ML19345D283
| ML19345D283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Bickwit L NRC COMMISSION (OCM), NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345D277 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7, TASK-PS, TASK-SE SECY-A-80-179C, NUDOCS 8012120373 | |
| Download: ML19345D283 (14) | |
Text
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UMTIO STATES NUCLEAR REGULATCY COMMtS::lON ADJUDICATORY ITEM POLICY SESSION
- ECv-A-80-179C November 24, 1980 For:
The Comrissioners From:
Leonard Sickwit, Jr.
General Counsel
Subject:
REDRAFT OF NDIAN POINT ORDER Discussion:
At the Commission meeting on November 14, 1980, the Commission reached agreement on most disputed issues, w'th some matters lef t for later resolution.
Most notably, the Comnissioners were divided on the statement of the principal focus of the adjudication, and on several of the questions to be addressed by the Licensing Board.
At the Commission's request, OPE has drafted a paragraph designed to reconcile ths differences on the focus of the adjudication. That paragraph (18A) appears along with the Commissioners' earlier versions of the same paragraph
( W ' and 18).
We have noted where the transcript indicated that a resolution of that paragraoh might affect the wording of other portions of the Order.
The attached draft reflects the Commissioners' divergent por,itions on certain of the questions; no attempt has been made in this draft to reconcile those positions.
The draft reflects that Commissioner Bradford will be supplying a footnote describing in greater detail the technical differences, as outlined by Mr. Stello in his briefing, between Units 2 and 3.
This redraft uses the same paragraph numbers as in the earlier draft.
In this redraft, additions are marked by underlining, and deletions by a minus sign in a circle.
The nature of the deleted material is indicated by notes in the margin.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices
~
Secretariat Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
General Counsel
Contact:
SECY NOTE:
This paper is currently scheduled for discussion e
ane, CGC at an open Commission meeting on Tuesday, November _25,1980.
- 8012120S Q
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C0t'rISSIONERS:
John F. Ahearne, Chaiman Victor Gilinsky Joseph it. Hendrie Peter A. Bradford
)
CONSOLIDATED EDIS0N COMPANY
)
0F NEW YORK (Indian Point,
)
Unit No. 2)
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-274 POWER A'THORITY OF THE STATE
)
50-286 J
0F ist YORK (Indian Point,
)
Unit No. 3)
)
)
PEMORANDUM AND ORDER Background
- Oi, '4y 30, 1980, the' Commission issued an order establishing a g\\
four-pronged approach for resolving the issues raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists' petition regarding the Indian ~ Point nuclear facilities, and by the decision of the Director, Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation (NRR), granting in part and denying in part that petition. The order announced the Commission's intention to hold a discretionary adjudication The Conmission has received a motion from the Union of Ccocerned Scientists, dated June 23,1980, equesting the disqualification of Commissioner Hendrie from participation in this matter.
In its Diablo Canyon decision (In the Patter of Pacific Gas and Electric, 11 NRC 411 (1980), the Commission, with Commissioner Bradford dissenting, stated that requests for the disqualification of a Cc=missioner would not be entertained by the Commission as a whole but would be referred to the Commissioner whose disqualification was requested.
By remorandum of April 23, 1980, Coanissioner Hendrie has denied the request for his disqualification.
for the resolution of safety issues concerning tha plants; initiated an informal proceeding for the purpose of defining the questions to be answered in that adjudication, as well as the criteria to be applied; announced the Conmission's plan to address the generic question of the operation of nuclear reactors in areas of high pcpulation density thrcugh a generic proceeding, to be decided at a later date; and directed, the Cornission's General Counsel and Director, Office of Policy Evaluation, to establish a Task Force to address the question of the status of the reactors during the pendency of the planned adjudication.
In this order, we will deal with the issue of interin operation of the Indian Point units during the adjudicatory hearing and will take the steps necessary to initiate that adjudicatory hearing.
Inter n Operation i
The Commission must decide whether the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 n
should continue to operate on an interim basis during the time it takes to complete the adjudicatory hearing we order today.
A decision on interin operation is not a decision about the long-tenn safety of the Indian Point plants.
In his decision on February 11, 1980, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation found that the interim risk of the continued operation
[5 of the Indian Point units did not warrant their shutdown while the matter was being further considered.
Additionally, the Task Force, fomed to conduct a separate investigation of comparative risks of b
interia operation,# completed its work in June.
The conclusion of the
" 'c now Task Force was that the overall risk of the Indian Point reactors is cc u pknA is crs" about the same as the typical reactor on a typical site.
The Task Force DE! CWD 2
{ nw.wtny.d fcund that although the Indian Point site was considerably more risky
.g.
topc than the average nuclear power plant site because of the density of the NCP surrounding population, the design features of the plants reduced the accident risk from Indian Point by a comparable factor.
The report acknowledged, however, that the degree of uncertainty for the design 3;
comparison g much greater tt-- for the site comparison.
Based upon this report, as well as the Director's previous decision, we conclud d on Julv 15 that the risk posed by the operation of the Indian Point facilities dj not warrant the suspension of the operating license,s,,
during the adjudicatory proceedir.gs.
The Task Force findings and the Director's findings are not the final judgnent on the safety of Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
That final judgment may only be made after all parties have had the opportunity to examine in detail the Task Force report and other evidence presented by the fiRC staff and present additional evidence of their cwn.
In -the event that the Licensing Board conducting the adjudication determines that new evidence warrants interim relief, it may at any time recomr'end a course of action to the Conmission.f The 2m.ruce u>
~
Task Force Report itself will be distributed free upon a written request 4%c' a c
Saw<ory V l
to the flRC.
" ba'i c\\eleted,
m e.
c u e.
l R.e per iS In making this decision, we considered the positions taken by the g 73
'fY cany commenters.
Certain of those positions warrant specific discussion.
UCS has alleged that there are specific safety defects in the Indian Point units which raise questions about whether or not the units
- 5 mp y with ?!RC regulations.
The Director responded to these allegations in his February 11, 1980 Order and UCS responded in turn in the submittal f
of March 10, 1980. We believe these specific allegations raise issues l
l 3
which are best resolved in the forthcoming adjudicatory proceedings.
We have not made a judgment about these allegations and rely in the interin upon the judgment of the Director of NRR.
However, we do note that the Task Force report found no significant difference in risk between the Indian Point 2 and 3 designs.
It also found that the technical fixes k
ordered in the Director's -decision would be clearly beneficial in reducing risk, but questioned whether the factor of improve.ent was significant s 9&cw in light of the uncertainties in estimating overall risk.
If the Board
'3 #
!:. a ~~
v4,
at any tire during the proceeding believes that any of these issues are g ex uA '
nct' serious enough to warrant immediate action, it should make an appropriate y
p recommendation to the Commission.
8 Several commenters contended that the Commission should rot pemit continued operation because of the lack of an emergency plan for the j g surrounding area.
11hile a successful plan for evacuation at Indian Point vrould probably reduce overall risk, the fact is that most operating reactor sites do not g have an approved plan and Indian Point is not different in this regard.
New York PIRG requested that we make no decision on interim operation until Senate confimation of a new chaiman.
!!e cannot delay Commission business pending a confimation process which is beyond our control.
I Furthemore, such delay would not nake a siglif cant difference in this g
case since the decision on interim operatior. was unanimous.
" W hl6d PIRG also requested that the Commission examine a copy of the FEMt.
I review on the status of state and local emergency planning ordered by the President.
We have examined this report and it does not change the l
opinion on emergency planning we expressed above.
4
We note that the Governor of New York has strongly urged that the plants remain in operation pending the outcome of the proceeding.
Both UCS and New York PIRG rs t to address the Commission orally j c, on the subject of interim operation.
By a vote of 2-2, that request was denied.
The recent leaks of large amounts of water into the containment and reactor vessel cavity at Indian Point Unit 2 are still being reviewed by lh } b 6
the Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
On November 14, h
1980, the Commission received a briefing on the status of the investigation
, at Indian Point Unit 2, and on the irplications of the problem for b
6t Unit 3.
Unit 2 is currently shut down, and must remain so for technical reasons for a period of months. With respect to Unit 2, rior to permitting i t6. M
, j \\^g resumption of operations, the Commission will determine whether its
\\.N decision of July 15, 1980, to permit continued operation remains valid.
f^
s'fwO g,,{g With espect to Unit 3, we decided to stand by our earlier determination
<P d's (j
to al"ow operation during the pendency of the adjudication. Our judgment 4 *6 -
is based upon the information received in the November 14 briefing from the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, who advised that the containment fan cooler units at Unit 3 are in markedly better condition than those which have been the source of problems at Unit 2, and that Unit 3 has additional safety features not present in Unit 2 in this regard.E Our judgment also reflects the fact that the two units are i
owned and operated by separate entities.
Adiudicatory Proceedino The Commission has received a motion for reconsideration of that p \\0 portion of the Commission's order dated May 30, 1980 which directs that y
Footnote to be supplied by Commissioner Bradford
.5 -
an adjudicatory hearing be held on the long-term safety of the Indian Point units.
The basis for the petition is the Task Force's conclusions that Indian Point poses the same overall societal risk and less of an individual risk than a typical reactor on a typical site. The licensees also contend that the population density is not materially dissimile from numerous other sites not subject to auiudicatory hearings.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The licensees would have us treat the Task Force report as the final word on the risks of the Indian Point site, instead of a document designed to aid the Commission p l\\
in its decision on interin operation.
As we stated previously in this order, the Task Force report, compiled in a short time period and not disclosing its detailed methodology and underlying data, will be tested in an adjudicato:y setting where parties may present additional or rebuttal oidence.
Furthernore, the Task Force report, even if perfectly accurate, does not answer all of the questions the Conmission wishes explored by the Licensing Board in a full proceeding.
In short, we will not turn a decision on interim operation into a final decision on the long-term acceptability on the Indian Point site.
Licensees also contend that the Indian Point demography is not different frca ocher sites.
In fact, according to the Task Force report,
. 311 l
Indian Poin+ has the highest population within 10, 30 and 50 miles of any nuclear power plant site in the United States.
At 50 miles, its population is more than double any other plant site.
i 7
l The Connission directs that the discretionary proceeding will be conducted in the vicinity of Indian Point by an Atomic Safety and Licensing l$lb
- Board, s'ng the full procedural format of a trial-type adjudication, l
(4 l3,6l, + l5 bELGED,,
on +he. ycw,d5 & - & SUSm n ce c pose w.y<ph:
i tweaed in
- IG.
6
including discovery and cross-examination.E The purpose of the pecceeding will be to take evidence and nake recommended findings and conclusions on disputed issues material to the question whether the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 plants should be shut down or other action f
taken. The record of the proceeding, together with recommendations, will then be forwarded to the Commission for the final agency action on the nerits of the proceeding.
In view of the complexity of this proceeding, and in order that the Commission may make its decision within a reasonable period of time, we stress that the Scard should focus clearly upon the questions asked by the Commission.
2_/
Because of the investigative nature of this proceeding, further guidance is necessary with respect to certain procedural matters.
R.DNyt&
Because the proceeding, although adjudicatory in form, is not nandated by the Atomic Energy Act, it is not an "on the record" proceeding
' pc6f# 76 4 within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act.
Although normal ex parte bg constraints will apply to communications to the Licensing Board, the
[ PifG Commission will not be limited in its ability to obtain information f
qtP with respect to Indian Point from eny source.
Because the Connission 10 ', -
itself is designating.by this Order the issues it wishes to be
~ p ' 'cg 3 addressed in the adjudication, it is particularly important that
..g gM A the Licensing Board have discretion to formulate contentions and Mf Ngem subissues, upon the advice of the parties, so as to effectuate that D, W, g M
,AO' purpose.
In admitting and formulating contentions and subissues, therefore, the Licensing Board will not be bound by the provisions
%9, cp of 10 CFR Part 2.
The Licensing Board may also, without regard to ci the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2 establish whatever order of presentation Iqcg M,
it deems best suited to the proceeding's investigative purposes.
'(6 gg v.2 Except as orovided above or elsewhere in this Order,10 CFR Part 2 Uary M g will control.
If the Board concludes that further relaxation of the rules is necessary for the efficient conduct of the hearino, 4
~ ^ ", g4 )
we expect it to request such authorization from the Connission.
t'4 O The Connission exoects the Licensina Board to use its authority under Part 2 to assure the relevance and efficiency of discovery and cross-examina tion. 3The Licensing Board shall not reach an initial decision, EDt as noted in the Order, shall instead forriulate reconrendations on the questions posed by the Commission.
No party will have the " burden
, g. mets of persuasion" as the term is nornally used in adjudicatory proceedings; if evidence on a particular matter is in equipoise, the Board's re:on-
- MO# 9 The staff will be a deparhrcb" mendation may be expected to reflect that fact.
party to the proceeding, and the licensees will be admitted as parties upon request filed within 30 days of Federal Register notice of the y '3 m All others wishing to intervene lkEod"\\ ^"y appair.tnent of a Licensing Board.
shall file petitions for intervention within 30 days of Federal RegSter
'T r%5 ' '< ww notice of the appointment of a Lice 1 sing Board.
The appointment of the
. g g
Licensing Board will be announced by subsequent order of the Commission.
1 ELE T l )m'E D.
[ NOTE: THE FOLLOUING THREE PARAGRAPHS ARE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE SAME ISSUE.]
[JA/JH:
The primary bases for the Commission's decision will be whether the risks to individuals living in the vicinity of the Indian
[ /7 Point site, including those resulting from the difficulty in evacuating, are significantly greater than the rius to individuals living in the vicinities of other operating nuclear power reactors in the U.S. and whether the societal risks from the Indian Point station are significantly above the range of societal risks from uther operating units station.
The Commission intends to compare Indian Point to the range of risk from other nuclear power plants.]
[VG,PS: The Commission is primarily concerned about the extent to which the large population around Indian Point affects the risks posed by Indian Point as compared to the risks posed by other plants.
In particular, the Commission is concerned about:
(1) the risks to individuals resulting from the difficulty of evacuating the vicinity of Indian Point; and (2) the total risk to persons and property pased by the Indian Point plants.
The Commission intends to compare the risks posed by the Indian Point plants to the risks posed by other nuclear power plants.]
lhe Conmission's primary concern is the extent to which the population p f d b around Indian Point affects the risk posed by Indian Point as compared to the range of risk posed by other nuclear plants.
In particular, the Commission is concerned with the total risk to persons and property posed by the Indian Nint plants as well as the risk to individuals l
resulting from the difficulty of evacuating the vicinity of Indian 8
Point.
The Conmission intends to compare the risks posed by the Indian Point plant to the range of risk posed by other nuclear plants. ]
The Commission is also interested in the current state of emergency planning in the vicinity of the Indian Point site and in future improvements gN in that planning as well as in resolving the specific contentions in the UCS Petision to the effect that some of our regulations are not met in one or both units.
Risks from nuclear power reactors are defined by the probabilities and consequences associated with potential accidents.
In directing a conparison of the risks of the Indian Point units with those from a representative group of other operating units, the Commission is fully h 99 aware of the uncertainties that attend such quantitative risk assessment calculations (reference NUREG-CR-0400, the Lewis Report, and the Commission policy statement on it.)
Nevertheless, risi assessment methods offer the best means available for objective and quantitative conparision of the kind needed here.
Further, some of the uncertainty that is associated with risk assessment estimates of the absolute values of accident probabilities and consequences does not apply to conparisons such as those soughc here.
Several meastres of risk are useful for the comparisons the Commission seeks.
For indisidual risks, these include the probabilities of early
- pM effects--fatalities and injuries that could occur soon after an accident--
and.of long-term effects--cancers and genetic effects that could occur more than a year after an accident, all as a function of-distance from the reactor.
For societal risks the useful measures include early effects, long-
- g. tern effects, and property damage and costs in terns of interdiction, decontamination, and crop and milk losses and the possibility that some i
e
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y S irib o n 'i areas affected by an accident might be uninhabitable for long periods. V.-
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Societal risk measures should include the distribc; ions of prcbabilities "yjNe ;
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7,. M ".s and consequences as well as the expected risks or mean annual values of nas *
,gn the consequences.
Risk teasures of these kinds for the Indian Point
}'?
.,, ;<. ; c
' bc units and for a representative group of other operating nuclear power
("
,r: A plants were presented in the report of the Conmission's Task Force on Interim Operation of the Indian Point, NUREG-0715, and were found useful by the Commission in its consideration of the interim operation matter.
In developing the record of the proceeding, the Board should address a series of questions as follcws:
[ NOTE: CC'4Mlul0NERS GILINSKY AND BRADFORD, ON THE ONE HAND, AND CHAlttAN AHEARNE AND COMMISSIONER HENDRIE, ON THE OTHER, FAVOR DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE INITIAL QUESTIONS TO THE BOARD.
THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR BEST ATTE!!PT TO REPRODUCE THOSE POSITIONS, BASED UPON THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE NOVE."SER 14 MEETING, WITH UNRESOLVED AREAS NOTED.]
GILINSKY/SRADFORD:
i 1.
(a) What is the range of probabilities assigned by experts to the possibility of core [ celt] [ damage] accident at a pressurized water reactor?
7 of a breach of containnent?
p
[ NOTE:
CC"11SSIONER GILINSKY INDICATES POSSIBLE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THIS QUESTION MORE SPECIFIC TO INDIAN POINT.
SEE TRANSCRIPT, PAGE 126.]
(b) Assuming that a core [nelt] [ damage] accident, followed by a breach of containment, has occurred at Indian Point, what are the possible t
patterns of radiation release under a variety o'
-teorological conditions?
(c) How nach time would be required for an [ effective] [PG:
adequate]
l l
eve.cuation of the surrounding population?
(d) What are the possible health consequences of a core [nelt]
[ damage] accident with a breach of containrent, assuming that [ effective evacuation has taken place] [PB:
evacuation has taken place according to (c) above]?
(e) What would be the property damage, including long-term uninhabitability, caused by a core [ celt] [ damage] accident win breach of
-ctwo containment?
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AHEARNE/HENDRIE:
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JI 1.
What is the currcat status and degree of conformance with NRC/ FEMA a
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cut guidelines of state and local emergency planning within a 10-rile radius of AQ eg w.
the site and, to the extent [that it is] relevant to risks posed by the twoJ \\cemch $q
$ ').H re" ce plants, beyond a 10-mile radius? pin this context, an effort should be made to establish what the ninimum nunber of hours warning for an effective evacua-tion of a 10-mile cuadrant at Indian Point would be.
[JA:
The FEMA position should be taken [as a rebuttable presumption] for tnis estimate.]
2.
What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific
!O offsite emergency procedures that could be feasible and should be taken to protect the public?
3.
What improvements in the level of safety will result tam measures required or referenced in the Director's Order to the licensee, dated Febru-ary 11,1980?
(A contention by a party that one or more specific safety Y ~(,
1 measures, io :ddition to those identified or referenced by the Director, should be required as a condition of operating the facility or facilities, would be within the scope of this inquiry.)
e
4.
Phat risk nay be posed by serious accidents at Indian Point 2 and 3, 01 g, -
including accidents not considered in the plants' design basis, pending and after any improvements described in (2) and (3) above?
[ NOTE:
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION APPEARS TO HAVE THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF ALL CCCMISSIONERS, WITH THE PROVISO THAT ITS,U4NGUAGE MAY BE ALTERED TO REFLECT THE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE LANGIRGE OF PARAGRAPHS 17 AND 18.
SEE TRANS-CRIPT, PAGES 143-45.
OPE'S DRAFT OF COMPROMISE LAf'GUAGE APPEARS AS PARAGRAPH ISA.]
5.
Sused on the foregoing, how do the risks posed by Indian Point Units 2 and 3 compare with the range of risks posed by other nuclear power plants licensed to operate by the Commission?
(The Board M~dl e
should limit its inquiry to generic examination of the range of risks pnd not go into any site-specific examination other than for Indian Point itself, except to the extent raised by the Task Force.)
[ NOTE:
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION APPEARS TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT OF ALL C0'4MISSIONERS.
SEE TRANSCRIPT, PAGES 146-46.]
y 6.
What would be the energy, environmental, econcnic or other "c i\\ or u
consequences of a shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2 and/or Unit 3?
OR-(M
- ELE CD
[ NOTE:
AT THE SUGGESTION OF CHAIRMAN AHEARNE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION WAS SET ASIDE FOR LATER CONSIDERATION, TO ALLOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE ORIGINAL UCS CONTENTIONS.
PREVIOUSLY, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE Arn COMMISSIONER FJNORIE DISAPPROVED THIS QUESTION, AND C0"MISSIONERS BRADFORD AND GILINSKY APPROVED IT.
RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WAS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF RESOLUTION OF THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPHS lg AND 26.
TRANSCRIPT,PAGES146-52.]
7.
Are Units 2 and 3 in compliance with those NRC regulations 3O about which specific contention:, of non-compliance have been nade?
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[ NOTE: THE FOLLOWING QUESTION APPEARS TO HAVE THE AGREEttENT OF ALL CO ::tISSIONERS. TRANSCRIPT,PAGES153-55.]
8.
Does the Governor of the State of New York care to express an official cosition with regard to the long-term operation of the units?
It is so ORDERED.
For the Commission i
sat;UEL J. CHILK Secretary of.the Commission Dated at Washington, D.C.
{
This day of
,1980.
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