ML19345H230
| ML19345H230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, SQRD-50-328-81, NUDOCS 8105010286 | |
| Download: ML19345H230 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATT A NCC G A. T E*.*.E 5 5 t.E 3 7.:O f 400 Chestnut Street ' Dower II April 27, 1981 SCRD-50-328/81-27 Mr. James P. O'Fei y, Director j
[%APgj0 ISg7A.)
Office of Inspec cn and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear atory Ctanission Regicn II -
te 3100 M
101 Marietta treet 7.,
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- Atlanta, gia 30303 s
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUCYAH NDCLEAR PIRFr 12T! 2 - SPATIAL SEPAPATICti NR CCEEUr!S AND GBLE TBAYS - SCED-50-328/B1 FINAL REPCRP The subject deficie:rf was initially reported to NIC-CIE Inspec+xt R. V. Crlenjak cn April 1,1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as ?CR SCN SWP 8112. EmlM is our firal rescrt.
If you have arrf questicns, please get in touch with D. L. Lactert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yuirs, TSIM VALIFI AumJF1d L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Pegulatien end Safety Enclosure Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)/
cc Cffice of Inspecticn and Enforcement U.S. hbclear Regulatory Ccmissicn Washingten, DC 20355 gsIf Sdt i
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4 ENCELEUNE SIC 00YAH NUCLEAR PIRTT LWIT 2 10 GR 50.55(e)
SPATIAL SEPAPATICN FOR CONDUITS AND CABLE TPAYS SCRD-50-32S/81-27 FINAL PEPORT Description of Deficiencv During an NFC audit corducted March 30, 1981, it was discovered that the required 20-foot spatial separation between conduits (2PL5025 and 2PL3029) and train A cable trays was not achieved. We conduits serve the reciprocating charging pumps and the train A cable trays contain redundant cables for the centrifugal charging pumps. We 20-fcot separation criterion was specified by the NFC as a result of its auxiliary system branch fire protection review. B is ncnconforming condition is attributable to an incorrect assumption that a 1-1/2-hour fire wall extended frcm the floor to the ceiling to provide the required fire protection; the wall does not actually extend to the ceiling. E is nonconformird condition was an isolated incident.
Safety Implications Had this condition rer.ained uncorrected, the redundancf of essential safety-related equipnent (charging pumps) could have been lost during an exposure fire. - A loss of essential safety-related equiprent such as the chemical and volume control system ccuponents could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.
Corrective Actions T7A has issued an engineering change notice (KN !b. 2998) to rercute the conduits to achieve the 20-foot separation as required. Rerouting of these conduits will be crapleted before fuel loading of Sequoyah unit 2.
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