ML19344A875
| ML19344A875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1978 |
| From: | William Cahill CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC. |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17150A107 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8008220437 | |
| Download: ML19344A875 (10) | |
Text
,
Willi _ m J. Cc hill, Jr.
vice em cert O
C:nso:edatec Esscn C rr:aw cf New Ycrk. Inc.
4 'rerg P: ace. New York. N Y 10C03 Teiecncre 1212) 460-3819 August 4,
'.978 Re:
Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stello:
By letter dated July 17, 1978, Con Edison responded to Questions 1 through 8 of your May 17, 1978 information request.
The response :o Question 9 is provided in the attachment to this letter.
This submittal completes Con Edison's response to the aforementioned information request.
Very truly yours, 4/., / j a
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William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President
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I ATTACHMENT 9.
Discuss the degree to which your facility complies with the eight (8) regulatory positions delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Revision 1, December, 1975) regarding Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis.
A comparison between Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Revision 1, December, 1975) and the Indian Point Unit No. 2 fuel handling building is provided in the following pages.
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REGULATORY POSITION 1:
The spent fuel storage facility (including its structures and equipment except as notud in paragraph 6 below) should be designed to Category I seismic requirements.
The Indian "oint Unit No. 2 spent fuel storage pit and spent fuel racks are of Seismic Class 1 design (see pages 9.5-3 and 9.5-6 of Section 9.5 of the Indian Point 2 FSAR and responses to questions. B1 and B2 transmitted to the NRC by letter dated May 9,1975, Mr. Cahill to Mr. LearT.
The response to question 1.3 of the FSAR presents a seismic evaluation of the fuel storage building structure.
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REGULATORY POSITION 2:
The facility should be designed (a) to keep tornadic winds and missiles gsnerated by these winds from causing significant loss of watertight integrity of the fuel storage pool and (b) to keep missiles generated by ternadic winds from contacting fuel within the pool.
The spent fuel pool tornado protection is discussed in WCAP-7313L " Tornado Induced Water Removal from Spent Fuel Storage", WCAP-7572L "F.ffect of Torando Missiles on Stored Spent Fuel" and WCAP-7387L " Characteristics of Tornado Generated Missiles".
REGULATORY POSITION 3:
Interlocks should be provided to prevent cranes from passing over stored fu21 (or near stored fuel in a manner such that if a crane failed, the lead could tip over on stored fuel) when fuel handling is not in progress During fuel handling operations, the interlocks may be bypassed and administrative control used to prevent the crane from carrying loads that are not necessary for fuel handling over the stored fuel or other prchibited areas. The facility should be designed to minimize the need for bypassing such interlocks.
Ihn response to question 9.5 of the Indian Point 2 FSAR describes the uc@ of mechanical stops on the bridge rails.
These mechanical stops are J
urcd to prevent the crane from passing over stored spent fuel when the spent fuel cask or other similar heavy loads are Jeing handled in the vicinity of the stored spent fuel.
REGULATORY POSITION 4:
A controlled leakage building should enclose the fuel pool.
The building should be equipped with an appropriate ventilation and filtration system to limit the potential release of radiactive iodine and other radioactive materials.
The building need not be designed to withstand extremely high winds, but leakage should be suitably controlled during refueling operations.
The design of the ventilation and filtration system should be based on the assumption that the cladding of all of the fuel rods in one fuel bundle might be breached.
The inventory of radioactive materials available for leakage from the building should be based on assumptions given in Fegulatory Guide 1.25, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Fandling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors" (Safety Guide 25).
The ventilation of the fuel storage building is accomplished by one exhaust fan and two supply fans and heaters.
A charcoal filtration system has been installed as part of the exhaust system of the fuel i
storage building. An exhaust fan in the fan room draws air out of the fuel storage building and exhausts through the plant vent past a process radiation monitor. During refueling operations the normal flow path is blocked by dampers and the air is directed through the charcoal filters before being vented through the stack.
The building is maintained at a negative pressure by the exhaust system to insure that leakage is only into and'not out of the building.
The response to Question 14.6 of the Indian Point Unic No. 2 FSAP describes an analysis in which all rods in an assembiv are breached.
In addition, an evaluation performed using the principal assumptions outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.25 also shows that if the cladding of all fuel rods in one fuel assembly is breached, the exposure limits of 10 CFR 100 would not be exceeded.
REGULATORY POSITION 5:
Tha spent fuel storage facility should have at least one of the following provisions with respect to the handling of heavy loads, including the refueling cask:
a.
Cranes capable of carrying heavy loads should be prevented, preferably by design rather than by interlocks, from moving into the vicinity of the pool; or b.
Cranes should be designed to provide single-failure-proof handling of heavy loads, so-that a single failure will not result in lors of capability of the crane-handling system to perform its safety function; or c.
The fuel pool should_be designed to withstand, without leakage that could uncover the fuel, the impact of the heaviest load to be carried by the crane from the maximum height to which it can be lifted.
If this approach is used, design provisions should be made to prevent the crane, when carrying heavy loads, from moving in the vicinity of stored fuel.
Tha responses to questions 2 and 6, submitted to the NRC by letter dated July 17, 1978, show that spent fuel casks an'd other similar heavy leads cra not moved over stored spent fuel. Mechanical stops (see Regulatory Position 3) are provided to prevent the crane from passing over stored epent fuel when the spent fuel cask or similar heavy loads are being handled in the vicinity of the stored spent fuel.
In addition the ragponse to question 9.6 of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 FSAR demonstrates that very little water would be lost from the spent fuel pool if the cack were to drop into the pool.
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REGULATORY POSITION 6:
Drains, permanently connected mechanical or hydraulic systems, and other features that by maloperation or failure could cause loss of coolant that would uncover fuel should not be installed or included in the design.
Systems for maintainiag water quality and quantity should be designed so that any maloperation or failure of such systems (including failures resulting from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake) will not cause fuel to be uncovered.
These systems need not otherwise meet Category I seismic requirements.
Loss of coolant that would uncover the spent fuel is unlikely to occur for the following reasons:
(1) There are no drains on the bottom or side walls of the spent fuel pit.
(2) The suction of the spent fuel pit cooling pump is taken from a point approximately six feet below the surface of the pool.
(3)
The spent fuel pit pump discharges into the pool approximately seven feet above the top of the spent fuel assemblies. This discharge line also has a hole drilled in it preventing it from becoming a syphon and partially draining the pit.
(4)
The skimmer pump takes suction from and discharges to the surface of the pool.
Thus, the failure of the spent fuel cooling loop and/or clean-up equipment would not result in the uncovering of the spent fuel.
REGULATORY POSITION 7:
Raliable and frequently tested monitoring equipment should be provided to clarm both locally and in a continuously manned location if the water leval in the fuel storage pool falls below a predetermined level or if high local-radiation levels are experienced. The high-radioactive-level i=strumentation should also actuate the filtration system.
Gamma radiation levels in the fuel storage building are continuously monitored by a local area _adiation monitor.
This monitor provides alarms both locally and in the control room if the water level in the pool is low or if high local radiation levels are experienced.
This instrument is dscigned to provide automatic actuation of the (11tration system.
REGULATORY POSITION 8:
I A ceismic Category I makeup system should be provided to add coolant to tha pool. Appropriate redundancy or a backup system for filling the pool from a reliable source, such as a lake, river, or onsite seismic Category I water-storage facility, should be provided.
If a backup cyatem is used, it need not be a permanently installed system. The capacity of the makeup systems should be such that water can be supplied at a rate determinad by consideration of the leakage rate that would be cxpected as the result of damage to the fuel storage pool from the dropping of loads, from earthquakes, or from missiles originating in j
CThe staff is considering the development of additional guidance concerning protection against missiles that might be generated by plant failures cuch as turbine failures.
For the present, the protection of the fuel pool against such missiles will ha evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Tha response to Regulatory Position 8 in provided in the following documents:
(1) Response to Regulatory Position 2.
(2) Response to Question 9.6 of tha Indian Point Unit No. 2 FSAR.
(3)
Response to Question B.1 submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 9, 1975.
(4) Appendix A of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 FSAR, (5) Section 9.2 of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 FSAR.
(6)
Section 9.3 of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 FSAR.
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\\ Q REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
- m' DISTRIBUTICN FOR INCONING MATERIAL 5 -247 EC: STELuO V ORG: CAHILL W J EOCDATE: 07/17./75 NRC CONSOL EDISON OF NY DATE RCVD: 07./21/75
.. C Tv F E : LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES PECEIVED
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LTR 1 ENCL ?
~!FOM5E TO NRC LTR'DTD 05/17/73.. FORWARDING RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS 1 THROUGH 9E FHYSICAL RELATION BETWEEN REACTOR CORE, FUEL TRANFER, ANAL, SPENT FUEL TOPAGE POOL AND '$ET DOWN, RECEIVING OR STORAGE APEAS FOR ANY HEAVY LOADS GUED CPJ TI-:E fiE. UELING FLO OR M M4,urcw44cg R e A ScaAS i
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