ML19344E034
| ML19344E034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1980 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8008260539 | |
| Download: ML19344E034 (2) | |
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i DUKE PowEn COMPANY Powna Buttonwo 422 Sourn Cucaca Srazer. CnAnz.otTz. N. C. asa4a wiww o. emanca.sa.
August 12, 1980 WCr Patsiociev Tgsgre.oes t:Asta 704 Stgaan Pm00vCTION 373-4083 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~
Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-369 and 50-370
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Pursuant to 10CFR 50.55e please find attached a supplecent to Significant Deficiency Report SD 369/80-07, 370/80-06. Reference our initial report dated July 7, 1980.
V y truly you 1 J'
ie William O. Parker, LJB:scs Attachment cc: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Si /
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-80082605 @
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,)g Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Uni ts 1 & 2 l
- Report Number: SD-369/80-07, 370/80-06 (Supplement) 1 Report Date: Augus t 12, 1980 Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Identification of Deficiency:
Inade.quate mininum flow through the centrifugal charging p6mps Description of Deficiency:
On June 5,1980, Mr. J. R. Wells and Mr. R. E. Miller advised Mr. Milt Hunt, NRC, of a potential design deficiency due,to inadequate centrifugal charging pump minimum flow. Duke Power Company has p'erformed a specific analysis for. the McGuire Plant, per Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2245 dated May 8,1980, to Victor Stello, which indicates that inadequate minimum flow will exist for the centrifugal charging pumps following a secondary side high energy line rupture if isolation of the minimum path is allowed to occur. Without adequate minimum flow, damage to one or both centrifugal charging pumps will occur.
Analysis of Safety implication:
Westinghouse has evaluated the impact of the recon...anded operating procedure modifi-cations ccasidering various secondary system ruptures cnd loss of coolant accidents which initiate safety injection and are sensitive to centrifugal charging pump (CCP) flow delivery. Feedline and steamline rupture analyses show that reduced safety injection flow due to normally open miniflow isolation valves have an insignificant effect on the plant transient response. LOCA analysis shows negil-gible effect on peak clad temperature (PCT) If CCP miniflow is manually isolated at the RCP trip setpoint. Also, analysis shows only slight increases in PCT if CCP miniflow is not isolated un
- 10 minutes.
Corrective Action:
Based on the safety evaluation above, Duke Power Company has chosen to implement as permanent corrective action the modification which Westinghouse refers to as
" Interim Modification 11."
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