ML19343D455
| ML19343D455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1980 |
| From: | Berry D METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040524 | |
| Download: ML19343D455 (15) | |
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UNITED STATES 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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__________________x O
4 In the Matter of:
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j METROPOLITAN-EDISON (TMI II) 1 8
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,______________x i
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l Conference Roon D-4 8
8 Howard Johnson Motor Inn 473 Eisenhower Boulevard n
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Harrisburg, Pennsylvania N
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10 Wednesday, September 3, 1980 L
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E 11 Interview of i
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BERRY z
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13 called for by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to j
14 notice, at 3:20 p.m.
E 15 On behal f of the Nuclear hegulator" Commission:
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g' 16 TERRY HARPSTER, Office of Inspection and.'.orcement i
g 17 JOHN W.
CRAIG, Office of Inspection and Enforcement W
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E 18 NORMAN C. MOSELEY, Office of Inspection and Enforcement P
E 19 DAVID H. GAMB LE <' Office of Inspe. tor and Auditor A
r 20 RICHARD K. HOEFLING, Office of the Executive Legal Director 21 l
l On behalf of Metropolitan-Edison:
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ERNEST L.
BLAKE, JR., ESQ.
23 a Shaw, Pittman, Potts E Trowbridge 24 shi gron 0036
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2 MR. GAMBLE:
We will'gofon theLrecord.
3
'This interview is being. conducted'as a' portion:of-the h
4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation into the exchange j
5
.of inIormation between' Metropolitan-Edison' Corporation and.the 1
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NRC on March 28th,-1979.
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7 Counsel here.is with Met-Ed.
Do you have any.. objections n
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to him being'present during the interview?
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g MR. BERR' :
No.
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H 10 Whereupon, I
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.4 DONALD A., BERRY i
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3 having first been duly sworn by Mr. Gamble, was examined and-j c
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EXAMINATI'ON l
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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Don, would you tell us what time you arrived'in-the' l
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This is a year and a half ago so, you know, you are lj'19 going to have to bear with me.
I would approximate some time 7
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20 between 7:15 and 7:30 in the actual control room.
l 21 Q
What did you do between the time you arrived and the.
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.g time shortly before the pre'ssura spike occurred about ten or two j
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or somewhere in the re?
24 A
The first thing was to find out as much as I could 25 ' about what had happened and what was going on.
I tried to stay
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back out of the way of the operations people.
I guess I talked 2
with some of the people that were there, you know, in the control l
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t I just tried to piece together a little bit about what was 4
going on.
I think, and this is strictly, you know, trying to 5-
- emember, that another engineer and I went down and took a look g
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6)at the polisher system to make sure that it was secure.
I don't
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know exactly when that was, but that was in the interim.
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the time was just strictly waiting to see il someone needed help d"
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in any area and, like I say, to find out what had happened and E
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3 II Q
What was the atccsphere in the control room during this M
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A I thought, or at leant my feelings were that people z
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The operators 5
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were up at the panel, and I can't even remember who the operators i
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It appeared to me, which I think I talked about before when g
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,been performing as far as people were organizing different areas P
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hto do what was necessary.
There was one person making sure they 20(h had a list of the names of the people that were there so they L
2I could account for everyone that was present.
They more or less i
22 set up a communications system where if you wanted to speak to 23fisomeoneup in the front and talk to one individual so that there a
r 24fweren't 10 or 15 people giving them orders and just causing more it 25 j of a problem.
I really felt that things were handled pretty well 1
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By someone up in front, do you mean somebody at the l
3 ' panel or somebody at the shift supervisor level or above?
4 A
The first person that I remer.ber was Jim Sellinger was p
5< establishing a communications systen and he was back away from I
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There was an area between the shift superviscr's v
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office and the actual control panel.
There were two or three
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He was setting up a command post there to more or
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W i
N I2 Eo you rete-ter any raJor decisions or actions.,ich
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Probably the one that sticks out in my mind the most i
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I7 I MR. HARPSTER:
You said that when you arrived y.ou tried i
18lto get up to rpoed.
Were ycu able to ascertain what the 19 ! sequence of events were that had led then up to this were?
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20 f THE 'cl1T:!ESS :
I talke d with Walter.':arshall.
He and h
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He had been called in 22 ' taybe screwhere between 5:30 and 5 o' clock.
It was his week to l
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He told te that they had had a trip, something to 24 I-
. do with the polisher system had tripped a feedwater and when he 25 got there it was in the process of a normal shutdown.
He said 1
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~I that was.when.it appeared there werelsome problems, but he said
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it didn't appear normal-when he first.got there.
2 I don't knowl 1
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exactly at what time he~got there.
When'I arrived it must f
4 have been about_that time.
I gotito the-front gate at about-5-
j seven o' clock, which was when.they were just declaring the site j
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emergency which kind of fit in with what was going on.
But-other a
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than that up *a that point,-you know, nob'ody really had"a feeling.
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with the flow.
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h 10 BY MR. CRAIG:
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During this time period was the status of the plant I
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Do you have.a feel-for i
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No.
I don't really have a feel.
-I know they were
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15 working to try to get the flow re-established which even_when they l
f ij 16 started the log we were still in that process and that was a; v.
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! major of people was to re-establish flow with the reactor cooling I
18 pump.
19 I
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What major parameters were discussed and used_for 20 the decisions to get flow back or any other ones during that 21 time period?
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A I am not sure.
You mean what were they basing their 23 decisions on?
Q What were they looking at?
9-f 25 A
I couldn't tell.
I can't remember that.
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mately 9:30 that morning?
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A No.
I wasn't aware of that.
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That was before they started ~ cycling the block 1 valve' I
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A Like I say, I was more or less back behind.
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Q Did you at approximately_.1:50 or later record any i
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.information with regard to the pressure spike?
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A.
Yes, I did.
I was behind the operators trying to get z
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10 information from them.
They.were just too' busy to keep.a log
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I could'only see -- you know, there was a high and there c
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I could only see the narrow range meter. I b
I4 just no.ticed that the spike went up to four and went strai ht~
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15 back down.
That is what I had recorded.
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This narrow range meter is an electrical meter as d
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I7 opposed to a strip chart with a pin?
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I can't even remember.
It has been a year.
See, I
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j don't work with Met-Ed any more.
It seemed to me there must 20 have been trace because we could see it.
I am not su e.
21 Q
There is a strip chart that shows actual pressure and 22 it went up to 28 or 29 pounds.
23 A
That would be the high range.
i 24 Q
I was wondering if you could explain the' discrepancy i
25 between your error of four or five pounds'and the 28 pound actual ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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.e that'.other people saw andItalked about?
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'A Well, I could-only.see the narrow range.
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Where are they located?
Can~youLdescribe.
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THE WITNESS:
It;seemed to me they;must-have'been f'
0 about waist high because the operator blocked"part of the view.
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I could see to the right.of.him.. I could.see theimeter on the j
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right and the other one was.on the left.
That isthebest I can e
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MR. MOSELEY:
As I understand it, you were sort of.
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seeking out~information to log or were people reporting and C 12 i
y calling out things to you?
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It was both.
It took the operators a i
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little while to realize I was keeping a log.
When'they reaiized' 2
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until that point, you know, I wasn 't' going to bother them as f ar i
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as they were working and things.
If I could see someth.ng that i
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I felt was pertinent and important then I-logged it.
Then after l~
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a while they started to feed'me information..
20 iR.. MOSE LY :
Again-recognizing the problem with time, 21 about what time did you start keeping a log, when you moved from j
22 this sort of standby status to the logkeeper status?
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23 THE WITNESS:
I started keeping a log, it must has e-24 been around one o' clock or one-thirty in the afternoon if I I
25' can remember.
It was probably a' half an hour or so until they
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I realized it and they feed me the information.
We then transferred 2
this information later into the other log.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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Did you discuss the cause of the pressure spike with 5
anyone on 3/28?
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Did you ever hear any discussions about the cause of M
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it?
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A No, I didn't.
They were very intent at that moment.
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4 and people were, you know, they said there is a pressure spike j
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The flow rate was foretost a"
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in their mind and they just didn't have the time, and because 3
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it was so fast it was over with so they just kept going with what
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they we re doing.
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MOSE LEY :
At the time were you aware at what us F
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pressure the containment spray pump would come on?
Was that part
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THE WITNESS:
Ilo.
I had only been at the Three Mile M
20 Island plant for a short while.
I had received a license and A
21
,I was just starting the training process at that tine.
I 22 MR. MOSE LEY :
But you were aware that the apray pumps 23, cane on?
24 i
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
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Wc uld you say that people in the control r
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THE WIT!!ESS:
I-think just a'few people right:at the-4 L
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.I recorded it and.I heard f
4 someone say we have.got.'a pressure spike.
That was about all.
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pretty important in my mind.
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.BY MR. CRAIG:
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-Did you monitor ~the containment building temperatures G
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I don't remember.
The log'may show that I did.
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Was there anything else associated with-the pressure-
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On 3/28/79 did you have a feeling that information f
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Q Did you feel that answering specific questions that E
19 would have been asked by the 11RC would fulfill reporting.
requirements?
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I am sorry.
I don't know whether I understand you.
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There are reporting requirements that licensees - have l
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to report things to the !!RC.
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Right.
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I was wondering if you felt or in addition to that I
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IEthink the. feelings were ' people were trying to
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-get the_information as best M could and as_bestIwe..could
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interested as anyone in getting the'whole'information together, 5
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Q.
Do you have any knowledge that. pertinent 1information i
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was-withheld from'the'NRC on the ' day of the accident?
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Not that I know 'f, no.
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Since-you reported on site on 3/28/79.'uhat pressures
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12 have you felt which influenced you either directly or indirectly
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None whatsoever.
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As a result of the-NRC investigation, the original one,
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17 as missing and they have never been identified: 'some of the E
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i-19 time segments for the day 3/28/7_9, the utility typer output, 20 set time sgments on it for 3/28/79 and the analog trend recorder 21 No. 2 strip chart for 3/28/79.
Can you explain or do you have I
i 22 any idea of what might have happened to this data?
t 23 A
The only thing I can say about the typer is there were 24 so many alarms coming In and out the typer just gets so far behind.
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As.to why,'~you'know,Lif'there' f
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were' parts missing,.I have no feeling ~for thatLat.all.
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3 thing I.know is.when you would go'over to look at'if it.wouldLbe,
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Data-reflecting primary system parameters was being
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monitored and printed out'by B5W employees, specifically John 3
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Flint, that day, and he would then carry.the'information-~or some -
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body else would carry it into the shift supervisor's office'. lSome g
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of the-data that Mr. Flint was looking at has-disappeared'and
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never been found.
Do you have any idea what.might have happened
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to that?
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A Ho, I don't.
We were putting all logs and' charts into E
II a box.
We had that right in'th'e shift supervisor's office.
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Have you been involved or overheard conversations con-f z
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cerning missing data?
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No.
I didn't realize there was data missing.
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Q Finally, the sheet on which the-core exit thermocouple
'i measurements were recorded, the millivolt measurements that were; 22
.g taken on the morning of 3/28 vanished until May 7th, 1979.
They 23 then reappeared.
Do you have any idea where-they might have been 24 for that time period?
25 -
A No, I don't.
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Have you ever heard any conversations about that?
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Ho, I haven't.
I didn't realize that was eithe" l
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Q Are you aware of any efforts which may have been made l
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g Metropolitan-Edison any more, to account for the disapm ?-ance cf l
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A Ho, I am not.
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MR. CRAIG:
We will provide you with a copy of tha
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transcript after it comes back Irom typing so you can make l
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4 I would like to thank you for coming in to talk to us.
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THE WITNESS:
I ar glad I could come in and maybe i
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we could get some things together.
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I4 MP,. CRisIG:
Thank you.
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MARM AUG E N B LIC K PHILIP J. M ARVET E Rf4 E ST L. 5 LAM E, J R.
RCBERT M. GORDON CA RLETON S. JON E S JE ANNE A. CALDERON THOMAS A. 5ARTE R SARGARA J. MORG EN s JAM ES M. BURGER BONNsE S. GOTTLIES SHELDON J. WEISEL
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SCOTT A. ANENBERG JAM ES THOM AS LENHART SETH H. HOOGASIAN STEVEN L. M ELT2ER SHEILA E. McCAFFERTY DEAN D. AULICM DELIS SA A. Rf DGwAT JOHN ENGEL M ENN ETH J. MAUTM AN STEPMEN 8. HUTTLE R DAVID LAWRENCE MILLER WINTMROP N. BROWN
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Norman C. Moseley, Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(
Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Moseley:
Enclosed are corrections to the interview transcripts for the following individuals:
Name Interview Date Robert C.
Arnold September 5, 1980 Donald A.
Berry September 3, 1980 J.
Robert Gilbert September 3, 1980 John G.
Herbein (2 pages)
September 5, 1980 Gary Paul Miller September 5, 1980 Sincerely, b-OlCf. g Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Corrections to the September 3, 1980, Interview of Donald A. Berry:
Page Line Change To Ru wd S
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RECEIVED Donaid A. serry y
SEP 2 51980
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