ML19344A774
| ML19344A774 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1980 |
| From: | Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008220185 | |
| Download: ML19344A774 (22) | |
Text
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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY P. O. D O X 1475 B ALTI M OR E, M A RYL AN D 21203 hurnet 20, 1080 ERTHUR [. LUN DVALL. JR.
v.c a rocs.or.a Su pssv
';uelaar Peneter Peru'ntien Office o c ti. 9 ?!uclear Reculatory Ce-i c tion Wnshincton, D. C.
?W7 Attn:
"r.
Fobar'. A.
Clark, "hiof Operatin? Eenctorn Vanch
- 7 I'ivi s i on o f I,i cens !"
"uh.i e rt :
Islvert Cli#fn 'uelonr Tower Plant Units "on.
I % 0, :1o cke t-M.
50-317 & S0-118 Fire Protecticn Guncen to Fira !.nrnrds Analvnin Feferencent a ) ';0 lett er int d 0 /1L /o ren P.
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A. F.
' :nivall,
Tr.
fo rward i n r-A.endments L1 and 23 b) E'ME 3 et+ ern antei ll /11.G, IP/21/70, )/11/"0 and 5/20/90 "rc~ A. 7 Lund vsll, Tr. to P. W.
- Feld, Fire H9:ards An tivni c and Cafety h aluation Ferort Centl eman :
Encioned are the follevirr reviced re'lacement nares for subetitution in our Fire Hanards Annlysis which van nuhnitted and discussed in Reference (b):
Pace FHA-7
""ahl e 1, F tren 1 th rou ch I P o f I ?
Paren 705-1; 2M-1 ; ?G-1,P,3 ; 311-l'),2 ; h 07-1,2 Our oririnal Fire Hanardn Analysis (FHA), which was submitted in rennonse to Reference (a), contains neveral snecific criteria.
Criterion 6 dealn with the encannulation o c redundant travn or conduits in a sincle fire area.
Srecifically, Critarion 6 nt ates that one of two redundant trays or conduits in a ninclo 'i re aren vill be vrapped with fire resistive naterial where the fire area or roon is not protected by an automatic fire supuression rycten or where there ir not adequite reparation between redundant ra-evays.
Sutsequent to our oririnal FHA, in our letter of 5/P0/80, we stated that ve were nerfomine an inyt.ntication of the effects of Criterion 6.
Durine the courne of this inventication, it was determined that the conbined heat renerate i vithin a croun of enbles could result in danare to the cable insulntion if thora cablen were encanculated. Therefore, ve have deleted Criterion 6 an reflected on the er. closed revined nave FHA-3.
We vill continue to eva!unte enennnulation of racevnyn on a case-by-care hanin where internal hest rararation in enhlan in rot sufficient to cause dnnare.
s u o 82 20/r5g g
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Fr. F. A. Clark Face ?
Aurust 20, 1080
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An an alternative to encon"ulatinn o# racernye outnide of centninnent we vill n44 nutc~ntic " ire surpression to the switchcent roo r.r nni other nrenn containinc redundant raceways.
In 11ett of encaprulntion of racevnya within the contninr,ent, ve rrrore to armly "l ee actic fire resistant contince to all enble tra"' arl to provide mariaite bstriers or sennration betvoen redundint rncevevn.
Tnese modi"Icatfors were vreviously discussed with nenbers of your 9taf",enern.
F.
L. Conner and G. I!udson en July 1h, 1030.
We have contieted actien re'n+ive 'o the "Unrenolved Ianue It e.?.
3.3.6", entitled " Fire richtine ftr tecier".
Written ntratecien have new been DrerTre? and are nvailable for " ire trncele tre in those areas identified in heferences (?' nhovo As discussed with our IGC Project Mana.;er, ve are avaiting any suppler.ents to yo"r f arety rvaluntion Nrort whick ma" he forthcominc in rennonce to thece or cur rrnviou<: "nc-b'e recuest vou nrormt restense in this nren innsnuch an we are hasitant to nee 'ortnin nodi fientions without none indication of 'M concurrence.
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F. E. Architto: - imC P r.
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o FHA-3 foot make this an acceptable method of extinguishment in this case.
Prior to extinguishment of either high or low flash point liquids, the cooling action of the sprinkler system provides significant pro-tection of safe shutdown equipment from heat.
In conclusion, the high reliability of automatic sprinklers combined with their capa-bility of extinguishing both high flash point combustible liquids and water soluble flammable liquids provides adequate assurance that both divisions of safe shutdown related equipment will remain undamaged following an exposure fire and one division will remain undamaged fol-lowing a fire originating in the other division.
Criteria 2 The addition of fire rated doors is not necessary for rooms where a wet pipe sprinkler system is employed at one side of the doorway.
Where credit is taken for automatic sprinklers in lieu of fire doors, at least one sprinkler head will be located adjacent to and immediately above the doorway to provide a water curtain to prevent extension of fire.
Criteria 3 In rooms where cable trays would. obstruct distribution from ceiling sprinklers, sprinklers will be located below the cable trays to sup-press transient fire hazards.
In addition, automatic smoke detectors will be provided at the ceiling above the cable trays to detect inter-nally initiated fires in trays which have been demonstrated by Sandia Laboratories Test Report " Cable Tray Fire Tests", SAND 77-1125C, July, 1977, to be slow propagating and would allow fire brigade response as discussed in Category B.
Criteria 4 For rooms which are analyzed as requiring an automatic suppression system but which would be subjected to a greater potential hazard from inadvertant actuation of a sprinkler system, an automatically actuated, total flooding HALON 1301 system shall be installed to sup-press a fire prior to damage of either redundant division unless the fire originates in one division. In that case, the HALON 1301 system will prevent damage to the redundant division.
Criteria 5 Sprinklers placed at the ceiling of a room in combination with the appropriate water flow alarms provide the required fire detection.
Criteria 6 DE LETED l
Revised:
5/20/80 8/11/d0
TABLE 1 PAGE 1 0F 12 PROPOSED PLANT MODIFICATIONS FOR FIltE PROTECTION UPGRADE It00M No.
FIItE DETECTION FIRE SUPPRESSION OTilER MODIFICATIONS 100/103/116 Smoke Detection Sprinklers at Ceiling 1.
Place sprinklers to cover entire floor area.
l 101/119 Smoke Detection Sprinklers at Ceiling 1.
None 2.
Add fire damper to ceiling and wall IIVAC duct penetration.
3.
Close blockouts between Room 118 and 119 and 101 and 102 with fire rated 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> stop.
4.
Provide interlock to close motor operated IIVAC dampers at ceiling and wall on actuation of smoke detectors.
5.
Close blockouts between Itoom 118, 119, 101, and 102 and the Corridors 100 and 103.
102/118 Smoke DeLeeLion Nonc 1.
Same as 101/119.
at Ceiling 103/116 See Itoom No. 100 104 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling Revised:
1/11/d0 5/20/80 3/11/80
PAGE 2 0F 12
' ROOM NO.
FIHE-DETECTION FIltE SUPPilESSION OTilER MODIFICATIONS 105/115 None Sprinklers.at Ceiling 1.
Provide curbs at ent'rance and between compartments.
2.
Add fire damper in.fiVAC duct communicating with Room 106/113.
106/113
.None Sprinklers at Ceiling None 107/114 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 108 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 109/112 None None Nonc 110 Smoke Detection None' None at Ceiling 111 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 113 See Roon No. 106 Merirlklers at Ceiling Nonc l Itevised:
1/ll/do 5/20/80
PAGE 3 0F 12 H00M No.
FIRE DETECTION FIRE SUPPHESSION OTilER MODIFICATIONS' 117 None None tunte 120/122
-Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling
-121/123.
None None None 200 None Sprinklers at Ceiling Nonc 201/228
.None Sprinklers at Ceiling 1.
Curb around each CCW pump foundation.
2.
Upgrade unrated penetration to Hoom 225/204.
202 None Sprinklers at Ceiling 1.
Provide spray shields at MCC's.
j 293/224 None Sprinklers East of None
{t Line l
Hevised:
5/20/80
7 PACE 4 0F 12 HOOM NO.-
FIHE DETECTION FIHE SUPPHESSION OTilER MODIFICATIONS '
204/225 None Sprinklers at. Ceiling None L205/226 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None 4
206/227 Smoke Detection Sprinklers at Ceiling None at Ceiling 2 c.*
None None None 208 None None None 209 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None 210 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None Hevised:
1/11/80 5/20/80 d/ll/80
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PAGE 6 0F 12 ROOM NO.
FIIG DETECTION FIltE SUPPRESSION OTilEli MODIFICATIONS 223 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None 229/230 IIcat Detection at None 1.
Coat cable trays with Flamemastic Electric Penetration 2.
Provide an licP oil collection system.
Areas and HCP uays 3.
Iteroute shutdown cable or install barriers. I 1A/lu/2A/2B Smoke Detection Automatic Sprinklers None at Ceiling-(existing) 301/304/305/307 None None None 302/306/lC/2C Smoke Detection llalon 1301 1.
Interlock lialon with ilVAC.
at ceiling total flooding 2.
Actuation of flalon by detectors.
3.
Electrically supervise all doors.
308 None None None 309/315 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None Itevised:
1/11/30 8/11/d0
PAGE 7 0F 12 It00M NO.
FIIG DETECTION FIltE SUPPitESSION -
OTilElt MODIFICATIONS "310/316 Smoke Detectio.a Sprinklers at Ceiling None l.
311/317 Smoke Detection Italon 1301
.l.
_. None at Ceiling; Total Flodding 2.
Add fire damper in !!VAC duct'in the ceiling.
(existing) 3.
Upgrade unrated blockouts to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
312/318 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 313/411/
None None None 314/427
>319/325:
Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 320 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling 322/324 Smoke Detection None Nonc at Ceiling Itevised:
1/11/d0 5/20/30 d/ll/80
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PAGE 8.0F 12 4
HOOM NO..
FIRE DETECTION FIRE SUPPRESSION OTilEll MODIFICATIONS 323 Smoke Detection None None at Ceiling of Passage Area 325 Smoke Detection None None 327/328 None None
-None (See Itesponse to SElt Item 3.1.18.)
400/401/402/
Smoke Detection None None 403/404/405/
(Existing) 415/432/434/.
435/436/437/
438 406 Smoke Detection IIalon 1301 None (Existing)
(Existing) 407/430 Smoke Detection IIalon 1301
- 1. None at Ceiling Total Flooding (Existing) 408 None Sprinklers -at Ceiling None Itevised:
1/11/do 5/20/du 8/11/80
PAGE 9 0F 12 It00M NO.
Film DETECTION fille SUPPitESSION -
OTi!Elt NODIFICATIONS 409/429 ~
' Smoke Detection Sprinklers at Ceiling None
.l
. at Ceiling (Existing) 410 None None None I
412 None None None 414/423 Smoke Detection Sprinklers at Ceiling 1.
Provide spray shields at NCC's.
l.
at Ceiling (Existing) 416/421/422 Smoke Detection Preaction Sprinklers None at Ceiling at Ceiling (Existing)
(Existing) 417/418 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None (Existing) 419/425/426 None Sprinklers at Ceiling None l.
1 Itevised:
1/11/80 5/20/80
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205-1 ROOM NOS. 205 and 226 - FIGURES 2 and 6 ROOM DESCRIPTION Service Water Pump Rooms Unit 1 - 226 Unit 2 - 205 These rooms contain three divisions of safety related equipment and associated cable, and two divisions of safe shutdown cable. These rooms do not contain any safe shutdown equipment.
PROPOSED MODIFICATION An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system will be installed in accordance with Category A and Criteria 1 SER QUESTIONS 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of separation between adjacent fire areas that are not separated by fire barriers (with protected openines and penetrations) of appropriate fire resistance.
Response
Automatic sprinkler systems will be provided in lieu of fire doors as discussed in Criteria 2.
Watertight doors are installed at the Heater Bay Wall. This type of door cannot be obtained with a fire rating.
2.
Identify the minimum separation between the redundant cables (in trays or in conduits)/ equipment required for safe shutdown in each fire area.
Response
The addition of a sprinkler system in combination with existing spatial arrangement, will accomplish effective separation between redundant safe shutdown cables.
3.
Identify the. largest fire that can be expected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved through the area.
-Response The Fire Protection Program Evaluation gave a fixed loading of approximately 1/2 minute; the Case 1 transient will add approxi-
- mately 3 more minutes.
Revised:
d/11/80
206-1 ROOM NOS. 206 AND 227 - FIGURES 2 AND 6 ROOM DESCRIPTION Piping Penetration Rooms Unit 1 - 227 Unit 2 - 206 These rooms contain two divisions of safety related equipment / cable and the following single division of safe shutdown equipment and associated cabling:
1.
Shutdown cooling return isolation valve 1(2)-Mt V-651.
2.
Low pressure safety injection to primary loop val.es 1(2)-MOV-615 and 1(2)-MOV-625.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 1.
An automatic fire detection system will be installed per Category B.
2.
An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system will be installed in accordance with Category A, Criteria 1.
SER QUESTIONS 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of separation between adjacent fire areas that are not separated by fire barriers (with protected openings and penetrations) of appropriate fire resistance.
Response
Sprinkler systems will be provided for separation and in lieu of fire rated doors, per Criteria 2.
All penetration seals are fire rated. Fire dampers are provided in ductwork. Separation of Rooms 206 (316) is by grated steel floor. Separation is not required, as safe shutdown equipment in the areas are not redundant to one another.
Identify the minimum separation between the redundant cables (in trays or 2.
in conduits)/ equipment required for safe shutdown in each fire area.
Response
There is no redundant safe shutdown equipment or cabling in this room.
3.
Identify the largest fire that can be expected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved through the area.
Response
The Fire Protection Program Evaluation demonstrated that the maximim fixed fire loading would be approximately 2 minutes. An additional 5 minutes loading is postulated due to a Case 1 transient.
l l
Revised: 8/11/30
229-1 ROOM NOS. 229 AND 230 - FIGURES 2 TIIROUCII 9 ROOM DESCRIPTION Containment Unit 1 - 230 Unit 2 - 229 The containment contains four divisions of safety related cable and equipment and the following two divisions of safe shutdown equipment and its associated cabling:
1.
RCP Seal Leakoff Valve 1-CV-506 2.
Pressurizer Sample Valves 1-CV-5465, 1-CV-5466 and 1-CV-5467 3.
Reactor Cold Leg Temperature 1-TE-ll, 1-TE-125, 1-TE-lllY and 1-TE-121Y 4.
Reactor fot Leg Temperature 1-TE-lllX and 1-TE-121X 5.
Charging Letdown Valves 1-CV-515 and 1-CV-516 6.
Shutdown Cooling Return Isolation Valve 1-MOV-652 7.
Pressurizer IIeaters 8.
Steam Generator Level 1-LT-1105, 1-LT-llll, 1-LT-1106 and 1-LT-il21 9.
Reactor Core Temperature 10.
Pressurizer Level 1-LT-103, 1-LT-110X and 1-LT-110Y ll.
Pressurizer Pressure 1-PT-100X and 1-PT-100Y 12.
Auxiliary Spray Line Valve 1-CV-517 13.
Pressarizer Power Operated Helease Valves 1-ERV-402/1-MOV-403 and 1-ERV-404/
l-MOV-405 PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 1.
A new Reactor Coolant Pump oil collection system will be installed.
Reference the response to SER question 3.3.4, "RC Pump Lube Oil Collection System."
2.
Fire detection devices will be installed in the electrical penetration areas and in the Reactor Coolant Pump Bny areas.
3.
All exposed cable insulation in ca61e trays will be covered widt two applications of Flamemastic fire resistant material.
4.
Where redundant safe shutdown raceway is routed within 10' fee t and not protected by physical barriers, such as concrete walls, one of the two raceways shall be rerouted more than 10 feet away or a physical barrier of 1/2" Marinite board will be installed to provide an equivalent 20' separation.
SER QUESTIONS 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of separation between adjacent fire areas that are not separated by fire barriers (with protected openin,'s and penetrations) of appropriate fire resistance.
Response
- The containments are 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated structures with no possibility of fire spreading into or out of the area. Entry into the area is strictly controlled at all times.
Revised:
8/11/80
225-2 2.
Identify the minimum separation between the redundant cables (in trays or in conduits)/ equipment' required for safe shutdown in each fire area.
Response
Where less than 10 foot separation between redundant safe shutdown cable exists,-
one of the two raceways will be rerouted to provide 10 ft. separation or a 1/2" marinite barrier of fire resistive material will be installed to provide equivalent separation. The following lists safe shutdown equipment and their safe shutdown separation relationship:
1.
RCP Seal Leakoff Valve 1-CV-506 and Pressurizer Sample Valves 1-CV-5465, 1-CV-5465 and 1-CV-5467 - Redundant components are located outside the containment.
2.
Reactor Cold Leg Temperature 1-TE-ll5, 1-TE-125, 1-TE-lllY and 1-TE-121Y and Reactor Hot Leg Temperature 1-TE-lllX and 1-TE-121X - Redundant instruments are located remotely and separated by concrete shielding.
3.
Charging Letdown Valves 1-CV-515 and 1-CV-516 - Valves are normally open but will fail safe in event of fire.
4.
Shutdown Cooling Return Isolation Valve 1-MOV-652 - This valve is normally shut and is not required to change position immediately.
Manual valve operation can be accomplished following fire suppres-sion to reach cold shutdown.
5.
Pressurizer I! eaters and Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves 1-ERV.402/1-MOV-403 and 1-ERV-404/1-MOV-405 - These devices are enclosed and isolated from adjacent areas by concrete walls and the area is devoid' of combustible materials.
6.
Steam Generator Level 1-LT-1105, 1-LTilll, 1-LT-1106 and 1-LT-ll21 -
Redundant instrumentation is separated by 100 feet and concrete walls.
7.
Reactor Core Temperature - In core instrumentation is run in conduit.
8.
Pressurizer Level 1-LT-103, 1-LT-110X and 1-LT-110Y and Pressurizer Pressure 1-PT-100X and 1-PT-100Y - Redundant instrumentation is more than 10 feet apart, column / wall mounted, above grated floors and not exposed by combustible materials, 9.
Auxiliary Spray Line Valve 1-CV-517 - This valve is normally shut and will fail closed.
3.
Identify the largest fire that can be expected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved through the area.
Response
Per the Fire Protection Progran Evaluation, the fixed fire loading in the containment is approximately 16 minutes. Approximately 50% of the fire load is due to electrical cables in tray, the majority of which are located at elevation 45'-0" in the area of the electrical penetrations.
The only credible fire _would be one due to a fire involving the cables in tray. Cable tray initiated fires have been demonstrated by Sandia Laboratories. Test Report, " Cable Tray Fire Tests" SAND-77-ll25C dated July,1977 to be slow propagating and are effectively contained within the initiated tray. Should a tray initiated fire occur, damage to only one division of safe shutdown cable is postulated since redundant raceways close' enough to be affected by a single fire will be separated by rated fire resistive barriers of 1/2 Marinite Bosrd to provide 10 feet equivalent separation.
I Revised: 8/11/30
229-3 The RCP lube oil comprises approximately 49% of the fire load with the remaining l?. being scattered miscellaneous material.
As discussed in the response to SER question 3.3.4, the RCP lube oil collection system will prevent a fire resulting from a lube oil release.
Transient combustibles can only be expected during plant shutdown as containment access is severely limited during reactor operation to operational inspections. Transient combustibles introduced during plant shutdown would be removed as a part of the final containment inspection prior.to startup. Therefore, safe shutdown could not be jeopardized by transient combustibles.
4.
Identify the worst damage that could result from such fire.
Response
The following safe shutdown cable / equipment could be damaged:
CV-506; CV-5465, CV-5466 and CV-5467; TE-ll5 or TE-125; TE-111Y or TE-121Y; TE-lllX er 121X; CV-515 or CV-516; LT-1105/LT-llli or LT-1100/LT-ll21; Pressurizer Heaters ( A or B); LT-103, LT-110X or LT-110Y; PT-100X or PT-100Y; ERV-402/MOV-405 or ERV-404/MOV-403.
5.
Demonstrate that such damage will not have an adverse effect on safe shutdown or cause excessive radioactive release to the environment.
Response
As identified in the responses to SER 2 and 4 above, only one division of aafe shutdown cable / equipment could be affected; therefore, safe shutdown of the plant is assured.
Since the prime purpose of the containment is to prevent the release of radiation to the environment, there would be no radiological consequences of a fire in these areas.
EVALUATION OF SER SECTION 5 MODIFICATIONS Refer to Section 5.19.6 of the SER.
1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of cable / equipment separation in preserving safe shutdown.
Response
Refer to the response to SER question 2.
2.
Install fire detection devices in areas which contain safety-related
. cables and/or equipment.
Response
Fire detection devices will be installed in the containment in the vicinity of the electrical penetration areas and Reactor Coolant Pump Bays which constitute the on1.y credible majo.- fire loads.
Revised: 3/11/d0
311-1 ROOM NOS. 311 AND 317 - FIGURES 3 AND 7 ROOM DESCRIPTION Switchgear Rooms Unit 1 - 317 Unit 2 - 311 These rooms contain three divisions of safety related equipment and cable, three divisions of safe shutdown cable and two divisions of electrical equipment.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 1.
A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated damper will be installed in the HVAC duct.
2.
Unrated blockouts will be closed with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rate penetration seals.
3.
An automatic total flooding Halon 1301 system will be added to suppress a fire in accordance with Category A, Criteria 4.
The system will be initiated by smoke detectors and HVAC dampers will be actuated to close.
Doors will be electrically supervised.
SER QUESTIONS 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of separation between adjacent fire areas that are not separated by fire barriers (with protected openings and penetrations) of appropriate fire resistance.
Response
Based on the proposed modifications, these rooms will form a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated compartment with the exception of the 1-1/2 hour rated doors into the Purge Air Supply Rooms 312 and 318.
The 1-1/2 hour fire rated doors will be adequate as the fire loading inside of Room 311 is only 23 minutes and that in the Purge Air Supply Room 312 is 25 minutes.
2.
Identify the minimum separation between the redundant cables (in trays or in conduits)/ equipment required for safe shutdown in each fire area.
Response
The Halon 1301 system will insure that a fire is suppressed before it can spread to other areas in the room and/or other divisions as described in Category A, Criteria 4.
Two di :sions of safe shatdown equipment are located in the room, consisting of disconnect switches (or each division. However, a third division, located outside of tha room, will be capable of performing the required function. All other redundant equipment is located outside of this room.
{
~.
311 3.
Identify the largest fire that can be expected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved throudh the area.
Kesponse As stated in the Fire Protection Progt u.i Evaluation, the fixed fire loading is approximately 20 minutes. Tne Case 1 transient loading is approximately 3 minutes.
4.
Identify the worst damage that could result from suen a fire.
Response
Due to the proposed modification to add a Halon 1301 suppression system, the postulated fire would be effectively suppressed before either division could become involved unless the fire originated within one division, then the suppression system would prevent involvement of the redundant division.
5.
Demonstrate that such damage will not have an adverse effect on safe shutdown or cause excessive radioactive release to the environment.
Response
The proposed Halon 1301 fire suppression system will limit damage to a single division of safe shutdown equipment and cable. Therefore, the ability to achieve safe shutdown is assured.
1 EVALUATION OF SER SECTION 5 MODIFICATIONS Refer to Section 5.12.6 of the SER.
The licensee will:
1.
Analyze the consequences of losing "A" cables in conduits above "B" switchgear concurrent with the loss of "B" division.
Hesponse Not applicable to this room. See response to SER Question (1. ) for Room 407 (430).
2.
Demonstrate by hose reach tests that every point in switchgear rooms can be reached effectively by at least one manual hose stream.
Response
Refer to the response to SER Item 3.1.21.
Page 311-3 voided.
Revised: 3/11/30 L_
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407-1 ROOM NOS. 407 ANP 430 - EIGURES 4 AMD 8 ROOM DESCRIPTION Electrical Switchgear Room i
Unit 1 - 430 Unit 2 - 407 These rooms c;ontain two divisions of safety related equipment and cable, and two divisions of safe shutdown cable and electrical equipment.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS An automatic total flooding !!alon 1301 system will be added to suppress a fire in accordance with Category A, Criteria 4.
The system will be initiated by smoke detectors and IIVAC dampers will be actuated to close.
Doors will be electrically supervised.
SER QUESTIONS 1.
Demonstrate the adequacy of separation between adjacent fire areas that are not separated by fire barriers (widi protected openings and penetrations) of appropriate fire resistance.
Response
This room forms a complete 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated compartment having Class A fire doors, with the exception of a 1-1/2 hour fire rated door into the electrical penetration room 409 and the steel bullet-proof door to computer room 406.
The 1-1/2 hour fire rated door will be adequate as the fire loading in room 407, including the Case 1 transient, is only 35 minutes and that
.in 409 is 18 minutes.
The fire load in Computer Room 406, including the Case 1 transient, is 23 minutes. Thus, the 1-1/2 hour fire rated doors and steel bullet-proof door have sufficient fire resistance to prevent a fire from spreading from one room to the other.
Identify the minimum separation between the redundant cables (in trays 2.
or in conduits)/ equipment required for safe shutdown in each fire area.
Response
The IIalon 1301 system will insure that a fire is suppressed before it can spread to other areas in the room and/or cther divisions as described in Category A, Criteria 4.
3.
Identify the largest fire that can be expected in each fire area based on the fixed combustibles in the area and transient combustibles which may be introduced into or moved through the area.
Response
Per the ' original Fire Protection Program Evaluation, the fixed fire loading i
~~-
^9.
407-2 would provide an exposure of 33 minutes. The Case 1 transient would add an additional 2 minutes of fire loading.
4.
Identify the worst damage that could result from such a fire.
Response
Due to the proposed modification to add a Halon 1301 suppression system, the postulated fire would be effectively suppressed before either division could become involved unless the fire originated within one division, then the cuppression system would prevent involvement of the redundant division.
5.
Demonstrate that such damage will not have an adverse effect on safe shutdown or cause excessive radioactive release to the mvironment.
Response
The proposed Halon 1301 fire suppression system will limit damage to a single division of safe shutdown equipment and cable. Therefore, the ability to achieve safe shutdown is assured.
EVALUATION OF SER SECTION 5 MODIFICATIONS Refer to Section 5.12.6 of the SER.
The licensee will:
1.
Analyze the consequences of losing "A" cables in conduits above "B"
switchgear concurrent with the loss of "B" division.
Response
Due to the proposed modification to add a Halon 1301 suppression system,
. dhe postulated fire would be effectively suppressed before either division could become involved unless the fire originated within one division, then the suppression system would prevent invclvemerit of the redundant division.
2.
Demonstrate by hose reach tests that every point in switchgear rooms can be reached effectively by at least one manual hose stream.
Hesponse Hefer to the response to SER Item 3.1.21.
1 4
l Revised:
3/11/80
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