ML19345A446

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Forwards IE Bulletin 75-04A, Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Action Required
ML19345A446
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 04/03/1975
From: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Andognini G
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 8011210561
Download: ML19345A446 (1)


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Yankee Atomic Electric Company

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Attention:

Mr. G. Carl Andognini Docket No. 50-29 Ci NE Assistant to Vice President 20 Turnpike Road 1

.Qh Westborough, MA 01581 y

t id Gentlemen:

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'91 Enclosed is IE Bulletin No.75-04A which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facil1*.y(ics) with operating license.

t of you, please contact this office.Should you have questions regarding thi:!

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Director g,.

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Enclosure:

IE Bulletin No.75-04A

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Approved by GAO, B-180225 (R0072), clearance expires 7-31-77.

Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

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H. Autio, Plant Superintendent cc:

i Donald G. Allen, President l

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Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No.75-04A

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April 3,'1975 i

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J CABLE FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR FIANT i

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The following material supplements and modifies IE Bulletin 75-04.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

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Additional, though still preliminary, information has become available' j-related to the fire which occurred at the Browns Ferry Site on March 22, 1975.

The fire started in the cable spreading room at a cable penetration

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through the wall between the cable spreading room and the reactor building

,j for Unit 1.

A slight differential pressure is maintained (by des,ign) ll g

across this wall, with the higher pressure being on the cable, spreading l

room side.

The penetration seal originally present had been breached i

E to install additional cables required by a design modification. Site f

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g personnel were rescaling the penetration after cable installation and l

were checking the airflow through a temporary seal with a candle flame g

prior to installing the permanent scaling material.

The temporary scaling caterial was highly combustible, and caught fire.

Efforts I

y were made by the workers to extinguish the fire at its origin, but j

they apparently did not recognize that the fire, under the influence 1

of the draft through the penetration, was spreading on the reactor I

j building side of the wall.

The extent of the fire in the cable spread-4 l

ing room was limited to a few feet from the penetration; however, the 1

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presence of the fire on the other side of the wall from the point of j {

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ignition was not recognized until significant damage to cables related j

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to the control of Units 1 and 2 had occurred.

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Although control circuits for many of the syste=s which could be used f h for Unit I were ultimately dicabled by the fire, the station operating l;

personnel were able to institute alternative measu: es by which the

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primary system could be depressuriacd and ade ate cooling water supplied j

s to the reactor vessel. Unit I was shut down manually and cooled using

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4 remote manual relief valve operation and condensate booster pump, and f

(D control red drive system pumps. Unit 2 was shut down and cooled for

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i the first hour by the RCIC.

After depressurization, Unit 2 was placed l

in the RHR shutdown cooling mode with makeup water available from the

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condensate booster pump and control rod drive system pump, a

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t ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES 3

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Because the occurrence appears to have resulted from modifications f

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being made to an operating unit, all power reactors with operating 3

a licenses should address the actions requested in Bulletin 75-04 as C

k well as the actions described below.

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Review your policies and procedures relating to construction or caintenance and codification work to assure that activities which

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E-cight affect the safety of a unit in operation, including the t

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ability to shut down and cool the unit are properly controlled.

E Your review should consider particularly your policy on deferring

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construction, maintenance or modification work on,a unit until a

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E shutdown period except for emergency maintenance vital to continued i

e safe operation or safe shutdown of the unit.

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Review your policies and procedures to assure that for construction or codification and maintenance activities during plant operation,

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particular attention is given to the following areas:

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The degree of safety significance of affected and nearby a.

i cabling and piping, g

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The use and control - f combustible caterials.

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The use and control of equipment that may be an ignition source.

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The assignment of personnel, knowledgeable of plant arrangement j

and plant operations, whose sole temporary responsibility is conitoring the safe performance of construction or maintenance and codification work, including attention to otherwise unat-r tended areas adjacent to the work areas.

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Provision of installed or portable equipment to provide the i

conitoring personnel with prompt communication with the operat-ing staff in the control room.

f.

Provision of adequate fire prevention and fire suppression equip =ent, installed or portable, for the following locations:

(1)

Areas where work is being performed.

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(2) Areas where occurrence of a fire has high safety signifi-cance, even though the probability of occurrence is rela-tively small.

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Recognition that a fire, even one involving electrical equipment,

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tay, if of sufficient intensity require water as the ultimate suppression medium.

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Review your emergency procedures to assure that consideration for alternate methods for accomplishing an orderly plant shutdown and cooldown are provided in case of loss of normal and preferred alternative shutdown and cooldown systems for any reason (e.g.,

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a fire).

In this connection, assure that the minimum ?,fo rma t ion j

necessary to assist the operators in such shutdown actions, the f

minimum protection system actions required (e.g., scram) and the spectrum of alternative paths available to the operators to supply cooling water and remove decay heat dependent on plant conditions are included in your emergency procedures, fg iLf' 3.

Report to this of fice, in writing, within 20 days of the date of this Bulletin, your schedule for review in each of the above areas.

6.

Upon completion of your reviews, provide this of fice with the re-N sults of these reviews and the schedule for acconplishment of any

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t revisions to your policies and procedures, and any proposed changes to the facility, and the date by which the changes are schaduled to be conpleted.

If this latter date is nore than 30 days af ter

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the date of the initial report, provide a monthly sunnary report detailing your progress in the revicu and/or proposed procedure

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or facility modifications. Reports requested by Bulletin 75-04 if may be incorporated with the initial response to this Bulletin.

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