ML19343D453
| ML19343D453 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1980 |
| From: | Herbein J Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040521 | |
| Download: ML19343D453 (79) | |
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1 NUCLEAR REGULA!ORY COMMISSION
x 2
In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN-EDISON (TMI II) 4 s
_________.________x 5
Room D-4 6
Howard Johnson Motor Inn 473 Eisenhower Boulevard 7
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 8
Friday, September 5, 1980 9
Interview of John Herbein began, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m.
10 PRESENT:
11 TERRY HARPSTER, Office of Inspection and Enforcement 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 13 JOHN W. CRAIG, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
(])
Nuclear Regulatory Commission NORMAN C. MOSELEY, Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
15 Nuclear Regulatory Co mmission l
l 16 DAVID H. GAMBLE, Office of Inspector and Auditor Nuclear c,quiatory Commission 17 RICHARD K. HOEFLING, Office, Executive Legal Directo r, 18 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 19 APPEARANCES:
20 ERNEST BLAKE, ESO.
WILLIAM REYNOLDS, ESC.
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21 Representing Metropolitan Edison Company 22 23
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MR. GAMBLES This interview is being conducted as 3 part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation 4 into the exchange of information betwe a the Metropolitan 5 Edison Company and the NRC on March 26 1980.
6 Mr. Herbein, will you please raise your right hand
~e 7 and I will administer the oath at this time.
.I 8
Mr. Herbein, would you please state your full name 9 for the record?
10 THE WITNESS 4 My name is John Giles Herbein.
11 MR. GAMBLE:
Would counsel please identify 12 th e m selve s.
13 MR. 3.AKE:
My name is Ernest B la k e.
Here with me
'O 14 today is William Bradford Reynolds.
We are representing 15 Metropolitan Edison Co:a p any.
16 MR. GAMBLFa M r. H erbein, there is counsel presen t 17 representing Metropolitan Edison Company.
Do you have any l
18 objection to their presence during this interview?
19 IHE WITNESS:
No, I do not.
20 21 E
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1 Whereupon, 2
JOHN GILES HERBEIN r^s 3
was called for interview and, after being first duly sworn,
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was examined and testified as follows:
5 EXAMINATION 6
BY MR. MOSELEY:
7 0
Mr. Herbein, I understand.the difficulty in 8
recalling some specific times, and so on, during the day of 9 March 28, would you recount for us, to the best of your 10 knowledge, what conversations you had and with whom atout 11 the plant on March 28.
If you will start with your first-12 notification during the day, and try to walk your way 13 through that.
1-4 A
I remember early on the morning of March 28 I 15 received a call from Gary E111er, and members of the plant' i
16 staff concerning unit trip.
They had called me to advise me 17 of the trip, and the plant conditions that existed at the 18 time.
We discussed that for, I guess, a 10 to 15 minute 19 period.
20 I then received a communication later on in the 21 morning from Walt Creitz requesting that I return to Three 22 Mile Island because he felt that the p ant conditions 23 indicated that it would be advisable f r me to do so.
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24 Af ter I arrived at ihree Mile Island, which vas 25 close to noon, I discussed the plant conditions with Gary 1
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1 Miller, and then briefed the press an approximately an hour 2 or so after I arrived at Three Mile Island.
3 I then went, at the request of Mr. Creitz, who was 4 then President of Metropolitan Edison, to brief the 5 Lieutenant Governor in Harrisburg.
After that briefing, I 6 returned to the plant, and had some discussi'ons with Mr.
7 Arnold, and then additional discussions with Mr. Miller,thet e
8 The plant-Erd-then started the reactor coolant pump and 9 restored cooling of the core, and there were additional vaht 10 communications.
I believe I lef t Three file Island early on 11 the morning of March 29.
I would imagine that it was about 12 2:00 in the morning.
13 0
Y0u did not mention conversations that you may O
k-14 have had with the control room during which you may have 15 received updates on plant status, and so on.
Could you sort 16 of tell me how they fit into the chronology you gave me?
17 A
It is dif ficult for me to remember the exact 18 consunications that took place with members of the control 19 room staff, other than Gary Hiller.
Those communications 20 may have taken place, but I don't remember any of the
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21 specifics that may have occurred.
22 I remember talking to Gary Miller about plant 23 conditions, but it is difficult for me to remember exactly
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24 what particular inf ormation wa s exchanged snd wha t time.
25 Q
Could you try to stretch your memory to estimate O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, o.C. 20024 (202)554 2345
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I the number of conversations that you may have had between 2
the time that you talked with Mr. Miller around noon, and 3
the time that you left to brief the Lieutenant Govarnor.
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4 How many conversations would you have had to 5
receive updates of plant of status?
6 A
Sir, I could not state the number of separate 7
conversations that I had to advise me of plant status.
I
,a 8 remember that I talked to the control room, speelfically 9
Gary.
I attempted to determine what hadhappened,why-u) Nob' 10 specifically had caused any fuel failure he thought we may 11 have had.
But I don't remember the number of 12 co n ve rsa tion s.
13 Q
Are you saying that those conversations did occur
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l 14 and you-don't remember how many; or are you saying-that 15 there were none of these conversations?
16 A
I believe that I talked to Gary Miller when I came 17 back from Philadelphia on March the 28th around noon.
I
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18 don't remember how many times I talked to him, whether it eaue(
i 19 was a con tinuing conversation ce a given period of time, or u3 ewe 20 whether there ers a series of conversations.
21 I could not say, certainly, that I only talked to 22 Gary Miller.
I may have talked to someone else, but I don't 23 recall talking to anyone else, other than Gary.
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24 0
Then, could you estimate to the best of your 25 recollection now the number of updates that you received O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE. S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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I between the time you arrived, and the time you vent to the 2 Lieutenant Oovernor's office?
3 A
Sir, I honestly cannot rememb'er, and to make'some 4 characterization of the number of updates that I received, 5 and length of time of update, would be I think inappropriate 6 on my part because I honestly don't remember.how many 7 conversations I had or who specifically I talked to on March 8 the 28th, 1979.
9 Q
Mr. Herbein, during the questioning, I will make 10 reference to previous statements that you have made in the 11 other depositions, and so on.
I will either characterize 12 them, or quote from them.
In any case, if you want to refer 13 to these, I have copies of these things, and if you will ask O
14 we will be happy to furnish them.
But in an effort to save 15 time, as long as you feel no reason to refer back to them, 16 then we will not do that.
17 A
I understand.
18 0
You previously stated in earlier interviews and 19 depositions that on March 23, in the initial early morning 20 conference call, you were notified that all the primary 21 pumps were not running.
You have also stated that during 22 the day in your discussions with the plant staff some 23 concern had been expressed about sa turated steam conditions
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24 in the hot-legs.
25 Ihe question is, are you aware during the morning O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 of March 28 that the reactor coolant pumps were not able to 2 pump water?
3 A
On March 28, I was aware that we had tripped the
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4 reactor coolant pumps early in the morning.
We had 5 attempted in the morning to restart the pumps, but were 6 unable to.
7 Q
The reason for your knowledge of the reason for 8 the inability to operate the pumps, what was that?
9 A
At the time, I believe that we felt that we could 10 not run the pumps because of a saturated steam condition in 11 the hot legs.
12 Q
Then did that lead you to conclude that because 13 there was. steam in the hot legs that the. pumps could not
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1-4 pump water or were not pumping water?
15 A
I don't know that I can answer the question 16 directly because I am not sure that it occurred that way.
i 17 It seems tha t I was told the operators attempted to start 18 the pumps, but there was a significant amount of vibration l
19 associated with running the pumps, or there was indication 20 that insufficient amperage was being drawn to enable the 21 correct operation of the pumps.
Therefore, the pumps were Z1 shut down.
23 I must also say that it is difficult for me to
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24 remember the way in which the inability to operate the pumps l
25 was characterized to me on March the 28th, 1979.
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1 Q
In other testimony that we have received, it has 2
been stated, and we have concluded that it was general 3 knowledge on the part of people inside the plant, those 4 people that were in the control roon, that the pumps cou?.d 5 not pump water because they were steam bound, vapor bound, 6 and this is why they could not operate.
7 You were not informed of this, or were you 8 informed of this?
9 A
I was informed that the plant, specifically the 10 plan t superintendent felt that we had a steam condition in yebu ked 11 the hot-legs, and aither directly to that steam condition or 12 as a byproduct of it ce were unable to run' the reactor 13 coolant pumps, in his opinion.
O 14 0
Do you recall whether this facet was discussed 15 during the 6:00 a.s. conference call?
16 A
1 don't recall that it was.
17 0
Was this inf orma tion, that is the inability of the 18 coolant pumps to operate because of the steam environment, 19 passed on to the NRC to the best of your knowledge?
20 A
To the best of my knowledge, I believe it was.
21 BY MR. HARPSTER:
22 0
You statad to the special inquiry group on 23 September 19, 1979, that you did not specifically remember i
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24 whether Mr. Miller told you that the EMOV had been open and 25 that was the reason for the loss of inventory in the primary nU i
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1 coolant.
2 Vere you aware from any source during the morning 3 of March 28, 1979, that the EMOV had been open for an
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4 extended period of time?
5 A
I don 't believe I was, but at this point I am not 6
certain specifically what I was aware of on March 28, 1979.
7 You have just indicated that I made a statement in September
,e 8 about what I remembered, and I would refer to tnat statement 9 as being a better '.ndicator of my knowledge in March of 1979 10 than my knowledge today.
11 Q
I believe you come from an operations background, 12 is that correct?
13 A
That is correct.
O 1-4 Q
When you were on the phone in the conference call 15 earlier in the morning, the discussion certainly had to 10 c=4 lve around the fact that the plant was sitting at a low 17 saturation pressure of 1000 or 1100 pounds.
The level was 18 high.
The plant was stable at this condition, certainly an 19 anomalous condition to anyone that is familiar with reactor 20 operations, pressurized water reactors.
Not a lot was going 21 on.
It just sat there.
The efforts to change that 22 condition did not seem to have much effect.
23 The next tioe you got in contact with the plant,
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24 what were you told with regard to how they got out of this l
25 condition, or what caused tha t condition?
How dc you O
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400 VIRGINtA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, O.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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Certainly there must have been some communication 3
to get you from the state early in the morning where the 4 plant was in such a strange condition?
5 A
I don't really remember that.
I remember the 6 discussion that I had with the plant. staff early in the
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7 morning, and then I vaguely remember phone calls with Mr.
8 Arnold and Robidoux, and Mr. Kreitz to my workplace in
,3 9 Philadelphia, which ultimately resulted in my returning to 10 the plant.
11 0
You don't recall any discussion later that morning 12 with regard to how the plant act out of-this condition?
13 There must have been some explanation offered, or at least I O
14 would surmise -- I would be curious as to how they got out 15 of this condition, and I would expect that that information 16 would have been volunteered to you, or supplied to you so l
17 that you understood the new condition of the plant.
I 18 A
I am not sure I understand what you mean by the 19 new condition of the plant.
20 0
As I understand your series of communications, by 21 the time you then became in contact with the plant again, or 22 became aware of the plant conditions later af te r your trip 23 from Philadelphia, by then you must have been informed that t
l O 24 ene 91 eat w ao 1oaoer ta tue coaditioa= =r 6 oo o ctocx 25 that morning when it was sitting with pressure at 1000 or l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, o.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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1 1100 pounds, I believe from my memory, I may be misstating 2
it somewhat, and the pressurizer level pegged high.
3 The major action up to that time had been to close 4
the block valve when pressure recovered rapidly.
f 5
A And your question is, how was I informed of the 6
change in --
7 0
Were you informed of the closure of the block
,s-8 valve, or the change in plant condition at any time that 9
morning, the reason for the rapid recovery in pressure?
10 A
I may have been informed of the closure of the 11 block valve, but I am not certain.
12 0
Then is it your recollection that you were unaware i
13 that mornin7 that the block valve had been open for any O
1-4 period of time, and subsequently shut which led to the l
15 reco ve ry in the plant pressure?
16 A
I honestly don't remember what information was 17 conveyed to me regarding the block valve closure, and the 18 recovery of plant pressure on the morning of March 28, 19 1979.
20 0
We have had testimony this week from members of 21 the control room staff, including the so-called think tank l
22 that it became general knowledge in tne control room that 23 morning that the block valve had been open for an extended
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24 period of time, and that this was the cause of the anomalous I
t 25 conditions that existed up until about 6s30 that morning l
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1 and, in fact, the recognition that this had led to a loss in-2 the inventory of_the reactor coolant.
3 Is it your recollection, as you were briefed in.
4 your discussions with the control rcom at any time that day, 5 that you were not. iade aware of this disparity with your 6 discussions with anyone?
7 A
If you say that information was general knowledge, 8 then I was probably made aware of that condition.
But
,s 9
today, I don' t specifically remember the discussion that 10 made me aware of that.
11 I wou.d say that I have been questioned in this 12 particular area by a number of groups, and would think that 13 my memory as indicated in those depositions and discussions 14 then would be a more accurate indication of what I actually 15 recall on Ma rch the 28th, 1979.
16 Today, it is just extremely difficult for me to 17 piece together when specific items of information were 18 pointed out, and made known to me.
19 0
You told the Senator investigators on August 21st, 20 1979, that when you talked to Gary Miller he would relate to 21 you system temperature and pressure.
Now, on the morning of 22 Msrch 28, 1979, were you aware of the magnitude of the 23 hot-leg temperatures?
(_j 24 A
From what you have just told me, I have already 25 indicated that Gary transmitted parameter information to me, O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
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1 although I presume you have got an accurate quote there.
2 Again, I would assume that quote is accurate, and hence I 3
was probably aware of the temperature and pressure 4
information.
5 Q
What is your recollection of the magnitude of the 6
hot-leg temperr.tures that morning?
7 A
I don't know that I can honestly give you a
,s 8
specific number any more.
9 Q
Do you recall if you were informed that the meters 10 were off-scale, or that they were pegged?
'4ere you inf ormed 11 that extended scale devices had been hooked up in the ARPS 12 ca binet in order to obtain a reading?
13 A
I may have been told that they were off-scale, but
)
I 14 I don't recall being told that extended devices were being 15 hooked up in order to obtain a reading.
i 16 0
On March 28, 1979, what was your evaluation of the 17 hot-leg temperatures when they sharply increased af ter the 18 reactor coolant pumps were shut down?
19 Let me refer to the charts we have here both from 20 Rogovin and ENSEC which display the primary system 21 parameters.
Perhaps you can see them better off the Bogovin 22 color plate, if you look at the time period shortly after I
l 23 the reactor coolant pumps were shut off.
24 A
You are referring now to the spread in TH and TC?
25 0
Yes.
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0 Specifically the rapid rise in the TH.
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A What. do I' think about. that now, or what' did I 5 think about that~ then?
6 Q
Let me rephrase the question better.
7 Were you.avare of that on March 28, 1979?
8 A
I don't believe I was.
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Q The following testimony is from your Special I nqu i ry Minn 3 L.3.
2 Group of September 19th, 1979, testimony.
You were asked the SIMONS~
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"By the time you talked to Mr. Miller it was clear OQ'-
4 I believe that, clear to the operators and supervisors in the e
5 control room that they had a certain amount of steam binding, h
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6 they had voids, they had steam bubbles and that was the problem.
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Do you remember that that was communicated to you?"
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" Answer: I believe that may have been."
That is the dd 9
end of the quote.
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10 My question is, were you aware during the morning of
'j 11 March 28th, 1979, that the hot-leg temperatures were in excess s
y 12 of the situation temperature for the corresponding reactor 5
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'3 coo 1aat syste= oressures?
-l 14 A
I don't believe that I was aware that the temperature 15 was above that corresponding saturation temperature for the j
16 existing pressure.
I believe I was aware that there was a e
d 17 steam condition in the hot legs as I have indicated previously.
E 18 (Short pause.)
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19 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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n 20 Q
Was superheated steam discussed with you or in your 21 presence on March 28th, 1979?
22 A
no, 1 den.t thinx it wes.
O 23,
Q On the morning of March.28th, 1979, were you aware of i
24 a concern over a core uncovery?
25 A
Please restate that question.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q On the morning of March 28th, 1979, were you aware of 2
a concern of core uncovery?
3 A
I am not sure I was aware of a concern of core uncovery, O
4 but I was ewere of the operetors. concern over keeping the core 5
covered.
In other words, the people that I talked to, as I g
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6 have indicated was primarily Gary, felt that the core was R
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8 Q
Could you tell us what information you were given with d
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regard to what the conditions were at that time and what he 10 based that on to your recollection?
11 A
Not tpecifically but generally ~I recall that they a
p 12 felt there was some heat transfer to the steam generator that E
Q 13 was in operation and as a result of that some natural circulation l
14 was taking place.
2 15 BY MR. M0SELEY:
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g 16 Q
Mr. Herbein, you were given in one or more conversations us 17 l with Miller on the morning of March 28th, you were told that
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18 the hot-leg temperatures were pegged on the console meter; is i'
19 that correct, pegged high?
20 A
I believe that is correct.
21
,Q I don't specifically remember the conversation where O
M ller t ld me that the TH indicators were that high.
I think 23 ;
previously the question was asked and referenced previous testimory
- 24 l that I had given sometime last year where I indicated that I was a
25l aware of the hot-leg indicators being at maximum range.
In other I
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1 words, I remember the discussion that we had just a few minutes I) 2 ago where I indicated in some previous testimony that you 3
described to me where I indicated that the. hot-leg indicators
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were at maximum range or pegge'd as you say.
I don't specifically e
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6 Q
Well, based on this prior testimony do you believe that R
7 at the time you made that testimony that was your belief?
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8 A
Yes.
I believe that was my knowledge at the time I dn 9
made the testimony.
10 Q
Then can we assume that indeed you did know that on 11 March 28th, based on that prior testimony, that the hot-leg 3
y 12 temperatures were pegged on the indicator in the console?
5
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13 A
Yes, sir, I think you could assume that.
l 14 Q
Were you aware on March 28th at what temperature the l
15 instrument-pegged?
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16 A
I am not sure that I was.
I imagine it is about 600 A
6 17 or 620 degrees.
5
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18 Q
Is that your belief of your knowledge on March 28th that 5
19 you would have thought or did think that it was in that range?
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20 A
I am not sure.
l 21 Q
Were you aware of the pressure at discrete intervals 22 V("%
of time -- let me back up.
Did Mr. Miller report system 23 pressure to you in any of the conversations or in the conversations-i 24 you had with him?
- 25,
i He probably did because we did discuss the plant status i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I and he gave me parameters, but I don't specifically remember any 2
of the temperatures and pressures he gave me, with the exception 3
of writing down in some notes following the discussion we had C-4 from 6:15-to 6:30 on March the 28th where I jotted down the 5
j temperature and pressure of'the system when I had talked to'the a
3 6
plant staff about the plant conditions following the trip.
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7
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believe that temperature and pressure is part of-the record.
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8 I don't recall specifically which inquiry group asked for that, d
ci - 9 but I think those notes are certainly available.
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MR. BLAKE:
It was referred to in the Presidential 5 'll Commission's interview of Jack and it was provided at that time n
g 12 to the Presidential Commission.
O AU g
13 f1R. f10SELEY:
This is the note that you made of your l
14 initial notification?
g 15 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
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j 16 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes, we have copies of thatV d
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I7 BY MR. M0SELEY:
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5 18 Q
fi r. H e r be i ri, if you will refer to this Color Plate 3 i:
h I9 and you will note that the saturation temperature is plotted l
20 l along there.
For the period of time from about 6 o' clock in 21 the morning until somewhere in the order of 9:30, and then 22 Q
again from perhaps 11:30 until about 1500 there is an iMication 23[
that based on T-hot and the pressure that existed at that time
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24f that the temperature is above the saturation pressure.
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25 A
Are you saying for the time periods mentioned that. THA t
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1 is above T-sat on the parametric display that I am looking at 2
here called Color Plate 3?
3 Q
What I am saying is that this saturation curve is based O
4 on ene ectuei tempereture.
now, you heve steted thet you seren.t 5
g aware of what the actual temperature was, but you were aware that e'
6 the instrumeni; was pegged and that you believe that your knowledge 57
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7 was that this was pegged at something like 620 degrees.
3
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8 My question is did you put together the temperature and d
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the pressure at those times that you were told of those two
!g 10 and conclude that there was superheated steam?
E 11 '
A No, I did not.
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12 MR. STELLO:
Did you conicude that there was' something a
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s 13 unusuei?
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14 THE WITNESS:
I concluded that we couldn't run the 15 reactor coolant pump and that forced cooling was certainly a f
16 desirable method of getting to cold shutdown.
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MR. STELLO:
Why did you conclude tha t' you couldn' t I
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5 18 run the pump?
?
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THE WITNESS:
Because that is what the plant staff told n
l 20 me regarding their tries during the morning of March 28th to 21 run the pu'mp.
(q 22 MR. STELLO:
I am trying to-understand with 620 degrees
~J 23 on the hot leg and 1,000 pounds in the primary system, would you 24 conclude that that was anything unusual and would create any 25l problems?
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1 THE WITilESS:
I dRn4 know that I was specifically O
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aware of that 620 degrees and a thousand pounds in the plant 3
at th'e time they attempted to run the pumps.
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Q Mr. Herbein, based on information that you did have e'
6 on March 28th concerning the HPI flow, the period of time that R
7 the MOV was opened, the reactor coolant pumps and their status
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n 8
and hot-leg temperatures, did you infer from the information you d
i 9
had that a ;irimary system inventory problem existed?
E 10 A
No, I did not because I don't believe we were able to E
II hook the information together as we now can in the post-mortem
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12 follow the TMI-2 event. It is a lot different looking at Color A
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eiete 3 witn ciear indications of Ts aad T-+>*- and 9ressure m
5 I4 variations and the things that -you have just mentioned, the
!E 15 reduce <' p res s u re, the M0V, the inability to start the pumps and-ij 16 the superheated steam in the hot legs were not abundantly clear w
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17 l or even remotely clear to us on the morning of March the 28th.
E 18 l f
We didn't understand exactly what had happened to P
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prevent the running of pumps.
We weren't quite sure as to n
20 how the steam condition got in the hot legs.
So in summary I 2I don't think that things were obvious to us on the morning of i
22
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the 28th as they now are to the people who studied this accident 23 j wenN and through countless pages of testimony for a good year and 24 and a half after the event.
25 [
Q Mr. Herbein, we have reviewed prior testimony of i
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I individuals and we have had discussions this week with a number
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of the key people who are involved in the plant.
The items that 3
we have just discovered were known by many, if not all, of the O)
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another.
But your testimony is that you were not aware of this; 3
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8 mean when you say I was not aware of these.
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indicate what I felt I remembered today and what I felt previous 10 testimony indicated I remembered.
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12 today, I really can't soeak to that.
I can only, to the best O
l is of my ability, sey wnet I remember end wnet I previoasiy spoke 14 to in other recorded testimony.
j 15 Q
Well, one of the things that we are pursuing in this x
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investigation is the flow of information within in the Met-Ed/GPU W
i 17 :i chain as well as between Met-Ed and the NRC and the state.
From C
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mation within the Met-Ed organization was not effective on that l
l 20 day.
Have I drawn the wrong conclusion?
21 A
I am not sure you have, based on the things-we have O
discussed today. 1ooked at the eatire coatext ia sufficieat iisnt i
23 to draw a conclusion, let alone the conclusion that Met-Ed's C
24 l communications were inef fective.
Certainly the communications l
25 l could have been better.
I think that is something that has i
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 been acknowledged by every study into the Three Mile Island r'
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3 I believe that the communications we made with regard p/
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with that plan and were done in a timely fashion.
I did the best 5
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7 the state government.
I also did the best I could to convey a
3 8
the status of the plant, based on the information I was given, d
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10 To now, in view of all that has passed, +e-be critical 3
h 11 of those communications and the effectiveness with which they
[ 12 were carried out to some extent may be justifiable, but again 5
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13 this accident hadn't happened to anyone before.
We did what l
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15 did the best I could, and I feel the people under Gary Miller j
16 did the best they could.
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20 of what actually occurred.
21 MR. STELLO:
John, I think you are missing the point.
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If the job that you did in communicating to everyone you 22 23 communicated to, given whatever information you had, were i
i 24 perfect, and let's for the moment assume that it was and just 25 !
ignore that part of it.
The issue is did you as an executive ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 officer of the company get the information you should have had pd 2
'so you could have done a better job?
We are trying to tell you 3
what we saw and we now have what people told us was the prevailing O
4 attitude of tne grincipei cnerecters in the controi room end 5
g how they felt.
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7 conversation we just had with Gary Miller that he somehow didn't 3j 8 I have that information.
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if it didn't come to him and he is 'the' only~ one.that.you-talked z
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I think that is what Norm is trying to do.
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He has told you what we now know to be facts that
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You never got that.
Is j
14 that a fair conclusion?
$i 15 11R. REYN0LDS:
Let me just interrupt for a second, if 16 Vic, because the whole discussion of Gary in terms of flow of us h
I7 information related to nothing that we have so far been talking 18 about with Jack.
So that I think it is unfair to indicate to P
19 him that because information that didn't get to Gary in another 20 area there you are going to conclude based on what we have been 21 talking about here that Jack didn't get it?
22 MR. HARPSTER:
Is it fair to conclude that a senior
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member of the management staff in Unit II reported to the NRC 24 at 9:30 that he was concerned the core was being cooled by 25 superheated steam and may be uncovered and that wasn't I
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known within the management staff of Metropolitan-Edison?
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2 MR. REYNOLDS:
I am not speaking as to whether ---
3 MR. STELLO:
I lost your point.
What was the point
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4 you were trying to make?
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MR. REYNOLDS:
All I was saying is that I think the 9
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g 12 MR. STELL0:
I don't think you have answered my question.
5
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I understood you to say that your m
5 14 principal point of contact was Gary Miller.
15 THE WITNESS:
Excuse me just a minute.
Is the ouestion
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17 l MR. STELLO:
Yes.
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18 THE WITNESS:
All right.
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19 MR. STELLO:
Was it?
n 20 THE WITNESS:
Ask the question again.
21 MR. STELLO:
The principal source of information you
(~3 22 had was Gary fliller?
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23 !
THE WITNESS:
That is true.
24 r'j MR. STELLO:
If you made any effort to contact others
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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specific as to whether you had any phone calls, if you did how O
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many or with who?
3 THE WITHESS:
That is true.
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4 MR. STELLO:
You~ don't have any recall.
.If it reasonabl e 5
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6 than Gary Miller they were not very significant?
57 7
THE WITNESS:
I would say that is a reasonable nl 8
assumption.
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9 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
The other people in the control 10 c
room, and I mentioned Kunder, have indicated they have significant 5
II concerns.
I am making this statement.
Gary Miller indicated is f12 he did not know of those concerns.
Another statement.
Can I O
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'3 now conciude thet the reason you didn't have those concerns then 14 was because Gary didn' t and that is where the breakdown in the 15 flow of information occurred?
j 16 THE WITNESS:
Where are you implying that the breakdown, us h
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if there was one -that occurred, in f act occurred?
3 18 MR. STELL0:
Between the plant staff r.nd Miller because i:
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your link was with Miller and not the plant staff?
n 20 THE WITNESS:
I can speak to the information that was 21 generally relayed to me by Gary, but I can't speak to the O
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releyeo o,,ot,,1,yed by the,lant staff 23 ;
to Gary.
That is an issue that you would have to discuss with i
24
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Gary.
25 MR. MOSELEY:
Let me interrupt just a second.
I think l
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the areas that we have talked about Gary has indicated that he O
2 ned knowiedge of end you heve indicated that you didn.t neve 3
knowledge of.
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there were other enings that Gary didn' t even heve, that this 5
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6 So what'we are saying here is that there seems to be breakdowns R
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at each o'f the levels.
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8 THE WITNESS:
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11 and my previous testimony would permit that, b u t to g o t h e 3
y 12 breakdo.wn of communications between Gary and the plant staff, 5
Q 13 if in fact there was one, I don't feel is appropriate for me to 14 undertake.
15 MR. STELLO:
There ii a rigor of the questioning that j
16 is somehow now allowing me to get across the question and get s
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the information I am looking for.
Forget for the moment 5
5 18 confining yourself to looking only back to the 28th.
You must i":"
19 have read the countless transcripts and the studies of Three j
20 Mile Island and all the rest of the stuff.
21 THE WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
22 MR. STELLO:
Good.
What is your view in why you didn't 23j get the information you should have had to have a better under-
/~N 24 standing of what was happening?
U 25 THE WITNESS:
The question, as I understand it, is why 1
i 1
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didn't I get the information I should have had and in turn have
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2 a better understanding of the events that took place.
3 MR. STELLO:
Right, you have got it.
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THE WITNESS:
I don't know the answer to that.
I don't o
5 know that anyone does.
We have been through it over and over U
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6 again.
It ~is a lot clearer today,as we took at Color Plate 3 R
7 and go back over the countless investiqations that have taken M
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place since the accident than it was to the people on duty that j
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morning of March 28th and those that came in in the subsequent 10 early hours of the morning and those of us that arrived some E
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(_ 12 At the time it just was not clear what the condition 3
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13 of_the plant was or how it got that way.
I think in view of that, me g
14 for the' actions by and large we e-e. responsible.
The plant j
2 15 staff acted according to the emergency p;eparedness plan.
They l
5 l
j 16 made the notifications to the off-site agencies, the NRC, M
d 17 i the State of Pennsylvania and their own plant managemen't.
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18 did the best they could to pursue what they felt was a wise i:
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l 20 that didn't work through the high pressure injection mode and j
21 elevated pressure that they maintained on the morning of b
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March 28th, they tried the other route, namely, depressurization 22
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23 in an attempt to get on decay heat in the afternoon.
24 In my opinion, the actions while they could have been 25l better, the information flow while it could have been better, l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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as-the bes t we could do under the circumstances.
I am not M~
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trying to justify anything more but-than we did the best we could 3
with wriat we had and what we understood.
I want to point out L 6h s.< k3 3
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that ai' or us can be extreme 1y criticat in ainasiisnt.
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'S MR, STELLO:
I don't want to be critical unless I can 6
be constructive at the moment.
What I am asking you to do is 57 7
to try to help me understand if there are weaknesses where they Al 8
are and where the flow of information somehow got filtered or d
d 9
bottled or whatever and it didn't get to you.
But maybe I 10 ought to start that with the understanding that I made an j 'll assumption that I would assume you agree that there was substan-3 y
12 tial significant information that did indeed not get to you.
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13 THE WITNESS:
I believe there was information that u
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And if it
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M '17 MR. STELLO:
Norm, why don't we continue.
flaybe if 5
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19 to this again a bit later and try to make the point one more n
20 time.
21 MR. MOSELEY:
Okay.
n 22 BY MR. M0SELEY:
U 23 ;
Q On the morning of March 28th were you aware of an 24 increase in the count rate on the source and intermediate 25 ;
range monitors?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A I don't really remember.
O 2
Q Thet guestion was on the morning.
To expeod it to tne 3
remainder of the day, were you aware at any time during the
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day of this?
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A I don't specifically remember now.
3 N
6 Q
You stated t'o'the Special Inquiry Group on September g
8 7
19 tnat you believed that you discussed the millivolt readings 8
taken by Mr. Porter on some of the core exit thermocouples.
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9 Later in the -deposition you ' state that you are not sure that on
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10 the first day you kn'ew that someone put a millivolt meter on the
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This testimony is consistent a
g 12 provided that in the latter statement the uncertainly is attributed 5
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13 to knowledge that a full set of millivolt readings was taken.
l 14 Straighten out the record, is the latter statement 5
2 15 related to a full set of' readings?
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16 A
I don't real!y understand that question.
us d '17 4
Q Let me try again.
5 5
18 A
Could you perhaps simplify the question?
5 19 Q
I will try.
I will also let you read the quote 20 for yourself.
21 (Document is handed to the witness.)
22 (Short pause.)
23 '
BY i]R. MOSELEY:
24 Q
Let.me.try to shorten'it up a little bit.
You stated 25 ;
to the SIG at one point that you believed you discussed the l
t ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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milivolt readings that were taken at~the computer terminal area
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down beiow the controi room.
you beiieve that wes discussed with 3
you by Miller on March 28th.
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teter in enat same deposition you state that you are e
5 not sure that you even knew that someone had put the millivolt h
6 meter on the lines to determine their actual value.
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7 This testimony seems inconsistent.
Would you straighten s
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that statement out?
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A With regard to the thermocouple readings in general I 10 believe I was made aware by Gary Miller at some time on March 11 28th that the computer printout in the control room gave vague 3
12 and ambiguous indications.
Most,specifica.lly rather~than printing
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outthermocoupletemep[raturestheprintoutwasgivingquestion.
13 l
14 marks or zeros or dollar signs or some ambiguous indication.
15 Miller in turn felt.that the information provided by that paper j
16 printout was probably not reliable.
usj 17 ;
With regard to millivolt meters connected in the relay 18 room, I don't believe that I was made aware of that at all on c
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March 28th, but rather became aware of that sometime later in the
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20 week.
21 You also mentioned a few readings and a full set of 22
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readings.
I was not aware of a partial set and a full set cf 23 !
readings until my discussions with one of the members of our legal l
24 staff yesterday.
25 :
Q Well, that still leaves us with the earlier statement ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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31 17 1
saying to.the effect that you are aware that these thermocouple O
2 readings ned been taken end your ieter stetement hich seys thet 3
you were not aware.
My reference to a full set of readings versus O
4 a four or five was an attempt to explain what appeared to be an e
5 inconsistency, and that is that the statements would be consistent U
6 Prc.ided one statement referred to whether you are aware of the 7
four or five readings that Mr. Miller has testified so many times 8
abc.ut versus the full set which Mr. Porter or I guess have dd 9
testified to but Mr. Miller apparently was not aware of on 2f h
10 March 28th either.
El 11 A
I can't honestly speak to millivolt readings four or 3
y 12 five in number or,all 52 total, and my knowledge of those on 5
d 13 March 28th.
I can only speak to my understanding of the computer
- l 14 readout and the fact that I think I was told later on in the week
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15 about some millivolt readings that were taken in the "elay room.
j 16 Based on the fact that testimony indicates that I may as g
17 have been aware of a few millivolt readings taken on March 28th, 5
M 18 then I guess that testimony is probably more accurate than my 5
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19 curr9nt knowledge.
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20 Q
It leaves us with the dilemma we started with because 21 in the very same transcript you seem to be saying that you were 22 aware of them and later in the same transcript you seem to be p) u 23,
saying that you were not aware of them.
That is what I was trying 24 l to clari fy.
O 25 MR. REYNOLDS:
May we look at it.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
32-18 1
MR. CRAIG:
Off the record.
O 2
.cwhereupon. e short recess was egken.)
3 MR. MOSELEv:
Let's go back on the record.
O 4
av MR. MoSelev:
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Q Mr. Herbein, during the recess you read portions of your bj 6
deposition to the Special Inquiry Group on September 19, 1979, R
7 specifically page 17 and 25.
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8 A
That is correct.
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Could you explain what your intention was when you
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10 made the statements on page 17 and 19 in relation to thermocouple E
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s 12 A
I was I believe trying to describe my understanding Q
13 of Gary Miller's interpretation of the computer printout of l
14 the thermocouple readings that were taken on fiarch -the 28th, 2
15 1979.
j 16 I indicated in my transcript statements that Gary had us
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17 indica ted to me he believed i..e question marks and zeros on the 5 ~ 18 computer printout were not realiable because of the range of 5
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19 data 4n-the absence of data in some cases, and I believe the.
20 absence of data in some cases refers to the question marks 21 on the computer printout.
22 The testimony on page 25 goes back over what I feel 23 l is the same subject, namely, in-core thermocouple readings that 24 were taken off the computer that had indications of a lot of 25{
question marks and in turn were deemed not to be reliable by I
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
33 19 I
members of Gary's staff and in turn Gary.
2 My understanding of the testimony on pages 17 and 25
-3 has to do with computer printout information on thermocouples O
4 on March the 28th, 1979, and does not have to do with readings 5
that were taken off console wires down in the relay room by the 6
electrical man, Mr. Porter.
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7 I did not become aware that millivolt readings off a
j 8
of wires in the relay room were taken until some days after d
9 March the 28th and I am not specifically sure when I became o
10 aware that approximately four millivolt readings on cora thermo-l ~II couples had been taken in the relay room, but it was not, to the g
12 best of.ny knowledge, on March the 28th.
I O--!
'3 Q
I think thet enswers my question Mr. Herbein.
~ I4 What was your evaluation of the meaning of the core h:
15 exit thermocouple temperature data that you were given?
16 A
I don't know that I specifically made an evaluation h
I7 of the data other than I heard what the plant staff's evaluation I0 was, and I am not sure that I did but I probably acknowledged C
g that that evaluation was acceptable.
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Q Mr. Herbein, in your answer to the previous question you I
indicated that you were told that some of the readings from the O
computer were question marks.
were you aware or what a questioa 23 l mark meant in a computer printout?
O
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At the time I was not.
l Q
At the time did you assume that that was an inaccurate ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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or unbelievable, or unreliable is a better word, unreliable O
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A Yes, I did.
I assumed it was an unreliable readilig.
C) 4 Q
At' any time on March 28tii were you aware or were you I
e 5
told that anyone was monitoring the SPflD's, self-powered nuclear h
6 detectors?
l
'7 A
I don't believe that I was told that someone was j8 monitoring the SPND's on March the 28th.
i dd 9
Q On the morning of March 28th were you aware of the l
b l
g 10 10_R per hour off-site dose projection in Goldsboro?
E 5
11 A
No, I was not.
s l
y ~12 Q
Now, related to the Lt. Governor's trip briefing, 5
Oi' d ' d ' " P ra a ^ ra a * * * ' r b r ' "9 2"* ~'t - S var" "'
l 14 A
No, I did not.
2 15 Q
During the trip to Harrisburg what was discussed, and 5
g 16 I have a list of specific items which I would like you to address
,s.
d 17 individually.
5
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19 in the trip to Harrisburg prior to the briefing with the i
l 20 Lt. Governor?
21 A
I don't specifically remember that it was.
22 Q
Was superheat discussed?
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23,
A No, I don't believe it was.
l l
24 Q
Was plant stability discussed?
25,
A I believe we felt the plant was stable.
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Q:
Was there a discussion of the reasons or the bases for oU 2
this conclusion or feeling discussed?
3 A
I don't remember.
O 4
Q uas plant inventory or deficiencies in plant tr.ventory e
5 discussed during the trip?
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A I don't believe they were.
R 7
Q Was the extent or core damage discussed?
~~
A j
8 A
No, I don't think so.
d 9
9 Q
Was the inability to establish fored flow cooling 10 or effective natural circulation discussed?
11 l A
We may have discussed the inability to start the pumps, a
y 12 but I am not sure we discussed the inadequate natural circulation.
{r-13 Q
Was the potential for the deterioration of the present j
14 situation discussed, that is of the then present situation?
15 A
No.
I believe we were optimistic about the situation.
j 16 Q
Was the pressure spike discussed?
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17 A
No, because I don't think we were aware of that 5
18 pressure spike until sometime Friday.
E l
g Q
Did you give or were you given any guidance specific 19 l
20 or general as to what was or was not to be discussed during the i
21 briefing?
22 A
No.
I told it the best I could.
g.
23 MR. STELLO:
Norm, hang on~.
f-24 Jack, could you stop for a moment ano describe the 25 mood and the essence of the conversation on the way down to ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
36 22 1
the Lt. Governor briefing?
What were you talking about?
O 2
THE WITNESS:
As I recall, we talked mostly about the v
3 general emergency, some of the iodine levels that we had seen O
4 off-site.
I think I remember taiking about grotective action
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guides that existea in the state plan.
I don't recall much other n
6 than that, and probably a run-through of events that we had 7
understood occurred from the time of trip up to the time of the M
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briefing.
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MR. STELLO:
Summarize those events that you think 10 occurred.
What was the essence of that?
11 THE WITNESS:
The fact that there had been a plant trip is y
12 based on a secondary plant upset leading to a loss of feedwater, O
'3 the need to trip the reactor cooient numps and subsequentiv go 14 into natural circulation cooling and then the inability in the h:
-15 morning to start the pumps and the present plan of attack at that ij 16 I time which was to reduce system pressure to get on the decay s
h 17 i
heat system and in turn provide forced cooling through that 5
3 18 mode.
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g MR. STELLO:
What was the mood?
l
,s 20 THE WITNESS:
The mood of the people who went to brief 21 the Lt'. Governor?
22 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
Q 23 THE WIT;,ESS:
One of concern, one of wanting to share i
24 f with them what we knew and one of optimism with regard to our 25 ability to get down on decay heat and also the plant's perception i
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
37 23 1
that the core was being cooled and.was covered.
2 MR. STELLO:
What was Kunder's mood?
3 THE WITNESS:
Well, we are speaking in generalities.
It O
4 is reeiiy herd to rememoer wne specifica,iy said whet on ese 5
g trip.
a 6
MR. STELLO:
That is why I am asking you for your 57 8,
7 impression of how you think he came across, sl 8
THE WITNESS:
I felt George and Gary were both optimistic d:i 9
about the plant and what we were doing and the fact that the Eg 10 core was covered and being cooled and our ability to get on E
11 decay heat.
25 p
12 MR. STELLO:
Then is it a fair conclusion that no one O
'3 realiy hed any concern that tne nient was in e notentially unsafe 14 condition?
There was none of that kind of thing?
t 15 THE WITNESS:
Vic, I don'.t recall that we discussed j
16 the unsafe condition of the plant or the potential consequences as 17 of it in its current state.
I don't believe we discussed that.
18 I think we were all optimistic and felt that we would be on P
h 19 decay heat by late afternoon.
I don't think that any of us
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21 I didn't understand at the time the amount of failed l
2 fuei that we had ex,erienced.
1 thought a frection of a percent, O
23 but I had nowhere near the idea or understanding that we had 24 sustained the kind of core damage that we now know in fact we 25 ;
had.
b i'
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
38 24 1
MR. STELLO:
I was asking for a feeling on' behalf of the O
2 people in the car on the plant condition.
If I were trying to 3
describe it as either as safe or unsafe, and I only allowed you O
4 either of those two options, you wouid say enet based on what 1 e
5 now understand that the mood was the plant was safe?
U 6
THE WITNESS: Yes.
R 7
BY MR. M'0SELEY:
9 3]
8 Q
Mr. Herbein, in statements that are made by Mr. Miller dd 9
and Mr. Kunder, their stated belief as to the cooling-of the Y
10 core was that it was minimal cooling of the core with minimal j
11 natural circula tion.
There was concern about the broad water 3
y 12 storage tank volume becoming depleted.
The TH was still very 5
Q' 13 high and had responded only slightly at the time that you briefed 14 the Lt. Governor.
i 5
l 2
15 What is the basis of your belief that the core was 5
l.
j 16 being cooled?
as d
17 A
The fact that we were maintain ~ing high pressure injection 5
h 18 and periodically were opening the PORV to allow flow from the E
19 high pressure injection system up through the core and out the g
n 20 PORV.
21 Q
I have a list of items that I would like to go through
(]
to ask you for each of these to the best of your knowledge were 22 23 each of those discussed with the personnel assembled in the 24 Lt. Governor's office for the briefing.
l 25 '
The first of_ these items is was core uncovery or its l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
39 25 1
possibility discussed with the group assembled?
O, v
2 A
I don't remember.
3 Q
Was superheat discussed?
4 A
I don't believe that it was.
e 5
Q Was plunt stability discussed?
b 6
A Yes.
I think we indicated that we felt that.the plant R
7
'was in a stable condition.
Kl 8
Q Did you differentiate it between a temporary stability dd 9
or a longer term stability?
How did you characterize it?
10 A
I don't remember.
E j
11 Q
Did you discuss primary inventory or concern for 3
y 12 deficiencies in primary system inventory?
O l
is A
no. I don't think we did.
j 14 Q
Did you discuss the extent of~ core damage?
15 A
I don't remember if we discussed that at the j
16 Lt. Governor's or if that came up during a press conference the us d
17 next day.
5
{
18 Q
Did you discuss the inability to establish forced flow E
19 cooling or effective natural circulation?
g n
20 A
I believe we may have.because I think we' discussed our 21 plan of reducing system pressure and operating the decay heat
]
22 system later on that afternoon.
23 Q
Did you discuss that in terms of that was your plan 24 or that because of the inability to establish forced cooling 25 '
and effective natural circulation that was your only option?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
$4) 26 1
A I think we-indicated it was our plan, but I think we 2
gave some indication that it was plan because we were unable to 3
start the reactor coolant pumps.
b) 4 Q
Did you discuss the potential for the situation 5
g deteriorating further?
9 3
6 A
We may have, Lut I am not sure.
7 Q
During Mr. Miller's testimony to the House committee in 3]
8 May of 1979 he was asked by Congressman Chainey about information d:i 9
the company is to give to the state so that they can make a z
-C g 10 decision on evacuation.
He response says in part, and I quote:
11 "The judgment part is based upon what I know the plant is j
12 is doing.
So I must give them input into whether I think the 3
O i
'3 consequences in the piant is soins to cet severely worse quickly."
l 14 Do you believe that the information supplied to the 2
15 state on 3/28 met the criteria Hiller described in the quote?
j 16 A
It is hard for me to make that judgment without under-us h
17 standing precisely what information you believe was given to the 18 state in order to in turn compare that to the benchmark you have E
19 g
just established which was getting severely worse quickly I n
20 believe were the words you used.
So I can't answer your question.
21 Q
My question is what your belief is as to the adequacy l
22 Q
of the information that was supplied to the state based on your 23 l knowledge?
24 '
A I believe we told the state everything we understood 25 at the time with regard to site. emergency notifications and l
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
41 27 1
general emergency notifications.
I think those notifications are O)
\\_
2 keyed primarily to defense radiation levels and dome monitor 3
readings.
I think the readings and the status of t'he emergency O
4 systems were conveyed to the stete as required end outiined in 5
the emergency plan and the implementing procedures.
We declared 3
6 a general emergency and we gave the state the information that P
6, 7
we were required to in our. plan.
illl 8
I am really not sure what more I can say with regard d
ci 9
to some assessment of that exchange relative to Gary Miller's z
10 stated criteria.
I don't know how to do that.
11 Q
Of the list that we talked about you either don't recall is f
12 the discussion or you recall some discussion of these items.
O !'3 These are sort of the same items we have been carryino throu9h m
14 in our discussions today.
15 Would you today characterize these things we have been j
16 talking about today as things that wouldn't be of use to the s
I7 !
state in making the decision that they have to make regarding the y
18 evacuation?
5 19 g
A I believe we need to convey as accurately and reliably
,s 20 as we can the plant status and our prognosis for either bettering 21 that status or its deterioration.
I think that the kinds of 22
()
things we are talking about probably are appropriately transmitted 23
- or should be appropriately transmitted to the state, but I would 24 also think that some assessment of the plant condition should go 25 l along with that transmittal.
I also think that with discrete i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
g
- e.. -- -
i 28 1
parameter values tied to increasing levels of notification and O
2 ascending severities of emergencies that we will probably be 3
able to achieve that better than we did on March the 28th.
O 4
o ouring the return trip from the Lt. Governor's office 5
what was discussed?
6 A
I don't really remember.
R 7
Q Was there a feeling on your part that the briefing
'4]
8 had left the desired impressio 6?
d 9
A I am not sure what the desired impression was.
I meant z
10 to convey to them what we thought the situation was with the plant 11 since they were the ones that had requested the briefing.
I m
f I2 think we were more concerned that we told them what we knew the O
=! '
best we couid rather than some concern about an atsessment of
{14 how the briefing went o/er.
In other words, we were probably te 15 more concerned about how well we had done the job on the briefing if 16 rather than whether or not the briefing had achiaved any us j
h 17 desired effect.
18 I think we wanted to tell the folks at the Lt. Governor's A
I I9 office vshat the plant condition was and what we in fact had 20 end Simons planned to do.
Hinson fois 21 e p.m.
22 23,
i 24 25 j
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
43
()
1 BY HR. MOSELEY 2
0 Maybe this is an appropriate time to go back and 3 look'at the question we were talking about earlier related 4 to the transfer of information.
I think the list of things 5
that we talked about in preparation for the Lieutenant 6 Governor's briefing, and in terms of actual discussion with Y
7 the Lieutenant Governor represent things that were known, 8 suspected, or of concern to key people in the plant on that 9 day.
10 I would ask you to review in your mind which of 11 those you are aware of in terms of information flow to you 12 and assess again how you would rate the adequacy of the 13 information flow on that day.
O
\\/
14 A
As I understand your question, I have been asked 15 to rate the adequacy of the information flow that occurred 16 on March 28, 1979.
i 17 As stated previously, we now understand a lot more 18 about the event than we did that specific day in tim e.
The-59 assessment generally is that we could have done better, and 20 that is certainly my assessment.
~'
21 But going back and remembering to the extent that 22 I can our reaction to what we thought we had, and we what we 23 understood, I felt it was the best we could do at the time.
()
24 There had been indications of rsdiation in the 25 reactor building that prompted the setting of the site in
{ O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
44
(])
I general emergency alerts as set forth in the emergency 2 plan.
Those notifications, as I understand it were carried 3 out in a prompt and timely fashion.
O 4
The operators, to the extent they were able given 5
the plant conditions, did what they thought was correct.
6 They tripped the reactor coolant pumps when the vibration 7 was excessive.
They attempted to reestablish forced cooling 8 and were unable to.
9 They blev down the system in the early and late 10 afternoon on March 28th in an attempt to get decay heat.
i 11 later we repressurized the system and were able to start the 12 reactor coolant pumps, and in turn restored forced cooling 13 to the core.
14 We did the best we could.
Yes, we could have done 15 better.
Yes, the information flow could have been better, 16 but this had never happened before.
You can always go back 17 and say that it could.have bee done better.
That is my 18 assessment.
19 MR. STELLO:
Let me make a su gestion.
Why don't 20 we go through what others were discussing among themselves l
21 of concern.
To start with the conversation with Kunder 22 about his belief that the core was being cooled by 23 super-hea ted steam, and that it was, in fact, uncovered.
.()
24 You know this clearly after the fact that those 25 discussions did take place during the accident.
There
()
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, o.C. 20024 (202)554 2345
45
()
I cannot be any question that that discussion was known to be 2 a very significant discussion then as well as now.
Why 3
wasn't there a way to get that kind of information to an 4 executive officer in the company so that he could make the 5 judgments he had to make?
6 I am suggesting tha t maybe if you could go through 7 those a little one by one, and we tried to see why it did 8 not happen.
9 MR. MOSELEY:
I think that we can go through the 10 list of items that we have, and say that one or more of the 11 principal people involved in the control room and the think 12 tank had concerns had concerns about each of these items, 13 many of them, if not most of them, were held by more than
\\
14 one person, or were agreed to or were concerns of more than 15 one person.
~
16 I am not sure that it would be helpful to 17 reiterate which specific person was aware of which of 18 those.
We will attenpt to do tha t if it will help Mr.
19 Herbein in his reaction.
20 THE WITNESS 4 If I may in te rj ect a question.
Are 21' we absolutely certain that these concerns that people had 22 were in fact as sharp and clear as we now understand those 23 concerns should have been relative to what they were on
()
24 March 28?
l j
25 To state it more specifically, it would seem that l
O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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('l 1
all of us to some degree become contaminated by the amount
(/
2 of information that has come out of the accident.
There is 3
the very slick relationship that we see here between the TH gm O
4 and TC pressure flow versus time.
5
'4e all know a good bit now about what happened.
I 6 would question just how much people really did understand 7 and were able to assimilate early'in the morning on the 28th 8 of March and through the day.
9 I think I hear you saying that there were people, 10 a cco rdin g to your understanding of the testimony, that felt 11 they had a pretty good handle on the situation that existed, 12 and I am here to tell you that I don't feel that I had a 13 good handle on the situation that existed compared to the
(
14 understanding that I now have.
15 BY MR. MOSELEY:
16 Q
Isn't that the question that we are trying to 17 cause you to address yourself to, and that is why, if key 18 people were aware of these types of items, shouldn't you
'19 have been aware of them?
20 A
Yes, I believe I should have been aware of them, 21 but I was not aware of them.
I can't speak to them because l
22 I don't know, and I tried to indicate in my previous remarks 23 that you seem to have the impression that there were people
({}
24 in the control room that had a pretty f air understan ding of i
25 the actual events that were taking place relative to the h
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345 c.
47
()
1 same understanding that we now have.
2 I question that because of the potential for 3
rantamination that we all have based on all the O
4 investigations that have taken place, and all the 5 information that we now have in front of us like color plate 6 three.
' ~~
7 BY HR. STELLO:
~
8 Q
I don 't think that that is the case.
9 Kunder said that the core was uncovered in his 10 opinion, not with the clarity of understanding of -the 11 accident that we have today.
It was his belief that the 12 core was uncovered.
Others have said this.
13 Why was there an attitude on your behalf of 4
14 optimism that the core was never uncovered?
15 A
Because the people I talked to felt that the core 16 was covered.
17 Q
That was principally Gary?
18 A
Yes.
j 19 Q
But you did have Kunder in the car with you.
t 20 A
Yes, and I did not sense as we drove to the 21 Governor's office that there was a disparity between what 22 Kunder felt and what Miller felt.
23 Q
There were three times that a safety injection was
! (])
24 reached in the plant.
Wouldn't you believe that you should 25 have been informed of that?
()
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(}
1 A
Wouldn't I believe that I should have-been 2-informed?
3 0
Yes.
7s U
4 A
Yes, I believe that I should have been informed 5
when a safety injection occurred in the plant.
6 Q
But you weren't.
~~
7 A
I don't remember whether I was advised of that or
~
i 1
8 not.
9 0
.The containment spray pumps started, you had a i
10 high containment pressure, and that did-not get to you until 11 Friday, is that right?
12 A
That is true, l
13 0
Do you think that you should have been told that l
14 earlier?
l l
15 A
I think in light of what we now understand l
l 16 Q
No, not in light of what we now understand.
A l
l 17 significant event in the plant.
18 A
There were many events occurring that were 19 significant in the plant, and some occurring that were 20 significant outsida of the plant.
The focus at the time 21 that I came back from Phi.'.adelphia was on radiation outside 22 the plant, and what levels we were reading and what the 23 iodine concentration was.
()
24 0
You knew that there was damaged f uel, but you Just 25 did not know how much?
O i
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i l
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2345
49
()
1 A
That is true.
I felt that the fuel damage, and as 2 I said earlier, I indicated this to the Lieutenant Governor 3 and to the press the next day.
I f elt the f uel dsmage was 4 minor, perhaps a half percent or a percent.
5 Q
What are the mecha nisms tha t you believe are 6 possible to create fuel damage?
~~
7 A
You can go through DND.
~
l 8
Q Let's take them one at a ti m e.
If you went 9 through DNB that means that the damage most likely would 10 have occurred during power operation, or in a transient very 11 shortly there after; true?
12 A
True.
j 13 0
Okay, so that would not be high up on the list? In
(~\\
ss/
1-4 fact, it would not even be on the list.
l 15 A
I would agree that that is a correct analysis.
In l
l 16 light of all that has happened, it is my understanding now.
i 17 0
No, that day, on March 28, Herbein knows.that 18 there is damage.
What does Herbein think the ways in which 19 you could get damage to the fuel are.
You have mentioned 20 DNB.
The damage is something like over two hours after the 21 trip.
It is no DNB.
Is that fair?
22 A
I don't know, Vic, that we made the connection 23 that the damage had, in fact, occurred two hours after the
()
24 trip.
I don't know what I knew specifically when the fuel 25 had been damage.
Tha t was one of the problems.
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()
1 0
But the monitors went off, and they did not go off.
2 until 6:00 o' clock.
What other time could you have 3
concluded tha t it was damaged?
4 Now you 1re stretching my' believability just as an 5
engineer.
Damage to the fuel, I know it is there because 6
the monitors are starting to read high; yes?
7 A
Damaged fuel because the monitors are starting to 8
read high; res.
Damaged fuel without the monitors reading 9
high?
10 Q
No.
11 A
It is a possibility when you consider the 12 transport time ana some slowly occurring mechanism which I 13 can't create off the top of my head.
1-4 Q
I will agree with your statement if you will say 15 that the transport time of minutes is what you have in mind, 16 but not hours.
17 What else is there?
18 A
One can exceed the kilowatts per foot.
19 0
Not two hours after scram you won't.
20 What else?
21 A
Eventually we have to get around to core 22 uncovery.
23 Q
You do, don't you?
I have a hard time
()
24 understanding as an engineer why that was not obvious to 25 you, you Js:k Herbein.
You have a lot of experience in the O
f ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
51 O
8==tae==-
2 A
Vic, I think we all missed the super-heated 3 steam.
4 Q
I am not talking about the super-h eated steam.
I 5 am just saying that you busted fuel, and the only way you 6 bust fuel is if the fuel gets too hot.
How does it get too 7 hot; it is when there is not enough water in the core.
8 I could give you a half-dozen indicators that that 9 was it.
You admit that you knew there vas damage to the 10 fuel, and why wasn't that enough to conclude that the core 11 as uncovered?
12 A
We felt the system was in essence solid, or close
.I 13 to solid.
14 Q
Can you damage fuel if the system is solid?
15 A
If the system is solid, then it is filled.
16 0
Good.
How do you damage fuel?
17 A
We could not deduce how the fuel danage occurred.
18 I could not figure that out on the morning of arch 28, or 19 even the day of March 28, and I guess I did not know the 20 29th, and possibly the 30 th, what had caused the core j
21 damage, and the fact that it was lack of inventory.
I did 22 not know that.
23 BY NB. M3SELEY.
O 24 o
otea t r =
tete to== e r11er ta t 1 =
ere re 25 of the loops were voided?
l O L
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
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52 1
A I stated to you' earlier that the loops were
{}
2 voided, or I knew the loops were void.
- Yes, I. indicated 3
that I believe I had knowledge on March 2'8 that there was O
4 steam in the hot-legs, but I did not associate that steam 5 condition in the hot-legs with the core uncovery.
6 0
I thought you said that you thought you were 7 solid, or essentially solid?
8 A
Solid from the standpoint that the pressurizer was 9
full following the trip.
Obviously not solid when the steam 10 indication existed in the loops.
Perhaps I have confused 11 the point in trying to indicate that.
12 My understanding of what the plant thought they 13 had was a solid plant initially after the trip.
)
14 BY MR. SIELLO:
15 0
What is initially after the trip, do you mean 16 minutes?
17 A
Let me correct something.
One of the things that 18 is very hard for me to do is to try to relate what I knov 19 now to what I knew then.
I am aware now that the operators 20 felt that the plant was about to go solid, or had been 21 solid, and in fact had to throttle high pressure injection, 22 at least they thought that they had to do that on the 23 morning of March 28.
That is an understanding I currently
(])
24 have and obtained sonetime after the accident, some days 25 after the accident.
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1 I did not understand that the day of the accident, 2 that the operators had intentionally reduced high pressure 3 injection flow.
Perhaps we ought to go through the line of O
4 questioning again to correct any misimpressions I may have 5 given when we started talking about the DNB and-various 6 kind s of transients.
't 7
Q What I was trying to get you to help me understand 8 is what you were doing with the facts that'you had that 9 allowed you to conclude that the core had not been 10 uncovered, since the facts, the only way that I can put them 11 together is to draw an opposite conclusion.
12 A
Vic, I don't know that I went back and made an 13 effort to determine what mechanism had led to failed fuel i
14 precisely how it happened.
I was made aware that there had 15 been some fuel failure, and that we were having difficulty l
16 restoring forced cooling to the core.
I did not really t
17 focus on what the specific mechanism was for the fuel 18 failure.
19 I know that the thought process we back to, well, 20 the core must have been uncovered, or we had gone through a 21 DNB transient, or a specific kind of mechanistic failure.
I 22 think the concern that the plant had, and I in turn had, was 23 how do we restore forced cooling to the core, not
(])
24 specifically what was the mechanism associated with the fuel 25 failure.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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54 i (]
1 0
Let me start down a different path.
You knew you 2 had some steam in the loops.
Is that a true_ statement?
3 A
Yes.
O.
4 0
There was a discussion where somebody told you 5
about the in-core thermocouple measurements made that 6 morning.
You had tha t available to you.
7 A
In-core thermocouple measurements off the computer l
8 that indicated dollar signs and question marks.
l 9
0 Problems.
10 A
No, readings that were not accurate.
11 Q
No.
Readings that were somehow not normal.
You 12 can't tell me that you did not know they were accurate l
13 because you can't tell that from the computer.
It will give 14 you a number, or it will give you a question mark.
l 15 A
There was not a focus or a great deal of 16 discussion about the indications off the computer printout 17 on the morning of March 28.
18 Q
I understand that.
I just going to try to go 19 through a couple of facts and then let me tall you what I am 20 going to do to you.
Then, I am going to ask you to tell me
~
21 what it was that you had, when you finish, that allowed you 22 to conclude that the core was covered because everything l
23 that I am aware that you knew should have caused you to draw O
24 the oooo=1te coa =1==1oa-25-The primary coolant pumps would-not work --
!!O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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55
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1 A
Excuse me.
Are you saying th a t the core was 2 uncovered at some point during the day?
3 0
I am going to ask you what you had which led you O
4 to conclude that it was covered.
You drew that conclusion, 5 and I am for the life of me trying to understand wny.
6 A
The plant staff felt that the core was covered
't 7 because of the pressurizer level readings, the fact that the 8 high pressure injection system was on and the flow was being 9 m ain tained.
In addition, I think there were periodically 10 opening the PORV to allow flow through the f uel and out of 11 the system.
12 Also, later on in the afternoon, I don't recall 13 the specific details, but I believe we depressurized the --
(
14 Excuse me, I know we depressurized,the system in an' attempt 15 to get on decay heat.
But during the course of that 16 evolution, I believe we injected core flood water and l'7 because of the amount of the injection determined that the 18 core basically was covered.
19 0
You knew you had steam in the loops.
They were 20 not full.
Ihe pressurizer was hancing on the system, and I
21 some accumulators sre hanging on the system.
How do those 22 facts go'together to say that you had the core covered?
l 23 A
I don't really know that I can sit here now with
()
24 what we know and try and reconstruct the plant's logic or my j '
25 logic on March the 28th that led us to believe that the core i ()
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
56
(}
1 was covered.
I don't know how to do that.
2 I know that the plant f elt that the core was 3 covered, and in turn this gave me reassurance that it wase J
4 that we were headed for a cold shutdown on the decay heat 5 system.
6 Q
Let me try one more path.
If Jack Herbein knew
- /
7 th a t there were some thermocouple readings taken on the 8 in-cores.
If he knew the steam was super-heated.
If he 9 knew that the neutron detectors were giving some unusual 10 signals.
If he knew there was a pressure spike in the 11 containment In that afternoon.
Would the briefings that you 12 had with the press have been any different than they were?
13 Would your briefing with the Lieutenant Governor
()
1-4 have been different than it was?
15 A-Had I been able to connect all these items tha t 16 you have just mentioned.
17 Q
I was not asking you to connect anything.
I just 18 said, if you had those facts, just the facts that I 19 enumerated.
20 A
Vic, they probably would have, but I have to put 21 the qualifyer on that it would have been different had I 22 been able to connect those facts in the fashion that we have 23 done in the reconstruction of the accident.
We look at
()
24 those indicators, those parameters and recognize th eir 25 significance as we go back and review the course of events.
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1 Now, sll of a sudden, all of those things have a very clear 2 meaning because they are understood and distill to the 3 essence.
O 4
At the time on March 28 those things that you have 5 just talked about were part of a great deal of information 6 and were not, to the best of my knowledge, clearly 7 anderstood and assessed as a group to lead to the 8 understanding that we now have on the overall damage to the 9 plant.
10 0
Who decided that take the plant solid?
11 A
Are you speaking now about later on in the evening?
12 0
Yes.
l 13 A
I guess it is difficult to say who decided that.
l T
1-4 0
Who gave the order?
15 A
Arnold and I discussed the condition of the plant 16 and the inability to blow the system down, and get on decay I'7 heat as a forced cooling mechanism.
We agreed that we would 18 increase the system pressure, and as we increased pressure l
l 19 try to restart the pumps.
I, in turn, passed that 20 information along to Gary Miller.
21 0
Are you suggesting that it was a collegial 22 decision between you and Arnold?
l l
23 A
That word has been thrown around quite a bit,
()
24 Vic.
You will have to explain to me what you mean by it.
l l
25 0
I am trying to figure out whether A rnoll made it, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC, 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345 1
58
()
1 you made it, or you both hit on it at the same time.
If 2
there is another possibility, give me that one, too.
3 A
We discussed it, and I don't really remember who fS V
4 decided that this is what we were going to do.
I think that 5
ve both agreed on that.
6 Q
What f acts caused you to conclude that this,is 7
what you ought to do?
8 A
Ve had tried pressurizing in the morning and start 9
the pumps, and that did not work.
We had tried blowing down 10 in the afternoon and start decay heat, and that did not 11 work.
12 Q
What do you mean when you say that it did not 13 work, Jack?
14 A
Wa had been unable to restore forced cooling to 15 the core as a result of our increased pres 7ure operation in 16 the morning, and our attempts to restart the pumps.
17 Then in the afternoon, we blev down the system 18 through the PORV, reduced the plant pre;sure in an attempt
{
19 to get on decay heat, and that had been unsuccessful.
Bob 20 and I talked and felt that it was certainly appropriate to i
21 repressurize the plant and attempt to once again start the 22 reactor coolant pumps and restore forced cooliac to the 23 core.
(j 24 0
What were the principal facts that said that 25 repressurizing would somehow in the afternoon allow you to O
i I
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1 do something different than you could do in the morning when 2 you tried it at high pressure?
3 A
I don't know that there were any essential f acts 4 that indicated that there was a great assurance that that 5 would work.
I think we.both agreed that that would be the 6 thing that we ought to do.
7 0
So.1etime at 4 :00 o ' clock, or thereabouts as I 8 recall, or maybe 5:00, or later in the af ternoon, you are 9 reaching the conclusion that says these previous attempts to 10 maneuver this plant to a condition that we have confidence 11 and understand and feel comfortable with are unsuccessful.
12 We are going to ombark on yet another one, and at that point 13 you would not know that it would be successful.
O\\J 14 Why didn't you believe that there was a reasonable 15 chance that you were losing that reactor?
i 16 A
I am not sure I understand what you mean by the l
l'7 statement, a reasonable chance that we were losing that 18 reactor.
19 I think that we wanted to restora forced cooling I
20 to the core Lecause, as you said, that was an understandable 21 situation, that was something we felt was better than the l
22 condition that we were in.
Hence, that was the direction l
23 that we wanted to go.
()
24 Q
Did I understand you to say that you wanted to get 25 something tha t was understandable in what you were trying to l
1 i
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I accomplish?
2 The obvious question is, does tha t mean that what 3
you had was not understandable?
4 A
I don't know the answer to that, Vic.
I just 5 remember tha t everyone was concerned over the ability to 6 cool the core by forced cooling, and that that was a 7
reliable method and something that we should endeavor to 8 achieve.
9 0
I guess everyone agrees.that this is the 4
10 comfortable one.
But did you feel comfortable with what you 11 had?
You continued to seek new ways, was that not because 12 what you had was uncomfortable and not really understood?
13 A
It is hard to go back and characterize 14 uncomfortability and understanding a year and a half ago.
15 It just sramed, as I remember it, that the thrust was to 16 restore forced cooling to the core.
We tried that in the 17 morning, and we tried a different way in the afternoon.
i 18 Then we went back and, in essence, tried the same way in the 19 late af ternoon as we had in the earlier morning, and at.that 20 time we were saccessful.
We managed to restart the coolant 21 pumps.
22 0
Did the plant staf f ag ree that that was the thing 23 you ought to try?
()
24 A
I think there was some discussion about whether or 25 not we should do that, but in essence there was agreement O
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I that that would be appropria te.
2 0
Wasn't there in fact opposition rather vocal or 3 forceful?
O 4
BY MR. MOSELEY:
5 Q
By Miller and Chwastyk ?
Didn't you have a 6 conversationvith Chwastyk over the radio, as well as a 7 conversation with Mr. Hiller on the telephone, and Ross?
l 8
A I may have.
I don't recall the specific 9 conversations.
I may have been, and probably was forceful 10 about wan ting to pressurize the plant, and starting the 11 reactor coolant pumps.
i 12 BY MR. STELL0s 13 Q
Someone suggested that you were forceful.
I am O
(~/
14 trying to find out who it was that agreed with you on the 15 plant staff; anyone?
l 16 A
Vic, I honestly do not remember.
17 Q
There is testimony and I could show it to you, but l
18 I would like to save some time, that suggests that they were 19 opposed to it.
Tha principal members of the think tank did l
20 not think that that was what you ought to do.
21 A
They may have. felt that the blow down effort -- I l
22 don't remembtr what they felt.
23 0
You see, there is another point that I am
()
24 disturbed with.
You were relying on your plant staff for 25 telling you what to do and how things were all day.
Now all i ()
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 of a sudden you come in and you says Plant-Staff, I don't 2
vant to hear what you have got to say.
You will do it this 3
way.
O 4
That suggests to me that you were passed the point 5 where you were willing to have the upward communication of 6
the plant staff in the decision making process, and you were 7
going to say:
I don't want to hear what you have got to 8 say.
You do it this way.
It is decided.
I 9
That is pretty much the impression I have of what 10 you told us.
In fact, the testimony succests tha t you 11 ordered them to do it.
12 A
Well, I may have.
I know we talked about starting 13 the pumps, and I felt that I had Miller's agreement to start 14 the pumps.
Now you are saying that I ordered them and that 15 there was a lot of opposition.
16 0
No, he in turn ordered the staff to do it.
17 My understanding is that you ordered him, and he 18 implemented the order in the control room.
19 A
Yes, that is probably the way it happened.
I was 20 dealing with Gary.
21 BY MR. MOSELEY 22 0
We have a couple of areas, and they should go 23 rather rapidly.
They have to do with the documentation, you
()
24 are aware of that line of questioning, and some questions 4
25 about reportability.
O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 Mr. Herbein, I have a series of question here on 2 some information that was described as missing in our NUREG 3 0600.
It was a report of the initial IE investigation which 4 I would like to pursue with you.
1 5
Ihe NRC investigation identified the following 6 specific documents as not being available.
There are two 7 different time periods on March 28 for the alarm status 8 printout, several time periods f or the utility typer output 9 for March 28, and the strip chart from analogue trend 10 recorder No.
2.
11 Can you explain or do you have any idea of what 12 happened to this data?
13 A
I do not.
I 1<4 0
Have you been involved in, or overheard 15 conversations concerning this data?
16 A
No, I don't believe I have.
17 0
What efforts have been made by Met Ed to locate or 18 explain this particular missing data and/or other missing 19 data that related to the accident?
i 20
'A I am honestly not sure, but to the degree that i. t 21 has been identified tha t the information was missing, we as 22 a company probably made every effort to provide it to you.
23 0
But you are not aware of specific efforts that
()
24 have been made, ic that correct?
25 A
No, I am not.
O
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202)554-2345
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Q There was data that was related to primary system 2
parameters that specifically wat trend type data that was 3
being printed out, I balieve, by John Flint in the control-4 room on March 28.
This data has not'been found, as far as I 5
know, until nov.
6 Can you explain or do you-have any idea of what
~~
7 happened to this data?
8 A
No, I do not.
9 0
Have you been involved or overheard conversations 10 concerning this data?
11 A
No, I have not.
12 0
Finally, there was the sheet on which the core 13 exit thermocouple measurements were recorded, the readings 14 from down below.
This cheet is unaccounted for a period of 15 time beginning on the date of the accident until May 7, 16 1979.
Can you explain, or do you have any idea as to what 17 happened to this data?
18 A
No, I do not.
19 0
Have yua been involved or overheard conversations 20 concerning this data?
21 A
No.
22 0
What efforts have been made by Met Ed to account 23 for the unavailability or disappearance of this data from O
24 3-28 unt11 s-7-792 25 A
I can't speak to the specific efforts, but again I O
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I would assume that had that missing information been 2 identified specifically to us with a request to deliver it, 3
then we would have made every effort to do that.
fsU 4
0 In our discussions earlier today with Mr. Miller, 5 he indicated that you may be in a better position to answer 6 these questions than he was.
In view of our lack of success 7 with you, can you point us to someone else who might be able 8 to respond particularly to eff orts tha*. have been made by 9 Met Ed to account for or locate this missing information?
10 A
Could we go off the record, and then I will come 11 back and answer your question.
12 HR. MOSELEY:
Certainly.
i 13 (Discussion was held off the record.)
(
14 MR. MOSELEYs We are back on the record.
l 15 BY MR. MOSELEY:
16 Q
Before coming back on the record, Mr. Herbein, we i
17 asked the reporter to read back to us the question.
Would 18 you respond to the question now, please?
19 A
yes.
I am unable to provide a specific or name of I
20 an individual who could supply the description.of the l
21 efforts we have made to locate the data that you have just l
22 asked me about.
23 However, Mr. Arnold is probably in a position to
! ()
24 designate the people most likely able to describe the j
25 efforts that were made to retrieve the data you are l
(
s ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, lhC.
l 400 VIRGINIA AVE, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 1202) 554-2345 L
66
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1 interested in.
2 0
Mr. Herbein, I have a group of questions now that 3
relate to reporting, and I think that it migh t be helpful to O
4 you to give you just a little axplanation of what it is we 5
are trying to accomplish with this series of questions.
6 One of the. things that is included in our charter D
7 is to, one, understand what those people who were subject to 8
reporting requirements understand about reporting 9
requirements so that we can assess the need for 10 modifications of our reporting requirements,'so that we vill 11 all have better guidante and understanding as to 12 reportability.
13 The first question is, on March 28 and prior
(
14 thereto, would you describe to us the Met Ed policy with l
15 regard to reporting information to the NRC?
4 16 A
I think generally we always a very forward effort 17 to interpret the tech specs and notify the NBC in all the 18 cases where it was required.
In addition, whenever there i
19 was a question as to whether or not formal notification was 20 required, we typically made every effort to notify you of 21 the areas in question.
22 0
In this question, and those that will follow, I 23 would ask you to understand when I refer to reportino, I
()
24 refer to both those things that one would report in a formal 25 way, tha t is through providing a formal repo rt, as well as 4
O 1
6 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 those things that would be reported verbally.
2 Did your prior response use that broad definition 3 'of reporting?
4 A
As I recall it, we reported things both verbally 5 and in writing when required to by the tech specs.
4 6 Additionally, when we felt that we were not required, but 7 the information was of interest to the NRC, we reported it 8 verbally.
If it was appropriate, we provided it in an 9 information report.
10 0
Are these policies that you have been describing 11 written in whole or in part?
12 A
I don't think that they really are, but I would 13 add that the NBC reporting requirements have changed since 14 the TMI II accident.
Specifically, as I recall, the 15 regulation, it is 10 CFR 50.72, requires notification of the f
16 NRC within one hour for certain plant events.
17 0
The question area that I am speaking to is on 18 March 28, and prior to that.
On March 28, and prior 19 thereto, who was responsible on site for reporting 20 information to the NRC, and I will ask you to address the
-t 21 time frame before Mr. Miller's arrival and the time frame 22 after his arrival.
l 23 A
I guess I would have to go back to the tech specs j ()
24 to give you a precisely accurate answer, but my l
25 understanding of our general practice is towards i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 interpreting the procedures and regulations where the shift 2 supervisor was charged with the emergency plan notification 3
per the emergency plan in the absence of the unit 4 superintendent, or station superintendent.
5 I believe your other question was, after the 6
arrival of the station superintendent on site.
7 Q
Yes.
i 8
A At that time, when the station superintendent 9
assumes the duties of emergency director, then if I recall 10 the old plan correctly he was the one charged with the 11 requirement to make the notifications of the outside 12 agencies.
13 0
If the emergency plan had not been implemented, 14 would you response be the same for items that were 15 reportable to the NRC7 16 A
I think had the emergency p la n' 1;o t been l
17 implemented, we chsracteristically would have relied on the 18 duty section superintendent to notify the NBC of any unusual 19 events or circumstances that were reportable per the l
20 technical specifications.
21 O
Whether or not the station superintendent or the 22 operation superintendent were on site.
23 A
If the operation and the station superintendents
()
24 were on site, then I believe they would have been the ones 25 to make the notification to the NRC.
Were they not on site, i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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thea t setteve the a=er =ectioa===eriateaceat outa h ve 2 made the NRC notifications, assuming that the plant had 3 tried to reach the unit and station superintendent and were 4 not able to.
5 Q
Do you believe that the Met Ed policy in this 6 regard, that is the responsibility of the various people 7 under various circumstances, was known and unders'. cod by the 8 people involved, that is the people who might have the 9 responsibility and those people who might supply information 10 to them?
1 11 A
I believe that our station superintendent along 12 with the operations supervisor were aware of this policy, 13 and I believe that the shift supervisors understood the way O'
14 we characteristically notified the NRC in times and events l
15 other than those controlled by the emergency plan.
16 0
Did the policy -- again we are still in the 3-28 17 time frame -- define wha t inf orma tion was reportable -- wha t 18 information was to be reported is a better way of s.ayino 19 it?
I 20 A
We have been talking about policy as though it j '
21 were written, and I don't think that we can go back to the 1
22 period of the 28th and find a specific written policy on 23 notification.
I think that we have to go back to the O
24 teca=1c 1 vectric tioa=
a a t o== orectice "ea deea ita 25 regard to NRC notification for those events identified in O
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the tech specs, and f or~ events that may not'have.been 2 specifically identified in the tech specs Dut we felt were 3
worthy of NRC notification.
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I Q
Well, I am not sure that that answered my question.
MITSON H
EIN 2
Maybe I wasn't clear.
I am trying to determine whether in your 5:p.m.
3 view the policy as stated or the ' policy as you believe c.
V 4
it to have been understood, that is the unwritten policy as you 5
g believe it to be understood, provided direction, guidance as e'
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6 to what.vas to be recorded.
R a
7 A
I believe that the practices established over the l
8 four and a half to five years we operated Unit I and the brief rJd 9
time we operated II were sufficient to engender an understanding i.
b 10 of how we dealt with the NRC on notification.
By that I mean II when it was in the tech specs we told the NRC.
If'there was a isj 12 question abo ~t it we also told the NRC and when it was appro-u 3
(O' 5
priate we filed an -information report.
I believe that that was 13
_/
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14 understood by the people I previously indicated, the shift i::
15 supervisor and the. station superintendent.
l j
16 Q
Did the company policy again in the March 28th, 1979, 25 h
I7 l time frame tend to stress events in their best light when f18 reporting them?
This is the written policy and the pol' icy as P"
19 g
understood?
n 20 A
Again, I don't believe~there is a written policy, and 21 as far as stressing events in their best light I think we made
(])
every effort to report the event as we understood it.
22 23 Q
Did this policy stress the volunteering of information 24 C;
when reporting?
25 A
I think that to the degree one needs to describe a i
l I
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
72 2
1 situation why the information is provided.
Certainly there was O
2 never any effort to concee, or w4thhoid or not to tei, 3
information.
I think quite the contrary we typically made every r~s U'
4 effort to ensure that whoever the duty inspector or NRC person
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5 that we reported particular events to in f act understood them.
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6 So information was shared openly to the best we were able.
R 1
6 7
Q Did this policy stress the reporting of unverified A
' ]
8 information although it could be potentially significant; that' d
9 9
is, it is potentially significant but unverified?
10 A
I don't know how to answer that.
I don't know that we j
11 ever made that specific a refinement on reporting of information.
S y
12 In other words, describing verified versus unverified, and if 5
O i -13 it is verified 'y6u' reported it and if it is unverified'you don't, l
l 14 '
I don't believe that that distinction was ever made.
15 Q
Then.the response is it did not stress this?
g 16 A
It neither stressed it nor took an inverse approach, as d
17 specifically that unverified information was not to be conveyed 5
18 to the NRC.
There was never any intent to not provide unverified P
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19 information.
n 20 Q
Did this policy on March 28th in any way restrict what 21 was to be reported to the NRC?
22 A
Not to the best of my knowledge.
I believe that we 23 made every ef fort to convey events and the situation as we 24 l understood it to the NRC.
oU i
25 l Q
Did the company policy stress that when there was a i
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3 doubt about a potentially reportable item it should be reported?
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2 A
I believe that was included in our unwritten policy.
3 and was part of the sense that we attempted to convey to the O
4 peopie responsibie for reporting the information.
5 j
g-On March 28th did you consider yourself to be responsible 6
for reporting information to the NRC?
A In the sense that I was responsible for the entire
]
8 operation it was appropriate that I ensure the mechanisms d
d 9
l-existed for ensuring that information was reported to the NRC 10 and I believe that we had established that.
II Q
On harch 28th, 1979, did you have a feeling that kI information should not be volunteered to the NRC?
O!'
A No, I did not.
E 14
-w Q
On March 28th did you have a feeling that simply answering specific questions asked by NRC representatives f16 fulfilled reporting requirements?
hI A
No, I didn't feel that.
18 Q
On March 28th did you feel any influences or pressures 19 j
that might affect your decision to report items to the NRC?
A No.
MR. MOSELEY:
We have reached the end, Mr. Herbein.
O Thank you.
We appreciate your time and your efforts in 23 l responding to our multitude of questions.
I O
MR. CRAIG:
We will provide you with a copy of the 25,
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 transcript when it is available, 2
THE WITNESS:
Thank you.
3 (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the interview concluded.)
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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the O
in the matter of:
Metropolitan - Edison (TMI II)
Interview of John Herbein Date of Proceeding:
september 5, 1980 Docket llumber:
Place of Proceeding: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 4
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
Patricia A. Minson Official Reporter (Typed) 0-
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Official Reporter (Signature)
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J NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.W4ISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 9
in the matter ef: Metropolitan - Edison (TMI II)
Interview of John Herbein
- Date of ?.*cceeding:
sentember 5, 1980 Decket !!u=b er :
? lace of Proceeding: Harrisburg, Pennsylvani,a,
l were held as herein appears, and that this is the criginal transcript thereof for the file of the Commissic-l Mary C.
Simons Official Reporter (Typed) 1 0 b, n 8
- mw Official Reporter (Signature)
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P00R ORIGINAL
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Pace Line Change To Read
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