ML19345F312
| ML19345F312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Roe J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | John Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102170172 | |
| Download: ML19345F312 (12) | |
Text
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James R. Miller, Chief Standardization and Special Projects Branch John Olshinski, Chief Operating Reactors and Assessment Branch FROM:
Jack Roe, Technical Assistant Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF RES LONG RANGE RESEARCH PLAN (LRRP)
Attached for your review are advance sections of the draft LRPP. The NRR response on the LRRP review should be back to RES by the end of Cecember 1980, so Division cowents are needed to be sent to me by Ocember 11, 1980. The review-should concentrate on broad prograrcatic issues and not focus on detailed work tasks. Specific points' requested in feedback are as follows:
o Specify whether the LRRP is responsive to the DL needs.
o Specify those needs which are not adeouately addressed and suggest proposed resources and schedules.
o Assure justifications identify our needs or provide appropriate revisions.
Jack Roe, Technical Assistant Division of Licensing Enclosure 30 '
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NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 tu S. GOVERNMENT PRINTINC CFOOE:."a F* 4 39 'M4
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. i 3.2 Safecuards Research
- i 3.2.1 Objective The objective of the safeguards research program is to ensure that NRC licensees protect public health and safety and national security against theft or sabotage through'the development, implementation, and maintenance of effective safeguards l
programs at nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities and during the storage I
and shipment of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and spent fuel.
3.2.2 Technical Capabilities Required To achieve this regulatory objective, NRC must be able to:
(1) define design-basis threats in terms that enhance uniformity and effectiveness of safeguards design and assessment (2) evaluate the level of safeguards protection against any tnreat within the design-basis definition (3) establish acceptance criteria for safeguards systems performance based on the relationship of the criteria to the major factors s
that contribute to risks to society.
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3.2.3 Status of Capability The current design-basis threat is stated in broad terms'that cover many possible variations. Studies to characterize nuclear threats have been based on analogies to criminal and terrorist attacks on nonnuclear ' targets.
The results have given insight.into the general kinds of capabilities that 3.2-1 i
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might be represented in attempts at nuclear theft or sabotage; however, this information has not :een translated into guidance for NRC staff and licensees on how such information can be used in design or evaluation of nuclear safe-guards systens. At present, there is no systematic way of ensuring uniform consideration of threats during safeguards design or evaluation, nor is there a systematic way of demonstrating the adequacy of the assumptions and i
considerations used.
i The evaluation of the effectiveness of a licensee's physical prote cien is based on documented procedures which have evolved from field experience and the Comorenensive Evaluation Program (CEP), which was an ensite, detailed review of safeguards performance and vulnerabilities at each major licensed fuel facility. A similar evaluation program (vulnerability assessments) for reactors is being developed. The " Fixed Site Physical Drotection Upgrade Rule Guidance Oscpendium" (NUREG 0669) will be applied to assass licensee performance and compliance with the physical protection upgrade rule. These methods for the evaluation of the effectiveness of a licensee's safeguards continue to rely to a considerable extent on implicit protessional judgments; there is a lack of guidance for taking into account the effect of adversary strategy on the
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performance of safeguards cocconents and subsystems.
In the future these methods may be supplemented by some of the quantitative evaluation techniques being developed under the NRC Research Program.l 2 The. methods being developed ISafeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNA), Sandia National Laboratories and Pritsker Associates, NUREG/CR-0725, Marr51979. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), Sandia National Laboratories, Vols.1, 2, and 3, NUREG/CR-1246, Draf t, August 1980.
2 Structured Assessment Acproach (SAA), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NURE3/CR-1233, draf t October 1979. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-ll69, April 1980.
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provide a means for assessing safeguards system response as a function of adversary characteristics and strategies.
They provide technical aids for evaluation which have the advantage of a systematic and reproducible analysis of licensee safeguards, and they have received considerable interest outside the NRC. However, they have not yet been refined through extended field application to licensed facilities nor have they been sufficiently validated.
(This lack of validation is primarily because of many--and uncertain--human factors involved in safeguards-adversary interactions.)
The acceptability criteria in the guidance compendium for the physical protection upgrade rule were derived from broad, performance-criented goals by establishing subjectively derived criteria for the characteristics of physical protection
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subsystems and components.
(Similar methods are being used in the upgrading of the material control and accountability (MC&A) rule.) The criteria are intended to be independent of threats; therefore, they do not reflect the way the I
effectiveness of safeguards will vary with different threats.
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The current ability to evaluate the risk to society which arises from malicious acts has been very limited.
It has included reviews of analogous terrorist acts and crimes as indicators of the likelihood that 'various types of adversaries would attempt such acts at licensed nJclear facilities.
The results of these reviews provide useful background information, but they cannot be codified to provide specific guidance for the design and evaluation of nuclear safeguards.
The consequences of deliberately malevolent acts also are important in understanding 3.2-3
6 potential risk to soc %ty. One study has been done of the consecuences of
" successful" malicious acts, and NRC has reviewed the events that would follow a " successful" theft, as indicators of wheth?r the thief would be aporehended before the material was used to harm society. However, to date there has been no attempt to fstematically evaluate the relationships between these various effects.
t 3.2.4 Research Program The nature of safeguards means there will always be a large subjective component in regulatory judgments; however, the safeguards research program is aimed at providing a more systematic technical and scientfic framework so that regulatory judgments can be as uniform and comprehensive as possible. The general objective encompasses three specific research program objectives:
(1) develop, test, and refine analytical methods to aid in predicting or assessing the effectiveness of licensees' safeguards ccmponents, subsystems, and systems in terms of the outcome of an adversary attempt at theft or sabotage.
(2) conduct experiments to measure the performanc?, against various adversary strategies, of safeguards components, subsystus, and systems as a basis for validating or improving analytical methods.
I (3) perform special studies related to improvements in ruler.aking, licensing, j
and inspection. Trie studies will include technical confirmatory work j
requested by NRC-user offices, as well as research to increase the utility of the risk perspective in the safeguards regulatory program.
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3.2.5 Results 3.2.5.1 Analytical Methods Methods to evaluate the effectiveness of paysical protection that have been developed during the past three years are currently being used by the NMSS staff in assessing regulatory applications.
The continuing research program will develop and verify methods for evaluating reactor sabotage and for representing the human-factors aspects of the safeguards / adversary interactions, (as recommended by the ACRS).
The goal is to complete the improvement of these evaluation methods and computer programs and their transfer to the NRC staff by FY 1982.
A study will be completed to rank reactor vital areas by order.of importance to help develop measures for safeguards protection against sabotage.
Physical Protection and Material Control and Accounting (PC&A) methods will be integrated to form a basis for the construction of integrated rules and to allow preliminary study of their application to nuclear-facility design. Tests of this integrated approach will include its application at a current fuel cycle site and at the Barnwell reprocessing site (AGNS). A study will be conducted to reexamine the safeguards needs for domestic and foreign reprocessing plants. Methods and procedures will be developed for avoiding potsntial conflicts between safety and safeguards requirements for reactor designs.
The research program for development of techniques for evaluating MC&A effective-ness has resulted in two computerized methods which are being used by the staff in assessing regulatory applications. A third method, the Aggregated System 3.2-5
i Model (ASM), is being used by the NMSS staff in its manual form; it will be computerized, completed, and transferred to the user Jffice by FY 1983. Use of these methods in special studies will require the1. refinement to evaluate methods to detect and deter nonviolent adversaries, to enhance the level of confidence in material-inventory status, to evaluate reprocessing safeguards associated with export licensing, and to evaluate safeguards pertaining to i
other fuel cycles which are being developed or utilized in other countries to prepare for possible introduction of these safeguards in the United States.
The two computerized methods, the Structured Assessment Approach (SAA) and the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP), will continue to be used to l
assess licensee performance relative to NRC MC&A regulatory requirements.
Efforts will be initiated to determine whether the resulting safeguard-
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vulnerability levels can be assigned priorities by using system dynamics (for example, timing and sequencing of individual events).
In addition, studies will be initiated to determine if safeguards systems can be designed using j
SAA/SVAP. By FY 1932 studies will be undertaken to adapt these tools to a I
mini-computer and transfer them to the NRC Applicatfon Development Facility (ADF).
l The Aggregated Systems Model will be improved by the introduction of. risk
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concepts during FY 1982-FY 1983.
Development and implementation of this analytical method (which has been underway for about four years) will be l
l completed by FY 1983.
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6 Marting in FY 1982, methods will be developed for determining the risk to society from the consequences of sabotage and theft; starting in FY 1984, methods will be developed for systematically determining safeguards acceptability criteria from preassigned levels.of risk and other general regulatory requirements. These will include formalized methods to aid in the development of regulations and criteria to safeguard reactors and fuel facilities against nonviolent and violent adversaries.
3.2.5.2 Experimental Data Programs for data collection and retrieval, which have not be en funded during the past several years, will be reactivated to serve the increased application of a
developed methods to licensing evaluations.
This program will continue at a constant level over the next five years. By FY 1983 input procedures for data relating to physical protection will be integrated with similar data input procedures designed for the MC&A process.
This effort will require close coordination of the Sandia and Lawrence Livermore programs, the NMSS staff guidance compendium effort, and the inspection-methods project.
Funding for this work will be concentrated 'n FY 1982 and FY 1983.
Experimental validation of models and computer programs ; sed in the evaluation of the effectiveness of physical protection will stress the design and use of field tests of independent safeguards and the comparison of these results with predictions generated by l
model and computer programs. Thus, funding will tend to increase over the next five years. The tests will be subject to the availability of DOE field-test sites and other sites, such as the AGNS facility. A major result of these tests--planned to start in FY 1982 and be finished in FY 1987--will be tne exoansion of the present limited understanding of the impact of human factors on the problems of evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards. Experimental validation of 1
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SAA/SVAP and other computer metheds used in the "C&A effectiveness-evaluation techniques will include independent, simulated, safeguards tests. The results of these tests will be compared with the results from other developed models and computer programs and with expert opinions. The testing of the effectiveness of material containment and surveillance controls against simulated adversaries will be completed in FY 1984, and the testing of detectors and unit processes will be completed in FY 1986. This phase of the research will include collecting data to support staff application of effectiveness-
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evaluation techniques, to support the use of these techniques in parametric and sensitivity studies, and to support studies relatEd to human factors, security-clearance effectiveness, and procedural improvements. A data base for evaluating MC&A effectiveness, which is also suitable for inspection purposes, will be completed by FY 1984 An experimental program will be developed to evaluate and recomend measurement b
techniques to characterize holdup at generic locations within a plant.
Bounds will be established on the magnitude and form of poter.tial radiological releases which might be caused by shipping cask closure or general structural 1
failure as a result of explosive attacks (spent fuel cask secondary violation).
The effects of sabotage on spent fuel at reactor and storage sites will be l
determined.
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3.2.5.3 Special Studies Research will be continued on the technical and psychological evaluation of messages which indicate that criminal acts involving nuclear material will be cortmitted.
Information will be developed on the relative attractiveness of various scenarios and targets to various adversaries, and on relevant resources and strategies which might be available to potential adversaries.
This research will extend through FY 1984 at a constant level of effort.
i Parametric, sensitivity, and trade-off effectiveness studies, based on developed simulation models of safeguards systems, will be accelerated. These studies (which have only recently been made possible by maturation of the models) are designed to provide improved bases for regulatory decisions. Parametric studies using tne detailed Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) to aid criteria selection will begin in FY 1982 and be completed in FY 1984. These projects will continue during the five-year planning period at a relatively constant levt.1.
Existing Inspection and Enforcement inspection modules will be updated and improved using new technical data and documentation mandated by the recent upgrading of regulatory recuirements for safeguards.
Energy park safeguards will be examined in regard to their vulnerability, i
effectiveness, and required resources. An appropriate technology base will be developed for making recommendations concerning the safeguards of multi-l national stcrage sites, s
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The extent to which safeguards regulations should be based upon risks and s
consequences (both to the facility operator and society) will be studied to provide a basis for judging the imncetance of each in establishing safeguards regulations.
By FY 1982, a three-year project will be completed on the safeguards aspects of proliferation-resistant fuel cycles.
In the absence of more definitive guidance, the fuel cycles recommended by this project will provide a basis for future NRC policy relative to development and commercialuation by the nuclear industry and for research efforts in transportation safeguards.
- However, unless GESMO concepts or breeder reactors becorra a reality, current regulatory 1
procedures concerning transportation safeguards are probably adeouate.
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Sensitivity and trade-off studies will use the developed evaluation methods c
v to assist in identifying requirements for improvements in existing facilities, to aid the design of new regulations in response to the recommendations in the Report of the Task Force on Material Control and Accounting, and to provide 4
safeguards guidelines for possible new fuel facilities. These studies will continue through FY 1985. A study will be conducted to determine best mixes of safeguards components to counter the nonviolent adversary; this study will give a technical base for making policy decisions and allocating safeguards resources against this threat. Development of this program will depend on progress in analytical and experimental studies.
A study will begin in FY 1982 to develop improved scenarios and operational representations of the events following a. successful act of sabotage or theft T
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1 of nuclear material; it will serve as a basis for assessing public risk.
Information relevant to detennining target attractiveness, setting regulatory priorities for safeguards, and planning emergency response also will be s
provided.
3.2.6 Budget i
The five-yatr budget for safeguards research, in millions of dollars, is:
FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987 5.4 5.75 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.5 4
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