ML19345C463
| ML19345C463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1980 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Parris H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012050067 | |
| Download: ML19345C463 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES 8~
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W., SUITE 3100 Q
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 NOV 2 i B80 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JPO 50-259 50-260 (J0-296~50-327)
Teanessee Valley Authority ATTN:
H.-G. Parris Manager of Power 500A Chestnut Street Tower IT Chattanooga, TN 37401 Gentlemen:
F.nclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-24 which requires action by you with regard to your nuclear power facility.
In order to assist the hTC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide us an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the Bulletin.
Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
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James P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/encls:
H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent py:r '
,..a R. E. Rogers, Project Engineer Sgg3s 90 H. N. Culver, Chief, Nuclear Safety GW U Review S*.aff.
G. G. Stack, Project Manager Nd 83 $N N J. M. Ballentine, Plant c,3 )
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Superintendent J. F. Cox, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Section 11HQ SN N. J. Burzynski, Project Engineer MG11MM,I 8012050 N
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8008220270 s
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555-nr November 21, 1980 0
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. UD IE Bulletin No. 80-24:
PREVENTION OF DAMAGE DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE INSIDE CONT (OCTOBER 17, 1980 INDIAN POINT 2 EVENT) t Description of Circumstances:
On October 24, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-37 described an event that occurred at the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP-2) facility. On October 17, 1980, upon containment entry for repair to a nuclear instrument, it was discovered that several inches of water had accumulated on the containment floor without the operators' knowledge.
This accumulation was later determined to have amounted to over 109,000 gallons which flooded the reactor vessel pit and wetted the lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was at operating temperature.
The flooded condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:
(1) There were significant multiple service water leaks from piping and fan coolers onto the containment floor.
This system had a history of leakage; (2) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses and the other due to binding of its float switch; (3) The significance of two containment sump level indicating lights which indicated that the water level was continuously above the pump-down level was not recognized by the operators; (4) There was no high water, level alarm and the range of sump level indicating lights. failed to indicate the overflowing sump level; (5) The moistura indicators for the containment atmosphere did not i di level apparently due to an error in calibration and/or ranging which made themcate high motsture lev n
insensitive to the moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (6) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the lab drain water, etc). containment sump also received water from other sources '(Unit 1 p These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump;-(7) The fan cooler condensate wier level measuring instruments were not properly calibrated; (8) There was no water level instrumentation in the reactor vessel pit and the pumps were ineffective since they discharge to the containment floor for ultimate removal by the containment sump pumps.
This Bulletin is issued to enable the NRC staff to formulate requirements for l
long term generic-corrective actions which will be the subject (s) of future l
NRC actions.
The bulletin requires short term actions which will preclude IP-2 l
type events at other plants in the interim before the longer term generic actions
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cre accomplished.
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IEB 80-24 November 21, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Actions to be Taken by Licensees:
1.
Provide a summary description of all open* cooling' water systems present inside containment. Your description of the cooling water systems must include: -(a) Mode of operation during routine reactor operation and in response to a LOCA; (b) Source of water and typical chemical content of water; (c) Haterials used in piping and coolers; (d) Experience with system leakage; (e) History and type of repairs to coolers and piping systems
-(i.e., replacement, weld, braze, etc.); (f) Provisions for isolating portions of the system inside containment in the event of leakage including vulner-ability of those isolation provisions to single failure; (g) Provisions for testing isolation valves in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 (h) Instrumentation (pressure, dew point, flow, radiation detection, etc.)
and procedures in place to detect leakage; and (i) Provisions to detect radioactive contamination in service water discharge from containment.
I 2.
For plants with open cooling water systems inside containment take the following actions:
Verify existence or provide redundant means of detecting and promptly a.
alerting control room operators of a significant accumulation of water in containment (including the reactor _ vessel pit if present).
b.
Verify existence or provide positive means for control room operators t
to determine flow from containment sump (s) used to collect and remove water from containment.
I Verify or establish st least monthly surveillance procedures, with c.
appropriate operating limitations, to assure plant operators have.
at least two methods of determining water level in each location where water may accumulate. The surveillance procedures shall assure that at least one method to remove water from each such location is available during power operation.
In the event either the detection or removal systems become inoperable it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted.
i
- d. Review leakage detection systems and procedures-and provide or verify i
j ability to promptly detect water leakage in containment, and to isolate L
the leaking components or system. Periodic containment entry to inspect J
- An Open system utilizes an indefinite volume, such as a river, so that leakage i
from the' system could not be detected by inventory decrease.
In addition, a l-direct radioa'ctive pathway might exist to outside containment in the event of
.a LOCA simultaneous with a system leak inside containment. A closed system 7
i utilizes a fixed, monitored volume such that leakage from the system could' be detected from inventory decrease and a second boundary exists to prevent loss of containment integrity as a result of a system leak inside containment.
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IEB E0-24 November 21, 1980 Page 3 of 3 for leakage should be considered.
Beginning within 10 days of'the date of this bulletin, whenever the e.
reactor is operating and until the measures described in (a) through (d) above are implemented, conduct interim surveillance measures.
The measures shall include where practical (considering containment atmosphere and ALARA considerations) a periodic containment inspection or remote visual surveillance to check for water leakage.
If containment entry is impractical during operation, perform a containment inspection for water leakage at the first plant shutdown for any reason subsequent to receipt of this bulletin.
f.
Establish procedures to notify the NRC of any service water system leaks within containment via a special licensee event report (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with written report in 14 days) as a degradation of a containment boundary.
I 3.
For plants with closed cooling water systems inside containment provide a summary of experiences with cooling water system leakage into containment.
4.
Provide a written report, signed under oath or affirviation, under the provi-sions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in response to the above items within 45 days of the date of this bulletin.
Include in your report where applicable, your schedule for completing the actions in response to items 2 (a) through (d). Your response should be sent to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office with a copy forwarded to the Director, NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555.
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If you desire additional information regarding this matter please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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N IEB 80-24 November 21, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-24 Prevention of Damage Due to 11/21/80 All_ nuclear power Water Leakage Inside Con-facilities with an tainment (October 17, 1980 OL or CP Indian Point 2 Event) 80-23 Failures of Solenoid Valves 11/14/80 All nuclear power Manufactured by Valcor facilities with an Engineering Corporation OL or CP 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees Source Connectors 80-21 Valve yokes supplied by 11/6/80 All light water Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc, reactor facilities holding OLs or cps Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-10B of Class IE Equipmen facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification 9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-01B of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees source Connectors 79-26 BoronLosshromBWR 8/29/80 All BWR power Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Pawer Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18
.' Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture i
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