ML19345G704
| ML19345G704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1981 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345G702 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-81-010, EA-81-10, NUDOCS 8104220100 | |
| Download: ML19345G704 (10) | |
Text
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O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4ISSION IN THE MATTER OF
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Southern California Edison Company
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License No. DPR-13 San Onofre Nuclear Generating
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Docket No. 50-206 Station Unit No. 1
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EA 81-10 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETAP.Y PENALTIES I
Southern California Edison Company, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue, Rosemead, California, 91770, (the " licensee"), is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-13 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
" Commission") which authorizes the operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1 (the " facility"), located in San Diego County, California.
The license was initially issued on March 27, 1967.
The facility is a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) authorized to operate at a power level not in excess of 1347 megawatts thermal (rated power).
II l
During an inspection of the licensee's activities at this facility conducted on September 22-26 and October 14-17, 1980, items of noncompliance were iden-i tified with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, " Standards for Protection l
Against Radiation," and the provisions of the license.
A written Notice of Violation was served upon the licensee by letter dated January 23, 1981, specifying the items of noncompliance in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201.
A l
810 4 2 2 0 'too.
2-Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties was served concurrently upon the licensee in accordance with Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2282 PL 96-295) and 10 CFR 2.205, incorporating by reference the Notice of Violation. Answers from the licensee to the Notices of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties were dated February 17, 1981.
Upon consideration of the answers received and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument in denial or mitigation contained therein, as set forth in Appen-dix A to this Order, the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement has determined that the penalties proposed for the items of noncompliance designated in the Notice of Violation should be imposed.
III In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Southern California Edison Company pay civil penalties in the total amount of One Hundred Fif ty Thousand Dollars within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order by check, draft or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
IV l
l The licensee may, within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order, request a hearing.
A request for a hearing shall be addressed to the Director, i
m c-
. S Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.N.R.C., Washington, D.C., 20555.
A copy of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U.S.N.R.C., Washington, D.C., 20555.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an order designating the time and place of hearing.
Upon failure of the licensee to request a hearing within twenty-five (25) days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings and, if payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
V In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such a hearing shall be:
(a) whether the licensee was in noncompliance with the Commission's requirements as set forth in items A and B of the Notice of Violation referenced in Sections II and III above; and l
(b) whether, on the basis of these items of noncompliance, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tNISSION
- /3f Victor Stel
,J.
Di ector f
Office ofIJ specti n and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this M day of April 1981.
Attachment:
Appendix A, Evaluation and Conclusion
APPENDIX A Evaluation and Conclusion The licensee admitted each item of noncompliance assessed a civil penalty in the Notice of Violation dated January 23, 1981, in Enclosure 1 of their February 17, 1981 response.
Enclosure (2) of the response presents a protest to the proposed imposition of civil penalties based on the contention that the corrective actions already taken with respect to problems discussed in the January 23, 1981 NRC letter, the findings of the Health Physics Appraisal inspection, results of continuing inspections and their own evaluations have adequately demonstrated to their management that major improvements in the Health Physics program were required, and that Southern California Edison (SCE) is now fully committed to ensuring that these improvements have been and will continue to be implemented. SCE feels that the added emphasis of a civil penalty is inconsistent with their demonstrated recognition of the problem and their commitment to secure long term corrective action.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement's evaluation and conclusion regarding the licensee's response is presented below.
Statement of Noncompliance Associated with Steam Generator Repairs (Items A1, A2)
A.1. 10 CFR 20.101 (b), (1) " Radiation dose standards for individuals in restricted area," states in part that, "Durir.g any calendar quarter the total occupational dose to the whole body shall not exceed 3 rems."
Contrary to the above, during the third calendar quarter of 1980 twenty-four individuals received total occupational doses to the whole body in excess of 3 rem.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement IV) (Civil Penalty
$75,000).
A.2. 10 CFR 20.201(b) " Surveys", requires licensees to make surveys as may be necessary to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR 20.
Surveys are defined in 20.201(a) as "an_ evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive materials or other sources of radiation under a specific set of condi-tions. When appropriate, such evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of materials and equipment, and measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material present." 10 CFR 20.202 " Personnel Monitoring", requires that "Each licensee shall supply appropriate personnel monitoring equipment to, and shall require the use of such equipment by:
"(1) Each individual who enters a restricted area under such circum-stances that he receives, or is likely to receive a dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent of the ~ applicable value specified in paragraph (a) of 20.101."
Appendix A (Continued) Contrary to the above, during the third calendar quarter of 1980 surveys or evaluations of the radiation hazard inside the steam generator channel heads were not made as necessary to assure compliance with the whole body dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.101(b) in that individuals received doses in excess of 3 rem and 10 CFR 20.202 in that appropriate personnel monitoring equipment was not provided to measure the dose to the heads and lens of eyes of individuals permitted to work inside the channel head.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement IV)
(Civil Penalty $25,000).
Evaluation of the Licensee's Response (Item A)
The licensee admits the items of noncompliance, but argues that the proposed civil penalties should not be imposed.
To support its view, the licensee cites its commitment of resources to improve the health physics program and good enforcement history for the three years prior to April 1980.
The licensee stresses the following circumstances surrounding the event to show that the personnel exposures were not particularly egregious:
1 1.
Use of a single film badge to evaluate steam generator dose was not unique to San Onofre.
2.
The procedure governing steam generator entries had been reviewed by NRC regional inspectors in April 1980 without comment relative to the methods of exposure control.
3.
More than 750 personnel received exposures associated with the steam generator work and, even with a conservative evaluation, only a small fraction received doses in excess of the regulatory requirements.
4.
The radiation protection program in effect was adequate to prevent any workct from receiving an injurious dose.
The largest calculated dose to any individual-was 4.9 rem.
5.
Once the problems were identified, the licensee took immediate l
corrective action to prevent additional radiation exposure without appropriate personnel senitoring, to perform a conservative evalu-l ation of previously exposed workers dose, and to accelerate major l
improvements in its radiation protection program.
1 The licensee agrees that steam generator personnel exposures are a serious matter, but believes in light of these circumstances that civil penalties should not be imposed.
I None of these matters alters the NRC's view that civil penalties should be imposed for these violations. With respect to the items raised by the licensee, the NRC believes:
Appendix A (Continued) 1.
Although incidents of inadequate personnel monitoring may be observed at other faciiities, Southern California Edison remains responsible for compliance with the Commission's requirements at its facility and may be subject to civil penalties for violations of such require-ments.
By industry practice, the highest entry dose should be monitored whenever the variation in exposure, as here, may be large.
Placement of personnel monitoring devices to measure the highest
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entry dose when the variation in exposure is large has also been recomended by the International Ccanission on Radiological Protection and the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.
I i
2.
Unfortunately, NRC inspections did not identify the inadequate personnel monitoring at an earlier time.
NRC licensees are, however, responsible for compliance with the Commission's requirements at all times, not just from the time an NRC inspection specifically ident-ifies a problem to a licensee.
NRC inspections are in nature audits of the licensee's activities and do not purport to examine every aspect of licensed activities.
Although noncompliance may not be found during an inspection, such a result does not constitute a finding that the licensee is fully in compliance with all applicable requirements. Again, we are concerned that the inad quacies in personnel monitoring were not identified until an NRC inspection.
3.
Inappropriate placement of personnel monitoring devices occurred from April to August 1980 when an NRC inspector brought the practice to the licensee's attention. While some 750 persons may have been involved in the steam generator program, the fraction who received exposures above regulatory limits is significant from the standpoint of adequately assuring that excessive exposures are avoided.
It was only fortuitous that the overexposures did not affect even more persons than the 24 identified in the third quarter and the 42 identified in the second quarter.
The NRC expects licensees to provide the most accurate assessment of an individual's radiation dose and considers the failure to do so a serious matter even when i
regulatory limits are not exceeded.
4.
While it is true workers did not receive biologically significant doses
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under the licensee's radiation protection practices during April to August 1980, a number of individuals received doses above regulatory limits during this period. These doses were unnecessary and clearly preventable.
Again, it was fortuitous that other persons did not receive excessive exposures.
5.
An NRC inspector brought the problems with surveys and dosimetry during steam generator repairs to the licensee's attention on August 20, 1980.
The licensee acted responsibly by immediately requiring multiple personnel dosimeters for all additional entries into the steam generators, by initiating a comprehensive survey to evaluate the radiation environment in the steam generators and using this
Appendix A (Continued) data to perform reassessments of the dose to each worker who had entered the steam generators wearing a single chest-worn film badge.
The licensee also committed substantial management attention and resources to update the radiacion protection program. These actions have been apparently successful to date in controlling exposures to the personnel involved in the ongoing steam generator repair activity.
While the licensee's corrective actions have been commendable, corrective action is always required of licensees when noncompliance is identified.
In the letter transmitting the Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, the NRC identified five factors which, in our view, underscore the particular egregiousness of the violations of require-ments in the conduct of the steam generator program.
The licensee does not specifically dispute these points.
These factors should again be emphasized as the basis for the NRC's action in this matter:
(1) The number of employees who received overexposures was in our view significant; (2) The inadequate survey and monitoring existed for a long period of time and might have continued for a considerably longer period if an NRC inspector had not discovered it; (3) The overexposures were readily preventable if adequate personnel monitoring had been used; (4) The licensee's radiation protection program had been cited for noncompliance on a number of occasions from April through September 1980; and (5)
In addition to the 24 persons receiving overexposures in the third quarter of 1980, the licensee had calculated that an additional 42 persons received total occupational doses to the i
whole body greater than 3 rem in the second calendar quarter.
Conclusion As the licensee admits, the licensee failed to perform adequate surveys of the radiological conditions inside the steam generators which resulted in persons receiving exposures to radiation in excess of regulatory limits.
The licensee's arguments do not alter the NRC's view that this event was egregious.
While the NRC acknowledges the licensee's corrective actions, such actions as a result of the identification of noncompliance are expected as a matter of prudent management to ensure the safety of workers and compliance with the Commission's requirements.
No adequate basis exists for remitting or mitigating the civil penalty.
l Appendix A (Continued) Statement of Noncompliance Associated with Handling the NFS4, NCA1E Shipping Cask (Items B.1-4)
B.1. 10 CFR 20.201(b) " Surveys", requires licensees to make surveys as may be necessary to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR 20.
Surveys are defined in 20.201(a) as "an evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive materials or other sources of radiation under a specific set of condi-tions. When appropriate, such evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of materials and equipment, and measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material present."
Contrary to the above, on September 5,1980 two individuals working under Radiation Exposure Permit No. 28855 were permitted to handle highly radioactive material associated with a spent nuclear fuel shipping cask and a survey of the radiation hazard to the workers' hands was not made as necessary to assure compliance with the hand dose limit specified in 10 CFR 20.101 in that the beta dose rate was not measured and a survey or evaluation to correct the dose measured by the thermoluminescent finger dosimeter was not made.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement IV) (Civil Penalty
$18,750).
B.2 10 CFR 20.103(a)(3) " Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radio-active material in air in restricted areas", states in part:
"For pur-poses of determining compliance with the requirements of this section the licensee shall use suitable measurements of concentrations of radioactive materials in air for detecting and evaluating airborne radioactivity in restricted areas and in addition, as appropriate, shall use measurements of radioactivity in the body; measurements of radioactivity excreted from the body, or any combination of such measurements as may be necessary for timely detection and assessment of individual intakes of radioactivity by exposed individuals."
Contrary to the above, on September 5, 1980 two individuals were permitted to handle highly radioactive materials in the restricted area under Radiation Expasure Permit No. 28855, in a manner that dispersed the materials resulting in facial contamination; no measurement of the concen-tration of radioactive materials in air in the individuals breathing zone were made; and appropriate measurements of radioactivity in the body and measurements of radioactivity excreted from the body as necessary for timely detection and assessment of the individuals intake were not made.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement IV)
(Civil Penalty $18,7bO).
Appendix A (Continued) B.3. Technical Specification 6.3, " Facility Staff Qualifications" requires that each member of the facility staff meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971, " Selection and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants", for comparable positions.
Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technicians are shown as members of the facility staff in Figure 6.2.2.2 of Technical Specification 6.2.
ANSI N18.1-1971 requires in Section 4 that,
" Nuclear power plant personnel shall have that combination of education, experience, health, and skills commensurate with their level of responsibility which provides reasonable assurance that decisions and actions during all normal and abnormal conditions will be such that the plant is operated in a safe and efficient manner", and that Technicians in responsible positions must have at least two years of working experience in their specialty.
Contrary to the above, on the morning of September 5, 1980, the Radiation Protection Technician who provided direct radiation safety monitoring and control for operations involving the NFS-4, NAC IE spent fuel shipping cask as required by REP No. 28855 did not have two years of working experience in radiation protection.
An interview conducted by an NRC Inspector confirmed that he was not familiar with the shipping cask, was not aware of the potential radiation hazard, and did not understand the limitations of the survey instrument he used.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement IV)
(Civil Penalty $6,250).
B.4. Technical Specification Section 6.11 requires that written procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and sh?ll be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Radiation Protection Procedure SVIII.8, Revision 2, dated January 10, 1979, " Decontamination Procedure Personnel" states in section E.1 that:
"A record of any skin contamination shall be made in the personnel decontamination log book.
The entry shall include name, date, time, work location, cpm of contaminated area before and after decontamination, and notice if person was given a whole body scan."
Contrary to the above, on September 5, 1980 two individuals working under Radiation Exposure Permit No. 28855 received skin contamination on two occasions while working with highly radioactive material and the log book record for the first occasion did not include the time, work location, cpm after decontamination and notice whether the person was given a whole l
body scan.
In addition, no log book entry was made regarding the second occurrence of skin contamination for these individuals on the afternoon of September 5,1980.
This is a Severity Level III (Supplement IV)
(Civil Penalty $6,250).
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Appendix A (Continued) Evaluation of the Licensee's Response (Item B )
The licensee admits the four items of noncompliance associated with the handling of the spent fuel cask, but the licensee protests the imposition of civil penalties for this event. The licensee emphasizes its corrective actions with respect to its radiation protection program and points up that the radiation protection program was at least effective enough to prevent any worker from receiving an injurious dose.
The licensee attributes its failure to adequately evaluate the radiological hazard associated with this particular cask and take appropriate protective measures to inadequate procedures, but contrasts the event with its previous uneventful history associated with handling spent fuel casks.
The NRC agrees that the licensee's failure to anticipate the problems in handling this particular cask led to the cited items of noncompliance.
The licensee's previous uneventful history of cask handling does not excuse or justify, of course, the inadequate surveys and protective actions taken by the licensee here. Licensees must constantly anticipate that their activities may require greater care and attention than past experience strictly indicates.
The NRC agrees that the workers involved did not receive a biologically significant dose.
In view of the breakdown in radiation protection procedures, however, this fact is merely fortuitous.
We are concerned that the failure to observe radiation protection procedures could have resulted in excessive radiation exposures.
As noted in the January 23, 1981, letter to the licensee, the NRC is particularly concerned that these noncompliances occurred even though, on the basis of the licensee's recent enforcement history on radiation protection, the licensee should have been alerted that improvements in its radiation monitoring program were necessary.
The licensee acknowledges in its reponse that the Health Physics Appraisal exit interview held on May 30, 1980, had identified the need for improvements in radiation safety practices and the licensee had begun to make improvements in the radiation protection program.
In addition to this awareness of the need for improvements in radiation safety, a meeting was held on the morning of September 4, 1980, among representatives of the cask owners, the Chemistry / Radiation Protection foreman, and representatives of the licensee's management.
Even though the likelihood of fuel fragments being present in the cask and the potential radiological hazards were discussed at this meeting, the subsequent surveys were still inadequate, an unqualified technician was assigned to the job, and radiation protection procedures were not followed.
Conclusion The licensee admitted the items of noncompliance.
The NRC indicated in the letter transmitting this enforcement action that an increase in the base penalty by 25% to $50,000 was warranted, because the licensee had been alerted to the need for improvements in its radiation monitoring program and should have taken remedial steps prior to the ocurrence of this event.
The licensee has not presented information which would cause the NRC to remit or mitigate the civil penalty.
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