ML19344E890

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Forwards Suppl 3 to IE Bulletin 80-17, Failure of Control Rods to Insert During Scram at Bwr. Written Response Required
ML19344E890
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 08/22/1980
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
References
NUDOCS 8009120044
Download: ML19344E890 (1)


Text

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'o, UNITED STATES 8 ',,7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

- E FIEGION lli 3

q 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD e

GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 I

Docket No. 50-409 rAUO 4 2 q Dairyland Power Cooperative ATTN:

Mr. F. W. Linder General Manager 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, WI 54601 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Supplement No. 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility with an operating license.

In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.

Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.

Sincerely, d/mA I.

(

f%amesG.Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Supplement No. 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 cc w/ enc 1:

Mr. R. E. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent Resident Inspector, RIII Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR AECD PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Mr. John J. Duffy, Chief Boiler Inspector, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations

.8009120 049

SSINS:

6820

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8006190074 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 August 22, 1980 IE Supplement 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17:

FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR NRC staff evaluation of a potential single failure mechanism of the control rod drive control air system has identified the need for licensee actions in addition to those requested by IEB 80-17 and Supplements 1 and 2.

The potential single failure was discussea in IE Information Notice 80-30, which was issued on August 19, 1980.

It involves gradual or partial loss of control air system pressure, which could cause partial opening of scram outlet valves without rod motion. The resultant accumulated seal leakage could conceivably fill the scram discharge volume in a few minutes.

Since not all operating BWR's have instrumentation presently installed to continuously indicate water level in the scram discharge volume headers and to provide a control room alarm or scram function, the possibility exists for the scram discharge volume to fill to a level which could prevent reactor scram before automatic protective action or before the operators cculd be warned.

In view of the possible single failure mechanism described above, the following actions are requested in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplements 1 and 2:

1.

For those plants in which the scram discharge volume headers are' connected to the instrument volume by a 2 inch pipe, within five days of the date of this Bulletin, provide or verify that procedures are in effect to:

a.

Require an immediate manual scram on low control rod drive air pressure with a minimum 10 psi margin above the opening pressure of the scram outlet valves.

b.

Require an immediate manual scram in the event of:

(1) Multiple rod drift-in alarms, or (2) A marked change in the number of control rods with high temperature alarms.

Installation of water level instrumentation in the scram discharge volume with level alarm and continuous level indication in the control room, in response to Item B.1 of IEB 80-17 Supplement No. 1, may provide a basis for relaxation of the time for initiating a manual scram.

IE Bulletin No. 80-17 August 22, 1980 Supplement No. 3 Page 2 of 2 2.

In addition, every BWR licensee is requested within five days of the date of this bulletin to provide and implement procedures which require a functional test using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block and scram switches after each scram event, before returning to power.

This procedure should remain in effect until modifications in addition to Ite: 9.1 of IEB 80-17 supplement No. 1 are complet.ed to substantially increase reliability of water level indication in the scram discharge volume (s).

Licensees of all operating BWRs shall submit a report summarizing action taken in response to the above items within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin Supplement.

Accordingly, you are requested to provide within 10 days as specified above, written statements of the above information signed under oath or affirmation.

Reports shall be submitted to the Dir actor of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operatiors Inspection, NRC.

Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

20555 Approved by GAO, B180225 (ROG72); clearance expires July 31, 1980. (Application for renewal pending before GA0.) Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified gt:neric problems.

IE Bulletin N2. 80-17 August 22, 1980 Supplement 3 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.

Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power rcactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "0" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL

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