ML19345B129
| ML19345B129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/21/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-0798, NUDOCS 8011260189 | |
| Download: ML19345B129 (79) | |
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UNITFD STATES OF AMERICA j
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS R
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SUBCOmiITTEE MEETING 3
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9 Roor' 1046
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11 Friday, November 21, 1980 4
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13 The-Subcommittee on Class 9 Accidents met at 10:15 5
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5 I4 pursuant to notice, William Yerr, chairman of the a.m.,
15 subcommittee, presiding.
j 16 PRESENT FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTFE:
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W.
Kerr
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S. Lawroski 18 C. Siess E
H. Etherington 19 s
P. Shewmon 6
D.
Ward 20 M.
Carbon G.
Schott, Consultant 21 M.
Sichel, Consultant
- 22 PRESENT FOR THE NRC STAFF:
23 Guy'Arlotto-Manny Medeiros 24!
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2 DR. KERR:
The meeting will come to order.
This is 3
a meeting of the Advisory Committr -
'a Reactor Safeguards, 4
the Subcommittee on Class 9 Accidents.
My name is William Kerr.
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I am subcommittee chairman.
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Other ACRS members present today are:
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Mr. Lawroski; Mr. Okrent; Mr. Siess; Mr. Etherington; Mj 8
Mr. Shewmon; and Mr. Ward; and Mr. Carbon.
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9 We also have as consultants Mr. Schott and Mr.
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10 Sichel.
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5 I4 The meeting is being conducted in accordance with 5j 15 '
the Federcl Advisory Committee Act and the Govarnment in the
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I7 Mr. Garf Quittscheiber is the desicnated federal I
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The rules for participation in today 's meeting have 5
20 been announced, as far as the notice of the meeting published i
21) in the Federal Register of Thursday, November 6th, 1980.
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Since a transcript is being kept, we ask that each 22 3
23 speaker identify himself and use a microphone.
The transcript J
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will.be available as stated in the Federal Register notice.
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I to make oral. statements from members of the public.
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2 We will proceed with the meeting.
Mr. Arlotto 3
from the Office of Standards Development will discuss the
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6 Mr. Arlotto, that's a formidable task.
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8 MR. ARLOTTO:
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So basically the official memo forwarded by the EDO P
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is to set up-a mechanism for coordination for major rulemaking l
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and with the associated research in licensing programs.
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24l slides is basically senior line ranagers, essentially at the 25) disision director level within the NRC.
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devoted by these people is something less than 10 percent.
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3 Up to now it's been more lika 3 or 4 percent.
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basically we are to keep the EDO and the Commission informed
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throuch identification of what transpired at our meetings K,
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through the process of the discussions and weekly events E
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which is part of the normal Commission procedures.
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(Slide.)
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22 - f Ed Jordan is a Deputy Director within a Division of
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Denny Ross you know.
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Secretary to this group.
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such as standards and regulations, you've got to identify a 22 23 scope that's small enough for you to chew, yet large enough 24 to make sense, and that's one of the key issues.
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Could you 'give me some idea what is meant 4
by scoping?
Does that mean ona. Writes an outline?
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the scope, it was sort of to see where it coes, to be sure that 4
it makes sense.-
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You look at scoping, then, as an ongoing g
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No, sir, I don' t believe so, not in z
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Could I ask if you could give me about 3
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these in terms of what might be added in addition.
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I'm still a little confused, if ycu
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I was goina to ask that question,
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So thank you.
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" Minimum" is a term that I'm strapped (O
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It's possible that they had an "M" 2I left over and they added it to ESF and they weren' t sure 4
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Guy, I thought that the minimum meant 25,
that no matter how. good the site demographically, you had to c
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Yes.
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No matter how good it is.
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Since you were referring to the legisla-
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You think the legislation meant for you I
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Yes, I think so.
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Do you think that if the Commission f8 staff finally concluded that that doesn' t make sense, it would d
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You have not yet decided whether it makes
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Or have you decided that it does make sense?
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Which legislation are we talking about?
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Fiscal ' 80 appropriations bill, Dr.
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Give me a brief recall.
24 MR. ARLOTTO:
Craia Roberts has it; if you want him
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25 to read parts of it, we can do that.
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Do we have an attorney present who can i
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I didn ' t ask for that, Mr. Chairman.
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Let's hear it.
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Okay, maybe you can read it to us, Mr.
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We don't.
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Mr. Chairman, I' ve been dealing with J
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I think the bottom line will be that the rules
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Let me go back, if I may, to an earli
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I don ' t have it -- I have it now.
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I did not evolve this document, but 3
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But I'm sure you thoroughly unders tand it.
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With that, that sounds almost like a
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I am a careful student of Prof. Okrent.
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2I Can you tell me what is meant by that?
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No.
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On the next page, about the middle of l
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The answer is, unles s I were to read a
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MR. KERR:
Perhaps you haven' t studied this in
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I really didn't come prepared to n
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if you feel that it's a key item, I'll be very happy to --
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I consider this a fairly key document i
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Commission, and that's the reason I was asking some cuestions.
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20 But maybe I should ask then of Mr. Finaug.
2I MR. SIESS:
He's acne.
L 22 MR. KERR:
That's righc, he moved out from under this, didn't he.
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25 MR. OKREUT:
Nhose job is it?
Is there a new head s
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2I MR. ARLOTTO:
S trictly actina.
Ray Smith, who was t) i 3
the Deputy Director to Mr. Minaug, is Acting.
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Nill he be here today?
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Mr. Minaug?
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R*E 7l Does that complete your presentation, Mr. Arlotto?
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Yes. sir.
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Thank you, sir.
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May we reconvane, please.
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Got any cood news to tell us?
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Walter, it was only E
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By intermediate size, you mean --
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The ice condensers and the Mark IIIs.
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Are these all concrete?
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I thought Clinton was almost ff.nished.
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Clinton 2 is not.
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In-the interim, as Mark I and Mark II containments 2
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Those 23 are the elements ' that need to be considered.
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The item analysis of containment pressure 25) and temperature response, how does.that differ from the preceding e
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It says containment responses.
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Let's see.
Item 3, the S taf f --
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Question.
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Yes, sir.
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Or maybe it's a comment.
I think it 22 is certainly relevant to make what you have called best-estimate 23 ;
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Is the Staf f willing to consider 1
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I think the answer to that has to be yes.
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I expect that there will be calendared {
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Are there questions of Mr. Butler?
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This is Don Hotson of Research.
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So it won' t just be NASH 1400 scencrios, 25 J it will be a set of scenarios that is deemed appropriate to f
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Do you know any more, Gary?
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Okay.
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24j (Whereucon, at 12:07 p.m.,
the hearing was 25 adj ourned. )
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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NUCLEAR REGULATOPY COMMISSION v
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the A c ca s in the matter of:
Date of Proceecing:
7tw, JI
/G ro Docket Number:
Place of Proceeding:
//4 L 4_)
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were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.
D 4 r,,,
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DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED PLAN TO ACCOMPLISil TASKS, RESEARCil AND RULEMAKING 7.
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SITING CRITERIA 5.
EMERGENCY PLANNING (FINE TUNE THE SAFETY PICTURE FOR SPECIFIC SITES BASED ON STANDARD DESIGN AND SITING CRITERIA)
ACTUAL SEQUENCE (EXACTLY REVERSED) 1.
N1 EMERGENCY PLANNING RULE BECAME EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 3,1980 2.
PREPARATION OF A PROPOSED SITING CRITERIA RULE IS UNDERWAY 3.
Il0RK HAS COMMENCED ON A MINIMUM ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE RULE 4.
AN ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING CONCERNING DEGRADED COOLING WAS PUBLISHED ON OCTOBER 3, 1980 5.
A PLAN FOR DEVELOPING A SAFETY G0AI. WAS PUBLISHED ON OCTOBER 27, 1980
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rJ6 STEERING GROUP PROGRESS TO DATE o
THREE MEETINGS HELD o
MOVEMENT TOWARD COMMON UNDERSTANDING 0F DEGRADED COOLING ADVANCE NOTICE CONTENT o
NEED FOR A RATIONAL BASIS FOR DECISIONS l
0 FOCUS ON IMPORTANT TECHNICAL AREAS o
TASK ASSIGNMENTS (E.G. RULE "FIRST CUTS")
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IMMEDIATE TECHNICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED i-o HYDROGEN 4
o FISSION PRODUCT C!lltISTRY AND AEROSOL PHYSICS j
o RANGE OF CORE DAMAGE TO BE CONSIDERED o
PREVENTION VS, MITIGATION EMPHASIS i
o ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES l
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES DISCUSSED j
o LEAD VS. FOLLOW FOR LICENSING VS, RULEMAKING l
o Tile' ROLE OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT o
RESEARCH TIELINESS i
- 1-o ELD ADVICE RE NON-NRC CONTACTS l
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ROUGH SCHEDULE O
SITING ADVANCE' NOTICE OF. PROPOSED RULEMAKING. PUBLISHED 7.-29-80 1
1.
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DEGRADED COOLING ADVANCE NOTICE'0F PROPOSED RULEMAKING PUBLISHED.
10-02-80 1
0 EMERGENCY PLANNING. RULE EFFECTIVE 11-03-80 i
l 0
-DEGRADED COOLING-ADVANCE NOTICE PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD CLOSES 12-31-80 I
k 0
DEVELOP DETAILED' PLAN OF ACTION FOR DEGRADED COOLING RULEMAXING EARLY 1981 l-
.0 IDENTIFY. ELEMENTS OF.' DEGRADED COOLING PROPOSED RULE APRIL 1981 j.
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ACRS.
ADVICE BASIS FOR PROPOSED REGULATIONS O
PREVENTION VS. MITIGATION EMPHASIS O.STRUCTUREbNbXPERIENCE O
STRUCTURE ON EXPERIMENTAL DATA O
STRUCTURE ON REASONED JUDGMENT 0
PROBABILISTIC~ RISK ASSESSMENT CONTRIBUTION TIMELINESS OF PROPOSED REGULATIONS 0
SACRIFICE.COMPLETNESS'(TECHNICAL CERTAINTY) FOR PROMPTNESS O
TRADE RESEARCH FOR EXPERIENCE O
AWAIT A SAFETY GOAL t
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