ML19345C343
| ML19345C343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012040461 | |
| Download: ML19345C343 (1) | |
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Q llovember 21, 1980 en W
Docket No. 50-312 Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Attention: Mr. John J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin flo. 80-24 which requires action by you with regard to your nuclear power facility (ies) with an operating license.
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each j
bulletin on licensees it would be helpful if you would provide us an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation i
i of the report (s). required by the bulletin.
Please estimate separately l
the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification ~ of problems through the bulletin.
Should you have any questions rt:garding this bulletin or the actions j
required by you. please contact this office.
Sincerely, l bbmbn l-R. H. Engelken Director l
Enclosures:
l 1.
IE Bulletin flo. 80-24 2.
Recently Isstred IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
R. J. Rodriguez, SMUD L. G. Schwieger, Si10D i
l 8 012040N[pl
SSIlls No'. : 6820 Accession ?!o.:
8008220270 IEB 80-24 UNITED STATES D
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OFFICE OF IllSPECTI0tl AND EllFORCEMEflT T'
HASHINGT0ff, D.C.
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i November-21, 1980 i
1 IE Bulletin No. 80-24: PREVENTION OF DAMAGE DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAINMENT (OCTOBER 17, 1980 INDIAN POINT 2 EVENT) i j
Description of Circumstances:
On October 24, 1980 IE Information Notice t!o. 80-37 described an event that occurred at the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP-2) facility.
On October 17, 1980, upon containment entry for repair to a nuclear instrument, it was discovered that several inches of water had accumulated on the containment ficor without the operators' knowledge.
This accumulaticn was later determined to have amounted to over 100,000 gallons which flooded the reactor vessel pit and wetted the lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was at operating temperature.
l The flooced condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:
(1) There were significant multiple service water leaks from piping and fan coolers onto the containment floor. This system had a history of leakage; 2
(2) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses and the other due to binding of its float switch; (3) The significance of two containment sump level indicating lights which indicated that the water level was continuously above 'Se pump-down level was not recognized by the operators; (4) There was no high water level alarm and the range of sump level-indicating lights failed to indicate the overflowing sump level; (5) The moisture level indicators for the containment atmosphere did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently due to an error in calibration and/or ranging which made them insensitive to the moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (6) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also received water from other sources (Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc). These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows frcm the Unit 2 sump; (7) The fan cooler condensate wier level measuring instruments were not properly calibrated; (8) There was no water level instrumentation in the reactor vessel pit and the pumps were ineffective since they discharge to the containment floor for ultimate removal by the containment sump pumps.
This Bulletin is issued to enable the NRC staff to formulate requirements for long term generic corrective actions which will be the subject (s) of future NRC actions.
The bulletin requires short term actions which will preclude IP-2 type events at other plants in the interin before the longer term generic actions are accomplished.
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IEC 20-24 Movember 21, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Actions to be Taken by Licensees:
1.
Provide a summary description of all npen* coolina water systems present inside containment. Your description of the cooling water systems rust include:
(a) Pode of operation durino routine reactor operation and in response to a LOCA; (b) Source of watar and typical chemical content of water; (c) Faterials used in pinira and coolers; (d) Experience with system leakage; (e) History and type of repairs to coolers and piping systems (i.e., replacement, weld, braze, etc.); (f) Provisions ice isolating portions of the systen inside containment in the event of leakage including vulner-ability of those isolation provisions to single failure: (g) Provisions for testing isolation valves in accorcance with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 (h) Instrumentation (pressure, oew Dolnt, flow, radiation detection, etc.)
and procedures in place to aetect leakace; and (i) Provisions to detect radioactive contamination in service water discharge from containment.
2.
For plants with open cooling water systems inside containment take the following acticns:
a.
Verify existence or provice redundant means of detecting and promptly alertina controi room operators or a significant accumulation of water in containnent (including the reactor vessel pit if present).
b.
Verify existence or provide positive means for control room operators to deternine flow frcm contaiment sump (s) used to collect and remove water f rom containment.
c.
Verify or estaolisn at least montniy surveillance procedures, with appronriate operating limitations, to assure plant operators have at least two methods of determining water level in each location where water may accumulate. The surveillance procedures shall assure that at least one method to remove water from each such location is available during power operation.
In the event either the detection or removal systers tseccme inoperable it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted.
- d. peview leakage detection systems and procedures and provide or verify ability to promptly detect water leakage in containment, and to isolate the leaking components or system. Periodic containment entry to inspect
- An Open system utilizes an indefinite volume, such as a river, so that leakage from the systen could not be detected by inventory decrease.
In addition, a direct radioactive pathway might exist to outside containment in the event of a LCCA simultaneous with a system leak inside containment.
A closed system utilizes a fixed, ronitored volume such that leakage frcm the system could be detected from inventory decrease and a second boundary exists to prevent loss of containment integrity as a result of a system leak inside containment.
- - = _
IEB 80,
flovember 21, 1980 Page 3 of 3 for leakage should be considered.
e.
Beginning within 10 days of the date of this bulletin, whenever the reactor is operating and until the measures described in (a) through (d) above are implenented, conduct interim surveillance measures. The measures shall include where' practical (considering containrent atmosphere and ALARA considerations) a periodic contairment inspection or remote visual surveillance to check for water leakage.
If containment entry is impractical during operation, perform a containment inspection for i
water leakage at the first plant shutdown for any reason subsequent to receipt of this bulletin.
f.
Establish procedures to notify the NRC of any service water system leaks within containment via a soecial licensee event report (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with written report in 14 days) as a degradaticn of a containment j
boundary.
3.
For plants with closed cooling water systems inside containment provide a summary of experiences with cooling water system leakage into containment.
4.
Provide a written report, signed under oath or affirmation, under the provi-siens of Section 132a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in response to the above items within 45 days of the date of this bulletin.
Include in your report where applicable, your schedule for completing the actions in response to items 2 (a) thrcugh (d). Your response should be sent to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office with a copy fomarded to the Director, ?!RC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
j Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires t!ovember 30, 1980.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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