ML19345C246
| ML19345C246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012040221 | |
| Download: ML19345C246 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD
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2 Docket No. 50-344
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~3 Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street 3*
Portland, Cregon 97204 S
Attention: Mr. Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear Gentiemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-23 which requires action by you with regard to your nuclear power facility (ies) with an operating license or construction permit.
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide us an estimate of the manacwer expended in conduct of the review and preparaticn of. the report (s) required by the bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated.
with corrective acticns necessary following identification of problems through the bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding this bulletin or the action required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
[hW MyL 1
R. H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
1.
Recently issued IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
J. W. Durham, Esq., PGE C. P. Yundt, PGE U0 40 QQ
SSINS No.: 6820 Accession No.:
8008220257 IEB E0-23 UNITED STATES s
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D_J NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEFENT oaj 2
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 Neverber 14, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-23: FAILURES OF SOLEN 0ID VALVES MANUFACTURED BY VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
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Introduction:==
Valcar Engineering Corporation (Valcor) has submitted 10 CFR Part 21 Reports addressina failures of Yalcor solenoid valves used at nuclear power facilitias.
These failures have occurreo at nuclear facilities cwned by Duke Pcwer Ccmoany and Omaha Public Power District, and are puroorteoly limited to solenoid valves Kaving part numcers (P/N's) V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3.
The information presenteo in this bulletin is intended to shed light on the defective solenoid valves so tnat appropriate actions can be taken to circum-vent the cegradation of any safety-related system using sucn solenoid valves.
DISCUSSION:
The specific Valccr solenoid valves acoressed herein were purportedly designed as Class IE ccmponents.- Ucwever, in light of the repcrted failures', it appears that neither the design nor the qualification tests were adequate for Class IE l
service. Valcer has attributed the failures to a latent defect in the magnet wire. Valcer believes that this defect manifests itself when the solenoid valves are continucusly energized at elevated temperatures by an inccmpata-bility between the magnet wire's polyvinyl varnish coating and the wire's polyimide insulation which causes a dielectric breakdown leading to turn-to-turn shorts within the coil.
Valcor states that the above inccmpatability is limited to solenoid valves having P/N's V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3, and that all customers affected by the aforementioned defect have been notified. A listing of Valcor customers so notified and valves purchased follows.
l CUSTOMER P.O. NO.
VALVE P/N OTY Anchor-Carling P-827 V70900-21-1,-3 24 Anchor-Darling N663 V70900-21-1 6
Cesare Bonetti (Italy) 1535/79 V70900-21-3 10 Duke Power Company E95188-11 V70900-21-3 100 Duke (Mill Pcwer)
C-97733 V70900-21-1,-3 335 Ouke Power Company E97822-11 V70900-21-3 70 Ralph Hiller HA-187-0 V70900-21-3 14 Mill Power E52462-73 V70900-21-1,-3 20 Omaha Public Power Dist.
43472 V70900-21-3 19 Stone and Webster LOOO #43 V70900-J1-3 8
Copes Vulcan 911,553 V70900-21-1 4
TOTAL 610
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IEB 80-23 November 14, 1980 Pages 2 of 3 Valcor's corrective actions include making arrangements for replacing existing coils with a newly designed coil using a 997 silicone varnish coating instead of the polyvinyl varnish. Sample coils of the new design are scheduled to undergo qualification tests. We do not know the particulars of these tests, but Valcor has scheduled the first phase of these tests for comoletion by November 15, 1980, and has identified the second phase as an on-going aging test.
' Fort Calhoun has replaced twelve of its original solenoid valves with Valcor i
type V70900-21-3 valves, ten of which are located inside containment and two outside. This substitution was made because the original solenoid valves did not meet the requirements of IE Bulletin No. 79-01. However, subsequent to the replacement, Fort Calhoun has experienced five failures of these Valcor edienoid valves. Each failure involvec a solenoid valve located inside contain-
.t:.nt and designed for operation in the nomally energized mode. These two factors (i.e., continuously energized mode of operation and a somewhat elevated tenperature inside containment) tend to suopert Valcor's contention regarding the failure mechanism.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES:
1.
Determine whether Valcor solenoid valves having P/N's V70900-21-1 or -3 are used to perform any safety-related function at your facility.
j If so, identify the safety-related systems. using these solenoid.
valves,- the-total number of such solenoid. valves used : and evaluate-acceptability of continued operation with potentially defective solenoid valves. A report of the results of the evaluation of continued operation shall be submitted within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin and should include factors such as (a) operator's ability to promptly identify a failing or failed solenoid valve, (b) effect of solenoid valve failures on safety-related systetrs and subsequent operator actions required, and (c) possible degradation cf the power supply serving a failed solenoid valve and the effects on other components :erved by said power supply.
If no such solenoid valves are used, you need only submit a negative declaraticn to this effect within thirty (30) days of the date of this bulletin and you need not respond to the remaining iters.
2.
Licensees of operating plants using the aforementioned solenoid valves in safety-related applications shall periodically test the coils for potential turn-to-turn shorts in a manner that will not violate any LCO
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or cause any undesirable transient. The tests should account for coil resistancechgngesduetotemperatureeffectsattributedtotheenviron-ment and to I R losses in the coil to provide accurate indications of changes in resistance due to turn-to-turn shorts.
These tests are to be initiated within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin. The following schedule is recommended until the units are replaced with qualified units:
(a) Daily for solenoid valves operated in a nort!1y energized mode; (b) Weekly for solenoid valycs operated in a normally deenergized mode.
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IEB 80-23 November 14, 1980 Pages 3 of 3 Whenever the tests indicate that ten percent or more of the coil turns have been shorted, said solenoid valve, or its coil, shall be replaced with a new unit.
3.
Licensees of operating plants shall submit a report within forty-five (45) days of the date of this bulletin describing their longer term corrective action plan and the date by which the corrective actions will be implemented. As a minimum, the longer term corrective measures should include the replacement of the coils with fully qualified coils.
j New solenoid valve assemblies (i.e., a repaired unit with a replacement coil or a completely new unit) shall be demonstrated to be qualified for its safety-related acolication cer the hcolicable recuirements of IEEE 323-1974 IEEE 344-1975, IEEE 382-1972 and IE Bulletin No.79-01B j
and supplements thereto.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS:
1.
Cetermine whether Valcor solenoid valves having p/N's V70900-21-1 or -3 are to be used to perform safety-relatea functions at your facility.
If so, a report accressing this matter snall be submitted by the earlier of the two following cates:
(a) within ninety (90) days of the date of this bulletin; (b) two weeks prior to the date by which you expect 4
to receive an operating License.
The above report should indicate your plans to replace said valves prior to concencing operatica, if this is the case. Otherwise, if you propose to ccamence operaticn prior to replacing said valves, the report should indicate the safety-related systems where such valves are to be used, and should include an evaluation of the acceptability of operatino with potentially defective valves. This evaluation should address factors such as your proposed test plan, operator's ability to promptly identify a failing or failed valve, effect of solenoid valve failure on safety-related systems and subsequent cperator actions required, and the preventive measures you plan to implement to
- Tevent the effects of failures of these valves.
If no such valves are to be used in your facility, submit a negative declaration to this effect within forty-five (45) days of the date of this bulletin but prior to the date by which you expect to receive an operating license.
The above requested reports shall be submitted to the director of the appropriate NRC region within time stipulated for each item in the this bulletin. A copy of each report shall be forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225(R0072); clearance exofres November 30, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for Mentified generic problems.
IEE 80-23 November 14, 1980 RECEllTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees Source Connectors 80-21 Valve yokes suppited by 11/6/80 All light water Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
reactor facilities holding OLs or cps Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-108 of Class IE Ecuipment facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification 9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-01B of Class 1E Equipment facilities with an OL 80-22 Autcmation Industries.
9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees scurce Connectors 79-26 Baron Loss from BWR-8/29/80 All BWR ' power -
Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 60-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in fac"ities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture i
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