ML19343D458
| ML19343D458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1980 |
| From: | Gerusky T PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040530 | |
| Download: ML19343D458 (46) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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In the matter of:
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5 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY g
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(Three Mile Island, Unit 2) i e
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8 Room 202, Federal Building j}
228 Walnut Street
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9 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Y
E 10 Wednesday, October 1, 1980 E=
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'd 12 INTERVIEW OF THOMAS GERUSKY z
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13 j was commenced at 1:30 p.m.
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14 APPEARANCES:
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15 NORMAN MOSELEY, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
J is G
l JOHN CRAIG, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, p
17 ;
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
5 5
18 TERRY HARPSTER, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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19 l 5
DAVID GAMELE, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 20 Office of Inspector & Auditor.
21 RICHARD HOEFLING, ESQ.,
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Executive Legal Director.
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22 23
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PEQQEEglEGE f
2 MR. GAMBLE:
This interview is being conducted as a 3
portion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation 4
into the exchange of information between the Metropolitan 3
5 Edison Company and the NRC on March 28th, 1979.
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Mr. Gerusky, at this time would you raise your right 7
hand to administer an oath.
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Whereupon, d
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THOMAS GERUSKY Y
10 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was z=
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11 I examined and testified as follows:
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13 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Please state your full name for the record.
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Thomas M. Gerusky.
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O What is your position?
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A Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, 5
5 18 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.
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O Is this the same position you held on March 28th?
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Yes.
21l Q
Thank you.
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22 h BY MR. MOSELEY:
23 Q
Mr. Gerusky, earlier Mr. Dornsife gave us three
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24l sheets of handwritten material, and he identified two of these 25j as having been prepared by himself and one as having been 4
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prepared by you.
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This is the one that he identified as being prepared 2
3 by you.
Can you confirm that for us, please?
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Yes.
These were my notes that were taken as a result e
5 of the first telephone call made to the plant about 7: JO on 2
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6 the morning of the 28th of March, 1979, and that line was left e
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7 open, and probably the first hour's notes,and then things got 7.
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so hectic we didn' t keep many notes the rest of that day.
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haven't been able to find any that we kept.
I'm sure that we I
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13 Q
Okay.
Also earlier Mr. Dornsife had supplied us with j
14 a draft of a letter to Mr. Bruce London, and you have just a few 2
15 minutes ago supplied us with a final copy -- a copy of the final 5
16 letter which you signed.
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17 Could you identify or could you tell us, to the best E
18 of your recollection, the timeframe in which this material was 5j 19 ;
prepared?
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Well, the letter was received from the President's 21,!
Commission on Three Mile Island requesting certain information li
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22 f about our response to the accident on May 22nd, and I believe we 23 started drafting a reply to the letter almost immediately, 24 and the final letter went out on June 18th.
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25j I don't know at what -- it's been so long ago, I don't i
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know how long it took, but I'm sure it was a; couple of weeks,
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2 and it went through many reviews before it went out in final 3
version.
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4 The draft is probably one of the versions.
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Does this document in'either of the forms here have R
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an individual author, to the best of your knowledge, or is it a sj 8
group-prepared document?
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It would be, at the most, three prime authors:
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Referring to the notes that 'you took in the morning
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I show you that brief notation.
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us now, to the best of your recollection, what the extent of the 5
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well, from recalling the conversation, because of the l
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1 22 think they said they lost some core coolant.
That's why I wrote
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that down, but things were happening very fast.
The telcphone 24 i line was open on a sqawk box, so that by this time in the morning (2) k 25 when the general emergency was declared, Margaret Reilly had d
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quick and dirty.
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We assumed NRC was on it s way and had been told at e
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what was happening offsite.
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Then you didn't have a perception at that point as i
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No, nor the failed fuel.
There had to be failed fuel
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I wrote it down.
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rather rapidly, it still didn't seem like it was, you know, 5-i E
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approaching a loss-of-coolant type accident, the kind where 19 l you would have a severe -- you know, a major loss-of-coolant n
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It was perceived by the plant staff that -- this is i
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automatic shutdown of the reactor, the reactor was returning
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to criticality as indicated by the source and intermediate 2
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4 To your knowledge, on March 28, was this information s
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6 A
No.
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Do you think that it should have been passed on?
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10 make our own decisions, so a lot of questions and information Ej 11 are going to be asked for a lot of questions will be asked u
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don't know if it would have-- at that point we weren't thinking 2
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consequences, and we expected that the utility and the NRC 5
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20 something that we would have anticipated getting, that kind of 21 information, immediately, anyway.
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Q So if I'd asked you whether this was something that 24 should be passed on to you on March 27, you don't believe you 25
- auld have said yes, that is something?
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Do you feel this information was withheld from you or 3
the BRP?
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Just to make sure I understand, while we are addressing
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No.
I have no -- I don' t know one way or the other.
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But I am really asking what you --
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20 of time that he had, because he was called away to do something, 21 !
because something else was going on some place else, somebody
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on his part to withhold anything from us.
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He deals primarily with radiological and health type 25j ehings2 d
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A Yes, and he is the one to talk to on the phone.
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Do you feel the utility didn't recognize or adequately 3,
evaluate this particular phenomenon, that is the increasing count i
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I don't understand the question -- what you mean.
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Do you think it wasn't passed on to you because the-Ej 14 utility didn't recognize or adequately evaluate this?
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Do you feel the utility's communication systems were 5
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5 20 accumulates information and passes it on to someone who then 21 I does the actual transferring of information to yourself.
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23 day, in your view?
24 A
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ij would have asked for more information.
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21 you know, the technical features _ of what was happening 3
individually with components in the reactor at that time, we
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I think you have answered generically a number 5
15 of questions I have here, but I think just.for clarity we would j
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about the source range and intermediate range nuclear-5 d
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secured and were unable to pump water because of sienificant
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voiding in the reactor coolant system hotlegs.
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you?
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I am not sure if that -- I didn't look again at these 3
notes, especially the notes that Bill took, before coming over 4
here.
We had another minor problem today at Three Mile Island.
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18 NRC inspectors onsite, rather than from the operators.
3 19 t Q
So this would have come some hours later?
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Well, it would have come after 9:00 o' clock, 9:30 in 21 h the morning, when they arrived.
The time, you know, went by so
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22 fast it seemed like they were there before we had plotted the 23 dose rates across the river, so it -- and we were talking to them.
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Again I'd like to ask you if you believe this informa-
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pump water -- if this information should have been passed on to O'
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Not in the time -- not in the -- I wouldn't have 4
expected it prior to the accident.
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I expect it now.
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questions had been asked, we would have gotten a lot more ts_
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We didn't ask them.
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The electromatic relief valve or power operated relief 5
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I don't know.
I don' t recall that I got that informa-20 tion on the 28th, but somebody else may have.
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I'm really asking you of your knowledge.
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recall any knowledge of that?
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No, later on.
But on the first day I don't recall 25) any -- I don't recall the specifics of that valve situation and --
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relief valve was there prior to the accident.
So, you know.
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Bill was getting information on one line while.we had an open
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We were talking to other people.
21l There were just too many things going on, and a lot of informa-i 22 tion came in, none of which we wrote down, unfortunately.
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Q Well, Mr. Dornsife in fact identified the conversation i
24 he had with Miller at about 9:00 o' clock.
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Before he went to the Lieutenant Governor's office, s
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When he obtained this information.
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And he was getting this information in preparation to 3
5 11 go over to the Lieutenant Governor's office and brief him on
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Is that your understanding?
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That's right.
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Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the E
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15 Lieutenant Governor had a personal telephone conversation, that w
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I have no personal knowledge, just from, you know, E
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from reading the reports.
Some of the reports, I find a lot 5
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'll i Governor's office and the Lieutenant Governor's office during i
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the first few days.
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for a period in excess of two hours been passed on to the state?
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-- would have indicated to everybody what was happening during
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coming from.that was coming out of the primary system.
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Q Do you feel this information was withheld?
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Governor's press secretary.
Because the Lieutenant Governor 24 25) had scheduled a press conference for that day, and he was d
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1j planning on going af ter the meeting for another update.
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4 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q But you are not sure that was done, you are just 0
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No, I don't know.
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BY MR. HOEFLING:
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Who was there for the utility?
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Gary Miller.
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11 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Herbein?
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Yeah, Jack Herbein.
There may have been a third
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It seemed to me there was another person there 5
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There was a third person.
It was George Kunder.
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Yeah.
Okay.
Yeah, I know of him.
I don't know him
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I don't think he said very much.
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20 l BY MR. HOEFLING:
21 1 0
Who did most of the talking?
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A Herbein.
Herbein did most of the talking.
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O Did Miller have an active. role or not?
24l A
Yes, but not as much as Herbein.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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_ Was Miller -- was his participation one -- well, let 3
me phrase it more in a question.
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Would you characterize 4
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it as introductory remarks about plant status?
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about the general features of what was happening down there, dg 9
rather than the details of the accident.
I don't remember.
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I really don't.
I'm sorry.
It's just so E
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I didn't remember the next day, to be honest with you,
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14 arguing with them about the releases from the plant, and --
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16 had detected and we had detected radiation levels in the field, 3*
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and they said, "Oh, no, there's nothing in the environment."
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A 20 That's what I was concerned with, was the offsite 21 details.
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22 Q
Do you recall Miller leaving the briefing at some 4
23 i point in time?
24 A
No.
25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. HOEFLING:
2 Q
When ycu were saying they were saying there were no 3
releases, can you differentiate between Miller and Herbein?
4 A
I think it was Herbein, e
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Herbein.
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6 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q Bear with us a little. bit, in-trying to shake your s
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memory a little bit, if we might.
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During the briefing, I'm going to ask you a series of Y
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11 Core uncovery or its possibility.
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I don't know.
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Superheat?
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I don't know.
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Plant stability?
5 16 A
Yeah, I think they gave the impression that they had
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things under control.
They may not have said so directly.
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5 18 don't know if that's what you meant by plaat stability.
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Yes, it is.
It is.
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21 any temporary nature to the stability, or that it was permanently I
22 stable or temporarily stable?
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A No, it was -- the accident was over, in effect and l
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That was the impression I got.
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25l There would be no more releases to the environment.
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over, and, "Ha, ha, ha."
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There was no -- you know, no severe core damage.
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Was the potential for the situation to deteriorate --
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Yes.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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23 BY MA. EOEFLING:
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What led you to believe that they were downplaying
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conference right afterwards, and we had decided that we would 2
not ask them to attend the press conference.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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When you say you needed more information and then --
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23 BY MR. HOEFLING:
24 Q
Do you recall how long the meeting ran, approximately?
25 A
I believe it was less than an hour, but I don't know.
4 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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0 And the bulk of that time was Herbein?
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I think it was Herbein.
It was both of them.
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explaining what they were doing at the plant then, Herbein, I
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think, explaining that it wasn' t -- you know, trying to play e
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Were there a lot of questions directed to them?
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Aside from the specifics, was there any time that 5
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day where you felt the/ communicated concerns that we now know A
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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I don't believe it could have been that early.
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you don't recall?
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3 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Did they decide then on any kind of action?
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No.
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Mr. Gerusky, let's go back to our things going to A
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Y 10 on March 28th, it was indicated reactor coolant 3j 11 system temperatures were of a magnitude of 700-800*
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12 Fahrenheit.
To your knowledge, on March 28th, was that informa-O l 13 tion provided to the Commonwealth about this?
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I don't know.
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Sure, I think it should have.
I think so.
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And you would have said that on March 27, as well as 21 today?
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Yeah, that one I would have.
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No, to my knowledge, it was.
5 7
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Should it have been?
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On March 27th, what would you have answered?
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Yeah, I think so.
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There was a serious inventory deficiency, a loss of is l
12 water or absence of water, voids in the large part of.the --
Q 13 both the steam generators and the hotlegs.
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deficiency communicated to the Commonwealth?
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Was this the secondary side that was dry?
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the voiding, rather than that there was a void.
24l A
No, I'm sure it was not.
If it was, it didn't register:
25 with me as being important.
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Q Again, should this information have been passed on O
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And your response again, on March 27, would have been E_
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had lots of problems, but their individual readings should have
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Some of the readings that were taken down below s
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And it is your belief that this should have been passed E
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20 who were at the -- in the building.
21 0
Specifically on the thermocouple data, would your
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discounted, would you now -- let's try to go to the generic q
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Was this, to your knowledge, reported or 5
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Should this have been passed on to you?
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A Not without an explanation of why it happened.
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something to Bill, but not to me or anybody else on my staff.
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Now you are answering the March 27th question.
Would 21l the same answer -- would it be the same answer today?
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No, I don't think it would have been.
23 0
So you're saying you think today it should have been 24 reported, using today's yardstick?
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Yeah, today's knowledge.
Yes.
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Q Now you have testified to others, and in fact I I
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prediction in Goldsboro --
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Do you recall what was told you -- what specifically f
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was told you which caused you to no longer give any credibility 5
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What i
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of any consequence, in that wind direction.
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designed for containment -- for containment design pressure,
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Was this all told to you at the same time you received 5
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19 l BY MR. MCSELEY:
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So there was action taken to notify PEMA after the 21 first prediction?
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Yes.
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And then some time elapsed before PEMA was called back 24 and said --
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it appeared to be like an hour or something.
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3 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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And was it the reading on the other side of the river a
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11 BY MR. CRAIG:
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Did you say earlier that --
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Excuse me.
We told PEMA to be prepared to evacuate
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21 Q
They told you that?
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To say that, "We don't really think it's real, 3
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the validity.
21 A
It was a calculated reading based upon -- a 22 calculated dose rate based upon pre-planned offsite accident
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measurements, using windspeed direction, chi over Q and so
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24 l forth.
25 J Q
Okay.
And then it's my understanding that that resulted l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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in the call to PEMA.
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2 A
Right.
3 O
And then at some --
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4 A
We called PEMA.
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6 surveys were made onsite?
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A No, no.
The surveys had been made -- were being made s
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Q But you didn't have the results?
E 10 A
Yes, we had results that they were not able to detect E
5 11 any activity on the island itself.
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And you had that information at the same time you were E
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Yes.
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Mot some minutes later?
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No.
Not before -- we had that information before G
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we called PEMA, because when we called PEMA, we really didn't 5
18 believe there was any need to evacuate anybody, based upon
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19,
the onsite readings and based upon the pressure in the contain-5 4
20 ment.
21 I Q
Then subsequently readings were taken across the I
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22 l river which confirmed this discounting or, let's say, hesitancy 23 '
to believe anything in the first place; is that correct?
^T 24 A A
That's right.
And we received the information from l' /
j T.4 25 Met Ed that there were no -- that they detected no radioactivity
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d ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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in Goldsboro.
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2 BY MR. GAMBLE:
3 0
can you tell from your notes, can you put some kind
()
4 of finger on the time this would have occurred?
Your notes e
5 started at 0730.
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6 A
It's probably in the letter.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
-f8 Q
Maybe I can give it to you. You might can find it G
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10 A
No, it was after 7:30.
It's a feeling, and I really E
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there, so Reilly got there about 7:30, and then Bill came in as 2
d 17 we were doing things, and he was getting updated.
I don't 5
i 18 think he was there when we were doing that, but I'm not positive.
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19 l You know, the timeframe we -- it was prior to the office opening l
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20 up, and there was a meeting going on of all the department over 21 at some place in another building.
We were sending people over 22 to get them, to bring the secretary back, and to keep -- you
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know, try to inform as many people as possible, and to get our 24 staff back from the staff meeting that was being held.
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There was an awful lot of information, a lot of if ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 i activity going on in our office at the time.
So time went by I
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2 awful fast.
I don' t remember eating that whole day.
I wasn't 3
even hungry.
I lost about 10 pounds during the first three
()
4 weeks.
I didn't eat much.
I 5l Q
During the day, didn't you have a secretary manning e:
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the phone, the direct line between your office and the site?
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during the next -- during the first three weeks of the accident, J
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but I -don't believe we had a secretary on the phone during the
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it until somebody came on, and then he would be given to somebody
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12 else for information, but the secretary would not have received E
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okay.
I was trying to get at maybe she took some b
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15 j notes.
16lj A
No, not as far as I know.
When we realized that the j
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accident was extending out, we started worrying about 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> N
18 duty, who was going to cover, and we had girls from other 5
3 19 offices coming in and just sitting by the phone, waiting for 5
1 20,
someone, and if there was a need from the utility side for them l
21 to talk to somebody else, she would come and get us.
If not, l
22]
she would just take down some information, and that's it.
An 23 awful lot of the survey data was recorded that way.
24 0
But your belief now was this was after March 28?
25 A
That we had a secretary who was taking down information?
1 4
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2i A
Yes.
I think --
3 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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4 Q
Mr. Gerusky, during the time interval from when you 5jl received the calculated dose rate of 10-R per hour, and when s
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6 you received the actual Goldsboro other-side-of-the-river R
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measurements that caused everyone to discount the calculated N
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reading, was there any other information passed during that d
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time, aoy other onsite measurements or any other kind of informa-7:
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10 tion which would tend to discount the original reading?
3 A
I don't remember.
I know that we were not very -- we h
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didn't really believe that evacuation would have to take place.
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14 t o evacuate people.
We just didn't want to take any chances, 2
15 even, until that reading came back.
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O And how long was that, again?
5 l
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I don't know.
I think in reconstructing it, or at 5
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19 least the telephone -- the PEMA telephone futy log indicated
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briefings.
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23
- BY MR. MOSELEY:
24)j Q
Going back, I have one more specific period to touch s
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on, as we have done in others.
George Kunder, who is the utility
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,1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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I superintendent of Technical Support, told the Senate Investigative O
2 Group that he and others had been concerned that the core'had 3
been uncovered for a period of hours after 6:45 a.m.
()
4 To your knowledge, was this information passed on to e
5 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
A 6l A
No, not until Friday, with Joe Hendrie's probably R
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second or third telephone call, or the visit to the Governor's Aj 8
office where he informed us of that.
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Should this information have been passed on to you?
Y 10 A
As a matter of fact, it may have been Thursday
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11 night, in a telephone call from the Governor back to the onsite 3
- j 12 NRC inspector, who said, "There are more problems than we
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13 anticipated.
There is a possibility the core was uncovered."
14 I didn't even know that telephone call took place at all until 2
15 reading it in one of the reports of one of the committees.
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16 Q
This was late Wednesday night?
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A Thursday.
N I
G 18 Q
Thursday.
E.
19 A
That s when things started happening, Friday morning.
A 20 Q
Yes.
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Thursday night and Friday morning, Washington started 22 to get involved.
()
l 23 '
Q I'm not sure, did you answer when I said -- did I 24 ask you, should this information have been passed on to you?
25 ;
A oh, hell, yes.
I mean if --
3 i
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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Q March 27, same answer?
2' A
We have always said if they had known that the core 3
was -- if the core had been uncovered and they couldn't get it 4
covered again, we would have evacuated people with no questions 5l asked.
But we felt if we knew the core was uncovered, they e
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gotten it covered again.
It just doesn't seem reasonable to me n
8 3,
that they knew the core was uncovered and didn't do something N
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about covering it.
E 10 0
Can you recall any other information which shoald have E
5 11 been passed on to yourself or BRP on March 28, but was not?
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No.
I really don't know how much they knew on 3=
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14 l BY MR. GAMBLE:
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15 O
I have one thing, Mr. Gerusky.
It is something 5
J 16 more about the dose rate in Goldsboro.
Do you know of any E
g 17 subsequent recollections, if not by your of fice, maybe by PEMA z=
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19 time, the first reports of the calculated dose rates, the first 20 l readings?
Has anybody written any repor3s or recollections on 21 that?
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22 A
I don't understand your questicn.
23 '
O I'm talking about the --
1 24 A
Did anybody get anything in between the time?
()
1 25l 0
No, no, no.
Subsequent, days, weeks, months later, did b
ti ii ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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anyone recapture the recollections of that time, review when
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you received the reports, and when you received the subsequent 2
3 actual readings?
()
4 A
Yeah.
Fell, the PEMA duty officer -- as a matter of n
5 fact, I believe in their testimony that they gave to one of 3
6l the committees, gave the sequence, the time sequence of when R
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the telephone calls were made, and when they received informatior, aj 8
for us to call to notify York County, and then when they received.
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9 the -- the actual time they received the information from us.
Y 10 They are used to recording it on emergency log sheets.
So PEMA, 3
5 11 I'm sure, had the information.
j 12 There was one thing that surprised me early.
I was
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13 sure that -- and I think some place in the letter I was sure i
l 14 there was a state police helicopter there taking people across b
15 the river.
The state police records indicate that their 5
g 16 helicopter didn't get down there"until much later than I had I
d 17 l anticipated;their records indicated something like 9:00 o' clock 5
5 18 before the state police helicopter got there, and I was sure 19 this all happened before 9:00 o' clock.
But it's very possible n
20 it didn' t.
Maybe that timeframe was all condensed and things 21 were happening so fast the time really went by and I didn't I
~T realize it.
(V 22]
23 l MR. MOSELEY:
That concludes our questioning for 24 this time, Mr. Gerusky.
{)
25]
(Whe reupon, at 2:40 p.m.,
the interview was 1
adjourned.)
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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ucctria atoutaroar co.Mrssron This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the in the matter of:
METROPOLITAN EDISO!! COMPANY (TMI, Unit 2)
D a t e o u,LTgRVIEW g{n g :OMAS)cf, /,
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TH GERUSKY recee
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Place of Proceeding:
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f were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcrip:
thereof for the file of the Cocaission.,
Ann
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Official Reporter (Signature)
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