ML19345F998
| ML19345F998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1981 |
| From: | Lazo R Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8102190703 | |
| Download: ML19345F998 (21) | |
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i NUCLEAR REGUIAIORY COMMISSION k
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
}ea g1 C G 2 3 jo g g F111 Before Administrative Judges :
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Q Robert M. Lazo, Esquire, Chairman Cv f
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- p, Emeth A. Lue,oke, Ph.D.
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'i Richard F. Cole, Ph.D.
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In the Matter of:
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-369-OL
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50-370-OL
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(William B. McGuire Nuclear Station,
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Units 1 and 2 -- reopened
)
February 13, 1981 operating license proceeding)
MEMORANDRI AND ORDER (Denvina CESG's Motion To Add "Further Contentiens")
I On November 25, 1980, the Licensing Board in the above-identified proceeding entered an unpublished order granting the August 15, 1980 revised motion of Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG) to reopen this operating license proceeding and admitted CESG's revised Contentions 1-4k On the same day, the Licensing Board entered a separate unpublished order regarding Duke Power Company's (Applicant's) motion of September 30, 1980 for su= mary disposition with respect to issuance of a low-power testing license, wherein Applicant and the Nuclear Regulatcry Commission Staff (Staff) were directed to respond by December 15, 1980 to two additional Contentiens (Contentions 5and6)advancedby'dESGonNovember 7,
1980 in its response to Applicant's motion for summary
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Duke Power Comoanv (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Me=orandum and Order Regarding CESG's Motion to Reopen Record, Slip Op. (November 25, 1980).
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2-disposition.1!
Both Applicant and Staff oppose admission of Contentions 5 and 6 in this reopened proceeding.
The Board's Order of November 25, 1980 admitted the following four CESG contentions:
Contention 1 - The licensee has not demonstrated that, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident at McGuire:
1.
substantial quantities of hydrogen (in excess of the design basis of 10 CFR section 50.44) will not be generated; and 2.
that, in the event of such generation, the hydrogen will not combust; and 3.
that, in the event of such generation and combustion, the containment has the ability to withstand pressure below or above the containment design pressure, thereby preventing releases of off-site radiation in excess of Part 100 guideline values.
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Contention 2 - Neither licensee nor NRC staff has demonstrated that a McGuire ice containment will not breach as the result 4
of the rapid combustion of quantities of hydrogen which a dry containment would withstand.
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l Contention 3 - Neither licensee nor NRC staff has demon-strated that the emergency planning radius of 10 miles is sufficient for protecting the public from the radioactive l
-2/ Duke Power Company (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum and Order Regarding Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition, Slip Op. (November 25, 1980).
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releases of a low pressure, ice condenser containment j
ruptured by a hydrogen explosion.
- l Contention 4 - Licensee and NRC planning do not provide for crisis relocation which would be required as a result l
of containment breach and radioactive particle release.
The two additional contentions raised by CESG in its November 7,1980 reply to Applicant's motion for summary disposition are:
l Contention 5 - Under current practice the NRC is required to issue an environmental impact statement as to the consequences of Class 9 accidents.
Such an environmental impact statement is required for. McGuire.
i Contention 6 - The emergency plan for McGuire must, due to the special circumstance of close proximity to a.large l
population center, be revised to provide an emergency response for the city of Charlotte in the event of a Class 9 accident.
Oral argument regarding the admissibility of Contentions-l 5 and 6 was heard during a telephone conference call with.
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the Board and the parties on December 23, 1980.
Thereafter, l
on January 8, 1981, CESG, through newly retained Washington, I
D.C. counsel, filed a motion requesting that before the Board rules on whether or not to admit these two contentions,,new i
j counsel be provided with an opportunity to-supplement-CESG's request with a memorandum of law.
A period of 10' days was i
sought for the filing of such a memorandum.
i During a subsequent telephone conference call with the parties including CESG's new counsel on January -14,1981, the i
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Board Chairman granted CESG one week within which to file its memorandum of law.
Following the filing of the memoran-dum on January 21, 1981, the Board granted requests by Applicant and Staff for a 10 day period expiring on February 2, 1981 within which to respond to the CESG memorandum.
All filings have now been submitted.
II CESG's Contention 5 asserts that an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the consequences of Class 9 accidents is required for McGuire.
Upon consideration of the filings of all the parties to this proceeding, as outlined below, we conclude that CESG is mistaken and contention 5 sha21d not be admitted in this reopened proceeding.
A.
On June 13, 1980, the Commission published in the Federal Register 1!a Statement of Interim Policy entitled " Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969," in which the Commission revised its policy concerning consideration of Class 9 accidents in environmental impact statements.
In the Statement of Interim Policy, the Commission instructed the Staff to prepare a discussion of Class 9 accidents in accordance with the Statement of Interim Policy "in its ongoing NEPA reviews, i.e.,
for any proceeding at a licensing stage where a Final Environmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued."b/
In the Statement of Interim Policy the Commission indicated that "this change in policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents in any previously issued Impact Statements, nor, absent a showing of special circumstances, as a basis for opening, reopening or expanding any previous or ongoing 3/ 65 Fed. Reg. 40101 4/ Id. at 40103
. proceeding." The Final Environmental Statement for McGuire has long been completed and thus does not fall within the scope of those cases in which the Commission has instructed the Staff to discuss Class 9 accidents.
B.
Neither NEPA, nor case law interpreting NEPA, support CESG's proposition that the EIS should be supplemented.
Indeed, this precise issue was litigated in the construction permit phase of this proceeding and is now res iudicata against CESG.
In Carolina Environmental Studv Groun v.
US, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C.Cir. 1975) the D.C. Circuit examined the purpose of NEPA and the adequacy of environmental impact statements under NEPA in the face of a specific argument that an analysis of environmental impacts, of the type now requested by CESG, had to be contained in the McGuire EIS.
The court noted:
Section 102(2)(c)(i)' of NEPA requires a
" detailed statement on "the environmental impact of the proposed action".
That language-requires description of reasonablv foreseeable effects.
A " rule of reason" is used to ascertain those effects anticipated.
"The detailed statement" 4
is required as a basis for intelligent balancing of the effect on the environment with the economic i
and technical factors." (Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
510 F.2d. at 798.
In that case the AEC, in accordance with its practice, had determined that the probability of the occurrence of the type of accident sequence at issue was sufficiently small to render the environmental risk associated therewith extremely low.
In light of this determination, the D.C. Circuit Court concluded:
the record as a whole, we cannot say that Viewing's general consideration of the probabilities the AEC and severity of a Class 9 accident amounts to a failure to provide the required detailed statement of its environmental impact....
...It is entirely proper, and necessary, to consider the probabilities as well as the consequences of certain occurrences in ascertaining their environmental impact.
There is a point at which the probability of an occurrence may be so low as to render it almost totally unworthy of consideration.
510 F.2d at 799.
CESG would engraf t a new standard on NEPA requirements ~.
According to CESG, where "significant new information or new circumstances" are presented, agencies are required, as a matter of law, to prepare a supplemental EIS.
CESG raises two points in this regard:
first, the Commission's Statement of Interim Policy; and, second the TMI accident.
The TMI accident is referenced in the Commission's Statement and is thus subsumed within it.
. Inasmuch as the Statement specific-l ally states that conclusions in prior EIS's such as McGuire remain valid, neither of these items can be said to be significant new information requiring the preparation of a Class 9 supplement to the EIS.
However, the essential question under NEPA is whether the original EIS remains adequate in light of present infor-mation and circums tances,
i.e., whether, under a rule of reason analysis (See CESG v.
US, suora) the final EIS I
previously approved in this proceeding continues to adequately deal with the reasonably foreseeable effects of the proposed j
governmental action in light of present information and circumstances. ~That question is readily answered in the affirmative.
The present McGuire EIS does not contain a specific section discussing the impact of accident sequences i
i
7-which go beyond the design basis of the plant and which include inadequate reactor cooling and melting of the fuel core.
The position is consistent with the proposed annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 published December 1,1971.
In that proposed annex, the AEC, while noting that the consequences of such accidents "could be severe," concluded that:
However, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is extremely low.
Defense in depth (multiple physical barriers),
quality assurance for design, manufacture, and oper-ation, continued surveillance and testing and conserva-tive design are all applied to provide and maintain the required high degree of assurance that potential acci-dents in this class are, and will remain, sufficientiv remote in orobability that the environmental risk is extremelv low.
For these reasons, it is not necessary to discuss such events in applicants' environmental reports.
Before it can be concluded that a supplemental EIS is required for the McGuire Nuclear Generating Station under NEPA, it must be shewn that the foregoing statements are no longer accurate.
Such a showing cannot be made inas=uch as the Commission specifically addressed this point in its Statement of Interim Policy wherein the Commission, in addressing the precise question at hand, stated:
Thus, this change in policy is not to bc construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in any previously issued statements...
Accordingly, under NEPA, a supplement to the McGuire EIS is unnecessary.
. C.
In its memorandum of law, CESG does not take issue with the Commission's Statement of Interim Policy.
Rather, it argues that due to "special circumstances" the Staff is obligated to prepare a supplemental EIS discussing Class 9 accidents in order to satisfy the Commission's Statement.
As noted by the Staff,5! evelopment of the "special d
circu= stances" concept in connection with consideration of Class 9 accid _nts began in the Offshore Power Svstemsk/
proceeding where the Staff, in support of its decision to conduct an analysis of the Class 9 accident risks associated with floating nuclear power plants ("FNPs), argued that:
[T]here is no need for a detailed NEPA ~ discussion of Class 9 accident risks in nuclear reactor licensing proceedings unless the special circumstances of a particular case indicate that Class 9 accident risks may be unusually higher or of a different character than for the typical land based nuclear power reactor.
To date only three types of special circumstances have been identified that would trigger a detailed Class 9 accident evaluation:
(above the "gh population density for the a hi trip points" in the Standard proposed site Review Plan and Regulatory Guide), a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a light water power reactor), or a combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode (a floating nuclear plant).7/
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See Staff's excellent discussion of the Commission's three-pronged test of special circumstances in February 2,1981 NRC Staff Response to CESG's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Add Further Contentions--Background pp. 4-9.
6/
Offshore Power Svstems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants),
C LI-7 9 - 9, 10 NRC 257 (1979), addressing a question certified to the Commission by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel in ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194 (1978).
-7/
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATI"E FINDING CN CERTIFIED QUESTION, at 47 (January 12, 1919), as quoted in In the Matter of Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2), DD-60-6, 11 NRC 371, 377 (1980).
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On appeal, in response to the question of whether the probability and consequences of a so-called " Class 9" accident at an FNP are proper subjects for consideration in the Commission's environmental analysis of Offshore's application, the Cocmission answered in the affirmative.
Moreover, the Cocmission instructed the Staff, inter alia, to " bring to i
(the Commission's] attention, any individual cases in which it believed the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents should be considered."8/
The next time the Class 9 issue was raised, it was in the; context of a request filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 for the revocation or suspension of the Seabrook Construction Permits.AI Petitioner, in support of its request for relief, alleged "that NRC has failed to...cvaluate the consequences of a t
Class 9 accident, in determining site suitability, including the necessity for evacuation beyond the -low population zone."10/
In denying the petition the Director of NRR reiterated that Class 9 accident analyses are appropriate only where one or more of three "special circumstances" is found to exist:
(1) high population density around the proposed site (i.e.,
above the trip points in the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75-087, September 1975) and Regulatory Guide 4.7, General Site c
l Suitability Criteria For Nuclear Power Stations (November 1975);
j (2) a novel reactor design'(a type of power reactor other l
l l
l 8/ Suora note 6, at 263.
-9/ In the Matter of Public Service Comoanv of New Hamoshire (Seacrook Station Units 1 and 2), DD-80-6, 11 NRC 371 (1980).
10/ Id. at 372.
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. than a light water reactor); or (3) a combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode.11!
Shortly thereaf ter, the Class 9 issue was addressed by 19/
the Commission, in the Black Fox proceeding.22 In this proceeding, which preceded the Statement of Interim Policy, the Commission noted that, while the Staff had discretion in bring-ing individual cases to the attention of the Commission, "[t]he Commission did not expect that such discretion was to be exercised without reference to existing staff guidance on the type of exceptional case that might warrant additional con-sideration; higher population density, proximity to man-made or natural hazard, unusual site configuration, unusual design features, etc.,
i.e., circumstances where the environmental risk from such an accident, if one occurred, would be sub-stantially greater than that for an average plant."11/
11/ Regulatory Guide 4.7, first referenced by the Staff as a benchmark for determining high population density in the Staff's OPS Brief, provides that:
I If the popularton density, including weighted transient population, projected at the time of initial operation of a nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumulative l
population at a distance divided by the area of that I
distance), or the projected dens'.ty over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, l
special attention should be given to the consideration l
of alternative sites with lower pcpulation densities.
Regulatory Guide 4. 7, General Site Suitabilitv Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations. p. 4.7-9 (November 1975).
The Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75-087, September 1975),
also referenced by the Staff, contains virtually identical language.
--12/
Public Service Comoany of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433 (1980).
13/
Id. at 434-35 l
l
. Thus, the Commission embodied in its guidance to the Staff the three-pronged test of special circumstances previously articulated by the Staff in OPS and the Seabrook Director's Decision.1b!
Subsequently, in the Statement of Interim Policy itself, the Co= mission identified as prior instances of special circumstances 3 cases which correspond to the three prongs of the standard:
(1) the Clinch River River Breeder Reactor ("a liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor very different from the more conventional light water reactor plants for which the safety experience is much broader"), (2) the Perryman site (involving high population density), and (3) the floating nuclear power plants ("[t]he special circumstances were the potentially serious consequences associated with water (liquid) pathways... " )
Thereafter, on five occasions following announcement by the Commission of its Statement of Interim Policy, the Director of NRR has used this three-pronged "special circumstances" standard to determine whether to prepare supplemental Class 9 analyses.11!
14/
It should be noted that, in Black Fox, the Commission
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added a fourth "special circumstance," proximity to =an-made or natural hazard, to the list proposed by the Staff in OPS.
15/
- See, e.g.,
In the Matter of Duke Power Ccmoany (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), DD 13 NRC (January 8,1981); In the Matters of Arizona Public Service Comoanv (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), Pacific Gas and Electric Comoanv (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), and Sacramento Municioal Utility Dis tric t (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1) DD-80-22, 11 NRC 219 (1980); In the Matter of Florida Power and Light Comoanv (St. Lucie Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Unit 2), DD 12 NRC (November 15, 1980).
D.
In support of its argument that the licensing of the McGuire facility involves "special circumstances" which warrant an analysis of Class 9 accident risks, CESG offers the follow-ing four factors for our consideration:
1.
Three Mile Island confirmed that Class 9 accidents Can occur.
2.
McGuire is located near the high population center of Charlotte, North Carolina.
3.
There exist uncertainties regarding the capability of the McGuire containment to withstand the explosion of an amount of hydrogen no greater than that present at TMI.
The EIS for >kGuire is now over four years old.16/
4.
Upon consideration of these "special c.ircumstances,"
the Board finds that, in each instance, the position _ taken by CESG is (1) outside the scope of "special circumstances" as defined by the Commission and (2) patently inconsistent with the policy articulated by the Commission in its Statement of -
Interim Policy.
The accident at Three Mile Island occurred before the Ccomission's Statement of Interim Policy was issued and the Commission was fully aware of the accident when it established the "special circumstance" standard.
Clearly, the Commission did not intend that the Three Mile Island accident would be treated as a "special circumstance," which would make a pro-ceeding subject to reopening for an analysis of Class 9 accident 16/ CESG at no time suggests that the McGuire facility involves a novel reactor design, a combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode, or proximity to a man-made or natural hazard.
. risks.
Instead, it specifically indicated that cases like McGuire need not be reopened absent a showing of "special c ircums tanc es. "
In CESG's view, the McGuire facility's proximity to the high population center of Charlotte, North Carolina warrants a finding by this Board that this case presents "special circumstances."
However, the Director's Decision in the Catawba case, suora note 15, provides a clear, unequivocal response:
the mere fact that a large city is located nearby does not constitute "special circumstances."
Indeed, Catawba addressed the very issue raised by CESG in the immediate pro-ceeding when the Director held that the location of Charlotte, North Carolina 17 miles from the Catawba facility did not constitute "special circumstances. "
CESG has made no assertions regarding the populatLon density for the McGuire site.
Concerning CESG's contention that the potential for a hydrogen explosion at McGuire requires that a supplemental Class 9 EIS be prepared, we note that the issue of hydrogen generation has explicitly been admitted as a concention in this proceeding for litigation.
Thus, the associated uncertainties regarding the McGuire containment must be sufficiently resolved by evidence in this proceeding.
However, this potential accident would not be significantly different from all other Class 9 accident sequences--thus it would not constitute a special circumstance.
CESG urges that we rule that McGuire's 4-year old EIS constitutes a "special circumstance."
However, CESG's attack on the adequacy of the McGuire FES because it was completed 4 years ago has no bearing on the Board's decision concerning the necessity to prepare a diacrete Class 9 supplement to
to that FES under the provisions of the Statement of Interim Polic y.
Indeed, the position taken by CISG runs directly counter to that taken by the Commission in its Statement of Interim Policy, wherein it declared that "this change in policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in any previously issued statements...."
III A.
In Contention 6, CESG asserts that the emergency plan for SkGuire must be revised to provide an emergency response for the City of Charlotte in the event of a Class 9 accident.
Applicant argues that the contention is an Dmpermissible attack on the Commission regulations regarding emergency plan-ning (e.g., Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50,10 CFR Section 30.47 and 45 F.R. 55402 (August 19, 1980)).
As noted by Applicant, the planning bases for Commission standards regarding emergency planning are contained in, inter alia, NUREG-0654:
" Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (January 1980)12/and NUREG-0396:
" Planning Bases For The Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Plans In Support of Light Water Reactor Power Plants,"
(December 1978).
See 10 CFR Section 50.33(g), n.1; 50.47(b),
n.
1; and 50.54(s)(1), n.
1.
Therein the Commission determined that a range of specified potential accidents to include a worst case core celt (Class 9 ) accident involving a breach of 12/ Revision 1 to NUREG-0654 issued in November 1980, is in accord regarding this issue.
containment formed the appropriate basis for Commission emergency planning requirements.
NUREG-0396, suora, at pp. 1-4--and I-7 and I-44--I-52, and NUREG-0654, suora, at pp. 5-6 and 9.
Indeed, NUREG-0396 sets forth specific activities and considerations regarding emergency protective measures in the event of core melt accidents.
NUREG-0396, suora, at pp. I-44--I-52.
Further, consideration of emergency planning actions must take into account " local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as democraohv, topography, land characteristics,
access routes, and jurisdictional boundries."
10 CFR Section 50.33(g); 50.47(2); and 50.54(s)(1).
In sum, pursuant to Commission regulations, emergency plans for McGuire must give appropriate consideration to both the City of Charlotte and the effects of hypothetical Class 9 accidents thereon.
l Thus, according to Applicant, CESG's contention that the emergency plans for the McGuire facility are inadequate because they do not consider the effects of core melt (Class 9) accidents on Charlotte is without a factual basis.
To the extent that CESG questions the basis of the Commission regu-lations in this regard, CESG's contention is a direct attack upon the basis of the Commission regulations, and thus,
the contention must fail.
Potomac Electric Power Comoany (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 88-89 (1974).
See also, Union of Concerned Scientists
- v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In response, the Staff suggests that although the Commission, in for=ulating the emergency planning rule, fully recognized the need to consider a wide spectrum of accidents in emergency plans, the rule itself is not specifically coupled to the accident classification scheme referred to by CESG in Contention 6.
The Staff notes that the Task Force charged with the
b responsibility for developing a planning basis for emergency plans " recognized from the start that there is no specific design basis accident or Class 9 accident scenario which can be isolated as the one for which to plan because each such accident would have different consequences, both in nature and degree."
NUREG-0396, suora at p. 111-2.
In endorsing the Task Force report, the Commission specifically noted "that it is appropriate and prudent for emergency planning guidance to take into consideration the principal characteristics...
of a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents."18/
The final emergency planning rule promulgated by the Commission (10 CFR 50.47) incorporates the foregoing " planning basis" by establishing 2 emergency planning zones (EPZs) around nuclear plants, one of about 10 miles for airborne exposure and one of about 50 miles for contaminated food and water.
Within each of these EPZs, the exact size and shape of which may vary, the Commission now requires predetermined protective action plans.
The Staff argues that these protective action plans are not, however, directly linked to the accident classification scheme referred to by CESG.
Rather, as noted above, emergency plans now consider a wide spectrum of accidents.
Thus, to i
the extent that Contention 6 is read to suggest that emergency plans must account for specific Class 9 accidents, the Staff notes its disagreement.
In addition, the Staff argues that Contention 6, as well as Contentions 3 and 4, are merely succeeding steps in the hydrogen generation scenario postulated by CESG in Contention (s) 1 (and 2) and are therefore dependent on a threshold finding on Contention (s) 1 (and 2).
Thus, although the Staff agrees i
18/
44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23, 1980).
i
i that the McGuire emergency plan should account for the con-sequences of such an event (hydrogen generation followed by combustion and containment failure) if indeed such an event proves possible, this latter question is the issue directly raised in Contention (s) 1 (and 2). Accordingly, the Staff submits, the Board must first make a finding with respect to the threshold issue raised in Contention (s) 1 (and 2) before addressing the subject matter of Contention 6.
Finally, the Staff notes its understanding that the event referred to by CESG in Contention 6 is the hydrogen generation scenario posited in Contention (s) 1 (and 2).
Accordingly, i
should the Board find there to be some possibility of the scenario posited in Contention (s) 1 (and 2) actually occurring, Staff submits that the issue raised by CESG in Contention 6 is a narrowly-focused one, i.e., whether the McGuire emergency plan adequately accounts for the consequences of the posited hydrogen generation scenario, and thus is subsumed under Contentions 3 and 4.
If, on the other hand, CESG now seeks to raise the broader generic issue of the adequacy of the McGuire emergency response plan, the Staff submits that CESG has not met the standard for reopening set forth in Kansas Gas & Electric Cocoany (Wolf Creek Generat ing Station, Unit No. 1) ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338:
l As is well settled, the proponent cf a motion to reopen the record has a heavy burden.
Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619, 620 (1976).
The motion must be both timely presented and addressed to a significant safetv or environmental issue.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Powe'r Coro. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973); id., ALAB-167 6 AEC 1151-52 (1973); Georeia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 409
18 -
(1975).
Beyond that, it must be established that "a different result would have been reached initially had
[the material submitted in support of the motion] been considered."
Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
(Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-227, 8 AEC 416, 418 (1974).
Staff therefore objects to the admission of Contention 6, so interpreted, to this reopened proceeding.
In its memorandum in support of its motion to add further contentions, CESG asserts that rather than challenging the general requirements of the regulations, as Applicant alleges, CESG instead is urging that, " fairly interpreted, the regula-tions require a consideration of the location of surrounding high population centers in determining the size of the EPZ for which evacuation plans must be prepared in order for an operating license to be granted."
According to CESG, this conclusion is required by the particular characteristics of the area, including the fact that the City of Charlotte is located in the path of winds which at certain times come from the direction of McGuire and is one of only a few locations in the U.S. which is uniquely susceptible to atmospheric inversions.
B.
In our opinion, CESG's position is incorrect.
Class 9 accidents were fully considered in the Commission's development of the 10-mile EPZ concept and CESG has provided no justifica-tion for further expansion of this distance.
In support of this determination we note that the joint NRC/ EPA report, NUREG-0396, suora, provided the basis for the selection of a 10-mile EPZ.
NUREG-0396 was developed by a Task Force composed of recognized experts on the effects of radioactivity from both NRC and EPA.
This planning document specifically recognized the possibility of Class 9 accidents in recommending the 10-mile distance.
NUREG-0396 states:
T The EPZ recommended is of sufficient size [10 mile radius] to provide dose savings to the population in areas where the projected dose from design basis accidents would be expected to exceed the applicable PAGs [ Protective Action Guidelines] under unfavorable atmospheric con-ditions...[C]onsequences of less severe Class 9 accidents would not exceed the PAG level outside the recommended EPZ distance.
In addi-tion, the EPZ is of sufficient size to provide a substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of the more severe Class 9 accidents.
NUREG-0396, at 16-17.
Appendix I of NUREG-0396 further explains that the 10-mile EPZ was designed to' provide full protection to the public in the event of any Class 9 accident.
Appendix I states as follows:
Class 9 accidents cover a full spectrum of releases The lower range of the spectrum I
would include accidents in which a core " melt-thrcugh" of the containment vould occur.
[T]he doses from " melt-through" releases generally would not exceed even the most restric-l tive PAG beyond about 10 miles from a power plant.
The upper range of the core-melt accidents is categorized by those in which the containment catastophically fails and releases large quanti-ties of radioactive materials directly into the atmosphere because of over-pressurization or a steam explosion.
These accidents have the poten-tial to release very large quantities
. of j
radioactive materials.
There is a full spectrum of releases between the lower and upper range with all of these releases involving some combination of atmospheric and melt-through accidents.
These c
very severe accidents have the potential for i
causing serious injuries and deaths.
Therefore, emergency response for these conditions must have as their first priority the reduction of early L
20 -
severe health effects.
Studies have been per-formed which indicate that if emergency action such as sheltering or evacuation were taken within about 10 miles of a power plant, there would be significant savings of earl even from the most " severe"y injuries and deaths atmospheric releases.
[ Footnote omitted]
NUREG-0396, at I-6 to I-7.
The joint NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) document establishing criteria for state and local emergency plans, commonly referred to as NUREG-0654,11/
adopted the approach recommended in NUREG-0396 and specifi-cally noted the conclusion of the NRC/ EPA Task Force that "it would be unlikely that any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond the plume exposure EPZ."
NUREG-0634, at 12.
Further, NUREG-0654 states that "the plume exposure EPZ is of sufficient size for actions within this zone to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of a worst case core melt accident." Id.
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In view of these conclusions, it is manifestly evident that Contention 6 now presented by CESG has already been considered by the NRC and satisfactorily resolved.
i 19/ " Criteria for Freparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, " NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980).
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, IV ORDER 7er all the foregoing reasons and based upon a consider-ation of the entire record in this matter, it is, this 13th day of February ORDERED That the November 7,1980 motion of CESG requesting the admission of Contentions 5 and 6 to this reopened proceeding is denied.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Ov42 -
Robdrt M. Lazo
~'d ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE I
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