ML19343D459
| ML19343D459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1980 |
| From: | Dornsife W PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040534 | |
| Download: ML19343D459 (39) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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4 In the matter of:
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, 9
i 6I (Three Mile Island, Unit 2)
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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Room 202, Federal Building c
9 228 Walnut Street Earrisburg, Pennsylvania 10 97ednesday, October 1, 1980 j
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12 INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM DORNSIFE,
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13 commenced at 10:05 a.m.
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14 APPEARANCES:
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15 NORMAN MOSELEY, U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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j 16 JOHN CRAIG, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, i
17 i Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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i 18 TERRY EARPSTER, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
E 19 i x
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DAVID GAMBLE, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 20,
Office of Inspector & Auditor.
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RICHARD EOEFLING, ESO., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, h
Office of Executive Legal Director.
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2 MR. GAMBLE:
This interview is being conducted as. a 3
portion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation into
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4l the exchange of information between the Metropolitan Edison s
5 Company and the NRC on March 28th, 1979.
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6l At this time if you would raise your right hand to e7 2
7 administer an oath.
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8 Whereupon, do 9
WILLIAM DORNSIFE i
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10 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was i
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11 examined and testified as follows:
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BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Will you please state your full name for the record.
2 15 A
William Paul Dornsife.
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Okay.
Thank you.
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17 j BY MR. MOSELEY:
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18 l 0
Mr. Dornsife, it was perceived by the plant staff s
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20 l the reactor was returning to criticality, as indicated by the i
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To your knowledge, on 3/28, was this knowledge 23 '
provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the Met Ed or
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24 j GPU organization?
25l A
Not initially.
The only indication that we got that l
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they were having some problem uith return to criticality was a I
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2 boron concentration reading they did give us at about 9:00 a.m.,
3 when I talked to Gary Miller, and I think they were saying that i
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4 the levels were -' it's on my notes -- 100 parts per million j
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boron, which was way down from what it was before the trip, and 8
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leak, and when the reactor pressure went low, they could have
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9 tion they gave me concerning it.
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Did they mention to you the source and intermediate I
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11 range instrumentation ceadinos?
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no.
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13 BY MR. CRAIG:
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What discussions did you have with Gary Miller by b
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way of explartation of the 100 ppm reading?
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I was really pressed for time.
In fact, I was about l
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half an hour late going to the Lieutenant-Governor's office l
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when I finally got the information, so I didn't have any chance i
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It was just a matter of him M
l 20 i filling me in on information he had.
It was not a real good I
21 interchange, by me asking him questions.
I just didn't have i
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the time to do it.
It took a while for me to get ahold of him, 23 '
first of all, to get the information.
I was really rushed for i
24 i time to get over there for the briefing.
So it was just him --
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a one-way information flow, basically.
Very little.
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him a few basic questions, but nothing in detail.
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2 BY tiR. MOSELEY:
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Let me ask a couple of auestions about that discussion,
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4 telephone discussion, before we get back to specifics.
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Would you describe exactly how it developed?
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6 call the site and ask for Gary Miller, or did Gary -- was he put R
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on the phone as a result of discussions or conversations you had i
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had with someone else prior to that?
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Well, up until I talked to Gary Miller -- well, I 5
10 arrived at the office at about 8:00, and after talking to the 3j 11 plant from my home for initial notification, and I guess same-u
- j 12 where in that time they had shifted the phone talk to the Unit 1
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13 control room, so we weren't getting direct information.
So every
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14 time we would ask for something, it would take a while to get E
'nformation back to us.
It wasn't -- we weren't always 5
g' 16 talking to the same person.
We were painfully aware of the A
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18 weren't able to get very, very much specific information.
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At about 8:30 or so, someone came down from the 20;l Secretary's Office indicating the Lieutenant-Governor wanted 21l to be briefed.
So since at that point I knew more than anybody f
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them.
And, of course, in my mind I wasn't clear what had 24 I happened and what the current situation was, so I called the 4
s-25j plant and asked to get a full briefing, indicating I needed li ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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1, the information to go brief the Governor.
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At that point the person I was talking to did not s
3 know enough to brief re, so Gary Miller came on the line.
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7 brief me in person.
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0 You don't recall who the first individual you were d
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talking with was?
10 A
No, I don't.
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Were there others on the phone besides Gary?
?
y 12 A
No, it was single, just with Gary.
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Okay.
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When you made the reference before to "we," "we were w=
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A Mostly Tom, Magaie and myself.
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Margaret Reilly?
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19 l A
Margaret Reilly, Tom Gerusky and myself.
We were 5
i 20 l the three that were primarily talking with the site.
l 21 l BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q Now let's briefly go forward to your briefing with l
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23) the Lieutenant-Governor.
Was there a telephone call made at i
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25 participated?
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!!ot that I was aware of, no.
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As far as you know, then, the Lieutenant Governor 3
didn't talk to the site on the morning of March 28th?
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A I was not emere of ha ee1x ue to the ette, no.
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tiow getting back to the question on the potential for n
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range instrumentation.
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11 range indications?
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A It would have been helpful, yes.
It would have O l 13 indic ted th t that was their concern, you know, it was their
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14 critical concern at that point.
The way it was given to us, 5
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it wasn't indicated to us it was of concern.
It was more of an 3
5 3l 16 administrative problem, not a real problem, deciding how the e
d 17 numbers got low enough that it was meaning anything.
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It is your belief that you have just stated that l
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19 l it would have been helpful --
20 A
Yes.
It would have indicated that something was amiss i
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22 of forced cooling in the reactor established.
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O Is this belief that you hold, is this different today l
24 than it was on March 28th?
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What?
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O This belief that it would have been helpful to have
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site radiation exposures than pumping for specific plant R
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parameters.
Our emergency plan was based on the utility being aj 8
able to tell us what the plant was doing, not us having to pump J
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them for information, and I think that has very much changed.
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Let me make sure I understand your answer.
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I'm not sure I understand what you are saying.
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our concern was mainly with offsite recommendations, and 23 \\
determining what the of fsite consequences might be, rather than 24
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getting specific plant parameters.
But now it would be a 25 - j thoroughly different role, the way it's perceived in our i
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Why do you feel that this information on the nuclear 3
instrumentation was not passed on to you on March 28th?
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I really don't know.
I haven't thought about it.
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It could have just been an oversight.
We don't feel that the 0l utility was withholding any information from us.
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right questions to ask.
I'm not sure whether it was an oversight
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existence, but I guess they weren't familiar in how we would 9
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assimilate that particular information.
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A I think that's a fair statement.
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Do you feel that the utility's communication systems 23 '
were inadequate?
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A Of course, this is based on a lot of retrospective on
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what I know now, obviously.
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Yeah, there was a lack of direct communications with 3
what was going on.
We had the open line, but again it was a
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There could 5-l have been better communications.
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Do you feel the utility saw no need to pass this R
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A That could have been part of it.
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Do you feel that other organizations within the 10,
state may have received this, that is the --
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No, I can't imagine who, because we were the only ones M
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Now, unfortunately I wasn't invited -- it was an 2
15 oversight on the state's part -- to the meeting that occurred i
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We intend to talk with others about that.
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A Okay.
n 20 Q
On March 28 th, the reactor coolant pumps had been 21 ')
secured and were unable to pump water because of the significant I
22 voiding in the reactor coolant system hotlegs.
23 To your knowledge, on March 28, was this information i
24 [I provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
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Not that directly.
The information -- the best t
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information I was able to sort out was the pumps were not O
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feed-and-bleed method, and that there wasn't anticipated to be a
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There was an indication that Gary Miller told me in R.
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the conversation there was a possibility that there were bubbles 7
or some voids in the systems, but certainly not indicating the j
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core could have been uncovered.
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3 11 Q
But specifically in terms of the voiding in the hotlegs j
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passed on to you as a specific piece of information?
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A No, no.
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Should this information have been passed on?
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Yes.
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And again, if we can differentiate between how you
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18 might have felt on March 28th and how you feel today, if you P
19 would.
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It would have made a difference, obviously.
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of information could have, you know, sprung the point, " Hey,
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parameters?"
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But on March 28th, you believe you would have felt i
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this is something he should have told you?
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Yes.
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Okay.
Or they should have told you.
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Again I would like to ask you why you feel this 0
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information was not passed on to you.
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Again probably the same reasons I'gave for the other.
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And then I will ask you -- I won't go through d
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the list of questions again, but could I ask you whether you I
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I don't believe so, not to my knowledge.
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Another fact, the electromatic relief valve had been 14 stuck open for a period in excess of two hours.
To your knowledge, b
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Yes, it was, in conversation with Gary Miller, he 2
6 17 !
told me the valve had been stuck open.
The indication was faulty,
5 18 and it wasn't indicating the proper position on the indicator, 5
19 l and the valve was now closed.
But this was again at 9:00 a.m.
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Did he tell you how long the valve had been open?
21 I Maybe not two hours, but a long time?
Or do you recall a period 22 of time?
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23 A
I think he indicated it was open for a fairly long 24 period of time, I believe.
25j Q
Okay.
Before we started the interview, you gave us 1
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some notes that had been taken on that day.
Can you refer-to
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2 those notes and point to us the note that you may have made 3
that would reflect on this?
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4 A
(Witness examining document.)
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I don't believe it's on those particular notes, but I N
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8 because at that point I realized it was going to become a very d
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critical piece of information.
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Do you have a copy of that?
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Yes, I do.
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Could we take a look at that?
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This is basically my reccllection of the first -- of m
3 14 what I did from 0700 when I first. received the call from t
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when I received N
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It includes that conversation.
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this again has not been given to anybody officially.
This 5
5 18 information -- and this has been given in other records -- this l
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O I was going to ask you to try to identify when this b
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was prepared.
Would you say it was within two weeks?
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A I would say within two or three weeks after, yes.
24 k Q
Then I'm tryir.g for as much specificity as we can get
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25 here, would you say by the middle of April?
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Yes, I would say by the middle of 7pril.
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2 MR.-MOSELEY:
Let's take a short break.
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3 (Recess.)
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4 MR. MOSELEY:
During the short recess, we have g
5 reviewed the three'pages of notes or report -- I don't know 6
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THE WITNESS:
Recollection is probably more 'like it.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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9 Q
An area I would like to pursue just a little bit more d
E 10 has to do with what Miller told you about the valve having E
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11 been stuck open and the block valve having been closed.
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12 Do you recall any discussions of inventory deficiency
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13 or deficiency of primary coolant as a result of this valve
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14 having been open for an extended period of time?
j 15 A
Other than him saying possibly there were voids in E
g the system, he didn't know how big, -I believe he might have -said 16 A
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possibly the candy canes could have been blocked.
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18 Q
Did he relate the opening of the valve or the valve 5
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having been open as the cause of these bubbles or voids?
n 20f A
I believe so, yeah.
That would be obvious, _the only 21 way to do it, to remove the inventory from the system.
I don't-F i
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It was just, you know, tu) 23 assumed on my part that was the reason.
24 Q
But that's an assumption you made on March 28th, based 25 on what Mr. Miller had told you?
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A I believe so, yes.
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2 BY MR. EARPSTER:
3 Q
Do you recall, in looking at your notes, the plant
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4 was characterized as being stable at some later point.
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5 this as a result of the block valve having been closed, that h
6l they now felt that the transient was stable?
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A I believe it was that, along with the feed-and-bleed a
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cooling they thought was taking place as being a stable mode.
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9 BY MR. MOSELEY:
Y 10 Q
Did Miller characterize this, the open block valve,.
E as being the cause of why the plant was in the condition it was 11 j
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I don't think directly, but I inferred that was the E
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14 case.
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Can you give us any benefit of your recollection of E
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A It's been so long ago.
It was difficult to write w
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those recollections or other set of papers.
I really have no F
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idea.
Things were going so fast at that point, a lot of it was 20 l a blur.
21l BY MR. CRAIG:
1 22 l Q
Did you believe the plant was stable when you got 23 that report?
- I 24 A
Yeah.
I guess so.
That was what I told everybody.
25 l I didn't really question, I didn't have time to question that
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We were relying on their 2
information at that point.
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Well, if you could describe your impression of the
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The feed-and-bleed 5
g method implies that they are cooling the core.
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effectively?
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A I recall someone along the line mentioning a cooldown d
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9 rate.
Whether it was in that conversation or not, I'm not sure, o
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In the morning or afternoon?
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Again, I don't know.
I only believe somebody mentioned 14 a cooldown rate at some point.
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15 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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16 A
~ from Met Ed?
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A Yeah.
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M 18 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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But you don' t recall whether that was morning or i
20l' afternoon?
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A No, I don't.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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Could you relate that to before or after the 1
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Lieutenant Governor was briefed by the Met Ed people?
25 '
A No, I can't.
I really can't.
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Q Okay.
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. It could have been in this conversation, it could 3
have been later in the day.
I don ' t know.
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4 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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0 Mr. Dornsife, referring to the notes you have given 8
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us in preparation for the Lieutenant Governor's briefing, that G
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is your briefing of the Lieutenant Governor at about 9:00 a.m.,
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I believe these notes were made.
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Right.
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There is a notation immediately following, " violation z=
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where the notation is simply " primary."
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12 Could you explain to us what that notation was meant to convey 5
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13 to you, recognizing you are writing this to yourself?
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14 A
Yeah.
Again I don't recall what that meant.
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j 16 important things.
Whether that was a very important thing or l
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I just didn't have time to have them 18 l G
stop and let me transcribe everything they were saying because I l
5 19,
figured he was pretty well tied up at that point, too.
I didn't 5
I 20 l want to waste any more of his time than I really had to.
He 21 had more important things to do than brief me for an extended h
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22 l period of time.
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O I asked you earlier if there was anyone else on his
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Was there anyone else on your end of the line?
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A No.
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Q Which specific violation -- again referring to the
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2 same note, you have " violation of tech specs."
Do you recall 3
which tech spec he mentioned?
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4 A
I believe it was -- again this is a recollection, I g
5 didn't write it down, but my other recollection indicates it was E
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6 the feedwater, auxiliary feedwater svstem block valves beine R
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closed, that.didn't allow auxiliary feedwater into the steam
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generators initially.
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Then there was a notation that follows, the B steam Y
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10 generator bottled up.
It says, I believe, " evacuate gas through.
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I don't recall what that notation means either.
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Did you have discussion at that time about the --
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I believe earlier -- I just want to clarify it -- you 5_
y 16 said the discussion of failed fuel -- there was a discussion of x
l 17 failed fuel.
x 18 l 5
A That's correct.
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19 Q
And the cause that was attributed by Mr. Miller was A
20 what?
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in primary pressure, there could have been some gap activity 22 23 '
released.
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think it's a very large percent."
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you on that morning?
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20 that would have keyed something.
21 Q
Okay.
On March 28th, the HPCI had been secured and
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then throttled for a period of time followine the trip.
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24 To your knowledge, on March 28, was this information
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3 Q
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Not to me, anyway.
22 Q
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passed on?
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24 Q
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22 To your knowledge, on March 28th, was this information 9
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No, it was not.
25j Q
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2 Q
At approximately 1:50 p.m. on March 28th, the Unit 2 3
containment building pressure rose abruptly to approximately 30
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s-5 To your knowledge, on March 28, was this information N
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i 22 il MR. CRAIG:
Can we go off the record for a minute?
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23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 l BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q Mr. Gerusky has testified to others and, in fact, it's 1
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included in this note that you gave'us, that was prepared on
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the state had been informed of the 10-R per hour predicted dose
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Were you aware of.this prediction on March 28th?
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interchange.
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I don't recall.
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21 I'm sure it was after I came back from the Governor's briefing, i
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A Yes, 1:00 or 2:00 p.m.
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Are there any notes, logs or records that relate to 25) the information that was received about'this projection, to your i
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knowledge, other than the note here you have givet us that l
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No.
That's the only information.
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10 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Any recollection similar to the ones you did shortly j
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Is this a copy we could keep?
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Can you give us a name in PEMA who might be custodian e
5 of that?
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She works 7
directly with them.
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copies made of?
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Sure.
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This appears to be a draft.
Did this go out in final?
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As corrected?
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We'll give this back to him, and he'll give us a copy.
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Sure.
This may be more detail than the final.
25 Q
I would like to read both, but since you didn't have k
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any direct knowledge about this, I think we ought to ask the (q
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3 George Kunder, the superintendent of Technical
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5 that he and others had been concerned that the core had been h
6 uncovered for a period of time after 6:45 a.m.
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No, it was not.
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Yes, it should have been.
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Why, in your view, was this information not passed on?
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The fact that someone --
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There are people that believe the core may have been l
5 20 uncovered, and why, you know, why they believe it.
21 Q
Then if we are trying to characterize this, according 22 to my little list here, then you would say -- would you categorize
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it as the utility didn't recognize or adequately evaluate this 24 information?
Would it fit in that category?
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I believe it would fit in that category, yes.
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Q Or would it fit in they didn't feel -- they saw no
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It was sporadic.
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confusion that we were hearing.
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1 0i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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opportunity to delve into more detail because, you know, I was r^s
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that I was tied up with a press conference for over an hour,
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j 6.I I believe that was the biggest mistake I made that R
7 day, agreeing to go brief the Lieutenant Governor.
I won't do it Ej 8f again, if they send the state police over for me, I won't go.
a 5
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Can you recall any other information which should have z
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Well, we were informed to some extent ccncerning the
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consequences.
That information was also kind of sporadic.
We Ec 18l weren't informed originally when it happened.
We weren't w
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the utility actually determined that could be the primary release, 21l when they actually discovered offsite levels and tried to find l
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We should have been told that riaht awav.
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they suspected a primary secondary leak early on.
24 25,
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A I believe we got that information while I was'either 2
at the press conference or somewhere else.
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morning when we got that information.
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4 BY MR. HOEFLING:
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How would that information have come to you?
N 6l A
From the plant, on-the open line.
And, of course, E
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the conditions of the water in the reactor building.
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That would have been, E
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Why do you think those two pieces of information did z
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It again falls into the category of a lack of the
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For the life of me, I can't figure out w
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20 l Q
Do you think that information was withheld?
21 A
No, I don't think it was withheld, I really don't.
4
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But I just don't understand how it could i
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have gotten lost in the shuffle.
24 BY MR. GAMBLE:
l 25 i Q
But you do feel that's what happened, rather than it l
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being withheld?
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When they were starting Ei j
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This is the early morning period, right after they Y
10 had attempted to restart coolant pumps and all the monitors E
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Right.
Well, not so much the in-plant monitors, 5
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all the monitors, wherever they were --
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18 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Q Would that be something back on March 28th you felt l
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Yes, absolutely.
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22 l BY MR. CRAIG:
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O Mr. Dornsife, you indicated earlier as one of the 24 possible reasons for -- I believe it was one of the first items C'.;s i
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ALDERSON REPORT NG COMPANY. INC.
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the 'icensee felt the state couldn't use the information or
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heard that?
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Gary Miller explains to the people there in that i
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j 16 seemed to me from listening to that tape that he was very much 7;j 17 aware of his audience, b
18 A
He knew who I was.
We had' met previously.
He knew E
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20 perceived us having that role in our emergency plan.
21k Q
Well, I was getting more to the point of the free flow i
22 of information between Mr. Miller and the state, specifically
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Did you feel that he was being open and honest with 24 you?
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In that particular conversation, yes.
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Yes, he was volunteering most of it.
I was really 3
pressed for time.
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I asked a few clarifying questions and other 0
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5 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Do you e
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I'm not sure what you mean.
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12 MR. MOSELEY:
Would you read back his response to the
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And pay attention to how you answered.
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(The reporter read the record as requqsted.)
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I don't think I was referring that they 2
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I think that was just 4
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the reason I said that, that was the conversation I got the most A
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continuous like that.
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23 '
BY MR. CRAIG:
24l Q
You indicated -- and I believe it's also in your notes 25 j
-- that there was some confusion that you overheard.
Would 9
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you explain that for us a little bit?
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Well, on the initial contact, you know, according to i
3; our emergency plan, I was required to ask questions about the I
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i s_
4' status of certain safeguards, which I did, and all the_ questions i
5 at that point were answered in the affirmative.
Everything.had 9
6l worked properly.
Th'2e was no indication they turned off any E
i 7
of the safeguard equipment or anything.
The plant was stable.
nj 8
But you could tell by the noise in the background and, you know, d
9 9
people -- the person I was talking to in many cases, say, Z
5 10 waiting for that information, there was some confusion in some z=
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11 of the answers.
3 y
12 And then right before I signed off, the person I was
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13li talking ' to put me over to a health physics type to get an n
5 14 assessment of what offsite indications they had at that point.
b
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15 :
In the background I could hear an announcement to evacuate the i
E 16 auxiliary and fuel handling building, and then he abruptly g
1.
17 4
hung up on me and said he had to go.
He said he had more I
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18 j important -- not more important things to do, but he had to go C
l 19 l and he would call me back.
6 I
20 l So at the point he told we there were no offsite 21 consequences, I figured there was no point trying to get same-(}
body back.
Somebody would have been back in the office at that 22 23 '
point and established the open line.
There was very little I i
l 24 could do at home, so I proceeded to the of fice.
i 25 )
Q Did this feeling things were confused stay with you i
l l
li ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
l l
36 l
l for the rest of the day?
1 i
()
2 A
I think until I talked to Gary Miller, I got that l
3 sense.
(])
4 0
Until 9:00 o' clock?
e 5
A At that point, you know, having had a full briefing of 8
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the status, I felt from the information he gave me that things R
7 were -- had some semblance of order and were under control.
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j 8
BY MR. HOEFLING:
d d
9 0
The impression that Gary left.with you after that Y
10 phone call was that the plant was stable?
z E
I 11 A
Yes.
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?
- j 12 O
That there was a cooling path --
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3 13 A
Yes.
z 5
14 Q
-- working?
b lb l'
A Right.
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16 l.
0 And that failed fuel was limited to some' gap activity w
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17,
as a result of the transient?
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18 '
A Right. And the radiation levels they were seeing in l
2 19 the plant was a result of that activity.
l n
20 BY MR. GAMBLE:
21 Q
What is your current position?
h (2) 22 l A
I am still the State Nuclear Engineer.
g 23)
Q And the organization?
3 24 A
Department of Environmental Resources, Bureau of
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25,!
Radiation Protection.
1 1;
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
37 1i BY MR. HARPSTER:
2 Q
Bill, let me ask you one question.
We have talked 3
about all the specific information that was passed, but in your
()
4 rele of being able to assess the conditions and plan for e
5 contingencies, the "what-if" type stuff, did you ever get any 8
6 concerns passed on to you that day -- I don't know how you write R
7 down to pass on concerns, but the type of concerns that would s
j 8
allow you to make recommendations to the state over, "Well, we d
i d
9 may have a need to step up our efforts or evaluate it in the i
O 10 context of pre-planning for evacuation," if there were concerns j
11 at the plant that the core may further degrade, or potential 3
y 12 for further deteriotation?
(])
13 I notice in reading your annex to the emergency plan, ag 14 one of the standard questions is potential for further 15 deterioration situation.
Did you get any of that type of 16 information from the plant?
d A
d 17 j A
Not really, no.
5 5
18 Q
They pretty much led you to infer that the plent was P
19 [
stable?
8' 5
l 20 l A
Right.
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0 Okay.
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22 l MR. MOSELEY:
We have no further questions, Mr.
23 i Dornsife.
Thank you very much.
24 (Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m.,
the interview was
)
25j adjouuned.)
d j
1 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
31 1
O ricctexa aEcutaroar casarsszon This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the in the matter of: METROPOLITAtt EDISON COMPAliY - TMI, UNIT 2 INTERVIEU OF WILLIAlt DORNSIFE
- Date of Proceeding :
(pd. I, jq g D Docket !!u=b er :
Place of Proceecing:
//mi ha,
d' were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Coccission.
knn
. Lep e
(
Official Reporter (Typed) 0-L
.As V
Official Reporter (Signature) 4 OJ P00R BRML
.