ML19345H580
| ML19345H580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco, Calvert Cliffs |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1981 |
| From: | Cooper J EG&G, INC. |
| To: | Shemanski P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H576 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-0231, CON-FIN-A-231 EGG-1183-4181, NUDOCS 8105210300 | |
| Download: ML19345H580 (15) | |
Text
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i INTERIM REPORT h:EBs3
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HRC TAC #
10788 Report No. EGG 1183-4181. Revision 1 Contract Program or Project
Title:
Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support Subject of this Document:
Technical Evaluation of the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Design Aspects of the Override of Containment Purge Valve Isolation and Other Engineared Safety Feature Signals for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Type of Document:
Informal Report Author (sh J. H. Cooper EOh Date of Document:
April 1981 1
Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Office or Division:
Paul Shemanski, Division of Operating Reactors This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use.
It has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.
EG&G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations San Ramn. CA 94583 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington. 0.C.
Under 00E Contract No.B&R 201904031 NRC FIN No. A0231 INTERIM REPORT NdM/6 M d
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1183-4181 April 19f'l I
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, iWSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 by J.-H. Cooper Approved for Publication Yhl'*, (le, '.
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'J.' R. Radosevic Department Manager e
This docu:nent is UNCLASSIFIED l
Derivative Classifier:
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' Nicholas Ef Broderick I
Department Manager l
Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract No. DE.ACOS-76 NVO 1183.
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ABSTRACT This report documents the technical avaluation of the electrical, instrumentation, and control design aspects of the override of containment purge valve isolation and otner engineered safety feature signals for the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2.
Tha review criteria are based on IEEE Std-279-1971 requirements for the safety signals to all purge and ventili. tion isolation valves.
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l FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the Selected Electrical.
Instrtmentation, and Control Systems Issues (SEICSI) Program being con-ducted for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors, by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Field Test Systems Division of the Electronics Engineering Department.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission funded the work under an auti ization entitled " Electrical, Instrumentation and Control System Sc;pu.t," B&R 20 19 04 031, FIN A-0231.
The work was performed by EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U. S. Depart-ment of Energy contract number DE-AC08-76NV01183.
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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.
INTRODUCTION.
1 2.
EVALUATION OF CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AIO 2 3
2.1 Review Criteria 3
2.2 Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuits Design Description 4
2.3 Containment Ventilation Isolation System Design Evaluation.
5 2.4 Other Engineered Safety Feature System circuits 5
3.
CONCLUSIONS.
7 REFERENCES.
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I TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF.THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (Docket No. 50-317 and 50-318)
J. H. Cooper EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations 1.
INTRODUCTION i
Several instances have been reported where automatic closure of the containment ventilation / purge valves would not have occurred because the safety actuation signals were either manually overridden or blocked during normal plant operations.
These events resulted from procedural inadequacies, design deficiencies, and lack of proper management controls.
These events also brought into question the mechanical operability of the containment isolation valves themselves.
These events were determined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) to be an Abnormal Occurrence j
(#78-5) and were, accordingly, reported to the U.S. Congress.
As a follow-up on this Abnormal Occurrence, the NRC staff is l
reviewing the electrical override aspects and the mechanical operability aspects of containment purging for all operating power reactors.
On November 28, 1978, the NRC issued a letter entitled " Containment Purging l
During Normal Plant Operation" [Ref.1] to all boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) licensees.
In a letter dated January 12, 1979 [Ref. 2], the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGEC), the licensee for the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2 re-plied to the NRC generic letter.
In a conference call [Ref. 3] and in references 4, 5, and 6 une 11censee described the purge valve isolation system design changes made to the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power station,
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Units 1 and 2, as discussed later in this report.
t This document addresses only the electrical, instrumentation, and control (EI&C) design aspects of the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) and other engineered safety features (ESFs).
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1 2.
EVALUATION OF CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNirS 1.AND 2 l
2.1 REVIEW CRITERIA The primary intent of this evaluation is to determine that the following requirements are met for the safety signals to all ESF equipment.
(1)
Criterion no.1--In keeping with the requirements of GDC 55 and 56, the overriding
- of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) should not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) for those valves that have no function besides containment isolation.
(2)
Criterion no. 2--Sufficient physical features (e.g.,
keylock switches) are to be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.
(3)
Criterion no. 3--The system-level annunciation of the overridden status should be provided for every safety system impacted when any override is active (see R.G.
1.47).
Incidental to this review, the following additional NRC staff design criteria were used in the evaluation:
(1)
Criterion no. 4--Diverse signals should be provided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system.
Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure (where containment high pressure is not a
~i portion of safety injection actuation) snould auto-matically initiate CVI.
i (2)
Criterion no. 5--The instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate the ESF should be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.
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- The following definition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:
Override:
The signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal.
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The valve control logic has been revised to incorporate a reset permissive, so that if a trip occurs and the system is subsequently reset, the system will remain isolated until each valve is individually reset.
i The valves are also controlled manually at the train level.
Indicator lights are provided for each control train, as are indicator lights for each valve pcsition indication.
. When a monitored plant condition calls for isolation, a trip occurs in ESFAS train A and/or B and the trip contacts open causing drop-out of the control relays.
Trip contacts also open in the valve ' control causing de-energizing of the solenoid valves.
The air control valves close, removing air from the containment isolation valves, which close by spring force.
2.3 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION In response to this issue, the licensee for Calvert Cliffs has committed to minimizing the nember and duration of purges, most of wnicn are performed on an interim basis wnen the plant is at or below the hot standby condition.
The containment ventilation isolation system (CIS) has no over-
- rides and no signals are blocked as stated in the licensee's letter of May 27,1980 [Ref. 6]. We conclude that NRC criterion no.1 is not applicable.
Similarly, NRC criteria nos. 2 and 3 are not applicable.
CIS is initiated by high reactor building pressure only and lacks
-diversit".
In the letter dated May 27, 1980 [Ref. 6], the licensee agreed to add tne safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) to CIS and containment radiation signal (CRS).
The completion date for diverse initiation is given in a letter dated October 19,1979 [Ref. 5] as January 1,1980 for i
Unit 2 and at the Spring,1980 outage for Unit 1.
With the addition of the SIAS and CRS, NRC criterion no. 4 will be met.
In the letter dated May 27, 1980, paragraph 1 (1) and (2) [Ref.
6], the licensee states that the instrumentation and control systems pro-vided to initiate engineered safeguards and CRS are designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.
Paragraph 2 of Reference 5, and a letter dated t
t April 7,1980 [Ref. 4], state that with the modified system, resetting of the isolation signal will not cause automatic motion of any ESF valve.
Review of the modification to the circuitry verifies this feature.
i We conclude that NRC criteria nos. 5 and 6 are satisfied.
2.4 OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) SYSTEM CIRCUITS.
In the course of this review, otner ESF systems were audited for compliance with the criteria previously listed.
The information provided
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CONCLUSIONS 3
The El&C design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and otner ESF signals for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station were evaluated using those design criteria stated in Section 2.1 of tnis report.
We conclude that wnen the modifications proposed by the licensee i
are completed, the design of the CVI system will meet the NRC staff criteria.
We also conclude that the otner ESF circuit designs audited meet the NRC staff criteria.
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j REFERENCES 1.
NRC/00R letter (R. Reid) to BGEC, " Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation," dated Noventer 29, 1978.
2.
BGEC letter (A.E. Lundvall) to NRC (R. Reid), " Containment Purging Cat.g Normal Plant Operations, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station, Units i and 2," dated January 12, 1979.
3.
Telephone coe/erence call with NRC, EG&G, and Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, February 11, 1980.
4.
BGEC letter (A.E. Lundvall) to NRC (R. Reid), "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket nos. 50-317 and 50-318, Containment Purge and Isolation," dated April 7,1980.
5.
BGEC letter ( A.E. Lundvall) to NRC (0.G. Eisenhut), "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2. Docket nos. 50-317 and 50-318 Follow-up Actions Resulting from TMI-2 Incident (Lessons Learned),"
dated October 19, 1979.
6.
BGEC letter (R.C.L. Ol son) to EG&G (J.H. Cooper) "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Containment Purge-System," dated May 27, 1980.
7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Tern Reconmendations," NUREG-0578.
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LLNL/Livermore EG8G/SRO l
Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory EG&G, Inc.
P. O. Box 808 P. 0. Box 204 Livennore, California 94550 San Ramon, California 94583 M. H. Dittmore L-97 (2 copies)
Author (2 copies)
C. E. Brown (4 copies)
B. G. Mayn M. W. Nishimura LLNL/ Nevada NRC l
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosutission P. O. Box 45 Bethesda, m 20014 Mercury, Nevaca 89023 W. E. Reeves, L-577 (2 copies)
J. T. Beard, MS-416
- 0. G. Eisenhut, MS-528 i
' a G.
Lainas, MS-416 l
1 P. C. Shemanski, MS-416 q
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US00E/MV00 US00E/ TIC l
i U. 5. Department of Energy U. S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Technical Information Center P. O. Box 14100 P. O. Box 52 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 Dak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 J. A. Koch T. /eernathy (2 copies)
R. R. Loux R. B. Purcell e
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