ML19344E907
| ML19344E907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1980 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | John Miller GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009120077 | |
| Download: ML19344E907 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
e REGION 11 1
101 MARIETTA ST N.W.,SulTE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3o303 In Reply Refer To:
A(JG 2 2 g0 RII:JPo 56-321 j
50-366 /
Georgia Power Company ATTN:
J. H. Miller, Jr.
Executive Vice President 270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Supplement No. 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 which recinires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility (ies) with an operating license.
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.
Should you have any questiois regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, kN~N James P. O'Re*11f Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Supplement No. 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/ encl:
M. Manry, Plant Manager C. E. Belflower, Site QA Supervisor W. A. Widner, Vice President and General Manager-Nuclear Generation 8009120 0 77
SSINS: 6820 Accession No.:
8006190074 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 August 22, 19Vs IE-Supplement 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17: FAILURE OF CONTROL RODE TO INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR NRC staff evaluation of a potential single failure mechanism of the control rod drive control air system has identified the need for licensee actions in addition to those requested by IEB 80-17 and Supplements 1 and 2.
The potential single failure was discussed in IE Information Notice 80-30, which was issued on August 19, 1980.
It involves gradual or partial loss of control air system pressure, which could cause partial opening of scram outlet valves without rod motion. The resultant accumulated seal leakage could conceivably fill the scram discharge volume in a few minutes. Since not all operating BWR's have instrumentation presently installed to continuously indicete water level in the scres discharge volume headers and to peovide a control room alarm or scram function, the,
Sility exic's for the scram discharge volume to fill to a level which could preven, reactor scram before automatic protective action or before the operators could be warned.
In view of the possible single failure mechanism described above, the following actions are requested in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplements 1 and 2:
1.
For those plants in which the scram discharge volume headers are connected to the instrument volume by a 2 inch pipe, within five days of the date of this Bulletin, provide or verify that procedures are in effect to:
Require an immediate manual scram on low control rod drive air pressure a.
with a minimum 10 psi margin above the opening pressure of the scram outlet valves.
b.
Require an immediate manual scram in the event of:
(1) Multiple rod drift-in alarms, or (2) A marked change in the number of control rods with high temperature alarms.
Installation of water level instrumentation in the scram discharge volume with level alarm and continuous level indication in the control room, in response to Item B.1 of IEB 80-17 Supplement No. 1, may provide a basis for relaxation of the time for initiating a manual scram.
'o IE Bulletin No. 80-17 August 22, 1980 i
Supplement No. 3 Page 2 of 2 l
2.
In addition, every BWR licensee is requested within five days of the date of this bulletin to provide and implement procedures which require a functional test using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block and scram switches af ter each scram event, before returning to power. This l,
procedure should remain in effect until modifications in addition to Item B.1 l
of IEB 80-17 supplement No. I are completed to substantially increase I
reliability of water level indication in the scram discharge volume (s).
Licensees of all operating BWRs shall submit a report summarizing action taken in response to the above items within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin Supplement. Accordingly, you are requested to provide within 10 days as specified above, written statements of the above information signed under oath or affirmation. Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, NRC. Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555 Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires July 31, 1980. (Application for renewal pending before GAO.) Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-17 August 22, 1980 Supplement 3 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To Supplement 3 Failure of Control Rods 8/22/80 All 3WR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Roscmount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL
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