ML19345H002
| ML19345H002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/03/1981 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104230014 | |
| Download: ML19345H002 (81) | |
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Transcript of Proceedings 5
'v,/ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c;.
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STAFF BRIEFING FOR COMMISSIONER BRADFORD ON NRC FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM i
l Friday, April 3, 1981 i
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Pages 1 - 81 1
Prepared by:
C. H. Brown Office of the Secretary l
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1 l
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t
2 !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 1'
I 5
STAFF BRIEFING FOR COMMISSIONER BRADFORD ON 6
NRC FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM 7
8 Friday, April 3, 1981 l
9 l
10 11,I 12,
i' 13 i
i' Participants in the Briefing:
i 14 I
15 t
Robert Minogue I
Richard Vollmer i
l Ronald Feith 16 Victor Benaroya j
Greg ry Harrison 7
Devid Notley La.;ry Shao 18 B.D. Liaw 19' N h*
Tad Marsh hGh 20 21 22 23 i
1 24 I n
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i (10:15 a.m.)
1 MR. FEIT:
The Fire Protection Research Program 1
2 was estsablished soon after the Office of Research was l
'3
'l formed, and mainly, in response to the needs identified in 4
l the Browns Ferry accident.
5 l
These needs were primarily identified in the 6
Browns Ferry Report as NUREG 0050.
The Office of Research 7
l put together a draft program plan, and.then formed a 8
i research review group to provide both an initial review of i
I 9 j the draft program and an on-going review of the program j
I 10li as it would unfold.
11 l
A final program plan was published about a year o
0 12,
later, and I believe, it represented a fair cbnsensus j
13l.
of opinion of those offices that were participating at the l
14 a!
time.
li 15 i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
When you say, the Office 16 l
.of Research and those offices, do you offices within 17 Research or was NRR also involved?
18 MR. FEIT:
I'm sorry, I&E and NRR.
There were l
19 three offices together.
Each had a member assigned to the 20 Review Group, and we reviewed the draft and came together f r three or four different meetings, discussed the areas 21 that were in contention and then put out a final program 22 I
P ""*
1 23 l
24 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
This would have been i
a 2 a. 4 in '76?
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MR. FEIT:
This was about 1976, middle of '76.
2 Ilj The main objective of the research program as 3
we finally agreed to it, was to evaluate the existing 4
i standards and guides that were in place at the time.
5 The secondary objective of the progam, which 6
l turned out to be, perhaps more important, was to evaluate I
i 7
the fire protection features that were utilized in nuclear 8
power plants.
And for the most part, these were not t
9 y represented by existing standards and guides.
l ji i
10 ji COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Can you explain that in j
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a little more detail?
i i
12 MR. FEIT:
Yes.
1 13 Many of the features that were installed in 14 nuclear power plants, and I think this practice just y
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carried on from the non-nuclear requirement, was based on 16 industry practice.
If it was done before that way, 17 generally, it was done again.
There were loose guidelines 18 that were considered engineering judgments, good engineering 19-practice, things like that.
They were not firm guides and standards.
20 For example, the coating materials that people 21 wereusingatthetimetosprayonthecabletraysthatwouldj l
22 ffer some additional degree of fire retardancy, were not put 23 gh on to any recognized standards that would come from IEEE or i
p ASTM.
It was industrial practice, and for the most part, the 23 :
l.
9
l 4
i I
1 i
method of application, degree of thickness and so on, and 2
the conditions that you applied the coating unden were 3
l things that were supplied by each individual supplier.
4 There was no general industry practice that you would point 5
to in the form of an IEEE guide or TSTM guide.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So when it came to 7
evaluating the coatings against our standards or guides, I
t 8
what wo61d happen?
What would the evaluator go after?
9 MR. FEIT:
I can't speak for what the evaluator i
l I
10 did at the time, I can tell ycu what we did in the research j
l 11 ;f program.
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12 When we cane up against this portion of the program l
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13 !
we found that in most cases, what we had to do was, first, j
14 develop a test method -- test methodology and test
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procedures.
And a good part of our program was aimed at 15 y I
16 developing these test methods by which these safety j
i 17 features could be evaluated.
And in some cases, these 18 methods have been used or adopted by industry and are, to a certain extent, generally accepted standards.
19
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20 develop our own test program on something like that, that l
is, I can see where there are a number of areas in which l
22 I
nuclear standards are just higher or different, but I l
23 24 l would have thought that fire protection would be one you i
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25 !
could have borrowed pretty extensively ---
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MR. FEIT:
So did I when I took the program over, 2
and I was shocked to find that that was not the case.
MR. MINOGUE: Concurrent with this activity, 4
there were a series of meetings that were set up with the 5
National Fire Protection Association and with ASTM and 6
with the other standards groups.
t 7
I think there was a general recognition at that. time 8
that there were -- many of the procedures that you would 9
use to test various features that provide for standardization-10 where there were no standards.
The industry standards 11,l program was quite incomplete, is what I'm trying to say, 12 and that was generally recognized as people 16oked.at this l
13 problem, and also, there have been a number of fires in 14 recent years that have cause very extensive property l
Il 15 l damage, and people generally in industry are more conscious of fires and costs than they were, say, 15 or 20 years ago.
16 17 MR. FEIT:
I would just like to amend my remarks l
l 18 by adding one thing.
1 19-For the coating material specifically, there was 20 a Factory Mutual test, and a Factory Mutual approval, l
21 but the coating material had been tested and approved as applied to a single cable, and said nothing about how 22 effe tive it w uld be on a cable tray, and in response to l
23 a typical design basis fire that you might find in a g
nuclear power plant.
This testing did not exist.
23 4
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The manufacturers of the materials didn't have it, and I
2 Factory Mutual didn't have such tests because they weren't 3
paid to do it.
I l
I 4
1 When we consulted Factory Mutual at that time, i
5 their first response was, yes, it is long overdue and you 6
should do this kind of testing.
But there was no means, g
l 1
l no funds, no program in place before we started.
j 7
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8 MR. MINOGUE:
There is another problem that 8
l i
9 sort of runs in parallel with this that is also widely 10 l preceived,andthatis,howwelldothetestsfireconditions{
11.l conform to what you have in the real world fire.
How i-12!!
representative are they.
That is also an area where 13 l
this is a great d2al of this kind of concern.
l i
14 (Slide) 15ji MR. FEIT:
The program plan that we finally j
l i
16 l published consisted of the following specific program i
i elements.
l 17 1'
These program elements all represent different 18 safety features.
Taken together, these safety features, 19 they comprise the total fire protection system in a plant.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
This is a program that is still concurred in by I&E, NRR and Research?
?
MR. FEIT:
This program is represented by these 22 8 program elements.
This is what we put together 25.!
initially We were told to bring them in on everything in
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1 1
this program with one exception.
NRR did not feel that 2
this item on detection systems was necessary.
They 3
weren't opposed to it, but they didn't think it was really 4
all that necessary.
5 l
Since that time, there have been some differing j
l 6
opinions as to whether some of these program elements should :
7 j
be continued.
I guess we will get in to these a little I
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later.
I 9
,1 Also, I would like to point out that in addition i
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to these -- the safety features represented by these i
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program elements, you have the administrative procedures --
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12 plant administrative procedures relative to fire,, and also,I i
a 13 the plant fire brigades.
These two add to the total level I
d of fire protection in a plant.
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15 'l Now the results of some of these research items i
l 16 showed there were some shortcomings relative to some of f
i 17 the safety features represented by these program elements.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When the program was first 18 appr ved, how many years was it projected to go over and at 19 what cost?
20 MR. FEIT:
I'd say -- Well, cost, we didn't have 3
any total projected cost at the time.
I If I remember correctly, when we originally 2a, 24 :l.
i proposed the program plan, we thought we would be finished j
by about 1981.
So I would say that looking at the program 25 i,,
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now, we are probably running about a year and a half or 2 i
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two years late from what our original projection was.
But 3
l you have to realize that when the original program was put 4
I together it was put together in a very general way.
These 5
are the' kinds of things we think we need, we will define 6
the details later.
As a matter of fact, that was the l
7 purpose of the Review Group, was to provide the detail, test 8 [
requirements, test plan as we went in to these various I
9 elements.
So it was not the easiest job to project a total l
i 10 schedule, for the whole program.
Of course, there have i
ll i' been many deviations, some additions, some cancellations.
g i
12 lI COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What do the costs look like 13 ;
now for this?
h 14 q MR. FEIT:
The total cost of the program today 0
15 l is between 3 and a half and four million.
i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's to date?
16 17 MR. FEIT:
That's to date.
ig COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Plus whatever it takes to 19 complete it?
20 MR. FEIT:
I would. say, to complete the program 21 as we had originally planned would probably be about another
$2 million.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Sorry, go ahead.
23 1
MR. FEIT:
Some of the results of these program I
24 ii 2 a. !;
elements showed weaknesses in some of the individual safety n
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As you are aware, these results ended up in I
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.f the form of allegations as to whether or not our fire 1
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protection systems are adequate.
4 4
Now, in evaluating these allegations, I think it is 5
important to consider not only the results form each of these !
6 alone, but consider the total effect of these safety features 7
l on the plant.
Any additional administrative procedures in' i
h the fire brigades, in establishing whether or not the total 8
h 9 ;!
fire protection system is safe enough.
I think this is one 10 point over the years that has gotten out of context.
We have 11 '
deliberately constrained the program, this portion of the i;
12ll program, to look at separate effects as opposed to. the 1
13 h tota'l system performance.
- I 14 i conclusions have been drawn with regard to the
- I i
15 l overall fire protection capability in power pla :ts, based h
16 !!
upon these individual research programs.
L 17 Our work to date, as I said, has been primarily 18 aimed at these individual safety features, and a type of 19-program that we would call a separate effects testing 20 program.
And of course, there is a separate effects j
t 21 analysis effort that goes along with this to support these individual test programs.
22 23 Our future program, work that we are proposing 24 y f r the remainer of this fiscal year and on, will focus more.
il directly on the overall level of fire protection.
We feel o
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we are close to the end of what we think we need in the It 2
way of separate effects testing.
We have an understanding is 3 0 of these individual effects, now we would like to pull it
- l all together to get the kind of evaluation that I think the 4
1 5
Commission has needed over the years in assessing these 6
allegations that have been made.
i 7
(Slide) i 8 !:
Before I discuss the results, I thought I would l
t 9
show you some pictures so you could get a feel for what the f
f 10 l research program is all about.
We have talked about it a I
11 j lot in the past, but I don't think anybody has ever seen 12 what goes on.
I 13 ll The testing -- most of the testing was conducted l
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in this particular facility, it is a Quonset hut around j
14 i
15 ji 20 feet high and around 60 feet long at Sandia Laboratories. :
d i
(Slide) i 16 17 We started the program looking at the effectiveness f cable tray separation.
What I mean by that is:
how 18 effe tive is physical separation between two cable trays 19 in preventing the propagation of a fire from one tray 20 to a next and so on up the line.
What we did is varied the spacing between cable l
trays, both vertically and horizontally.
We initiated 23 i
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fires electrically by over current; we also initiated fires l
0 using a simulated exposure fuel, in this case propane.
We 25,
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l-
11 I
also looked at different types of cable.
Cable that had 2
been tested to an IEEE standards, cable that had not been 3
tested to an NRC recognized standard.
We made measurements 4
within the cable tray bundle.
We made measurements within 5
the space between cable trays to calculate heat fluxes, 6
which is the heat density in a similar manner that the 7
neutron or gamma flux would be described.
And we tried 8
to draw conclusions as to how effective different separation 9
distances would be to preventing propagation.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How did you happen to 11 use Sandia?
MR. FEIT:
Well, when the Office of Research 12 was established, this particular program was already 13 underway.
It was a very small effort, it was a $5,000 or 14
$10,000 effort that had just started, and Sandia had been g
chosen.
Now, it was my understanding that Sandia was chosen because the Commission directed it -- the work to l
be done there, as a national lab.
s 19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Directed that the work 20 be done at a national lab or at Sandia?
21 l
MR. FEIT:
No, at Sandia.
l 22 j
l MR. MINOGUE:
I can add to that.
l 23 i
Now, this may not be the whole picture, because l
24 l
I wasn't a party to the precise decision for this project l
25 l
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at 3andia, but when the NRC was first formed, there was I
l
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a question as to how much we would use the national labs, t
2 and which ones.
Should it be a dedicated lab, should it 3
broadly use all of the labs.
4 Gossick headed a team of guys that went around 5
to the different labs, basically to assess their capabilities.
6 Now, I was with the team -- I was a part of the team that 7
went to Sandia.
What we got out of that was the feeling 8
that because of some of the work they had done in testing weapons components, weapons transportation systems and 9
j!
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10 stuff like that, it wasn't keyed to fires specifically. It l
11 ]
was keyed more to the idea of qualification testing.
12 ll capabilities as it would reflect familiarity with the normal i-13 industrial engineering environment, and th'e consensus of 14 h the Review Group was that Sandia looked like a very promising li
- 15 l
institution to do qualification testing in general.
l 16 l Now, this is very closely related to the kind of 17 testing you define as qualification testing.
The precise thing that people focused on was discussion of
- it was 18 really more'of transportation, secure packaging of fuel 19 shipments and things of that type.
But my guess is that 20 that kind of -- and tnere is an element of speculation 21 here -- but that that kind of general discussion at the EDO level ends up coming down to staff as a directive to put 23 all testing type stuff under that lab, because we want to j
24 f.
concentrate it there.
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(i MR. SHAO:
Also, if you go the a national lab 2 il l'
g you can start right away, because if you go to some other l
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outfit, you have to wait for a year.
b h.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that because of the 5 l!
contracting process?
6 l
MR. SEAO:
Contracting process.
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7 l*
MR. MINOGUE:
Of course, that is more of a
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comparison between i.%
and a national lab.
That wouldn't d
8 9
apply -- a choice between going to another government i
10 g laboratory, we just transfer funds and that also can be 11 ?
begun quite quickly.
i 12 i I am speculating, but I know that all of us were 13 particularly impressed with their ability to do solid,
- i l
14 1 well-thought-out engineering qualification tests, which
{
t 15 j not only is very rare in the nuclear industry, as you well a
1 i
16 know in other contexts, and I think we came out of it with il 17 I
a pretty sound message that staff would have read as pushing
.1 18 this kir' of stuff to their lab.
MR. FEIT:
I might add, when we took the program 19 ver, we wanted some cross-fertilization in the program, 20 and we made an attempt to get other organizations involved.
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21 t'
As a matter of fact, we did get one other 22 1
organization, Underwriter TAhnratorleS who had a competitive h
,,y RFP and they went out.
And I also personally tried to i
get Factory Mutual involved, encouraging them to bid on the RFP and they refused to do so.
i r,
14 l1 1 h COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Why?
i 2 f.
MR. FEIT:
I'm not sure.
- l 3 p MR. NOTLEY
They have plenty of work.
Il 4
MR. FEIT:
The official word I got was that the 1
i 5
program was too small, it was too big an effort.
6 l
Let me just show you what some of these look like.
I 1
7 Here is a typical fire that we started. This one was started l'
electrically in the center of this cable tray, and what l
8 i
9 we are studying here is the progagation above.
The mechanismi i:
10 'l for progagation is of some interest.
These hot gases filter l' i
11 j through the cables, there are air spaces, and the hot 12 l gases collect under the next tray.
When they.get hot i
't 13 j en ugh, they literally explode under this tray and you have l
a fireball that then progagates back down.
So the mode 14 i
i gi of propagation is the hot gases migrate creating an l
explosion up here, a small explosion, the fire then migrates down to this tray creating a fire.
That led to conclusions 7
l that the way we really want to prevent progagation is to 18 close up the air spaces between the trays, either with a i
barrier or with coating material, where the coating material l
20 totally seeps into the tray closing down the air spaces.
21 After we looked at the individual cable tray 22
!l propagation problem with electrically-initiated fires, we i
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knew we had to go to explosion fires because the Browns 24 -
d Ferry and other experience has shown that fires are more 25 i
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likely to start because of other combustible materials 2 4j that are brought in, and the Commission sources that would b
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be around, so we looked at typical plant configurations to it ti 4
l see what kind of fuel load would be involved in a given 5
safety division..
Now, this schematically shows one 6
safety division.
These 14 trays represent one safety 7
i division.
8 Now, there might be a very small portion of these h
I 9 q cables that are safety related, and they would be located 10 l
some place in this division.
Most of this cable would be 11 !!
non-safety related.
The separation standard, the physical d
e 12 h independent standard that we were using, Reg Guide 1.75, j
i 13 did not address itself to how much additional fuel load i
14 there would be in this division.
It only said that the ti i
15 h division that the safety cable is in, shall be five feet 16,
away vertically, and three feet away horizontally from l
l 17 redundant safety cable.
But in fact, when we looked at l
l 18 typical power plants, we found configurations in which this is typical.
And we constructed a test --
19 i
(Slide) 20
-- which looked something like this, where these, 3
i we called
" stacked division", and the redundant safety j
division, which is up here five feet away which you can't 23 h see, is another division three feet away horizontally.
These i 2,. i.
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pipes, conduits have cable in there, and that is a typical c
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thing that you find in power plants where safety cable 2 0 l
might run right through the division, but inside a conduit p
10 3 "
P for protection.
4 4
I So we were testing both the effectiveness of h
conduits as well as the separation effectiveness, on the 5
i 6
l ability to prevent propagation between divisions.
7 This test was a failure in that we showed that 8
once a fire was started in one of these bottom trays, and ll 9 [
it was fully developed, and by that, I mean the temperatures ;
i 10 0 were high enough and we had sufficient area that the fire
!i 11 N would sustain itself, that propagation would occur with the il P
12 ;;
separation distances between these trays, which I might add, j
13 li l
were typical of what we found in the plant.
As a matter ll i
14 "
of fact, there were a few cases which were even worse.
i k
i 15 h This was a conserv'ative case, but not the worst case.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It sounds more as though 17 the test was a success, but the configuration was a failure.
18 MR. FEIT:
Right.
19 I guess there is some prejudice coming into my statement and I apologze for that.
20 The test was successful.
We learned a lot from 21 l
I it, but we found that the position that had been taken many i
22 years e
re w en ese plants were build, namely, tnat 23 ll separation distance alone was adequate when, in fact, it was N
But I might add that the staff position prior to this not.
2a, i
y 17 1
test also recognized this and the staff were working with 2
the utility people to try to correct the situation by 3 l adding additional safety features.
So in a sense, this 1
4 really confirmed these staff position at the time.
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, when you design 6
a test of this -- when you talk about this particular 7
test, is that done in conjunction with NRR, that is, do l
8 they have direct input in to the configuation being tested?
l 9
MR. FEIT:
This particular one, when this test l
I 10 was constructed, the Review Group was working quite i
i r
11 j effectively here.
The people had more time, the work load i
12 was not such that they couldn't attend these meetings, and 13 inf.this test, the NRR people were heavily involved.
14.
Charlie Miller, who is now retired, and Ray Shaw who was I
I l.
15 w rking for him, was heavily involved.
We made planned l
l tours together and they spent a number of days with me at 16 t
Sandia working out these test details.
So they were 17 heavily involved in this particular test.
18 l
MR. AUSTIN:
In this study, the effects of the 19 fire rules, do you look to the conductivity of the cables l
themselves to see whether the temperature of the fire was 1
21 affecting the performance of the cable?
MR. FEIT:
Yes.
As a matter of fact, the failure
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criteria that we used in all of our tests, one of them, i
- mainly, the ability of the wire to conduct current.
25 f l
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These cables were all under load during the 2
entire test, which is no small problem, because during 3
the fire when you get failure, you get severe short 4
I circuits.
5 MR. AUSTIN:
So you were looking for those 6
l kinds of hazards?
l I'
7 MR. FEIT:
A lot of thought and a lot of work 8
goes in to these tests.
They seem simple when you look l
9 at them, but when you consider all of the detail that goes j
i i
10 i
in to it in some places, yes, it was.
11 j-l 1
MR. AUSTIN:
But the purpose also is only on l
ll 12 p safety-related cables?
Do we know much about'whether 10 13 pieces of non-safety related equipment failing causes l
14 a safety problem?
E 15 lj MR. FEIT:
I'm not sure I understand your l
16 question, but I will try to answer it.
17 Typically in a power plant, the safety cable 18 and the non-safety cable are the same type.
The 19 architect / engineers order one grade of cable.
So you are 20 talking about the same cable.
The function in this tray, 21 you may only have two cables that are actually safety-related, the rest of them would not be, but typically the 22 ables would be the same.
f 23 Now, the other part of your question, I think is, g
2a N if you have a lot of non-safety related cables ---
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1 MR. AUSTIN:
That you think is non-safety.
I 2 1 MR. FEIT:
-- that we think is non-safety related..
L I
3 y can that affect the performance of the safety-related cable, (
li 4 li and the answer is yes, because it represents a fuel load.
b 5
MR. MINOGUE:
- Sir, there is another sense too.
6 You have got a very, very complex interactive system here, i
l i
7 and in the real sense, the whole power plant is one system.
I 8 !,
Obviously, if you get a common-mode failure i
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mechanism that causes many, many failures in other systems, 10 h the operational combination may be significant.
That is p
11 q an area that we know very little about.
It is not in thic l
12 !;!
Precise context, but I think that is one of the big problem a
13 0 of future users.
n 14 ]
MR. FEIT:
It is really a part of the electrical interaction.
15 il l
MR. NOTLEY:
That is really the purpose of the 16 i
associated circuits prior to Appendix R and so on, to 7
l delve into that, and indeed, it is a great complex problem.
8 MR. MINOGUE:
This is another element in this 19 kind of test growing that may not be coming across, in a l
sense, we are also, by doing this kind of test, either i
21 l
l qualifying industry standards or qualifiying specifications 3
22 i
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that were used by iadustry in purchasing this stuff and 23 il 24]'
installing it.
So, in a sense, you are testing the configurations that the standards prescribe rather than to 25 '
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sit down and from some basic principals try to figure out 2 I what the spacing should be.
There is a strong element o
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in this kind of program.
Qualifying the standards.
i tl 4
In fact, I think the program was started when 5
it was perceived, there was some real doubt in people's 6
l minds as to whether the standards were adequate.
There l
8 7
I was a very strong element in the inception of this program il 8 P to qualify the standards, or not qualify them, to find out l
t 9
what was needed from there beyond.
l li i
10 MR. FEIT:
Yes, that is a good point Bob.
11!l One thing I wanted to point out is that in i
F i
12 j constructing this test, what we tried to do ih every case 13 is use the same practice that industry was using.
We bought l 14 l the same weight, the same specifications, from the same t
15 l suppliers, we laid the cable in to the best of our I
li 16 ability the same way that it would be laid in to the plant.
17 Things like pulling the wire through these 18 conduits, we used the same pulling compound that they l
19 used, it is a soapy thing, and in every detail that we 20 could think of, we tried to replicate the industry practice.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: We are going to have to 22 pick up the pace a little bit if I'm going to hear any 23 other parts of the briefing.
l i
MR. FEIT:
Then we moved on to look at some of the !
24 n
L fixes that we might -- some of the other safety features that
,_ o
i I
I 21' i
I 1
might improve the problems that we discovered in separation 2
tests, one of the things that we looked at was cable 4
3 tray coatings.
The coating, in this case, is sprayed on 4
the tray and, hopefully, that prevents progatation between 5
trays.
6 (Slide) i 7
l This is the coating material after a test.
In this~
8 I case we were studying retardency of the coating,its ability 9 j to prevent ignition from a flame sorce below and then
'i 10 h propagation to the tray above it.
1 11 h (Slide)
I h
I Here is one that didn't work.
The' fire was 12 ;i 13 l
starting here, and it ignited this tray and then spread to l
I 14 (l the tray above it.
As you can see, it resulted in a large
!l i
15 ]
fire.
16 !
(Slide)
I 17 I thought I would show you briefly what this 18 replication test looks like.
I will have some slides in i
j 19 a minute.
'This is a portion of the Browns Ferry auxiliary 20 building outside the reactor wall.
There are four vertical 21 trays that are of prime interest, two here and two that are hidden.
They are located in a trough that could collect 22 flamm ble liquid that possibly could be ignited.
l 23 24 j Right next to these four trays are three conduits O
23 -
that also run up to a set of horizontal trays above.
There P
l 22 i
il s
il 1 I
[
is redundancy in division -- divisional redundancy in the 2 0 jj conduits and cable trays, and also within the three conduits.
O I will talk a little bit more about that later.
'l I
4 I
(slide) 5 This is a plan view showing the four vertical 6
cable trays and the three conduits.
Coming up, you can 6
7 see the trough area within which the cable trays are located.i i
8 j That represents a very natural containment for any l
9 j flammable liquid that might spill.
j l
1' 10 l9 (Slide) l j
11 "
I showed you before what the program looked like c
12 when we first put it together.
Here is how it actually 13 ll unfolded over the years.
There are two items on this il 14 vugraph that were not on the original program plan.
4 15l!
One of them is the full-scale replication test
\\l 16 l{
of which the Commission is aware.
Another one is the fire 17 hazards analysis support, which we are projecting to 18 start in '82, but we haven't started yet.
l 19-One item that was on the original list that we 20 have not started yet, and that was an item whereby we 21 could evaluate the vulnerability of equipment cabinets.
All of the work that we have done to date is aimed at 22 the protection of cables, which is a primary concern in i
23 plants.
Cables and cable trays, I should add, but there 24 is combustible material splices and cables come together in 25 b
l-
I 23 l
l 1
i equipment cabinets that are also vulnerable in places like l
2 i
the control room and so on.
This item has not been started l
3 yet.
Our contractor is strongly recommending that we do i
4 this, but we have't reached agreement within NRC at this 5
time.
6 l
The program started with horizontal cable tray l
7 testing.
We described that before.
We were then to go on 8 i to test' vertical cable trays, also in an open space l
1 9 j configuration.
I might add, the horizontal cable tray I
i 10 work was done in an open plant area where the influence of l
l l
11,j the walls and ceilings would be minimal.
12 lI We then wanted to go on and do vertical testing 13 ).
also in an open space, to see how vertical cable trays j
ll 14 !
propagated.
Because of the failure that we had here, and 15 ji the subsequent UCS petition, we reoriented the program il 16 lI slightly.
We started to get in to the full-scale testing; i
17 we conducted a full-scale test at Underwriters Laboratories.
4 18 That also resulted in a Commission hearing in which you were a partp to.
l 19 COMI 10 R
Le 's see, does de l
20 full-scale replication test give you a certain 3
amount of vertical cable tray testing as well?
g MR. FEIT:
Yes.
23 l
24[l Let me show some of the slides here. That might help.
i l
i (Slide) f
?
4 f
8 l
24 i
j i
i I
This is the vertical replication test being 2 il constructed now at Underwriters Laboratories.
This is b
3 I!
up close to the ceiling.
This is about a 30 foot ceiling 4
and here is the horizontal cable trays.
5 The vertical cable trays rise from the floor.
Thero 6 I are four of them in close proximity, and then they empty a
7 l
in to the horizontal cable trays.
I 8
(Slide)
{!
Here is another view looking from the floor ap, 9
10 h and you can see the vertical cable trays rising up to the 1 1 ll, ceiling and the horizontal trays.
The pipes are the l'
i 12 j water sprinkler system they put in.
i il l
13 i (51i60) f 14 ',
This is the ground level view showing the four 15 0 vertical cable trays, and
- the three conduits.
This is a 0
16 6 junction box that happens to be in place where the splices I
17 were made during construction.
18 So to answer your question:
Yes, we will get 19 some vertical cable tray testing.
20 (Slide)
This is another view.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Why don't you go back to 22 23 l
the other slides as we may not have time for the others.
24.i MR. FEIT:
Okay, let me say a little bit about one other program which you might be concerned with.
This
l 25 I
I l
i
]
1 is a different type of program.
The IEEE 383 flame test.
l 2.
This was the standard for connections and splices 3
for Class lE safety related equipment in nuclear power i
i 4
plants.
It is an IEEE standard which has been adopted by I
5 the NRC.
We decided to undertake research in this area l
l 6
because of an inconsistency in the results that we were I
i 7
seeing as submitted by industry.
The same cables would I
8 l
pass or' fail in different test facilities.
We realized l
l 9 q there were some problems with the test and we undertook l
10 !
a parametric evaluation of the test at UL, and we published !
I, I
11 !j a report and submitted recommendations to Standards
(,
12 d Development and that has been incorported into a modified i
l 13 Reg Guide.
f 14 j We did testing on horizontal trays to see the n
i 0
effects of walls and ceilings, whether it made the fire 15 i
16 l w rse or better.
In this case, it contributed to the fire intensity.
17 We did work on fire suppression systems.
We have 18 just finished some work on halon.
The reason for getting in to this work was because of some data gaps.
There was no data on halon, on how it performed in response to a deep-seated fire.
What I mean by a deep-seated fire is one that is fully developed and the center temperature is 24L]
a maximum temperature of about 1500 degrees and a lodge i
in the fire area.
2 5
i I
~
26 l
i 1
0 1
i:
1 ll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What is the importance of 9
2 i halon testing for the licensing purposes?
ll 3 j!
MR. FEIT:
Right now, 20 or 30 percent of the a
i I
4 i
plants do use halon in some portions of their plant, but
.I 5
there is no data that says -- there is no data that supports 6
l the effectiveness of halon against a deep-seated fire.
i 7
j Now, halon is designed to work on the flame I
8 front.
It is supposed to work with a rapid detector and ld l
suppress the flame front.
There is no data that indicates 9
L i
10 4 how effective it would be in a deep-seated fire, and in o
i 11'!
postulating a single failure, namely, a detector system II 12 might not respond as they did not with the UL test that 13 g we ran.
U 14 The question was raised:
How effective would 15 g the halon be in putting out a fire that had time to get i
li 16 li started?
The results of this test showed that halon is h
17 l quite effective on a deep-seated fire. We were surprised, as was the industry.
We just finished that work.
We g
showed that the minimum concentrations and sometimes, 9
as suggested by NFPA, a DuPont manufacturer was quite adequate.
MR. AUSTIN: An interesting note is halon is used in the North Anna control rooms.
23 MR. GIBBONS:
We don't accept halon in f
j d
Appendix R, do we?
Do we take any credit for halon in 25 '
l..
27 I
i l
1 Appendix R?
N 2
MR. HARRISON: There wasn't any problem in ll 3
i Appendix R, so we didn't address it.
t 4
MR. BENAROYA:
Yes, we do, especially in the
[.
i l.
5 cabinets in the control room, and in some arear where 6
there is no way that we can use water.
We don't give i
7 l
credit for CO -
2 l
.t 8 P MR. NOTLEY: It simply wasn't addressed in l
9 j Appendix R because it was not a problem.
This was not one 10 [
of the areas that we were having disagreements between the i
!i 11 ll staff and the licensees.
12 !!
MR. GIBBONS:
Is that because the licensees were
!}
13 l
not using halon as a primary suppression system?
f l'
14 d MR. NOTLEY:
No, there was agreement between the i
il h
staff and the licensee.
15 i
l MR. GIBBONS: That it was effective?
16 MR. BENAROYA:
Appendix R is only for our 17 ncern, we had these agreements with the licensees.
If 18 we had no problems, that would be good enough in itself.
g But in Appendix A, yes, we d1 give cr5dit to halon under 20 some conditions.
21 MR. GIBBONS:
Let's see, it is not used to protect cables, is it?
'{
MR. BENAROYA:
Yes. In PGCCs, the power complex L
24 under the control room in the new BRW-6s.
That section is 25 I
l,r 28 i
i I
i 1 l protected by halon.
I 2 I i
MR. GIBBON:
Now, let's see, did the industry 3
8 come forward with tests to show that halon was effective?
4 l
On what basis did the staff accept halon?
5 MR. NOTLEY:
Keep in mind that there is always 6
is used.
some sort of water backup wherever halon or CO2 I
7 As of a minimum, at least manual hold strings, l
8 "l
and some of the places, I believe,they are installed, not 9
automatic sprinkler systems, and manually operated sprinkler l l
10 systems.
j 11 d MR. MINOGUE:
Where they have a real fire problem, !
i; 12 N we always specify water.
13 MR. HARRISON:
North Anna and other plants have i
4
'14 ';
had halon in their cable spreading rooms and in any place 1l 15 lI there is a group cable fire hazard, the staff has not d
li 16 l:
given credit for that and specified water suppression 17 l
l systems.
i l
18 MR. NOTLEY:
Or not given credit for that alone.
19-MR. HARRISON:
Okay, in my personal case, in l
20 a cable spreading room or a gallery or in a case where 21 a halon system was used, once we have been in there and 22 specify water suppression systems, the to me, halon is 1
23 t issue and they have gone along with the idea.
It am was already installed and if they want to take it out,
{
24 I don't care.
The primary suppression is an automatic water 25 l
l l
[
L U
I I
?
29 l
!t
!i h
1 suppression system.
To my knowledge, there is no data 2 i suggesting that halon is effective on cable fires.
In fact, NASA has a policy out dated in '79 stating that halon g
I 4
is prohibited.
5 i MR. BENAROYA:
I'm af' raid there is more to it.
6 GE has run quite a few tests with halon in i
7 California, three years ago, for the PGCC specifically, 8 I and they showed that it is quite effective as long as we j
h 9 j used test cell cables.
10 MR. HARRISON:
We were not using test cell i
11 l cables?
Y 12 [
MR. BENAROYA:
No, just giving some~ tests for 13(L some conditions.
e 14 0 MR. FEIT:
As a matter of fact, we found' I
i 15 y that halon was as effective or more effective on non-l I!
i 16 !!
qualified cable.
The reason being, that you don't get t
17 a deep-seeded fire in non-qualified cable. It burns it 18 completely.
There is nothing burning beneath the surface 19 and the halon actually works better in these cases.
20 Why don't I move on.
21 This is a summary of the results that we have obtained to date.
We have worked on the separation 22 23 l criteria for electrical initiated fires.
We have worked 24ll n exp sure fires and reached some conclusions from other ii 2a..'
research information on these data.
We then looked at i
i l+
e 30 I
i
!i
(;
l!
il 1 0 fire retardant coatings and fire shields, and the work 11 2 il we did has been published, and we wrote a research information 3
paper on that.
We did some full-scale work where we got 4
some data on how sprinklers would respond in a typical design-5 basis fire, and we did get some feel for vertical trays and 6
l then testing, but nearly enough yet.
i 1'
7 We completed the work on the flame test for IEEE 383, s
8 and we intend to write a research information letter on i
9 d that.
The corner effects work was complete and published j
t 10 h for horizontal trays, we still may want to complete some n
11 !!
more additional testing on vertical trays.
12 ]
fires stop works and preliminary data has been published, 13 h and we are discussing now within the Review Group whether i'
14 we should continue that work in looking at additional I
l' i
15 test parameters.
And the halon work that I talked about, 16 we do intend to go on and do some work with water.
l 17 CO2, the water tests are ready to go, we are just waiting 18 f r our agreement here on the test plan.
We hope to get that resolved next week.
19 We also did some work on evaluating the fire 20 retardancy of aged cable.
We were concerned that a cable, 21 as it ages would lose its fire retardant material which 22 is a low-molecular weight material that is typically not 23 chemically bonded, and the thought was that under elevated i
conditions, this might fuse out leaving the cable in a 25 e
as
r i
i' 31 l
l l
l i
0 1 fj degraded condition later in life. We did some work on 2 !I g
that, just completed it and found out that was not the 3 i case.
The retardancy is maintained.
3 4
I I
So in summary then, our future program that we 5
are proposing, and in some cases it is on-going, is to I
6 complete the fire suppression work, that is water and l
7 CO, complete the replication testing and perhaps you 2
8 would want to discuss that?
I i
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I was going to say, I I
i 10 gather with regard to the replication testing, there seemed a
11 to be some difficulty a test run of a system that we would g
i 12 h' currently be approving.
Why don't you talk about that 13 program' l
14 '
MR. FEIT:
Let me just run through these items.
I 15 ]
complete the fire stop testing with some 16 l
additional items, excess fuel and cold side conditions 17 and ventilation, the cold side of the room and so on.
18 We wanted to work -- we are thinking about 19 working on an in-place smoke detector test.
Right now, 20 these detectors are tested on the bench of a factory.
21 There is no way to test these detectors, once they are 22 installed in the plant.
We don't know how effective they 23 j
are in picking up the response -- picking up the smoke and responding to a fire once they are installed in the plant.
i 24
'i An ther item that we would like to look in to when 25 t
I 32 I
i j
D 4
1 E l!
we get to the point, of the overall fire protection of n
the plant.
We feel we have enough separate effects data L
3 {l and separate effects analy.cis that we can now start putting n
4 this all together into an improved method of fire hazards 5
analysis.
This could be in a form of a Regulatory Guide or 6
l industry standard that would provide guidelines to a I
7 fire protection engineer in evaluating the vulnerability of 8
different areas in the plant due to the suseptibility 9
or loss of redundant divisions to the fire.
10 Let me talk a little about replication tests.
l 9
11 I'm sure you are aware of some of the history.
The original l h
u 12.;';
proposal was to test a number of different configu, rations.
n 13 !!
We originally proposed Rancho Seco for the make-up room.
I' i
1 14 '
We started negotiating with the utility and at about the l
15 ';
time we got serious, we found that they had made some
(
16.
modifications and that test was no longer relative.
l 17 We then went to the next item on the list, and I i
18 should say that this list is something that was provided 19 by NRR, the Task Force that Steve Hanauer headed.
We started working on the next test which was Arkansas 1, 20 and we were at a point when we were ready to start 21 constructing, we found that there were some outstanding 22 i
i 23 i
disagreements between the utility and staff, so that that 2 *, d test didn't fit the guidelines, the guidelines being that
,, g the area had been reviewed, approved and in place.
Ane 1
l l
c
l 33.
I t
l 1
we got a Commission order last May, CLI -- I forget the 2 l number -- but anyhow, it came out last May and at that 3
point the Commission said that we wanted you to test the I
4 i
most vulnerable configurations first, the ones most likely to 5
fail.
6 l
So that caused us to reorder our priorities l
7 again, and we went to the Browns Ferry plant, and that's j
l i
8 i
where we are right now.
I l
9 y At the time that Hanauer's Task Force put j
10 together the recommendations, the configuration that I l
11 j showed you earlier was believed to contain redundant safety j
12 lq cables, or at least it could have.
When the reviewers made 13 their review, they did not know that there was not i
I 14 functional redundant cable in the vertical cable trays c
15 lI and the conduit.
i 16 i
Now, there is a difference between functional i
17 redundancy and divisional redundancy, if you are familiar 18 with that?
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Do I need to be?
19 MR. FEIT:
Well, yes, because divisional 20 redundancy, you might have division "a" cable here and 21 division "b"
cable here.
1+d !.t looks like there is a 22 p ssibility that the, iig oe functional redundancy.
23 g!
i In other words, you r,1ght have two circuits that would N
initiate a pump.
One would be here and one would be here.
2a.
4 4
u li 4
g
_34 l
i i
I f
I i
- l I
lli 1
Now, if you lost both of those, that is clearly 2 0 l
3 'I; a safety problem.
But if you had sono thermocouple circuit here that was working some totally different system and 4
they had a pump system here, you could lose both of these, 5
but not lose functional redundancy.
6 Now, when the people made the review initially I
7 j
at Browns Ferry, they did not go in to detail of trying to i
8 l
decide whether it was actual functional redundancy in these I
9 vertical cables and the conduits.
So Hanauer's group, in li 10ll looking at the Browns Ferry design assumed that it was 11 ll i
l volatile configuration, because the vertical cable trays i-12 !!
and the conduits were very close.
J 4
13 !!
When we got the details from the utility, which i
l 14 0 was this November, and took a look at every single circuit,
!i 15 n we found that, in fact, there were no functional redundancies.
16 They were divisional redundancies.
You have division "a" 17 and division "b", but in fact, no functional redundancies.
18 S
even if the test fails, you would not even 19 think of shutting the plant down, because they haven't 20 reached any -- it is not a safety issue.
In addition to that, they have put in an alternate shutdown system, which 21 l
also violates the original premise upon which the 22 23 l replication test was formulated.
l'il So that is where we are now.
24':
2a 9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, where does that leave you?
i l
l 35 i
MR. FEIT:
Well, we discussed this in the 2 l l
Review Group meetings in December and it was the consensus 3
l of the Review Group, which represented mainly NRR and 1
4 l
Research, that although the test wouldn't give us an 5
awful lot of information, it probably is worth continuing 6
because at the time the plant was reviewed, with _the
~
7 understanding that there could have been functional 8
redundancies, and it would be interesting to see if l
j!
that was successful.
9 il 10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The configuration would i
v 11 j still be approvable without the alternate system?
It 12 ;l I
would not be approved?
l l;
MR. BENAROYA:
No, because we don't give credit 13 3
i 14 '
to coating any more.
The reason we want testing is I
L l
15 because we give credit to coatings at Browns Ferry.
16 l After Browns Ferry, we changed our minds and we didn't I
17 give credit from then on, except in a few plants where ---
.i l
la COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that why Browns Ferry l
19 then installed the alternate system, once they couldn't 20 have credit for the coatings?
MR. BENAROYA:
I don't know why did.
21 22 l MR. VOLLMER:
You see, from a general perspective, I think the answer to your question on verification testing 23 L
ll as such, we had a number of meetings beyond the Review i
24 e I
Group meetings, our staffs, Research and NRR, and discussed 2a.
?
i Y'
u 36 l
l l
1 the Browns Ferry replication testing as well as the 2
r.:ontinuation of other replication testing.
3 j I think, as we see it right now, I think I'm 4
speaking -- between the offices, we think that the 5
continuation to completion with the Browns Ferry replication 6
test would be cost effective in terms of a fire protection 7
l research, we would gain certain things out of the test.
8 We have a fair investment in the test right now, and I 9
think it is prudent to continue with it.
j 10 We are, however, doing two thin.gs.
One, NRR is 11 l
about to formally recommend something that we have discussed :
i 12 with Research already, and I think there is agreement on 13 a slight modification or extension of the Browns Ferry 9
'i 14 !
test, and there is sufficient information that we think i
15 i
would be useful in the fire protection program by adding i
16 a third component to the test.
17 As far as the continuation of replication testing, 18 I think we would be coming down to the Commission, jointly l
19 between the offices and saying that we think it would be 20 cost effective in terms of overall fire protection research, to rethink the additional replication tests.
We don't have 21 t
much dollars invested in them right now, and we think 22 i
i that because of the types of information that we are j
23 looking for and the things that have happened in the fire protection program in terms of the limitation of 4
b
I' il i
l 37 t
i d
1 0f Appendix R and our current review effort and so on, that i
2 !
perhaps replication testing would not be the best a
3 "I' expenditure of dollars.
I hope, before we begin,to discuss t
4 this between the offices and the Commission.
MR. MINOGUE:
I would like to add a little by 6
generalizing.
7 We are trying to be responsive to what we take 8
as a Commission directive.
That is, in terms of planning 9
j research program tests of.this type are not test that you l
4 i
10 'i would normally do.
There are either no useful results or 1
i 11;l they yield very useful results at a very high cost and
- i 12 y there are the general questions about the reliability.
il 13 y This is not good research.
It may be seen as needed, but 14 l it is not good research.
!i l
15 !l So I think when you are talking about going j
t i
16 forward, we are talking about, given the investment j
l 17 already made, here are some worthwhile things to do that 18 are cost effective.
In starting from scratch, this not the 19 kind of thing you want to do.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, it sounds like a 21 g
d discussion for the day when it comes down.
l l
MR. MINOGUE:
Well, I should say that bluntly.
22 i
ii COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As a warning.
l 23 h i
MR. MINOGUE:
Okay.
24 MR. VOLLMER: But your March 6th memo asks that 5
r 38 l.
1 8
we discuse replication.
I think, as far as Browns Fe.ry 2
we are in agreement that it should go forward, a slight i
3 $
modification, we think, will give us some additional very l-H 4
l cost-effective research information.
The rest of it, I
5 we.will get to you as soon as we can on those.
6 MR. GIBBONS:
Dick, is the modification such 7
i that it would represent a configuration which would be 8 d acceptable under Appendix R so that we would be testing
)
h 9 j Appendix R?
i 10 MR. VOLLMER:
Yes.
11 ;!
In fact, it is not clear the total applicability F
i 12 ll of the Browns Ferry test.
That is all in the eyes.of the 13!!
beholder, but we do feel that it is a worthwhile test to n
i 14 !
go on with, and we are getting exemption requests from i
i l
industry now on the backfit of Appendix R and if these 15 ll I
16 f tests give us information that we weren't likely to expect, 1
i l
17 it could influence those, and it could influence the impact 18 f Appendix R.
So we really should go forward with it.
MR. MINOGUE:
You can see, this is a proof 19 i
j 20 test.of an application of a lot of concepts.
Since these are Proof tests, it is not a general -- this is going to 21 give me a 1 t of insights, it is just a proof test.
22 f
f MR. GIBBONS:
This is not a typical configuration?
23 l
i l
MR. SEAO: There are so many combinations of i
24 :
configurations.
l 25
{
I b
i l
l 39 I
1 l'
MR. MINOGUE:
There are no typical configurations, 2 '
- }
and there are no typical fires.
Now that we have laid i
3 1
out the basic facts, let talk about what kind of work 4
you do.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see, Bob, 6
supposing, just hypothetically, that we actually had I
standardization in a high degree such that there were 10 I
7 8 ll or 15 plants which did, in fact, have identical configur-lI 9
(
ations ---
l I
10 MR. MINOGUE:
Yes, but you have to recognize 11 the standardization you have got to talk about has got to l
I i
12 ;lf be everything that is involved. So it is a standardization I
13 j; of layouts, a standardization of component and equipment i
i l
14 'l.
locations, it is standardization of your cable layouts',
!l l
15 ]
it is standardization of your operational practice, it is i
16 a standardization of your control of final materials, 17 et cetera, et cetera.
18 MR. BENAROYA:
May I say something.
It is very 19 difficult to standardize fire protection in'that respect, 20 because it is not that you build on the North Pole, it is 21 not that you build in the Sahara.
We have completely different ventilation systems, and the ventilation system 22 is the key to the fire protection.
23 24 j S
whether you are standardizing ventilation i
o systems, the reason I'm saying that is because I was 25 I
t
1 I
40
~
I I.
I 1 0 y
involved in replicating an ethyl plant that was designed 2 i!
It in Houston which went to California.
The company told us a
3 y"I to build it exactly the same way, whether.it is build in i-4 l
Texas or California it won't mr.ke any difference.
[
5 Well, we started with that.
The first thing that 6
we found out was that the weather was completely different.
i
~
7 Second, the terrain was different and therefore the i
l 8
drainage would be different.
So the standardization didn't i
9 j!
work very well in the plant.
It worked very well in j
il i
10 i the process.
The process was identical, but the ventilation 5
I 11 h system and the layout seemed to be different.
l h
i 12 j' COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It sounds as'though what 13 [
you are saying about replication testing is, in some way, l
14 ;1 applicable to all testing, that is, whatever you test is --
'i 15 F if you tested situations that existed in no plant and just I
il I
l' i
16 /
tried to generalize on the basis of the data of other 17 plants, why is that a more satisfactory test than a 18 configuration that may, in fact, just exist in only one 19-plant?
20 MR. MINOGUE:
You can build up a body of 21 knowledge by doing separate effects tests to specific i
22 phenomenon, and if you couple that, as Mr. Feit pointed i
)i ut, to some kind of a general fire hazards analysis where j
23 y u try to assess some of these imponderables that relate 24 m re to plant configuration, ventalization system design 25 i:
'l 41 i
i i
i I;
1 j
and things like that, you can begin to come up with an 2 H
.i organized methodology that will give you a tool that you e
3 d
[
can assess a very complex system.
But you have basically 4
i got to build it up from separate effects test, and to do l
5 this aally well, it involves a very large program far 6
l beyond anything we talked about here.
This is a problem 7
I that is whid.y perceived throughout industry in general.
l t
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You see what I'm saying, j
1 9 [
that is, if you learned so that the configuration at Browns I
i 10 Ferry was unsatisfactory and found quite a similar I.
11 jl configuration in New England and they said, wait a minute, li 12 ll our ventalization system is different, then you can't i
13 generalize.
It is hard for me to see why that is fundamental 1g 14 different from doing the cable tray testing and then
!i 15 h trying to go out and use it as the basis for regulatory l
l 16 actions, then having the licensee saying, well, hell, 1
17 you didn't test the ventalization system.
18 MR. MINOGUE: When you build a very complex array i
19 and test it, if there is a failure, that tells you a l
20 great deal.
You are certainly right about that. If it doesn't fail, it really doesn't tell you anything, because 21 the general applicability of that data that is done on a 22 very specific configuration is very questionable.
23 l
Now, if I come down to the next tier down and 24 25 t
e
r 42 I
1 j
easier, easier, but not easy, to'now generalize this 2 H f
ii basic data more broadly. In no case is the problem simple.
b 3 1 This problem is -- people have been concerned with fire 3
4 protection standards broadly, and this is a major thing 5
that ASTM is concerned about over the years.
They are 6
almost staggered by the scope of this problem, and the 1'
7 importance with which is generally handled is shown by 8
these wide-spread fires that make the headlines just every 9
few weeks.
It reflects a basic problem in a very complex j
i 10 area.
j i
11,j All I'm really trying to say, and I think there i
l; 12 jf is pretty much a consensus on this is that in~ dealing with l
l 13 this very difficult problem, don't kid yourself, that i
14 !
replication tests give you a hell of a lot of very good I
15 l information. What they really give you is a proof test or l
16 J they may give you some red flags that say a particular l'
17 thing is no good, that you thought was good, but they 18 don't give you a lot of board understanding.
That is not 19 to say that doing it other ways is really easy, but it 20 is going to be easier in replication tests.
Think of it in terms of LOFT.
Very high cost, very limited output.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
LOFT you would also i
22 l'
call basically a proof test?
~
23 MR. MINOGUE:
LOFT is a replication test.
24 Very high cost, very limited output, very hard to apply.
25 I,
l'. -
1 l
43 1
i i!
l U y
MR. AUSTIN:
On the choice of Browns Ferry 2 II ii for the replication test, I would have thought that b
3 d
Browns Ferry, having had the fire that started the whole 4
issue, and having to re-cable because of the fire, that t
i 5
l they would have one of the best configurations in the 6
industry today.
I I
i 7
MR. MINOGUE: That is touchy.
t 8
j MR. AUSTIN:
I was just wondering about the i
9 typicality of that, and is it -- -
j i;
i 10 ll MR. VOLLMER:
They did that on an existing plant.
j i
11!l I'm not suggesting that they didn't try to make it foolprcof, f
12 !!
I can't qualify what their problems were, but they had certain 13 !!
constraints which, in a lot of points of view, may have U
4 14 made the job more difficult that, let's say, I
15 i have done if they had started from scratch.
16 MR. AUSTIN: So they 13 /e remair.0' somewhat t
i 17 typical.
18 MR. VOLLMER:
I guess so.
MR. FEIT:
Now that we have said all of those l
19 negative things about the replication tests, let me leave 20 y u with the fact that it is on schedule, and we don't 21 expe t it to overrun.
As a matter of fact, slightly 22
'3
'i
,,, j MR. MINOGUE:
Let me add something, Commissioner i
I is Bradford.
If the Commission wants that kind of test we will 25
- i U
r v;
44' 1
I 1
go out and do it and sufficiently well.
I mean, that's t'
2 l our job.
li 3 [
MR. GIBBONS:
When you say, "on schedule,"
l 4
j whose schedule are you talking about?
i t
5 MR. FEIT:
The last schedule we sent you.
1 6
MR. GIBBONS:
I mean, it is not on the original i
7 schedule, by any means.
8 MR. FEIT:
No, the schedule that we presented on 9 g Browns Ferry, and I know you came back and were upset by i
10 l it, but we held to it because we knew it was realistic 11 and it is.
We are about two weeks ahead of schedule.
n 12 ll That is about the best we can do.
We have spent about half 1
of the money on the program, and we will start the separate 13 I'
b effects procram on schedule.
j 14 n
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When is the test actually 15 i i
due?
16 MR. FEIT: Well, the full-scale test -- the full 17 test Won't be antil July, but we expect to start the separate effects testing that is required to build up to i
that in about May, I believe.
I think that is all that I had.
21 MR. VOLLMER:
I think we have touched on a couple 22 of other areas, but in a few minutes I would like Vic 23 l
Benaroya to give you an idea where we -- how we have used 1
2 5 (..
the research results and the licensing process, which is i
?
4
I l-45 i
i l
i l
I j
something else you wanted to know.
Then Greg Harrison 2 H t
will ---
li 3 4:'
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would especially like 4
to know, Vic, how your concept of the research program over 5
the future plans with what we have just heard.
I also 6
want to hear from Greg.
I 7
MR. BENAROYA:
Do you want to hear first what i
8 we have found out from the res'earch to date, or do you i
dlI want to hear what we would like to see in the future?
9 il i
10 i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see, I'm going to 11 d have to press a little on the time.
i 12 [j l
MR. BENAROYA:
It is very short.
I l
13 li The test run verified that the separation 14,1 criteria which is contained in Reg Guide 175 of a few f
l j
(
i!
15 y feet ho,rizontal and five feet vertical is not adequate j
16 h for fires when we consider explosure fires.
i 17 (Slide)
.l 18 Reg Guide 175 was written only for electrical 19 cable fires.
The test verified that coatings cannot be 20 xmi&usd at rated fire value.
Now, this also, I have to 21 add that the manufacturers of the coatings never claimed 22 i.
23 l
that either, but some people thought it was and in Browns l
24 ;
Ferry, we didn't give credit to that at the beginning, i
ii and that's why we were running the replication test as 2a.
['
I I
46 I
li p
- i 1 N being most vulnerable.
g!
l 2
l (Slide) 3 The test showed also that the intensity area of 4
walls and ceilings can be higher because of the ventilation 5
and the radiation effects from the heat.
Therefore, when l
we are looking at corners, we have to be more careful.
6 i
7 i
(Slide)
J 8
The few tests conducted show that deep-seated ei 9 [
fires can be extinguished by 5 to 7 percent halon.
We l
- j 10 l; had doubts at the beginning that even 20 percent was l
i 11 ll adequate.
In the few places where we do have that, we l
c 12 !!
have Men quoting 30 percent, and we said that that would 13 iae based on verification by test.
So now, we have a few 14 places where we do have it, 30 percent and that is i
i 15 adequate.
It is over 20 percent, anyway, but very few places.'
16 c The few places usually is at PGCC at General Electric, the
{l i
17 BWR-6.
18 (Slide) 19-In the full-scale test we ran last summer, we 20 found out that some fires that are small can cause damage, 21 but not initiate the suppression system, and that shows that we do need to have defense in depth that only one 22 i
23 echelon is not enough.
You have to look at the whole i.
i 9
P cture.
2 24 2 a_ '
(Slide)
G
47 i
t l
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l Also, from the same test, we found 6ut that if il 2
a fire is from blanket-like kaowool installed in a l
u 3 y vertical tray, we should seal the bottom, because it acts l
'l 4 I; like a weight.
And I don't know of any place where we l
l i
1 5
do use kaowool in a vertical configuration, but it 6
could be used in the future.
i 7
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And this is all kneyladge 8
which, as nearly as you can tell, is not available from I
9,l Previous fire research efforts in other industries, done h
10 ]
by the insurance industries?
I MR. BENAROYA:
We weren't aware of it.
11,1 i
]
MR. MINOGUE:
They are more worried.about wide-l 12 i
spread property damage. And what we are worried about I
13 P
i here, really, is the destruction of the control capability 14 i
,1 in mplex transits.
15 I
' IR. BENAROYA: They can take some damage, but 16 l
we cannot tolerate it, we cannot shut down.
There is a l
17 l
difference.
18 (Slide) 19 Last, we found out that the aging effects, if it 20 was disqualified with 383, it is a good test.
It is 21 something that can deteriorate with time. We are afraid 22 that time might deteriorate the fire retardant that is i
23 1
compounded into the cable.
i=
24 Y 9
These are the items that we learned from tests.
25 '
a 6
i
I t
48 1
For the future, we are proposing four tests 1
2 I that we thing would be very useful.
We have been using 3
a 20 foot separation criterion for quite some time.
4 (Slide) i 5
We have some identical work done on it, but we 6
need verification as to how effective and what is a level of I
7 safety for having the 20 foot separation 8
(Slide) l 9
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's.see, the basis I!
f r the 20 foot safety criterion at the moment is the li 10 11 ;j Gage and Babcock recommendation?
D 12 ll MR. BENAROYA:
Yes, and it was -- once we said 1
4 a
s not adequate, we hau to decide what would be 13 4l adequate.
We have to determine what distance is adequate.
E Then what Bob says come in to place. It is a 15 j
16 very complex situation.
How big a fire are you going to i
I assume?
If you assume it 55 gallon drum of oil coming in, a 20 foot difference is not enough.
On the other hand, we do have procedures that would probe into things like that.
Well, then we look at two gallons of heptane which is 20 a nice critical. value because we calculated BTUs very 21 well, because from plant to plant, it will vary.
Based 22 l
on that, we found out that 20 feet is just about an l
23 i
q acceptable amount.
It is not absolutely
- correct, j
24 -
p it depends on what you want to assume.
But if you take 25 4
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49, I
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a 1 0 y
a match, of course, then that would be quite adequate.
ti 2 4 i
g We would like to conduct one or two large scales 3 0j' to confirm the effectiveness of ceiling level sprinklers.
4 l That came out, again, from the test we ran last summer, 5
the distance is very effective -- it depends on the distance 6
l or the height from the floor as to whether the sprinklers i
7 i
are going to get initiated and whether the density we are-II 8 ]
having is adequate.
We need some more information on
!j I
9 that, to see how well -- how we can depend on this suppression 0
i 10 systems.
j 11 9 (Slide) c 12 The full-scale Browns Ferry, we want to add a 13 third one, and that is putting in a one-hour barrier a
14 1 between the two divisions as we have -- this is one of I
li 15!!
our acceptance criterion that we have now in Appendix R, i
j 16 and of course, to be incorporated into our best position.
17 And we want to verify that again, it is like verifying 18 the 20 foot separation, it is the one-hour barrier.
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There is no one-hour 20 barrier in the Browns Ferry fire?
21 !
MR. BENAROYA:
No.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But they have the alternate 23 h, system?
MR. BENAROYA:
That's right.
This is just for 24.'
l our own education and see
-- as long as we have the whole 20
i i
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50 i
1 I
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1 13!i configuration it is an ideal place to test it.
Il g'l 2
l MR. FEIT:
That is assuming you get a failure.
3 ":
MR. BENAROYA:
Yes.
1 f
4 (Slide) 5 The last one, again, is for education.
If we 6
have 20 to 40 foot high cables and if we start a fire, 7
by looking at the temperature of the different elevations-8 l!
and the propagation rates, we can get a lot of education ll I
9 ;!
and information as to what kind of fire protection and j
li i
10 what kinds of things we need to suppress such a fire.
l i.
11 0 It is an education.
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i.
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I 12 qlt MR. VOLLMER:
It represents a situation.that we j
I 13 ;l come in to a lot in the plants and we would like to see 14 :!
what type of suppression is effective in dealing with il I
15 that kind of a fire.
I 16 !
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let's see, these are 17 things that you would like to do.
Are they things that 18 are actually going to be done?
19 MR. VOLLMER:
As I indicated, we have had a lot 20 f meet!.gs -- staff meetings with Research in the last.
21 six months, and NRR is preparing -- trying to coordinate 22 l the fire protection, and we are proposing things and 23 discussing things that Ron had indicated that they would wish to go forward on. For example, the fire hazards i
24 e
25 ;
review is something that we need more staff discussion 1
4
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before we can settle down on whether we agree that is
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is a viable cost-effective bit of research.
3 !!
To answer right now, I think the first thing i
i 4
that we would like to see is some discussions on the 5 !
effectiveness of the replication tests.
Next, I would 1
6 l
press what we thing the fire protection program should I
i 7
i go forward with from now on.
~
i' 8
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That projection, on 9
i that one slide, Ron, of your future program and -- you 10 d don't actually have any more ---
- li
?
11 MR. FEIT:
I don't have any more slides.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Could you put that one 13 h up, then?
it 14 MR. VOUJER: You see where it says " complete,"
i i
li 15 i
certainly on the first three, we are in agreement with 16 l
completing those tests.
There is not an area of 4
I 17 disagreement there.
The fire hazard methodology is 18 something we have not worked out with the staffs as to whether or not we think that is -- we should go forward 19 with.
They haven't initiated anything either, that is 20 something that is currently in the thought process.
21 I
l Item 4, ---
I MR. FEIT:
There is a feasability study going 23 L o
il on right now to see whether the program is doable.
We i
24 r d
expect to get something from Brookhaven on that.
2 a,,
e f
l-52, f
l 1
j MR. MINOGUE:
We might or might not hold back 2 i from that ourselves.
3 lI I think, in discussing this kind of program 4
i j
there are two levels you come out with.
One, is to talk
[
5 about general approaches and types of tests, how you are 6
going to come at some of these issues.
i s.
7 Once that is settled, I think the specifics, 8
'cl the kind of stuff that Dick was talking about, are best i
9 i resolved by mutual discussinn between the staff. Whatever l
t i
10 they come up with together that they both agree to ---
11 0 MR. BENAROYA:
Let me emphasize that all programs N
i 12 ll are based on the information we have learned in the last it 13 $
five years.
As you can see, we have seen these things il 14 !
now and it is time to proceed.
4-1 15 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And I gather that the t
16 e program of the last five years was in substantial part, t
17 at least, developed through the original -- the three 18 office coordinating committee.
4 19-MR. MINOGUE:
Yes.
I 20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, is that committee still active or some variant of it?
21 MR. FEIT:
It is still active.
It is not as 22 active as it was, and I think partially because of the 23 I
0 ndition of the workloads in the various offices.
24 s
. I:
MR. MINOGUE:
Well, also, I think, in a very real 20 t
i 53, e
N 1
y sense we are kind of the end of a phase with a certain 2 il g
element of re-grouping and re-thinking going on now.
3 4
[
We have done a lot of the initial work, we have got a l
4 I
lot of results, there has been a lot of case work done 5
and we have probably a better understanding of what some 6
of the real world problems are.
i 7
~
I think right now, we are in a re-group mode.
8 We need a lot of dialogue and discussion.
i' I
9 MR. GIBBONS:
You know, if you look at the l
i 10 pl five bullets there and you look at Vic's three or four j
i!
I 11 d bullets, I don't see a lot of overlap.
It almost seems il i
12 !!
like the two offices are ---
o 13 0 MR. VOLLMER:
Three of those are complete.
- One, F
14 of which Vic indicated we should be going forward with~.
f 15 ll I think this is something Vic indicated, we have used a i
16 lot of the research ourselves, and this is how we see j
l.
1 17 us going forward in the future and --
i 18 MR. MINOGUE:
Yes, Vic points are more specific l
l 19 tests that they would propose to run as part of an overall 20 thing.
I don't think they are at the same level.
21 Vic's stuff is a sub-set of what you are looking 22 at, almost by definition.
They have specific things that I
they want to explore, we chug at it.
We try to do it in l
23 i(l 2, ll the frame work that fits in to some overall approach.
8 MR. FEIT: There is one more item that I really 25 l
O 54 I
1 had on here that I should have put on, and that is j
additional vertical testing.
3 If you remember, during my presentation, I said j
l 4
I I wanted to do more vertical testing.
The reason I didn't 5
put it on here is that I recognize that that is an area 6
that we have to get more closely together on.
When you i
7 get the configurations and the type of cable and so on of 8
the initial source.
So it is almost put down here in I
9 replication testing, but I didn't want to refer to it in l
'i i
10 replication testing, because I don't want it in an j
ll !f actual replication test.
I want vertical tests and 12 separate effects.
So as Mr. Minogue points out, this is 13 lp a higher level, broad areas, and there are more specifics.
14 We have no problems with the things that Vic U-15 !l suggested.
i 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: You had an earlier slide 17 tnat indicated, I think is part of your on-going program, 18 the issue of fire penetration testing.
That, I guess is 19-a score point between the two offices?
20 MR. FEIT:
There is some disagreement on that..
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Can you talk a little about that?
22 MR. FEIT:
Well, originally the program was 23 24 l endorsed, agreed to. Subsequent to that new people have come 9
25 ;i in to NRR and they have had differences of opinion.
NRR has r
Fi n
b
1 i.
6:
55 1 f been on record, I guess, in the last year and a half or I
2 it two, as not supporting that program.
We continued the o
3 "
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program, however, because there was a Reg Guide being 4
worked on that the Office of Standards developed.
And the 5
work was being carried on for them in support of their-l 6
effort.
I 1
l 7
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Tell me quickly, just 8
in principal, what is it? Is that the way a fire would 9 j!
propagate through a penetration?
l 10 '
MR. FEIT:
You have a. fire barrier in the plants, 11 you have the three-hour wall.
If you put a door in it, 12 you rate the door for three hours.
Now, if you have to j
13 pass cables from one fire area to another through this 14 '
three-hour wall, you have to pass then, through the wall i
15 and stuff the cables and that becomes what we call a i
16 Penetration fire stop.
17 MR. MINOGUE:
Yes, these are potential 18 progagation -- that is a problem in real fires.
19 I think, if there were something that I would 1
expect we might at some later point have some real 20 dispute on it would be this question of fire hazards 21 analysis.
How far you needed to go, what level of fire you 22 could limit yourself to, based on the kind of practice i
23 I
that you have, in terms of what you approve and the kinds 24 n
25 g f systems you want.
But that matter is very complex and L
b
i l
56, I-
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l f' I would suspect if it were in there, we might end up 2 i 1j with some disagreement on that point.
We might be more 3 U inclined to want to do more analyses to define fire
'l 4
conditions under possible configurations of these very q
5 complex systems, then the licensing people could see a need 6
for them.
!l 1
i' 7
Beyond that, I really don't sense any real,
l l
i 8
l.
disagreement.
i li 3
9 j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Explain to me, though, j
10 [!
i the mechanics of the penetration dispute.
If RRR tells you E
11 '
we don't need any further research, then what is Research's 12 h basis for going on with the research?
13 MR. FEIT:
In this case we went on with it because 9
14 h we were supporting another office.
Standards.
They had 15 !l a Reg Guide, Regulatory Guide for the testing of these i
l 16 stops.
What we were looking at, we were testing a test, l
17 we were evaluating the test methodology to see whether the l
l 18 test as described by the -- in this case an IEEE test --
19 simulated an actual challege in the plant.
I think there 20 is no disagreement between NRR and ourselves that the i
21 test does not represent an actual challenge.
I think NRR's view point, you could ask Greg,
is that they feel 22 k
there is so much conservatism in the fire stop any way, 23 l
it becomes a "no, never mind,"
even though the test might g
v t be totally representative, there is enough conservatism 25 h'
I I
,I
-i 57, i
I il 1 l in the fire stop designs that we could best spend out E
2 1 money some place else.
ll 3 l!
MR. MINOGUE:
I think, as an organizational unit, I
4 Standards tends to be a lot more nervous about penetrations i.
I' 5
and penetration and liability, across the board than the I
6 other offices have.
I think they are more nervous about i
i 7
that.
)
MR. VOLLMER: This was in support of a Reg Guide 8 i i
g also, if my recollection is correct, that NRR was interested in, either.
l 10
'l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I was going to say, it 11 12 l really nly removes the problem one step, then the question I
I ec mes:
y s Standards interested in it if NRR ---
13 t
d MR. FEIT: Well, NRR originally asked for it.
l 4
D
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l 15 16 l.
line area like this, you are going to have shif ts, depending j on who the current actors are.
17 I would like to give you a hypothetical answer, though, which is not related to this specific case.
If we wanted to do research on some barrier design 20 that we had some real questions whether it really would do 21 the job or not, we would do that research, even if none of 22 l
the other offices said it should be done.
23 i
24 !l-If we have serious doubts that whatever the i
particular barrier design was, we would do the job.
That is 25 '
f Il I
58 r
I u
1 the kind of thing where you get a real -- we are going to 2 I do it anyway.
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I can understand that i
l i
4 I'
that is on-going.
'ER. MINOGUE:
I don't think this is in that 6
category, though.
I get the impression that this is more I
i 7
~
of a border line judgment call.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I can understand that that 9
type of concern is an on-going one throughout all areas of 10 li i
research, that is, when should you do things on your own and il 11 h when should you have support.
e 12 h, I would think at a time when an office which had 13 supported 'it came to you and said, well, we have decided 9
14 0 we don'.t need it any more, that that would at least be h
15 ]
an occasion for rethinking and ---
16 MR. FEIT:
Well, we are right now.
As a matter i
17 of fact, we may not continue the program.
We have not 18 committed to any additional tests other than what we have 19-already finished.
l 20 MR. MINOGUE:
I give a lot of weight to that.
21 When the primary user comes back and says, I 22 don't need this any more, I give a lot of weight to that.
23 l
I give almost total weight to the reverse situation.
If he l
says he needs something, even if I don't really think he
. I 24 d
does, if the Commission demands that we do some replication 25 I.
I f
I 59 I
h{
l l
j tests, we will do them.
2 0 g
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I can understand why you 11 3
f give weight to that.
4 MR. MINOGUE:
There is a difference though of 5
feeling almost a total obligation to meet requested 6
research, rather than a question of where the research is i
7 j
no long requested you give a lot of weight to that.
I 8
wouldn't necessarily automatically adopt with -- it is a l
9 il slightly different orientation.
j i
10 MR. GIBBONS:
Let me ask, how long do you suppose 11 h it would take if NRR and RES agreed that it was a good E
12:1 idea to go after those -- to test the 20 foot' separation 13 criterion in a one hour time frame.
Can you give me any l
l ij t
l 14 1 kind of a time frame.for that?
l 15 MR. MINOGUE: Well, the way the problem is stated, 16 j
and I really heard it for the first time today, I think the 17 immediate obvious question is how severe a fire do you 18 test against.
You are really looking at an external fire 19 that is affecting these cables, that is a hard question.
20 I think that would be a tough test to plan.
You are 21 literally trying to make a verification of the adequacy f a 20 foot criterion that would be very generally 22 applicable.
You want to be very sure you tested the right 23 r
i j
conditions, and it is not self-evident to me what those 24
'a conditions are.
Given that you have defined the conditions, 25 c; I
L
1 P
l 60 l
1 I
i il 1 9
-the test itself should be quite straightforward.
l 2
MR. FEIT:
You could postulate an explosion fire 1
3 and 4
MR. MINOGUE:
What one might do would be a t
5 parametric set of tests, where you would just do a lot of 6
l fires and if it worked for all of them, then that is the i
1 7
i end of it, and why are your worring and trying to agonize 8
this very complex calculation to decide what fires look like.
g li 9
I MR. GIBBONS:.So if that became a priority item l
i i
10 for negotiations between NRR and
-- You don't have 11 j physical limitations, a test site or something like that 12 that you have to worrry about?
O 13 {i MR. MINOGUE:
No.
If I were asked to do it on
.i 14 '!
a crash basis, we would probably run the same parametric 15 ji test.
l
'{
16 MR. VOLLMER:
On that particular test program, i
17 we do have a skeleton of what we want to do and give i
reasonable consideration to parametrics and some 18 discussion with the Research staff.
l 19 MR. HARRISON:
My name is Gregg Harrison, and I
20 I have got the differing opinion.
21 I'm sure that the memo has been read by all g
l here, and I would just like to go through quickly, because 23 4 I know time is running out or has run out.
24 -
U COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: This is the January 8th --
25.
1 1:
I I
I e
I l
~
61 l
i
[
4 l
1 MR. HARRISON:
Right, Vic Benaroya from me II 4
2 through Bob Ferguson.
l l
3 Taking them in the order as they appear, and l
I 4
to start off, the reason I wrote the differing opinion is
,{
i i
t 5
one, concerning the subject of replication of fire test.
6 For some period of time it was a consensus opinion i
7 among the staff that replication fire tests should perhaps 8
be re-directed or in part, eliminated.
And yet, there 9
- l didn't seem to be any focus to bring this to a head, so I wrote this differing opinion to try and attempt to do that,!
I.!
10 l
1 11 !!
to draw attention to it.
i 12 lll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I gather your position on l
13 the replication fire testing and the one articulated today I
la by both office Directors --
i r
i l
MR. HARRISON:
Correct.
15 I
l Actually, point number one, in my mind, particular l 16 with the Bob Ferguson memo has been resolved.
In other 17 words, the recommendation to modify the Browns Ferry to make it in line with Appendix R and test that 19 configuration and to delete the other replication fire tests.
Mainly, because Appendix R made that test a moot issue that we don't accept coatings as fire barriers, and as Ron Feit had already stated, there is already research documented at Sandia showing that coatings are not an i
effective fire Larrier.
So we have that information and 25 I'
t
.i r
62 t
i i
1 3 I did not 3--
that we need to brief each other.
f-2
'l l;
The second item is the penetration fire test 1,
i 3 H P
program.
My points were that it should be cancelled 4
for the following reasons.
This was in the RES fire c
protection five year plan, I believe.
And that is that 6
to the best of my knowledge, NRR has not supported this I,
7 l
program.
I use the word "never."
To the best of my I
8 [
knowledge that is true.
Private industry is quite j
9 d satisfactory at handling this matter through the ASTM il i
10 o B-119 Fire Test Committee and the NFPA.
The fire test 0
11 ]
program results would not assist in our licensing process.
4 12 ll By the way, the penetration fire test issue on r
13(i the part of the pressure has been studied by' ASTM E-5, which 14 j is a full fire test committee, and they put in an offer to 15;i the industry and to those who thought positive pressure in
- l 16 a furnace might be a significant parameter to come forth l
17 with a fire seal design that would pass a standard, ASTM 18 E-119 fire test procedure, but yet fnil the positive 19-pressure.
To dr.te, that has not been done and the full l
20 c mmittee E-5 has discounted that parameter of the fire test.
We also have it, as Vic Benaroya stated, a 21 t
22 l letter from our fire protection consultant, Bert Cohen, who is also a member of the E-5 committee saying that 23 p sitive pressure in a furnace is a negligible parameter.
24 1
a y
c unisszonEn BaroFono:
I ga aer eat eere 25
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I 63 i
i l
I 1
1 wouldn't be full agreement with all of the points that i
2 '
g you make under the heading of " penetration fire test," but 3
'l.
the disagreements would be more historical, that is, the 4
question of whether your program was strictly an 5
endeavor to change by Research, if I understand it.
6 MR. HARRISON: Correct.
7 MR. MINOGUE:
Well I don't share the view that 8
the ASTM standards clearly categorize real fires.
In fact, 9
I think the exact opposite view at ASTM itself, which was l
10 mandated by the Board of Directors,.in which I will admit, I
.I 11 j helped to write".
It says, we don't know whether these n
12 f standards categorize real fires or not. Andeverystandardusedsaystha$.
l 13 !
MR. HARRISON: Well, the definitely don't.
l' il 14 !!
MR. MINOGUE:
Then I misread what you were saying.
15 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, the controversy 1
I 16 here is -- really only comes to a head if, in fact, you 17 propose to go on with fire penetration testing, that is, 18 the decision which Research still has to make.
19 MR. 72IT:
Well, this other issue too.
It is 20 a question of shether or not NRC requires that future fi" stop testing include the Positive Delta p tests, 21 and I'm not sure where I stand with that.
I just might 22 have a dissenting opinion.
23 I
COMMISSICNER BRADFCRD: A positive --
g e
MR. FEIT:
I'm sorry.
A positive differential i
pressure.
l li
ir 64 l
I 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'm sorry.
MR. FEIT:
I might add that our contractor, l
Underwriters Laboratory also conducts a lot of these 4
fire stop tests, and they are of the opposite opinion.
l 5
They feel that differential pressure is significant if 6
you have an inferior fire stop design.
7 I agree with Greg, in that today's fire stops i
8 that we see going in to plans today are adequate in that 9
j differential pressure will not make them fail. What concerns 10 me, concerns UL, that in the future the rest of the tests 11 ;!
really simulate an exact challenge.
People will design just 12 l to pass the test and you might get some inferior fire stop i
13 designs in plants to safe some money.
14 ',
So we agree, but there is a little subtle 9
15 l disagreement on making sure that industry does the test i
I 16 correctly so that the level of design is maintained in 17 15-20 years from now.
18 So even though we might not go ahead with the 19 test program, because we feel we have gone as far as we can and probably won't do any additiani differential pressure testing, 20 there still may be disagreement of whether or not NRC 21 should require differential pressure in its licensing.
22 I
In f act, my conL.&r may disagree.
They may decide to 23 disagree without me.
g k
MR. HARRISON:
To the best of my knowledge UL does 25 -
e "I
i I
65 i
4 la l
b 1
not have a problem with deleting the positive pressure 2
g from the fire test.
All indications are in the inferior 3 'l seals, but I have talked with Leon Prezybyla and he has 1.
il 4
l not indicated that to me.
5 MR. FEIT: He is my contractor. He.certainly does feel that
- I 6
MR. HARRISON:
Yes, I know.
i 7
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay, well, that is going l
8 [
to be an issue that's --
l 9
MR. HARRISON:
That is a future issue, whidi 10 ll should be continued.
That's a fair way of characterizing it.
11 ]
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Why don't you move on.
4 a
12 !I MR. HARRISON:
The next item is the' worst j
l
- 13f, suppression fire test, and my point there is that I think i
3 14 L because of the full-scale size that we have envisioned for ii
.i 15 'j our needs and also from a contractor selection view point, 16 that it is my opinion that the National Bureau of Standards i
17 could do this work because of their on going extensive 18 means for research and the 19 facilities they already have in place, and the ease of l
20 contract administration of driving up Route 270 versus 21 Albuquerque, New Mexico.
I think we need work in this area.
22i f
I 23 j Now, I have, I guess more of an issue than I l
h l
24ll thought then, with the halon test.
One reason I have a l
0 25 [
differing opinion on this contractor selection is because it 1
1
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t l
~
6 6 '.
l I
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i
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1 i Il is my personal opinion that I don't think Sandia is b
I 2
el qualified to fire research.
Specifically, as an example i'
b 3 "
on halon, the statement is made:
"No data in the l-4 literature" but however, there is lots of fire research, h
5 full-scale test, air plane compartments to verify if halon 6
would put out fires in suite case luggage and things like l,
6-7 that, in closed environments during flight.
And the I
' 8 d NFPA Committee 12A has sponsored much research on halon.
lI ll The bottom line which is expressed in Appendix 2 NFP 12A 9
i 10 is that halon will not put out a deep-seeded fire in ordinary i
11 f combustibles.
I I
l 12 It only an effective extinguishing agent and has t
13 a very limited application.
There is nothing like field j
14 data and one of the big users like NASA, until recently, li 15 has been NASA and they have issued in January 1979 a policy 16 statement on halon.
Let me read just a couple of statements.i 17 I'll leave this document.
18 "The use of halon 1301 is prohibited in a 19-central electronic equipment operations."
Statement 2:
20 "The wet-type automatic sprinkler systems shall be the 21 standard fire extinguishing system for electronic equipment 22 peration."
The reason they came out with this is because 23 i
i i
NASA lost some satellites and some expensive computers g
iii because of a failure of halon to do the job.
This is all 25 I
i
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67 i
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?
h in the background report on halon.
I i!
2 ]
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let mc take you off k
i 3 !!
the specifics for halon for a minute, and back to your l
Yl earlier statement about Sandia.
4 l
l' 5
You say that you don't think that they are 6
qualified to do fire protection research, and I gathered 8
I from the memo that you felt, among other people, the National -
7 g
t Bureau of Standards would be ---
8 e l
MR. HARRISON: Would be just one of a number of 9 3 b
10h qualified.
Southwest Research.
The Bureau of Standards to i
n 11 ]
be is attractive because of the contract administration.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Can I get e view from 12 fi Research on that?
Obviously you do feel Sandia is I
13 1,0, qualified.
i n'
MR. MINOGUE: Well, the original selection is l
15 l l
en lent history.
I gave you that.
In terms of their 16 qualifi ations to do this kind of work, I have no reason 7
not to assume that they are.
I don't know from firsthand knowledge.
l The assessment that was made with the Gossick Task Group was more concerned with the broader question of 21 l
l running qualification tests and we didn't focus on this 22 i
f particular area.
23
- j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD
I guess, at the time of j
24 "
if the original selection you would go by one set of criteria, 2 5.'
that is, do they have the right kinds of people.
By now, 9
e
e i-I 68 I
1 I li it must be possible to go also on the basis of the kind of f
2 i
data -- the kind of results we have been getting.
Is the I
3 point that we are learning less than we could for the 4
I money we are spending?
5 MR. HARRISON:
I think so.
6 My personal opinion and based on some of the 1'
7 comments I have heard today is, on halon, to me verges on 8
wreckless.
We do not begin to use that data in licensing.
9 jl And I have -- here is something that is a year old out of i
10 NASA who is a major user of halon and this is a common j
I 11 j document, GSA has recognized it.
There have been many Ii l
12j' articles and much in the literature, and much'in the technical 13 codes on halon emphasizing the limitations.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Part of this, I'm sure 4
1 5
is my own unfamiliarity with both of the entities involved, j
16 together with research techniques generally, but are you 17 saying that if the same tests were done at the Bureau of 18 Standards you would get different results?
19-MR. HARRISON: Well, in my opinion they would not have conducted the test in that manner.
If you will, I 20 will leave this here, the summary of the fire suppression 21 i
test data.
Quite frankly, if you look at one draft that 22 i
tells it all.
This was as spoken at a review meeting, very 23 24'l briefly, I have a draft here showing the test results,
,s g however, Test No.
58, showing no halon used in a fire test.
r e
69 l
1 y
The door was shut and the dampers were shut, has better 2 i performance than others with the use of halon. So I cc,uld 3
i il conclude that no halon is better than halon.
4 MR. FEIT: That's not true Greg.
You misread 5
your data.
6 MR. MINCGUE:
I couldn't really answer your l
7 l
question about Sandia for Research.
I would like to give.
8 Mr. Feit a chance to make some comments about Sandia's 9
qualifications, which I think is your basic question.
10 MR. FEIT:
Well, I started in this area, not
'l 11 knowing anything about fire protection, in 1976.
12 ll I want out to Sandia and I met the people for j
i 13 the first time.
Then I realized, I had a big learning l
14 '
curve myself.
So I want out and got consultants, because 15 ]
I also didn't believe that I wanted to lock myself in to i
16 a national laboratory.
It was not a Factory Mutual nor 17 NBS and so on.
I spent a lot of government money on 18 additional consulting help, I went out to get other 19 contractors, UL, I went and got a contract with Applied 20 Physics Laboratory, because they had a fire research group.
So we infused into our program other ideas, and 21 my final conclusion now, is that the work that Sandia has 22 d ne has beon well received.
The people publish regularly, 23 i
they participate on committees and deliver papers all of 24
,i 25 ]
the time, and a number of these papers, I was in attendance.
i I
v
(
70 i
1
'i 1
3 Their work is well received.
We had an open-ljl 2
g house, essentially, about two years ago at Sandia where 3
i they invited a few hundred people, I think the attendance l
was like 250 people at Sandia where we presented the 4
5 results that Sandia had obtained.
It was extremely well 6
l received, very good technical discussions.
I 7
I have attended meetings at the Insulated 8
Conductors Committee.
I used to go regularly, every six l
f months to their it.eetings, just to get a feel for how the 9
i 10 work was going and whether or not it is perceived as good 11 l work or just a waste of government money.
The perception l
12 that I had was that they thought the work was' good.
I 13 That isn't to say that Factory Mutual and NBS 14 can't also do good work.
I'm not saying that.
15 l One other point that I wanted to make.
We have, 16 in Research, had contracts with NBS when it first started.
17 They were not successful, because NBS is not in a mode 18 where they work directly.
They want to work directly --
19-COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Was this in the fire 20 protection area?
MR. Fell *:
I'm sorry. This was in other areas.
21 22 Generally, they don't like to work in a close relationship with their government people.
What they like 23 to do is get a grant, very general assignment and then come j
i g
ll back a year or two later and let me know what happens.
25 n
ll
C i
l 71 l
4 I,
I l
3 i
f Now, the way we work at Sandia, I called them 1
ti l
2 '!
on the phone, we reorient their thinking, I could get them I
i; 3 ll in here -- I could have gotten them in here for this l
l!l meeting if I called last night.
This kind of thing.
And 4
b; I
5 you can't work with NBS, at least it is our experience ll when we first started research.
You can't work with NBS L
6 i
7 in that mode.
Sandia being a government laboratory and a
'I in the weapons area, is better attuned to this kind of i
9
.I workino relationship.
4 10 lI I have worked with all of the national labs since d
11 i I have been in government, since 1963, and Sandia is the best 12ll naticnal lab that I have worked with.
I don't have anything 1
9 negative to say about any of the national labs.
Sandia 13 is the best group that. I have been associated with.
14 O
S O
BRADFORD:
Is Me protection de 15 a
a U
only area you have worked with in Sandia?
MR. FEIT:
No. I have another contract with them which is also highly successful, qualification testing.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let's see, what is it that is happening to fire protection research in the reorganization?
Something is happening to Ron?
21 l;*
i MR. MINOGUE:
He is a very broadly abled guy ---
22 i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I see.
23 ';
y MR. VOLLMER:
I would like to add one comment.
24 '
I haven't really investigated the cost benefit of the 25.!
i I
72 i
d i!
l effectiveness of the research for this area, but I 2
think, my experience would indicate that a technical b
3 [
organization like Sandia, that they are capable of 11 4
l conducting good research in a lot of broad areas, because 5
they have a well defined test program, and I therefore 6
l would assume they could conduct adequate test programs in I
i 7
this area.
i 8
Research is not dependent only on a high degree I
I' 9 j of knowledge of individuals, rather their capabilities.
j 10 MR. MINOGUE: Some of their weapons design work 11j!
too, has required them to deal with some complex problems, I
12 ll would make looking at the fire propagation problem very H
13 ll simple.
e 4
MR. SHAO: Also, in dealing with NBS, not in the l
14 fire protection area, in the structure area, they are very 15 talented people, but they are.very independent.
They 16 l
almost don't want to listen to you.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD That's the point that l
18 l
Ron was making.
19-MR. FEIT:
It is a real point.
They way we have to operate here -- for example, out of the research result from the UCS petition, I couldn't conceive of NBS 22 i
i l
being the contractor in that problem, because we were l
23 l
l responding on a timely basis to these allegations.
They j
24 jl' l
l l
just would not handle the situation.
25 '
l l
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l
1
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11 1
73, i
lr 1
1 i
If you ask me the question, if I were starting 2 ?
the program now, would I go to Sandia?
the answer is
- l probably not.
I would probably try to get involved with 3
i 4
somebody like Factory Mutual or NBS, but here we are 5
today --
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me try to understand l
i 7
that.
8 Do you mean that if this were 1975 again and 9
Sandia ---
10 l!!
MR. FEIT:
Right, and Sandia has no capability.
l l
3 11 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You are not saying that i
12 if y u had a fire protection problem today you would not 13 [
take it to Sandia?
1, 'Il MR. FEIT:
No, I definitely would go to Sandia.
s 15 l We have the people there, we have the facility.
Where we 1
Y ** 9 16 could go to Factory Mutual.
.17 But I'm saying if I were starting the program today, there was no capability at Sandia, none whatsoever, I l
might consider going some place else and probably would.
But given the fact that we are here today and we have this --
They have also done work for DOE, by the way, in the last 22 few years.
i 23 d
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Greg, does your concern l
24 "
n about Sandia go beyond the halon issue?
25 6
t' b
I:
l i
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74 t
1 MR. HARRISON: Yes.
d, 2
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Smoke detection, I gather?
o 3 "
MR. HARRISON:
Smoke detection, fire barriers.
+
4 Most any document that we have sent over to NRR for our 5
evaluation, I think there is a memo in the file, usually 6
with Roger Mattson!s signature saying that we have serious I
7 1;
reservatiens and problems.
I think you all have copies of that memo.
]1 8
MR. FEIT:
You know, Greg, the smoke detection I
9 feasibility study is being done by Brookhaven, John i
f 10 Boc'clo yho was an NRR consultant for many years.
He U
l 11ll worked in the group.
So t
.re again, we have gone to n
12 who we think, and he is a fluid dynamist.
13.
So we try to go, by subcontracts to Sandia.
They 14 are very flexible subcontracts,by the way.
We try, by f
r i
15 j using subcontracts through Sandia, to get the best people 16 ll in each area. In this case, we felt that Brookhaven had Il 17 a better person to put on this feasibility study, than we could get at Sandia, and Sandia is quite amenable to 18 this.
They work well together.
g, MR. HARRISON:
I guess I object to traveling O
around the country and contract versus subcontract being centralized.
If it is done in your own back yard, it just o!
seems to me to be more cost-effective.
Eventually these 23ll l
people go to NBS. Inis I know for a fact.
I 24.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Do you mean the work 1
O 75 1
i 1
1 I
I actually winds up being done at NBS?
2 I
l't MR. HARRISON:
They go to NBS and either want s
b them to do part of the research for them.
John Boccio I
4 f
camped out there for quite a while.
j The experts are at NBS. I can provide documentation.
I 6
It is the center for fire research, particularly smoke 7
detection. They hire the most eminent PHDs from Harvard, i
I t
8 Yale and Cornell in fluids and particle dynamics, 9
aerosols, whatnot.
'Ihe cream of the crop caming from around the I
f 10 il worhi. John Boccio goes to NBS and picks their brains.
I!
11 !
MR. FEIT:
We may end up subcontracting this
~
12 h
job.
We don't know what the job is yet. NBS participated f
13 n 14]M in that workshop that we held there.
We held a workshop i
I!
on this subject at NBS.
l l
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
As a general matter, if j
16 you get a memo back or a series of memos back, from NRR, in this case I gather, from Mattson, expressing doubts 18 about the quality of the research, you say it is not an 19 area that you had a personal background in, what mechanism i
20 do you use by way of sort of quality control to assure 21 yourselves that there isn't a problem.
22 MR. FEIT: Well, in the beginning, I didn' t have 23 a background.
I think now, in terms of experimental fire I
research, I'm qualified.
I'm not a fire protection 2 5 ['
I i
l 76, i
i 1 li y
engineer in the sense that I couldn't go out and locate 2 H
]
sprinklers in this room, and then assign it to some 3
assurance company to gratify it.
I don't have that 4
kind of qualification. But I feel now, with my general 5
background in the four years that I have had in this area, 6
l and in terms of experimental fire research, I'm qualified.
l 7
Now, in the beginning, the first few years, I 8
l' didn't feel I was qualified and I used consultants.
I used 9 jj gag,n,3 m,k as one consultant. 'Ihe same organization NRR used.
l ji i
10 {d COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And did their reports tend l
r 11 0 to bear out the NRR -- the Mattson concerns?
i; 12 f MR. FEIT:
No.
In those years we didn't.have 13 l.
the. differences of opinion.
f 14 For example, this halon test, the way that test l?
l 15 was conceived, and I contracted at Gage Babcock to write 16 l
the first plan for me.
We paid for it, we paid a few 17 thousand dollars for it.
I took that test plan, submitted 18 it to the Review Group.
It was reviewed, and then went 19 back and wrote a second draft. And that's how the whole 20 Program was put together.
21 Then we went to Sandia and said, this is the kind 22 f program we think we would like to have you run. Then Sandia took a crack at it. So we bent over backwards to l
23 l
try to make sure that we weren't getting locked in to an
}
g f
25 '
rgan za n.
u n w, at this point in time, I feel that n
i I
b
1 F
l 77 l
1 1
I, 1
l I'm qualified to make a judgment about fire research.
1 2
Dut that doesn't mean that we still have discussed tM se li 3 I things.
Standards have not been involved in the fire 4
protection issue.
I 5
Sandia themselves have used fire protection 6
research organizations.
So they have, themselves, used I
7 fire protection engineers as consultants.
j 8,
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I'm going to have to j
l
+
9 terminate my participation at this point.
3 10 l
Greg, on the last two items, is there anything I
11 j that I ought to be aware of beyond what is in your memorandum?,
12 ;!:
I MR. HARRISON:
I don't think so.
I' don't believe i
13 l o
so.
I' 14 I guess, the only statement I have on NBS versus anyl l
15 j other place, I think they are a recognized fire testing l
t t
t 16 research laboratory, there is more than one. Southwest i
l 17 Research and then UL and the National Bureau of Standards, j
18 Ohio State University, Berkeley.
19 What I find very hard to understand is that I l
20 can accept that with all of the fire research done at NBS, but with all of the expertise and the fact that the center 21 for. fire research was created by public law to serve the g
Commissions ~ and federal agencies, to avoid the problems 23 i I
of going all over the country, having repetitious work, 24 !l-l duplicated efforts and to save the taxpayers dollars, why, 2 a, p t
P.
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uf 78 1:
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l 1
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why is there not some fire research up there, considering 2 i-the tremendous expertise that goes on in fire hazards i
I
- analysis, detection modeling, smoke detection and water t
4 I
suppression.
The facilities at NBS, I think, you are 5
l comparing a Mercedes to a moped compared to Sandia. All they 6
have is a quanset hut.
The National Bureau of Standards j
l 7
i has a multimillion dollar facility, the best in the 1
8 h world, it is in our backyard, it was created by public law, b
9 to ge used by agencies and Commissions.
10 0 So I find, as a matter of fact, I believe there was il 11 k in a GAO report, something on this issue, it is two years 12l; old, I believe, and I wrote a memo embracing their j
13 l:.
conclusing on fire research and whatnot.
But, basically, l
l G
t 14 }!!
I find it hard to comprehend why we don't have something j
i 15 0 out there, with all of that expertise going untapped.
i 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's see, there is l
17 one issue in what you are saying that does concern me a bit, 18 the one that I think ultimately that I have to leave to 19 Research to resolve.
20 The one that does concern me is any suggestion 21 that the end product coming out of Sandia is in any way 22 deficient or not of a quality that NRR finds acceptable.
MR. HARRISON:
Well, I think the easiest one 23 is the halon. And you could never get that published and i
24 2s k accepted through an NFPA Committee which is a committee of l!
i
i l
1 79 1
1 1
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users, research, and engineers as an acceptable fire test 2 !!
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program.
In fact, much research has been done on halon.
l li 3
Sandia will do a limited research.
Evidently l
f 4 l they are not in touch with the research that has been 5
done and I have come across this l'n other areas in a 6
smoke detection report.
The report did not have in the i
8 7
1 bibliography, :the state of the art review on smoke e
i 8
detectors, which was an inch thick published by NBS which
,l i
9 j covers the whole gammit.
To me, it is just incomprehensible.
10 If you'are in the field you know where the data 11 i!
is, and halon data is plentiful.
i 12i All you have to do is call the Committee Chairman, Walt l
I 13['
Jenson and ask, where is it, and it is in the appendix.
And
- l 14 a it clearly states that halon does not put out deepseeded i,'
15 1 fires and there are great cautions with it. And you come 16 I out from a very, very simplistic fire test, two cable trays il 17 in a very small fire, in a room where you shut the door i
1 18 and put no halon in, the fire goes out anyhow.
I cannot 19 accept that as a fire protection engineer.or as a
- reviewer, to crank that into the licensing process.
{
20 i 21l And to date, it is very clear to me, they do not give credit to halon or CO2 as a primary fire suppression 22 system and any areas that have significant fire hazards 23 cable spreading room, root cable and what not.
24 l
l 25 '
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80 I
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: As I say, that is.a point I
2 f that is of some concern, and it is if the quality of I
3 b Sandia research is of concern to NRR, then I think that is il i
4 l
something that is a problem which you will have to work out.
5 As to the question of whether one place is 6
a more efficient choice than another and quality is high, t
7 I think it is -- I think I have to put my faith in Research
~
8 I!
to know how to assign research and how to administer lj 9
contracts.
Obviously, the questions have been raised, and y
10 I trust you will take a look at it for future work to be f
11 !
done, but I am concerned about the quality question.
If, E
12 in fact, NRR remains concerned as an office about the i
13.ll quality of Sandia research, then ---
l 14 MR. MINOGUE:
I don't believe I heard him say i
15 'j that.
Is NRR concerned about the quality of Sandia j
I i
16 research?
i 17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, if it runs to a 18 level that Roger Mattson decided that was the fact, that 19 qualifies.
MR. VOLLMER:
I'm not aware of it, but I haven't 20 been in this area too long, but I understood that the 21 4
Mattson memos were perhaps concerned more programmatically 22 u
er a n ngs San de quality of de test, but I 23 l
would have to go back and see.
g N
MR. MINOGUE:
I would be glad to discuss this 25 [
t a
81 1
with Roger.
I'm quite taken aback, because he came from 2
Sandia, and to my knowledge he has pushed them hard as 3
being the best of the national labs.
4 MR. VOLLMER:
NRR will take a look and see how 5
we as an office, feel about Sandia research and discuss 6
it.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, Sandia fire 8
protection research.,
9 MR. MINOGUE:
I share your concern on that.
I 10 did a program review at Sandia and I'm at a loss to 11 understand why this area wasn't covered.
So I will dig 12 in to this question, because I have no personal knowledge 13 of it.
And I will do it objectively, because I have no 14 ax to grind.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Fine.
15 Thank you all very much.
16 John, did you or BD have further questions?
7 I didn't mean to exclude the other offices.
g (No response.)
(The briefing was concluded at 12 :10 p.m. )
21 22 23 24 25
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