor 405 (which have been violated at similar nuclear fuel fabrication plants) nor 10 CFR 70.56(c) requiring tests of radiation detection and monitoring equipment.
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~2.
TEST FREQUENCY INADEQUATE (Contention XIII.B.16.b)
By evaluating air sampling equipment on once a year (License Application, 4-4.2, page S-21) applic ant cannot comply with 10 CFR 20.1(c) ALARA require-ments,10 CFR 20.103 requirement for timely detection of excessive exposure to individuals, nor 10 CFR 20.405 requirements for reports of overexposures and excessive levels and concentrations within 30 days in the event of excessive levels and releases of radiation because:
--sir sampling equipment could remain inaccurate or inoperative for longer than the 30-day reporting periods or quarters for averaging whole body exposure and inhalation limits due to only annual testing for accuracy and lack of operational testing;
--applicant may use air monitors in lieu of air samplers (License Application, 5-3.1.2, page S-41) and has no stated provisions for testing air monitors;
Attachment A ',
. -applicant has overexposed. personnel at a similar facility it operates and other nuclear fuel fabrication plants have had violations concerning-failure to provide timely evaluations of overexposure, excessive releases, operational testing frequency and inoperative air samplers, so these violations cannot be avoided at the ANFFP plant due to inadequate air sampler testing.
13.
INADEQUATE CRITICALITY SHIELDING (Contentions XIII.B.3.d. and XIII.B.17.g.)
The engineered safety of the SNii building will not be adequate to protect health nor minimize danger to life and property due to applicant's assumption of constant transmission factor for walls without regard for low density materials or doors, partitions or panels (License Application 5-3.4.4'.C, page S-63) which are subject to being open or removed. This situation will result in excess radiation dose to individuals in violation of 10 CFR 20.101, a disregard for ALARA requirements in 10 CFR 20.1 and releases exceeding limits in unrestricted areas in violation of 10 CFR 20.105 in the event of a criticality incident.
The danger from the lack of adequate shielding in the building is compounded by the fact that work will continue during criticality detector outage (License Application 5-3.4.4.C.(1)) and that nuclear fuel fabrication facilities have violated Commission regulations relating to calitration of criticality monitors and posting of criticality safety limits.
- 14. STORAGE RACK AND NEUTRON ISOLATION STRUCTURE DESIGN INADEQUATE TO PREVENT CRITICALITY (Contention XIII.B.4)
The design of storage racks and neutron isolation structures is not adequate to prevent nuclear criticality which will result in violation of
Attachment A.
Commission regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 regarding ALARA, whole body dose to individual in restricted areas, limits in unrestricted areas and adverse effect on the environment because License Application states (5-1.2, page S-25) only that these racks'and structures will be designed to withstand credible loads, shocks or collisions without taking into account:
--the effects of fire, a credible event which has occured at other nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Fire could easily cause the failure of the integrity of storage racks and neutron isolation structures, thereby causing criticality, and at the same time damage the SNM building and/or filter -
system, causing excessive and damaging release of radiation to the environment;
--the omission of fire and other accidents in the brief discussion of criticality accidents in the Environmental Report (5-4.9, page 5-28) limited to a supercritical liquid system, overlooking the fact that applicant seeks to be licensed to possess SNM in all forms, not just liquid;
--the exemption applicant is taking from criticality monitorina system in storage areas (License Application,13.5.1, pages S-74 and S-75), so that there will be no warning whatsoever in the event of criticality involving storage racks;
--the fact that fuel fabrication facilities have violated Commission regulations regarding proper storags of fissile matcrial and by storing SNM on transfer carts. Applicant does not discuss design of transfer equipment important to nuclear criticality safety.
l
- 15. HVAC VARIANCES (Contention XIII.B.5.a. and f.(2))
l HVAC systems variances in License Application (5-1.3, pages S-25 and i
S-26) will result in airborne radioactivity in excess of levels permitted l
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Attachment A-I-by Comission regulations found in 10 CFR Part 20 because a variance could l
result in:
--movement of untreated air from controlled areas and/or confinement to uncontrolled areas, a violation of CFR 20.105;
--movement of untreated air from confinement to controlled areas and no filtration of radioactive gaseous effluent before release to controlled area, a violation of CFR 20.101; i
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--use of HEPA filters with far less than 99.9 per cent efficiency and little ability to remove particulate matter, a violation of ALARA requirements t
i of CFR 20.1;
--no HEPA filtration of confinement or control area effluents before release to the environment and/or uncontrolled area, in violation of CFR l
20.105'and 20.106(a);
--and no measurement of pressure across HEPA filters or representative
-l air sampling of gaseous effluent discharged to environment and/or uncontrolled i
areas, in violation of CFR 20.103(a)(3) and ALARA requirements.
- 16. EXCESSIVE RELEASES TO UNRESTRICTED AREAS (Contention XIII B < 5. d.)
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According to License Application (5-1.3, page S-26) the release of' l
radiation to unrestricted areas will be controlled through ventilatio7 i
pick-up, with par ticular reliance on the use of HEPA filters.
In the event of failure of a HEPA filter, this system will result in the rtlease of excessive levels of radioactivity to unrestricted areas in violation of 10 CFR 20.106(a).
In addition, reliance on a HEPA filter does not guarantee.the pro-tection of the public and the environs from the release of excessive
Attachment A.
amounts of radioactivity, as indicated by excessive releases at facil!'ies where such filters are used.
17.
INADEQUATE RECIRCULAf!NG AIR FILTERING. (Contention XIII. B. f.1.)
Based on the License Application (5-1.3, page S-26) the recirculating air system will not provide adequate filtration of airborne effluents from the stacks and other points of release to prevent the build-up of excessive levels of radioactivity within the plant buildings. This constitutes a violation of the Comission's regulations and prevents the issuance of the requested license because the lack of adequate filtration of incoming air constitutes a non-compliance with ALARA requirements of 10 CFR 20.1 since the-addition of _ such filters could reducs radiation exposures. This is particularly significant as the applicant has a record of over-exposure of personnel to excessive air-borne concentrations of radioactive material.
l In addition, if the incoming air is not filtered, excessive exposures will occur in unrestricted areas in violation of 10 CFR 20.106(a) and in restricted areas in violation of 10 CFR 20.101.
I
- 18. FIRE RESISTANT MATERIAL NOT REQUIRED (Contention XIII. B. 6. a.)
License Application (5-1.3, page S-26) states +. hat the use of fire resistant materia's in construction of the confinement system will be considered. Nowhere in the application is there any commitment to assure that such materials will be used.
In the absente of a comit-ment tc use fire resistant materials, the requested license should not be issued since flammable materials would increase the possibility of fire and the subsequent releases of excess radiation in violation of f
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Attachment A.
10 CFR 101, 103, 105 and 106(a).
In addition, the failure to use fire resistant materials in the confinement system is a violation of ALARA requirements in 10 CFR 20.1 since use of such materials would reduce the hazard of radiation.
Fires have occured at nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in the past and the fire hazard is particularly acute where pyrophoric SNM materials are central to the industrial process. Such materials will be present throughout the facility, including in the confinement system, where they will collect due to the applicant's use of ventila-tion pick-up for airborne radioactivity control (License Application, 5-1.3, page S-25).
- 19. UNSAFE RADIOLOGICAL WASTE HANDLING (Contention XIII. B. 7.)
Radiation waste (License Application, 5-1.3, page S-26) handling operations "may be permitted a design variance." As a result the NRC is unable, on the basis of the information supplied, to deter-mine whether the waste handling system will protect the public health and safety. I'.iless the variances are thoroughly specified or prohibited altogether, there can be no assurance that the radioactive waste will not harm the public health and safety.
Past experience at fuel fabrication facilities has shown that excessive releases can be expected to occur. The NRC must not permit variances and must require that the applicant perform all of the following:
a.
Recycle scrubber liquors, in no event dispcsing of them as liquid radiological waste into the Alabama River;
Attachment A.
b.
Gispose of HEPA filters as solid radiological waste, in no event sending them to a non-licensed waste disposal facility in violation of 10 CFR 20.105; c.
Assure that all ' airborne releases to the general environs meet license specifications; 1
l d.
Keep process and service liquid wastes separate from sanitary and storm drainage; i
e.
Assure that all liquid effluents are help up, samp':2d, analyzed, and treated as necessary before being released into the Alabama River; f.
Provide facilities for proper preparation of contaminated solid wastes before sending to a non-licensed disposal facility.
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l 20 INADEQUATE AIR SAMPLER TESTS (Contention XIII. 9. b.)
The applicant should not receive the SNM license because by testing air sampling equipment only once a year (License Application, 4-4.2, page S-21) the applicant does not demonstrate any effort to comply with certain Commission regulations.
Air sampling equipment is likely t ecome inoperative for long periods of time between tests. Without quarterly testing there may be i
violations of 10 CFR 20.101 and 20.105 and without at least monthly l
testing the applicant cannot submit accurate reports of overexposures and concentrations as required by 10 CFR 20.405, and the applicant has a record of overexposure of personnel to excessive levels of airborne radioactive material.
v Attachment A 16 -
- 21. INADEQUATE ~ FIRE' PROTECTION (Contention XIII.B.13)
A license should not be granted to the proposed ANETP because there is not adequate fire protection to prevent damage to health, life and property, in the event of a' fire at the plant which 'could spread radio-active material over the area;. Fire 2 have occured at nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in the past and the dangers will be compounded at the facility proposed for licensing because:
--the License Application (page S-29) states that low combustibility HEPA filters will be " considered," with no assurance of their use;
--the SNM Building design sha',1 only " consider" construction which will confine fire (License Application, page S-29);
--there will be no automatic fire suppression system in areas of the SNM BuiTding where highly pyrophoric uranium is stored,. processed or handled (License Application, page S-29);
--only portable fire extinguishers will be provided for fire fighting (License Application, page S-30) and this type of equipment is not adequate to surpress a major fire in the SNM Building and its use would greatly endanger the lives of individual firefighters.
By omitting a fire supression system in the SNM Building, the applicant will violate 10 CFR 20.101, 20.1, 20.105, 20.106(a) and 20.103(a)(3).
- 22. INADE0VATE ALARMS (Contentions XIII.B.15 and 16)
The applicant should not receive a SNM license from the NRC because the alarms at the proposed nuclear fuel fabrication facility will be inadequate and will not give clear warning of danger to prevent damage to the facilities, m-r-
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Attachment A workers and the environment in case of accident at the plant. The alarms are indaequate because:
--there will be no separate alarms for fire, accidental release of radioactivity or criticality ~(License Application, page S-30) and a common alarm will not alert personnal about specific hazards for correction;
--the immediate evacuation alarm and the criticality alarm will be audible or visible (License Application, page S-31), and an alarm which 'is not audible and visibie to all personnel at all times is not adequate;
--a visible criticality alarm would be in violation of 10 CFR 70.24(a) which requires " clearly audible alarm signals."
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- 22. INADEQUATE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING (Contention XIII.B.20) l The applicant should not be granted a SNM license because there is l
l provision only for coveralls and shoes for workers (License Appli ation, pageS-61). This is not adequate to protect the workers from exposures of radiation in excess of NRC regulations nor to minimize exposures to individuals, for the applicant is not providing headcovers, gloves and l
plastic overcovers.
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ATTACHMENT B Deferred Contentions XI.C. Issuance of license for. unspecified activities would be a threat to the national defense, in -violation of 10 CFR 70.23(d) in that Westinghouse would be licensed to supply potential weapons-grade uranium compounds internationally.
XIII.
The application does not meet-federal requirements pertaining to equipment and facilities which will be used to protect health and minimize danger to life and property.
A.
The application does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.T2(a)(7) in that it does not contain a description of equipment and facilitie'., such as:
1.
Handling devices; 2.
Working areas; 3.
Shields;
- 4. ' Measuring and monitoring instruments;
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5.
Deyices for the disposal of radioactive effluents and wastes; 6.
Storage facilities; 7.
Criticality accident alarms, etc.
XIII.B.6.b. The application does not discuss placement of ventilation hoods.
XIII.B.6.c. Hoods for chemfcal effluents are exempted in application, while hazards of chemical toxicity are as great as fire and criticality hazards.
4 Attachment B XIII.B 8.
Toxic waste handit.ng is not described in the license application, which omits equipment and facilities for handling toxic wastes..
XIII.B.10. The process and service waste equipment and facilities will not be adequate, a.
The application states only that provision m_ay, be made for degrading uranium as special nuclear material to. source material as part of waste treatment; b.
The appitcation states that provision may be made for measuring volumes of treated process and service wastes released from plant, but:
(1) Page S-50 of the license application demonstrates that volumes of effluents released at each liquid sampling station are not applicable; (2) The " provisions" are not specifically set forth.
XIII.B.11 Solid radiological waste handling is not adequate.
a.
The application does not specify the equipment for handling or determining radioactive levels of waste; b.
The application states radioactive solid waste aggt be sent to a non-licensed disposal facility.
XIII.B.12 Emergency power equipment is not adequate in that it does not i
provide for safe and automatic shutdown of process equipment, j
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l XIII.B.13.f. (3 ) Type and number of fire extinguishers is not provided.
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s Attachment B 3-XIII.B.17 Equipment des.ign will not be adequate to preclude critical configurations.
a.. Failure modes may be based on operational experience, b.
Westinghouse does n5t have operational experience in " dry" fuel fabrication.
c.
The probability of criticality is not subject to reliable quantitative,rediction.
d.
Ocuble-batching, which is not uncommon in nuclear fuel fabrication, occurs due to human error.
e.
Fire hazard: are not considered.
f.
Criticality safety signs are not adequate protection.
MIII.B.18. Air sampling equipment will not be adequate to protect health
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and to minimize danger to life or property. The application states that air-monitors will be used in lieu of fixed-position air samplers.
a.
Westinghouse does not state maintenance-requirements or sensitivity of air-sampling equipment.
b.
(WITHDRAWN)*
c.
Equipment will not represent the concentrations inhaled by exposed personnel.
(1) Air-sampling equipment will not duplicate inhali1g and exhaling rate of an average individual.
- Contentions which appeared to overlap those of Petitioner Safe Energy Alliance of Central Alabama were withdrawn at request of the Board
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Atttchment B 4-(2) 7M system will not indicate nor segregate materials' that will be retained in upper and lower respiratory systems of individuals exposed to high concentrations of radioactivity.
XIII.B.21.. Respiratory protection equipmer4 rs not adequate. The license application does not contain:
a.
The type of respiratory protection equipment proposed for use; b.
Assurance that respirators will be available to all personnel subjected to high levels of airborne radioactivity; c.
Monitoring, inspecticn, decontamination, repair and sterilization equipment for respiratory protection equipment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing upon the following named parties by mailing the same to them cn this the 29th day of May,1981.
John F. Wolf, Chairman Dr. Martin J. Steindler, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3409 Shepherd Street Argonne National Laboratory Chevy Chase, MD 20015 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, IL 60439 Dr. Harry Foreman, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Docketing and Service Section (3)
Box 395, Mayo Office of the Secretary University of Minnesota U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Canaission Minneapolis, MN 55455 Washington, D.C. 20555 Donald R. Marcucci, Esq.
Sherwin Turk, Esq.
Law Department Legal Staff Westinghouse Electric Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 355 Washington. 0.C. 20555 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Julian C. McPhillips, Jr., Esq.
U.S. t!uclear Regulatory Commission 516 South Perry Street.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Montgomery, AL 36104 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eckert, Seamans, Cherin Washington, D.C. 20555
&-Mellot 42nd Floor 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Dr. Ira L. Myers State Health Officer State of Alabama Department of Public Health State Office Btdiding U
Montgomery, AL 36104 Cathplynn Dona son
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