ML19344F229
| ML19344F229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/02/1980 |
| From: | Brickley R, Hale C, Yin I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19344F228 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900528 IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8009120657 | |
| Download: ML19344F229 (8) | |
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O U. S. NUCI. EAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENIORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.
99900528/80-01 Program No. 51200 Company:
EDS Nuclear, Incorporated 220 Montgomery Street San Francisco, California 94104 Inspection conducted: June 18-19, 1980 Inspectors:
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7Mh R. II. 3_pckley, Princpil Inspector Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch C.
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I. T. C[ia, ' Reactor Ippfctor Date Region III Observer:
2 P240 x
J. Bidjfi, Mechanica/ Zagineer Date NNEC, Brazil 4
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Approved by:
C. J.<Hdle, Chief Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch Smnmarv l
t Inspection conducted on June 18-19, 1980 (99900528/80-01)
Areas Inspected: EDS Nuclear activities with regard to IE Bulletin 79-14 l
(Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems). The inspection involved thrity-two (32) inspector-hours on-site by two (2) NRC inspectors:
Results:
In the area inspected there were no deviations or unresolved items.
800g32f
2 DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by R. H. Brickley and I. T. Yin)
A.
Persons Contacted 1.
EDS Nuclear T. C. Cheir, Section Manager, Piping Analysis Division (PAD)
- M. J. Scholteris, Project Manager
- M. N. Shulman, Section Manager, PAD
- T. K. Synder, Section Manager, PAD D. M. Witt, Manager, Structural Design Division K. Wong, Senior Engineer 2.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
M. C. Strait, Engineer
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview.
B.
Overstressed U-Bolts on Class A Piping This: item is a follow-up to a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report by the Licensee (TVA-Sequoyah Unit 2) that several EDS Nuclear designed pipe supoorts for 3/4" class A pipes, related to the Reactor Coolant System and Chemical and Volume Control System, were designed using standard U-bolts.
These U-bolts will be overstressed according to the loadings shown on each individual drawing.
1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to:
a.
Examine the results of the evaluation of this item to determine that a proper evaluation was performed.
b.
Determine whether this item is generic or plant unique.
2.
Method of Accomplishment l
The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of:
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a.
EDS Nuclear Report No. 0060-107-A (U-Bolt Attachment of 3 ranch Lines to Main Run, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1&2) Revision
.0, dated April 1980.
b.
EDS Nuclear letter to TVA No. 0060-107-316 (Analysis and Support Design of Piping Inside Containment) dated April 7, 1980.
c.
TVA Nonconformance Report dated March 31, 1980.
d.
EDS IOM frca the Manager, Structural Design Division to the Manager, San Francisco Office dated April 29, 1980.
3.
Findings a.
Genera 1 (1) TVA engineers identified a problem with unit 2 designs invciving the pre-torque values specified for U-bolts on small branch line supports e.g vents and drains.
These supports were desi ted to tie the branch line to the run t
pipe. The design was intended to only act as a guide for the branch piping, however the supports were issued showing loads which indicated that the piping was anchored.
The support design sketches included pre-torque requirements without specifying whether they applied to one or both of the U-bolts.
(2) The EDS Nuclear investigation determined that the support had been modeled in the analysis as a fixed anchor at both the branch line end and the main run end. They further determined that the piping was acceptable either guided l
or anchored and'that it was not overstressed. To insure that the design did not resist forces and mesents EDS Nuclear recommended that the U-bolt around the branch i
pipe be loosened and provided with double nuts.
I (3) The examination of the documents identified in paragraph B.2 above indicated that a proper evaluation had been performed and that this problem was not generic.
b.
Deviations and Unresolved Items None identified c.
Follow-Uo Items None identified
4 C.
Pressurizer Relief and Safetv Line Blowdown Analysis This item is a follow-up to a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report by the Licensee (TVA-
'4ates Bar Units 1&2) that one of the two (2) modes of operation used by EDS Nuclear to perform the analysis was incorrect.
1.
Obj ectives i
The objectives of this area of the inspection were to:
a.
Examine the results of the evaluation of this item to determine that a proper evaluation was performed.
b.
Determine whether this item is generic or plant unique.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an = = 4nntion of:
a.
TVA Nonconformance Report dated July 21, 1979.
b.
EDS Nuclear letter to TVA No. 0060-200-291 (Analysis and Support Design of Piping Inside Containment) dated July 13, 1979.
c.
EDS Nuclear letter to TVA No. 0060-207-170 (Analysis and Support Design of Piping Inside Containment) dated August 28, 1979.
d.
Design Review Report dated August 14, 1979.
a.
EDS Nuclear calculations No. 3-1 and No. 3-2.
3.
Findings a.
General (1)
This item was identified during an independent design review that was performed by the EDS Nuclear QA Department.
(2)
In this analysis the analyst runs a thermal-hydraulic analysis to develop a set of forcing functions for the blowdown analysis. The number of functions obtained frem this analysis exceeded the = v4== allowed due to computer core storage limitations. The analyst eliminated those functions (17) having a value of < 52 in the si:nultaneous discharge of safety / relief valve analysis mode. By error, the same forcing functions were eliminated from the sequential discharge analysis mode.
This set of functions contained significant forces for the sequential mode.
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5 (3) The reanalysis by EDS Nuclear resulted in revisions to fourteen (14) supports and the addition of one new support.
(4) The programs that were used in this analysis were EDS FLOW (RELAP) and EDS GAP (SAP) which have now been replaced by SUPERPIPE which should prevent recurrance of this type of error.
(5) The examination of the documents identified in C.2 above and discussions with engineering representatives indicated that a proper evaluation had been performed and that this problem was not generic.
b.
Deviations and Unresolved Items None identified c.
Follow-Up Items None identified D.
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems 1.
Objectives This was a special inspection of EDS Nuclear activities being conducted for the Commonwealth Edison Company (Quad Cities - 1&2, and Dresden - 2&3) with respect to IE Bulletin 79-14.
The objectives of this area of the inspection were to examine the analysis of various piping systems to determine that:
a.
The IE Bulletin 79-14 activities are being conducted in a documented, planned and systematic manner.
b.
The inputs to the seismic analysis can be readily identified.
c.
Identified nonconformances are analyzed and the result
" anerly documented.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of:
4.
The following Project Instructions:
No. 1.0 (Engineering Criteria / Procedure for the Review and Resolution of As-Built Deviations) Revision 2, dated March 7, 1980.
6 No. 2.0 (Administrative Procedure for Processing Vsikdown Packages Through Operability Assessement) Revision 2, dated March 7, 1980.
No. 3.0 (CDL-File: Organization and Control Procedure) Revision 0, dated Oct^5er 10, 1979.
No. 7.0 (Docums1:ation and Transmittal Procedure) Revision 0, dated October 2.,
1979.
No. 8.0 (Pipe Support Engineering Criteria / Procedure for the Review and Resolution of As-Built Deviations) Ravision 2, dated April 10, 1980.
No. 14.0 (Procedure for Handling Support Location Requests)
Revision 1, dated May 19, 1980.
b.
EDS Nuclear Specification No. 0590-003-01 (Design of Pipe Supports fo the IEB 79-14 Effort) Revision 1, dated June 3, 1980.
c.
Bechtel/ Ann Arbor Procedure (IEB 79-14 Field Inspection Procedures)
Revision 2, dated August 27, 1979.
d.
Fourteen (14) calculation packages numbered:
Q1-HPCI-01C D2-LPCI-03C Qi-HPCI-01B*
Q1-EPCI-03B*
Q1-HPCI-04B*
D2-HDSP-01B*
D2-EPCI-06B*
D2-HPCI-07B*
Q1-CCCD-01B*
Q1-RHRS-02B*
Q1-RHRS-03B*
Q1-RHRS-09 B*
Q1-RHRS-13B*
D3-LPCI-02B*
- See paragraph 3.b.(3) below.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations and Unresolved Items None identified b.
Follow-Up Items
7 (1) The examination of calculation package No. Q1-EPCI-01 revealed that the formal system operability evaluation did not appear to be adequately documented.
This ites will be examined further during a future inspection.
(2) The examination of calculation package No. D2-LPCI-03C revealed that the present method of using the center of gravity of the pipe system to select the horizontal static coefficient (g) used in the calculation appears questionable.
This item will be examined further during a future inspection to determine if there were any pipe stresses at the higher elevations, using the lower elevation g valve, that were just below the code allowable.
(3) The examination of several calculation packages (indicated by an asterisk in paragraph D.2.b above) revealed that a number of new anchors, guides, and single directional restraints had to be added to the systems to meet "Blume Curve" requirements.
In addition it appeared that no system operability analysis had been performed in those cases.
In discussions with the Licensee and EDS Nuclear representa-tives it was revealed that the original design was by Sargent
& Lundy to "Blume Curve" requirements.
It was the inspectors position that any changes to the as-built condition that is needed to meet the "Blume Curve" (baseline) requirements represents nonconformances with the original design and shon1d have undergone a system operability analysis as required by IEB 79-14.
The Licensee's representative disagreed with this position since it was not clearly stated in the bulletin and because if they performed this analysis on each package as completed it would extend the time for completion of these activities. Note:
In a l
telecon with IE HQ personnel the inspector confirmed that I
his position met the intent of IEB 79-14.
l This item will be followed-up by Region III with the Licensee. Region IV will examine this item further during a future inspection of EDS Nuclear.
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It appears that stress intensification factors had not l
been considerad in those system evaluations based on "Blume Curve" design.
EDS Nuclear had assumed that these factors had been considered in these curves. The actual bases of the curves were not available for examination.
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This item will be examined further during a future inspection.
(5)
In reviewing the requirements for using the "Blume Curves" it appeared that on piping above elevation 579 ft restraint loads will be multiplied by a factor of three (3) to account for amplification. Based on the Quad Cities reactor-turbine building floor response spectra it was found that the ratio of peak acceleration and the acceleration in the flexible vibration range at a time period of 0.23 sec. factors of 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 at higher (> 579 ft) elevations.
The use of a factor of three (3) in these cases is questionable.
This item will be examined further during a future inspection.
E.
Exit Interview An exit interview was held with management representatives on June 19, 1980.
In addition to those individuals indicated by an asterisk in paragraph A those in attendance were:
L. W. Cooley, Senior Vice President and Manager, Business Development F. L. Porter, Senior Vice President and Manager, Western Operations The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. Management comments were generally for clarification only, or acknowledgement of the statements by the inspector.
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