ML19345C344

Forwards IE Bulletin 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment. Written Response Required.Requests Info on Manpower Expended

ML19345C344
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	11/21/1980
From:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 8012040463
Download: ML19345C344 (1)

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Docket No. 50-344 EN" sy i

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I Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland Oregon 0,204 Attention: Mr. Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-24 which requires action by you with regard to ycur nuclear' power facility (ies) with an operating license.

In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Hlletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide us an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the bulletin.

Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the bulletin.

Should you have any questions regarding this bulletin or the actions required by you. please contact this office.

2 Sincerely, i

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R. H. Engelken Director 1

Enclosures:

1.

IE Bulletin No. '80-24 2.

Recently Issued IE Be N tins l

cc w/ enclosures:

J. W. Durham, Esq., PGE C. P. Yundt, PGE' i

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SSIllS No.: 6820 Accession No.:

8008220270 IEB 80-24 UtlITED STATES 0FFICE OF INSpECTI0fl A!!D E!!FORCEMEllT T 90 ' N 7 WASHINGT0fi, D.C.

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f Jfru u flovember 21, 1980 IE Bulletin flo. 80-24:

PREVEflTI0fl 0F DAMAGE DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT (OCTOBER 17, 1980 IllDIAN POINT 2 EVENT)

Descrintion of Circumstances:

On October 24, 1980 IE Information Notice f:o. 80-37 described an event that occurred at the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP-2) facility. On October 17, 1980, upon containment entry for repair to a nuclear instr 'ent, it was discovered that several inches of water had accumulated on tb

ntainment floor without the operators' knowledge.

This accumulation was

.er determined to have amounted r

to over 100,000 gallons which flooded the reactor vessel pit and wetted the a

lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was at operating tempera ture.

The flooded condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:

1 (1) There were significant multiple service water leaks from piping and fan coolers onto the containment floor.

This system had a history of leakage;

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(2) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses and the other due to binding of its float switch; (3) The significance of two containment sump level indicating lights which indicated that the water level was continuously above the pump-down level was not recognized by the operators; (4) There was no high water level alarm and the range of sump level indicating lights failed to indicate the overflowing sump level; (5) The moisture level indicators for the containment atmosphere did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently due to an error in' calibration and/or ranging which made them insensitive to the moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (6) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also received water from other sources (Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, ctc). These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows frca the Unit 2 sump; (7) The fan cooler condensate wier level measuring instruments were not properly calibrated; (8) There was no water level instrumentation in the reactor vessel pit and the pumps were ineffective since they discharge to the containment floor for ultimate removal by the containment sump pumps.

This' Bulletin is issued to enable the NRC staff to formulate requirements for long term generic corrective actions which will be the subject (s) of future flRC actions. The bulletin requires short term actions which will preclude IP-2

' type events at other plants in the interim before the longer term generic actions 4

are acccmplished.

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IEC 20-24 flovember 21, 1980 page 2 of 3 Acticns to be Taken by Licensees:

1.

Provide a summary descriptier of all open* coolina water systems present inside containment. Your description of the cooling water systems must include:

(a) Pode of operation during routine reactor operation and in response to a LOCA; (b) Source of water and typical chemical content of water; (c) "aterials used in pioing and coolers; (d) Exoerience with system leakage; (e) History anc type of repairs to coolers and piping systems (i.e., replacement, weld, braze, etc.); (f) Provisions for isolating portions of the system inside containment in the event of leakage including vulner-ability of those isolation Drovisions to sinole failure; (g) Provisions for testino isolation valves in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 (P) Instrumentation (pressure, oew Dolnt, flow, radiation detection, etc.)

and procedures in place to oetect leakage; and (i) Provisions to detect radioactive contamination in service water cischarge Trom containment.

2.

For plants with open cooling water systems inside containment take the following acticns:

a.

Verify existence or provide redundant means of detectir.g and promptly clerting controi room operators of a significant accumulation of water in containnent (including the reactor vessei pit if present).

b.

Verify existence or provide positive means for control room operators to c'eternine ficw frcm contaircent sump (s) used to collect and remove uator from containment.

c.

Verify or estaolish at least irontniy surveillance procedures, with aoprocriate operating limitations, to assure plant operators have at leas: two methods of determining water level in each location where water rav accumulate. The surveillance procedures shall assure that at least one method to remove water frcm each such location is available during power operation.

In the event either the detection or removal systcrs teccme ir. operable it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted.

d. Peview leakage detection systems and proceduns and provide or verify ability to promptly detect water leakage in containment, and to isolate the leaking components or system. Periodic containment entry to inspect

• An Open system utilizes an indefinitt volume, such as a river, so that leakage frcm the system could not be detected by inventory decrease.

In addition, a direct radioactive pathway might exist to outside containment in the event of a LCCA simultar.cous with a system leak inside containment. A closed system utilizes a fixed, monitored volume such that leakage frem the system could be detected from inventory decrease anc a second boundary exists to prevent loss of containment integrity as a resu't of a system leak insido containment.

IEB 80-24 November 21, 1980 Page 3 of 3 i

i for leakage should be considered.

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Beginning within 10 days of. the'date of.this bulletin, whenever the reactor is operating and until the measures described in (a) through (d) aboy'e are implemented, conduct interim surveillance measures. The measures shall include where practical (considering containment atmosphere and ALARA considerations) a periedic containment inspection or remote i

visual surveillance to check for water leakage.. If containment entry is impractical during operation, perform a containment inspection for water leakage at the first plant shutdown for any reason subsequent to receipt of this bulletin.

f.

Establish procedures to notify the NRC of any service water sy(24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> stem leaks within containment'via a 'soecial licensee event report i

with written report in 14 days) as a degradatien of a containment boundary.

3.

For plants with closed cooling water systems inside containment provide a summary of experiences with cooling water system leakage into containment.

I 4.

Provide a written report, signed under oath or affirmation, under the provi-sions of Section 182a.of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in response to.the above items within 45 days of the date of this bulletin.

Include in your report wnere applicable, your schedule for completing the actions in response to. items 2~(a) through (d).

Your response should be sent to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office' with a copy forwarded I

to the Director, URC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

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If you desire additional information regarding this matter please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.

Approved by GA0, B100225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.

Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified genaric problems.

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