ML19343D451
| ML19343D451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1980 |
| From: | Logan J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040516 | |
| Download: ML19343D451 (73) | |
Text
l THE UNITED STATES f
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF
()
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY (TMI II)
Nuclear Station Training Center Surry Nuclear Power Plant Surry, Virginia October 16, 1980 Deposition of JOSEPH BAILEY LOGAN, the deponent, called for examination by the staff
{}
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m.,
when were present on behalf of the respective parties:
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
RICHARD HOEFLING, JOHN CRAIG, NORMAN [40SE LEY, and DAVID G AMB LE.
On behalf of the deponent:
JOHN F. WILSON, Esq., of Debevoise & Liberman, 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Wa shing ton,
D.
C.
20036.
O t
TAYLOE ASSOCI ATES Registered Professional Reporters s
\\
Telephone (804) 461-1984 Norfolk, Virginia
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J.
B.
Logcn 2
1 P
R O
C E
E D
I N
G S
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2 3
4R. GAMBLE:
On the record no w.
(')
4 This interview is being conducted as a portion of 5
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation in to the 6
exchange of information between the Metropolitan Edison 7
Company and the NRC on March 28, 1979.
8 If you would, raise your rig ht hand at this time.
9 Whereupon, 10 JOSEPH BAILEY LOGAN, 11 having been first duly sworn by Mr. Gamble, was examined and 12 testified as follows :
s()
14 MR. GAMBLE: Please state your full name fo r the 15 r eco rd.
16 THE WITNESS: My name is Joseph Bailey Logan.
17 M R.
GAMBLE: What is your current position?
18 THE WITNESS: Eng in eer ing superviso r at Surry Power 19 Plant, VEPCO.
20 MR. GAMBLE: Wha t wa s yo ur po si tio n on Ma rch 28, 1979?
2l THE WITNESS: Superintendent, unit two, Three Mile eg 22 Island, Metropolitan Edison Company.
O 2'3 M R. G AM3 LE: Co uns el present plea se id en ti f y 24 yourselves.
25 MR. WILS ON:
John F. Wilson, Metropolitan Edison TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
u.
c.
Logan J
l Com pany.
()
2 MR. GAMBLE:
Mr. Logan, Mr. Wilson is here 3
representing Me tropolitan Edison Company.
Of course, you
( })
4 don' t have to consent to Metropolitan Edison's attorney being 5
here, but he may remain with your consent.
6 THE WITNESS:
Ag reeable to me.
7 MR. GAMBLE:
Thank you.
8 9
EXAMINATION 10 BY MR. C RAIG:
11 Q.
Mr. Logan, you sta te in the IE interview of May 9 12 1979, page 9, HPCI had been secured, and I'll quote, "I
(~}
13 recall -- I believe we r einitia ted.
We initiated emergency v
14 inj ection af ter tney had ini tia ted this before and secur ed it.
15 "I might point out in previous r eac to r trips we had 16 ini tia ted high pressure inj ection and subsequently, 17 corresponding with that high pressure injection, we have the, 18 you know, sodium hydroxide inj ection also, and this has 19 caused us considerable problems, of course, in removing the 20 sodium f rom the plant, and they secured the high pressure 21 injection.
22 dI am getting this from tal ks that I had wi th them O
i l
23 a f ter this occurred, of course.
They had secured that when J
24 the pressurizer started filling up, you know.
That indicated 25 that they certainly had enough water in there, a nd they TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Login 4
)
i 1
didn't want to put any more sodium hydroxide in the plant,
()
2 and they secured both the sodium hydroxide and RWST, the high 3
pressure injection."
()
4 On 3-28-1979, did you discuss or overhear 5
discussions about the status of HPCI, the fact that when it 6
had been secured -- during the morning, did you discuss or 7
overhear discussions of the status of HPCI, in which Gary 8
Miller was present?
9 A.
You're,asking me to recall something that occurred 10 almost two years ago.
11 Whether I remember a conversation with Miller on the 12 securing of the high pressure injection, I can't honestly say
(])
13 I do recall.
14 Q.
Shortly af ter Gary Miller arrived, or sometime af ter 15 he arrived in the morning, do you recall repo r ting to him the 16 status of the plant or having a discussion with him?
17 A.
I recall when Gary came in.
By that time, of course, 18 we we re in to an emergency si tua tion.
I recall telling him 19 what I knew of the status of the plant at that time.
20 21 BY MR. HOEFLING:
[}
22 Q.
Would tha t have included any comments about the 23 status of HPCI?
24 A.
I would tend to think i t wouldn' t a t this particular 25 time because, as I say, we were in to an emergency situation I
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logan 5
1 there where -- HPCI was not the first thing that was of
(
2 concern, then; rather the fact that we were having radiation 3
ala rms.
And to me that was more -- would have been more
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4 impo r tan t, I believe, rather than discussing whether they had 5
secured or started the high pressure inj ec tion.
That's what 6-I am saying now.
7 Of course, trying to remember what actually went on, 8
I have no recollection.
9 BY MR. CRAIG:
10 Q.
On page 21 of the same in te rview, May 9, 1979, in 11 respon se to a question about high pressure inj ection you-12 state, and I quote, "I don' t recall being informed.
I don' t
()
13 think -- let me rephrase that.
At the time I got there, they 14 were not injecting.
I recall vaguely that Zewe told me that 15 we had had an inj ection and that they had secur ed it."
16 During the course of any of the think tank meetings, 17 was the fact that high pressure inj ection had been secured in 16 the morning discussed?
19 A.
Would you define think tank?
20 Q.
This group of supervisors that Gary Miller was 21 calling in to the shi ft supervisor's of fice periodically.
(])
22 A.
Okay.
Are you asking did they discuss the fact tha t 23 it had previously been secured?
24 Q.
Yes.
25 A.
I don't know.
I remember Gary ordering high TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
a.
u.
Logan o
J 1
pressure injection to be initiated, or to continue, but as
()
2 far as whether they discussed the fact that had it originally 3
'been secured at one time or another, I don't know.
()
4 I don't think that if the discussion came up, the 5
fact that they did secure it, as I point out in my original 6
interview, tha t would have been a normal reaction; when the 7
pressurizer started filling, for them to secure it.
8 So if the question came up, I think it would have 9
been in the context that the pressurizer was filling, so it 10 was secured.
11 Q.
Was linformation related to the securing, the 12 throttling back, of the high pressure inj ection system passed 13 on to the NRC o n 3-2 8-7 9, to the best of your knowledge?
'[
14 A.
I have no recollection of that.
15 Q.
In your opinion, on 3-28, that is on the day of the 16 accident, do you believe it sho uld have been passed on?
17 A.
I think they should have been told everything tha t 18 went on.
If you mean the initial time that it was secured --
1^9 in other words, when the level started returning and the fact 20 that it came up and they secured it, I don't think there is 21 any reason they shouldn't have told them.
i 22 "
I don't know if that would be significant in their
(
l 23 mind at this particular time, because tha t wa s a no rmal 24 occurrence; the fact that the water level was coming back up, 25 it was secure.
Whether the individual would have said, hey, l
l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Loggn 7
1 that's very significant, you ought to tell them --
I) 2 BY MR. MOSELEY:
3 Q. Wha t we ar e trying to ge t a t is there was a fairly 4
long period of time f rom j ust af ter the accident when the 5
pumps were secured, or throttled back, severely; a. fairly 6
long period of time before a high rate of flow was 7
reinitia ted, a couple of heurs.
8 This contributed to a loss of water f rom the system, 9
and wha t we are trying to ge t to is whe the r o r no t tha t, in 10 your view, on March 28, was a reportable situation, should 11 have been passed on or reported, whatever term you like.
12 A.
Certainly in hindsight, realizing now that they did
_()
13 contribute, it should have been, probably.
But wha t I ' m 14 saying is at the time, whether that would have been something 15 someone considered significant and told, you know, 16 specifically; say, hey, there's a problem; we cut back on 17 this, and you guys ought to know about it, I don' t really 18 think that wo uld have been one of the more important things 19 to pass on.
20 Because, if you will remember, the NRC showed up, I 21 think it was, a ro und ten o' clock.
I can't recall exactly
()
22 when, but at tha t particular time we were in the emergency 23 phase of an accident and tr ying to prevent releases or
(])
24 controlling releases that did occur.
I think tha t was the 25 more important thi ng to get across to the NRC.
Not TAWMdL:L/###TJUA5DE
J.
B.
Logcn 8
1 necessarily at this particular time what led up to it but to AV 2
control it.
3 Not that I think there was any attempt at all of not 4
passing on all information that was available, and certainly 5
I am sure tha NRC sa id, well, hey, tell me specifically the 6
steps that happened here.
I'm sure they did.
7 BY MR. CRAIG:
8 Q.
To your knowledge, was this information concerning 9
the status of high pressure inj ection in the morning hours 10 withheld from the NRC on the day of the accid en t?
11 A.
I can unequivocally say it was not intentionally 12 withheld.
The r e wa s no attempt to withhold anything from the Q
13 NRC, nor has there ever been, to my knowledge.
14 2
Again referring to your IE interview of May 9,
- 1979, 15 on page six and seven you state that George Kunder in fo rmed 16 you the reactor coolant pumps were no t pumping water.
I'm 17 go ing to refer to the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center I
18 pr in to ut.
It's an equipment and system action matrix.
19 The main coolant pumps are indicated as being 20 energized, and in your IE testimony of May 9, on page 32, 21 you state that you were also present in the control room
'22 during the time periods of approximately 6: 47, 7:15, and 23 again between 8 and 8:30, when they a ttempted to restart main 24 coolant pumps.
25 was information passed on to the NaC o n 3-2 8-79 TAYLOP ASSOCIATES
u.
u.
Logan 9
1 concerning the attempt to restart the main coolant pumps and
()
2 the fact that you believe they were not pumping water?
3 A.
I don't know whether that was or not.
When the NRC
(])
4 personnel appeared, I did not have a direct conversation with 5
them about the status of the plant.
6 Miller talked to them at that time also, Seelinger 7
was there, and any conversation as f ar as status of the plant 8
or things that had occurred prior to or af ter the accident 9
was passed on by them.
10 Q.
To your knowledge, wa s this info rmation concerning 11 reactor coolant pumps, inabili ty to pump wa ter, withheld from 12 the NRC o n 3-28-7 9 ?
13 A.
Not to my knowledge.
{)
14 2
Again referring to this NSAC g raph, on the morning 15 of 3-28, what was your interpretation of the primary system 16 behavio r when the PORV block valve was shut?
We look at 17 primary system prassure, and this is approximately the time --
18 you see the block valve indicates being shut right here.
You 19 have a ra pid recovery of system pressure to greater than two 20 thousand po und s, pressurizer level.
Also the pressurizer 21 level came down.
22 A.
What time was this again?
23 Q.
It was shut at 6:18, a nd here is -- these numbers 24 here, four o' clock, five o' clock, six o' clock.
So it's 25 approximately 6:18 when the block valve was shut.
The TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Legan 10 1
pressurizer level comes back down to indicating range.
2 A.
Would you rephrase your question?
3 Q.
What was your in ter pre ta tion, or what did you (Os 4
celieve was going on in the primary system to have thi s 5
pressure recovery as the pressurizer level came back down?
6 A.
First of all, I don' t recall seeing this, no r recall 7
looking at the indications when that was shut.
I'm trying to 8
recall if we had the indications by then of the leak of 9.
radiation alarms.
In my mind --
10 Q.
The answer to the question is no, they have not come 11 in.
12 A.
Okay.
I can' t honestly say that I witnessed, you t()
13 know, the shutting or the return of the pressurizer to its 14 level or pressure.
Whether I was in the supervisor's office 15 at that time talking to Kunder or what, I just don't recall.
16 Q.
During this time frame there was a conference call 17 between Kunder, Miller and Herbein.
This is about the time 18 he would have been on the phone with them.
19 A.
I think at that time I was trying to, in my own mind, 20 find out the cause of the trip and what had transpired be fo re 21 I got there.
(}
22 The activity in the control room, of course, was i
l 23 very intense, and I was trying to not get in the way o f i
(}
people that were trying to do things, at the same time trying 24 25 to ob ta in in fo rma tion, bo th f rom Kunder or from Zewe, and I TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
_ _m _
J.
B.
Logan 11 1
just don't recall them shutting the PORV block valve.
]\\
3 Q.
This is the time when Zewe made some comment to the 4
effect, gee, this was the cause of the thing, the valve was
)
5 open.
And some other comment which I don' t recall offhand.
6 And here we have the principal problems that were 7
concerning people are going away.
The low pressure, high 8
pcessurizer indications, which were analogous, were going 9
away.
And what we are trying to ge t a t is we r e yo u involved 10 in discussions of this having been the problem?
11 A.
No, no t a t that pa r ticular tim e.
12 As I say, there were several other things going on,
()
13 as you will recall.
We had a steam generator that was 14 isolated with a leak, evidence of a leak in there.
We had 15 the coolant pumps of f also, which was an abnormal situation, 16 certainly.
And, as I say, I tend to think that I was, at 17 this par ticular instant, probably in with Kunder tr ying to 18 find out -- because he had arrived before -- f rom him the 19 sequence of events that had caused the trip, and also I 20 suppo se trying to help him in answering questions that Miller 21 and Herbein --
(])
22 Q.
Were you in the room during the telephone 23 co nv er sa tion?
(])
24 A.
In and out, yes.
25 Q.
It just seems strange tha t this is, you know, the
)
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J.
B.
Lcgtn 12 1
thing that apparently has turned around the problem, and we
()
2 are trying to get at what discussions you had concerning thi s.
3 Do you recall any?
()
4 A.
No, I don' t recall -- in fact, I'm almost positive 5
that I didn't really find out that that PORV had been the 6
culprit until quite sometime later, and I don' t even remember 7
if it was the same day, with everything else that was going 8
on.
9 You have to put yourself in the atmosphere tha t 10 existed in that control room at this particular time, with 11 all the other problems that were attendant with the accident, 12 to apprecia te that.
({}
13 Q.
Because this was before the radiation alarms were 14 coming on?
15 A.
Yeah, but the radiation alarms, as I recall, came on 16 about 6:30.
17 MR. CRAIG:
Closer to 6: 50.
18 THE WITNESS:
Okay.
Sometime in that time frame.
19 It's surprising' how fast time goes when you are in those 20 situations.
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
)
Q.
This is also about the time Zewe realized tha t the 22 23 steam generator was probably not leaking, and they were 24 watching the reactor building pressure, and he showed a 25 decrease at this point in time.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log an 13 1
A.
Not leaking into containment.
O s/
2 Q.
Right.
3 A.
But there was still -- we knew that there was a O
s_/
4 primary -- secondary leak in the steam generator.
5 Q.
You state in your IE testimony of May 9, pag e 31, 6
you were aware the reactor building sump pumps had been 7
secured and that you wouldn' t have expected the reac to r 8
coolant drain tank disk to rupture.
9 And you state, "Well, I
-- referring to the fact 10 that the Ask had ruptured -
"was unusual, to me, for it to 11 occur.
I would not have anticipated tha t it would rupture.
12 It's designed, of course, to pro tect the tank, but under
(])
13 normal circumstances I wouldn' t expect it to rupture."
14 And Hunter asks you a question, "How did -- what did 15 you ge t the impression -- what kind of impression did you get 16 f rom Bill when he's telling you about it a nd that it did 17 rupture?"
18 Your response was, " He wa s v e r y v ag ue.
I'll have to 19 summarize that it was when we were probably discussing the 20 electromagnetic relief valve operation.
If it nticks open, 21 y o u 5.r.u w, and you can' t -get the steam in to it, it's not
(])
22 designed fo r tha t, I don' t believe."
23 BY MR. MOSELEY:
{])
24 Q.
Does that quo te refresh your memory of any l
25 discussion you had with Zewe on this?
l TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
~
J.
B.
Logan 14-1 A.
When I first arrived, Zewe give me a quick run-down 2
c.5 the status at tha t pa r ticular time, and as I recall in 3
that conversation, he had mentioned the water in the
()
4 containment and the fact that he had secured the pumps, sump 5
p um ps.
6 Now, the discussion of the rupture of the ta n k, the 7
rupture disk going on the tank, I don't really remember 8
whether that occurred at that particular time or whether 9
during the day or even days af ter that that that discussion 10 took place.
11 BY MR. CRAIG:
12 Q.
Can you remember any more specifics concerning this
({)
13 discussion between Mr. Zewe and yourself about the EMOV 14 having been stuck open?
15 A.
No.
As I say, I don' t recall any conversation with 16 him, at least on that day, abo ut the EMOV being, you know,
17 stuck open.
19 When I got the r e, there was no mention of the EMOV 19 being stuck open, because we didn't realize it, of course, at 20 that time.
And when that information became apparent to me,
21 as I say, I just honestly can' t remember.
({}
22 BY MR. MOSELEY:
23 Q.
It just seems to us this would have been discussed 24 with people coming in, Rodgers, Miller, as sort of bringing
{}
25 them up to what we know about wh e r e we are.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcg an 15 1
1 A.
I agree.
That's why I say I didn't know about it, l
(N_)
2 at least when Miller got there.
I had no -- I still, when he 3
arrived, could not have expla ined the si t ua t ion, why it
()
4 existed, because I wasn' t aware of it.
And, as I say, I do 5
not rememoer now when I became aware that the EMOV had been 6
found to be stuck.
7 BY MR. CRAIG:
8 Q.
Was the possibility tha t the EMOV had been stuck 9
open discussed in the think tank meeting on the day of the 10 accid en t?
11 A.
I do no t recall any conversation concerning the EMOV, 12 but I would assume that it was discussed.
Certainly if Zewe
({}
13 wa s awa r e o f i t, I'm sure it would have come out on some of 14 those think tank meetings.
15 Q.
Well --
16 A.
Let me clarify one thing.
When you say think tank 17 meetings, this isn't what you might assume to be a g roup of 18 people that are remote from the problem tha t get together in 19 a little corner and talk about things.
This is Miller 20 si tting in there and calling individuals in at times, or a 21 couple of people in, or as F.any as he can get in there, and rm 22 people going out and doing things.
U 23 You have to apprecia te the atmosphere that existed 24 of trying to control tha t accident, rather than trying to 25 rehash what caused it.
What caused it was not ma terial to TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J. B Logan 16 l
1 the problem at this particular time.
That's what I'm trying O
2 to get across.
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
(
4 Q.
You don't really believe that, do you?
5 A.
Yes, I do.
6 Q.
You've got to know how you got into a situation in 7
o rd er to know how to get out.
8 A.
Let me give a similar situation.
You're aboard a 9
ship and you have a fire.
Your object is to put the fire 10 out, not to find out wha t caused it.
11 Q.
But I don't think this situation is quite analogous 12 to that.
You had a situation that no one understood with the
()
13 low pressure and high pressurizer level, and this was'when 14 the valve wa s finally closed, things begin to come back, and 15 it 3eems to me if you are in a position where you don't know 16 what caused it, that it is quite relevant and impo r tan t to 17 say, well, how did we get here?
18 A.
I don' t disagree with that.
I'm saying you have to 19 get the priority of what's impor tant.
At the time that all 20 of this was taking place, the main thing was te stop any 21 releases of radiation, right?
I
(])
22 Q.
Well, certainly.
23 A.
Just like putting out the fire is what yo u wan t to
(}
24 do first; then you look at what caused it.
25 Q.
Well, go ahead.
l T&Wb@@ &@@@$T(2dfES
J.
c.
Logan 1/
1 M R.
C RAIG:
Okay.
/y(_j 2
THE WITNESS:
I'm not trying to say wha t you' re 3
getting at is not important, and I agree that it is.
(])
4 Truthfully, I wa s no t awa r e tha t the PORV was stuck open.
5 Had we -- had I known that, and I assume when Miller found 6
out about it, it would have been rather apparent to him and 7
to me that certainly that was a cause of it.
8 BY MR. MOSELEY:
9 Q.
Well, I guess the reason I ask is we have heard this 10 f rom a number of people; we weren' t trying to analyze the 11 accident, we we r e trying to get out of it, and this went on 12 for many hours.
We find it a little difficult to understand 13
&(~'
why people weren' t motivated to ask themselves, well, how in 14 the world did we get here?
What would help us 15 get out?
16 A.
I think a lot of people did question how did they 17 get there.
What I am saying is you have to appreciate the 18 situation tha t existed.
You can't sit here at this table and 19 a pprecia te the tension that was going on in there of trying 20 to direct the releases, to try to stop them, and things of 21 that nature.
It's impossible unless you were there to 22 appreciate tha t.
3 v.)
23 Now, 20/20 hindsight is the greatest thing in the 24 world.
You say, why didn't you do that?
Who can say?
I'm 25 trying to remember back almost two years of a conversation f
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcgcn 18 i
1 which I j ust don' t.
()
2 MR. MOSELEY:
I can appreciate tha t problem.
3 BY MR. CRAIG:
O) 4 Q.
Was the fact tha t the RC d rain tank disk had q,
i 5
ruptured discussed with Gary Miller?
Did you discuss that 6
with him?
7 A.
I can' t recall whether I discussed it with him or 8
not.
If I was aware that it had ruptured at that time, yes, 9
I did tell him, I'm sure.
7.ew e 10 By this I mean if Ae had told me he was aware tha t 11 it had ruptured, and again I can' t remember when he told me 12 this, whether it was af ter Miller was there or before, but
({}
13 I'm sure I would have told him.
i 14 Q.
Was information passed on to the NRC, to the best of 15 your knowledge, concerning the fact that the EMOV had been 16 stuck open or that the RC d rain tank rupture disk had, in 17 fact, ruptured on the day of the accident?
18 A.
Again.. did no t have a conversation with them 19 concern ing this, and I wouldn't participate in that 20 conversa tion with him on it, so I don' t really remember.
21 Q.
To your knowledge, was this information withheld 22 from the NRC on 3-28-79?
[}
23 A.
Not to my knowledge.
24 Q.
Were you aware tha t the ho t leg temperature was 2700 f
}
25 and 800 degrees as measured by Ivan Porter on the digital TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lugan 19 i
1 volt meters and on the multi-point reco rd er in the control
()
2 room on 3-28-797 3
A.
I don' t remember the readings that Ivan had
()
4 men tion ed.
Ivan came through the con trol room at some point 5
in the accident or in the --
6 BY MR. MOSELEY:
7 Q.
I believe you are talking about the core exit 8
thermocouple.
He's asking about hot leg temperatures.
9 A.
I don' t remember any readings on the hot leg 10 temperature that he had hooked up.
At the time that Ivan was 11 making his measurements and things, both thermocouples -- I 12 was running the emargency plan for Miller, and as far as the
{}
operation of the plant and particularly the pa rame te r s 13 14 af fecting the plant, I wasn't really involved in those. Those 15 are things that I heard from being in there.
16 Yes, I can recall those, but some of the things that 17 went on I did no t ge t involved in just because I was doing 18 other things.
19 SY MR. CRAIG:
20 Q.
Well, were you aware on the morning of 3-28 that the 21 temperatures were above 620 degrees Fahrenheit, which I 22 believe is the maximum indicated on the front panel?
N 23 A.
At sometime during the day I was, a nd that was when 24 I mentioned tha t Ivan came up, because he wen t' down to 25 measure thermocouple temperatures.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcgan 20 1
M R.
MOSELEY:
Core exit.
1 ()
2 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Because obviously we didn' t have j
3 any pumps running or stuff like that.
It would have been
()
4 more accurate to get them off the thermocouples core exit.
5 I remember him coming through the control room and 6
mentioning to Miller -- I think it was Miller.
Yeah, I'm 7
sure it was -- that he had some awf ully high readings and 8
very low readings, the inference being tha t they were 9
questionable, the readings were questionable.
Some of them 10 were very low, some very high, so wha t did you believe.
11 In that context, I feel I knew that the hot leg 12 temperatures were unreliable up there.
They were probably 13 off scale or he wouldn't have taken those.
{)
14 BY MR. MOSELEY:
15 Q.
You don' t recall either personally seeing or being 16 told that the meter indications of hot l eg temperature, which 17 pegged at 620 degrees, were either 620 degrees or the meters 18 were pegged?
19 A.
No, I don' t.
I can' t recall tha t.
20 Q.
Do you recall having any knowledge of the hot leg 21 tem pe r a tur es, the fact they were high, or some indication 22 other than the reference that you made to the core exit p/
s-23 thermocouples?
24 A.
I don' t recall tha t right now.
Now, at the time I 25 may have.
I just don't recall right now of seeing that.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logen 21 1
My big concern at that particular time -- now, when G(_j 2
I first got there, and the period shortly thereaf terwards, I 3
was interested in trying to re-establish flow.
That was my
( })
4 main concern, was to re-establish flow.
Now, whether I 5
looked at the hot leg / cold leg temperatures or nct, I don't 6
rem em,be r.
7 Walking across that board, you remember the number 8
of gauges and dials that you have on there.
And I was 9
concerned with trying to get the flow back.
10 Also, I must say there were some people that were in 11 front of it.
I was trying to stay out of their way, so I was 12 actually behind them.
-(])
13 Q.
Why were you concerned about getting flow back if 14 you had no feel for temperature?
15 A.
Decay heat is there.
We have been operating, and a 16 philosophy that had been bred into me, if you try to sustain 17 flow -- I have never been -- natural circulations was a new 18 concept to me, as f ar as actually observing it or having a 19 lot of confidence in it.
To me, the more desirable 20 situations have forced circulation.
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
22 Q.
What 'vas your evaluation of the meaning of super
[}
23 hea ted steam in the system on 3-28-79?
24 A.
My evaluation of it?
I never discussed tha t with 2S anybody.
I didn't evalua te it, is what I'm saying.
I never TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lugan 22 1
considered it, at the time.
(})
2 Q.
Did you believe that the loops were steam-bound?
3 A.
I don't recall even considerirs that.
I must have.
(]J 4
.When they said tha t the pumps we r en ' t pumping water, 5
something was preventing them f rom pumping it.
I would have 6
assumed that I felt there was something in the r e tha t wa s 7
preve them f rom pumping.
Naturally, something would be 8
steam.
9 But I don' t recall -- certainly I didn't discuss 10 that with anybody, nor do I recall it going through my mind, 11 as far as super heating.
12 BY MR. MOSELEY:
13 Q.
But there is a difference, I think, between pump 14 cavitation limits that one sees on pumps and a pump that is 15 operating in a steam environment.
Did you have the 16 impression that this pump was operating in a steam 17 environment?
18 A.
I didn't have any impression because, of course, 19 when I got there the pumps had been secured, or were secured 20 shortly af ter I got there.
And I did not observe their 21 operation.
22 There'are different things that can cause a pump to 23 cavitate, as you say.
Pressure, low pressure, or steam 24 environment, o r wha tever.
And I did not witness the 25 fluctuation of the current or the flow on the generator, so I TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log an 23 1
just don't remember.
O 2
Q.
But were you there when attempts were made to sta r t 3
the pumps?
O, 4
A.
Yeah.
5 Q.
You don' t recall anyone making a comment, it was 6
only drawing one hundred amps?
7 A.
Yes.
In fa c t, I observed the current drop off, drop 8
down to -- I forgart the amp.
9 Q.
And no one sa id, g ee whi z, that pump is pumping 10 steam?
There was no discussion about what the one hundred 11 amps means to us?
12 A.
No, there was a discussion.
The fact i t wa sn ' t
()
13 pumping water led us-to believe it was steam in there.
I 14 think by this time we realized tha t we had steam in the 15 loops.
This was what time?
16 BY MR. CRAIG:
17 Q.
This is seven and eight, respectively.
18 A.
Yeah.
19 Q.
John Flint of B&W has testified that he advised 20 several people, including Lee Rodgers and Gary Miller, that 21 the magnitude of the temperature of the super heated steam
()
22 precludes the ability to collapse the bubble.
Were you aware, 23 on 3-28-7 9, o r d id yo u ta ke pa r t in or overhear any
(])
24 discussion of these concerns?
25 A.
No, I didn' t.
TJAT7M@LJL@M6TJlS5BW
J.
B.
Leg an 24 t
1 Q.
Were you aware of an a ttempt,to try and collapse the
()
2 bubble in the morning?
3 A.
I knew that we were trying to collapse it with the
()
4 high pressure inj ection system, but I don't recall any 5
conversation with John Flint, Lee Rodgers or Gary Miller, 6
being a participant in that conversation.
7 As I say, at that particular time during tha t 8
morning we were -- I was in charge of the emergency plan and 9
did not really get actively involved in wha t they were doing 10 in the plant, other than a peripheral sense.
11 BY MR. MOSELEY:
12 Q.
Pointing to the pressure indication on,this chart,
(])
13 this NSAC cnart, what was the purpose of the pressure 14 increase at this point in time, and sas held fo r a pe riod of a i
15 little over two hours?
16 MR. CRAIG:
This would be about 9:20 in the morning.
17 THE WITNESS:
You are asking how it got up there or 18 why?
19 BY MR. MOSELEY:
20 Q.
Was that a planned evolution?
21 A.
I don't know how it got up there.
I mean I'm sure I 22 knew at the time, but it doesn't come back to me right now
{)
23 what we were doing.
24 Q.
So you don' t recall whether that was a planned 25 evolution or whether it just occurred?
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log an 25 1
A.
Right now, I can't tell you.
If you give me a O-2 little background on what happened in he r e, I could tell you.
3 It j ust doesn' t,-
()
4 Q.
I think I know, but I'm interested in your 5
recollection.
6 A.
Right now I can' t te ll yo u.
7 Q.
Okay.
8 BY MR. CRAIG:
9 Q.
To your knowledge, was this information, referring 10 to the super heat, the inability to collapse the bubble, 11 withheld from the NRC on 3-28-797 12 A.
I'm sure it was not withheld f rom them.
They were,
_()
13 in fa c t, by that time --
14 Q.
Actually, the NRC inspectors arcived --
15 A.
No, I know of no reason why it wo uld have been 16 withheld from them, nor do I believe it was.
17 Q.
You have te sti fied today and in previous testimony 18 that on 3-28-79 you were aware the high pressure injection 19 system had been secured in the morning.
It was your 20 perception that the reactor coolant pumps could not pump 4
21 water, that you were aware that the EMOV had been opened fo r
()
22 some period of time -- and you have previously testified that 23 yo u we r e awa r e tha t the EMOV had been opened fo r an ex tend ed
(])
24 period of time, or some period of time, as indicated by the
?. 5 RC d rain tank rupture disk rupturing and the sump pumps TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logcn 26 1
having to be secured and there was a steam bubble in the
()
2 vessel.
3 On March 28, 1979, did you infer these plant
()
4 conditions and indications were just inventory problems that 5
existed in the reactor coolant system?
6 A.
Let's go back to some of the sta tements you made.
7 PORV normally opens on a trip if you get a high pressure, if 8
you trip the turbine.
I would assume that the PORV was shut.
9 So let's say that I knew it had opened, and I assumed it 10 would have been shut.
But I didn't know it was still open.
11 The fac t tha t the tank ruptured, I don' t remember 12 when I found that out, like I say.
But the fact that it
{}
13 ruptured, if the PORV had opened and filled up and shut it 14 would have been no problem as far as an invento'ry goes.
15 The fac t tha t we had the morning -- with the 16 conditions that I observed, I realized we had some kind of a 17 problem, but I didn' t know what it was at the time.
When you 18 had a low pressure, you had a pressurizer level that was 19 going out of sight, these conditions were extremely abnormal, j
20 and I knew we had some kind of a problem, but I didn't know l
21 what i t wa s a t the time.
22 The fac t that subsequently we determined we had a l
23 steam bubble in the plant, obviously if I had known that then 24 everything would have been clear, but I didn' t.
25 BY MR. MOSELEY:
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log cn 27 1
Q.
But you have told us you were aware that the reactor
/m V'
2 coolant pumps were probably pumping steam, they weren't 3
pumping wa ter.
()
4 A.
Le t me sa y tha t toe pumps had been secured when I 5
got there, o'r shortly thereaf ter, and when I asked why, 6
because they were erratic, the indications were.
j 7
When we subsequently tried to restart them, then we 8
got the -
you star t fi tting things to wha t would give you 9
tho se indications, a nd that's when I assume that we agreed 10 that they had steam in the r e.
But all this doesn' t come 11 together.
12 Q.
Do esn ' t tha t lead to a loss of water, loss of
(])
13 inventory from the primary coolant system?
14 A.
Cer ta inly.
15 Now, let me say that you can push water uo in to tha t 16 pressurizer and not be lost ex te rn al to the system.
You 17 follow me?
18 BY MR. CRAIG:
19 Q.
Can you push enough water out the EMOV to get the 20 sump pumps to start?
Don't they start on the level?
21 A.
- o rmally,. no, you wouldn't.
Under no rmal situations, 22 no.
PORV started in to the pressurizer dra in tank, and you 23 would normally -- the thing would cycle open and sh ut, and 24 you have sufficient ro om in there to take care of it.
25 But obviously wha t happened was it stayed open and TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logcn 28 1
blew the rupture disk and went out and the pump started.
,\\
(_)
2 From any other source of water in the compartment, 3
condensation or anything that you have in there, the pumps
()
4 could have been operating pr io r to the accident, just prior 5
to the accident, or during the actual time that this PORV 6
lifted.
In other words, the sump isn't necessarily 7
completely dry at all times.
8 BY MR. NOSELEY:
9 Q.
What is the pumping rate of those pumps?
10 A.
I don't know.
They are not very large pumps.
I 11 don' t know.
I would think something under 25 ghp.
12 BY MR. HOEF LING:
g{g 13 Q.
How of ten do these pumps run?
14 A.
Not very often.
Normally you wouldn' t have much 15 reason fo r them to, except if you had condensation from the 16 atmosphere.
You have cooling coils in there that have cool 17 wa ter going through there, and they would condense, of course.
18 Q.
Once a week or once a year, or what is the 19 approximate frequency?
20 A.
Oh, no.
I would think they were probably operating, 21 e s tima ti ng, probably once or twice a day.
(%.)3 22 Q.
Once or twice a day?
23 A.
Just a rough --
24 BY MR. MOSELEY:
g-
\\s 25 Q.
For a period of a couple minutes, five minutes, half l
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Legen 29 1
an hour, two hours?
(
2 A.
No t ve ry long.
I think in the order of minutes.
3 BY MR. CRAIG:
()
4 Q.
What efforts were made to determine or estimate 5
reactor coolant inventory frequency in the primary system on 6
the morning of 3-28-79?
We will use 12 o' clock as the break 7
point.
8 A.
What did you mean by estimate?
9 Q.
Well, high pressure inj ection had been on for 10 sometime in various pumping rates.
11 There was return, the amount being put in to the 12 primary system was being discussed.
Was there any discussion
()
13 made to estimate how much water you were putting in the 14 primary system?
15 A.
I don' t remember any conversation on the morning.
I 16 think subsequent -- some time subsequent to that we did, 17 because we were trying to estimate,how much water was in the 18 basement.
But I don't remember a conversation.
l 19 Q.
In the af ternoon?
20 A.
No.
I don't remember when.
21 Q.
Okay.
In your IE Testimony on May 9, pag e 31, it's
(])
22 an interview with Mr. Hunter, and you are relating a 23 conversa tion with Bill Zewe, and you say that sometime during
(])
24 the morning is when you had the conversation with Zewe 25 concerning the fact tha t the RC d rain tank rupture disk had TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
i l
J.
B.
Logcn 30 I
ruptured, and that's the one I read previously, talking about
(
2 the stuck open in the EMOV.
L 3
When did you conclude that you had an in"entory
()
4 problem?
If you were aware the rupture disk had opened and 5
the EMOV had probably stuck open on the 28th, you knew that 6
you had water leaving the primary system?
7 A.
The time I had that conversation with Zewe, the EMOV 8
isolation valve had been shut, and, as I say, I can' t recall 9
discussing an inventory problem with him.
10 BY MR. MOSELEY:
11 Q.
Does the word invento ry in fer, perhaps, an accurate 12 determination of quantity?
If it does, then we have used the
()
13 wro ng wo rd.
The word we are trying to convey is the idea of 14 a deficiency.
15 A.
In the primary system?
16 Q.
Primary system.
17 A.
I don' t recall discussing that at all.
13 Q.
Not even on the basis of the fact that the rupture 19 disk had blown in the drain tan k?
The pumps had been on for 20 a long period, the f act there was voiding in the loops and 21 you suspecting voiding in the nead, none of those things led
[]}
22 anyone, yourself included, to wo nd er abo ut how much 23 deficiency there is in the primary cooling system?
24 A.
No.
Let me get back to a couple of things that you
{}
25 are missing.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logen 31 1
One, high pressure inj ection was reinitiated.
So
("')
\\/
2 water was going in there, and there is not much else you can 3
do about it.
Whether you say, hey, we need three thousand
(
4 gallons in there or ten gallons, you are putting as much as 5
you can in there.
6 What I am saying is if they were putting water into 7
the plant, as far as when I found out that this rupture disk 8
had ruptured and the fac t tha t the PORV stuck open, I don' t 9
remember when that conversation took place.
I am sure it was 10 certainly after we got in to this accident pha se.
And frankly 11 I was tied up in handling the accident rather than the 12 opera *lon of the plant pe r se.
()
13 I'm sure that the concern of putting water in there 14 was very much in Miller's mind, and I'm sure in Zewe's mind 15 also.
And to ask me if I was concerned about the inventory 16 at this particular time, no, because I was involved in 17 something else.
I wasn't really thinking about that.
18 BY MR. CRAIG:
19 Q.
Were you concerned about inventory for the 20 deficiency of primary coolant at any time on 3-28-797 21 A.
I tnink I was concerned when we couldn' t run the
(])
22 pump, because something, obviously steam, had taken the place 23 of the wa ter in there.
So I am sure at this particular time
[]}
24 I was, yeah.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log an 32 1
Q.
But this was a general type concern, not a concern
()
2 for how bad is the problem, how low is the level; is that 3
co r r ec t?
()
4 A.
At the particular time before we started getting 5
alarms, I don't think that I considered that we had, for 6
instance, uncovered the core, no.
7 BY MR. C RAIG :
8 Q.
At any time on 3-28?
9 A.
Oh, certainly af ter.
10 Q.
Before the pump was started.
11 A.
Prior to the time that we started getting radiation 12 alarms, I did not consider chat, nor at the time we had the
(])
13 radiation alarm did I consider that we had uncover ed the core.
14 I don' t know when, you know, I became concerned that the core 15 was uncovered.
16 BY MR. MOSELEY:
17 Q.
To what did you attribate the high radiation alarms?
18 A.
I don't know, at that particular time, except 19 perhaps a primary leak.
20 Q.
And you would have expected the primary coolant 21 system to give you radiation alarms, that is the normal 22
{)
primary radiation system, of that magnitude and that number?
23 A.
All we had was an alarm that sta r t ed the thing, and
(-
24 after tha t the thing escalated.
V) 25 Q.
Almost all, if not all, were on; is that correct?
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
- s. Lugan 33 1
A.
Well, I guess eventually, yes, you know.
Certainly
()'
2 I wouldn' t have expected to get the high radiation alarm in 3
the reactor compartment, no, and that may have been the thing m
)
4 that triggered my mind tr.at we had a very serious problem.
5 Q.
Did that lead you to conclude the core had been at 6
least partially uncovered?
7 A.
What, the one in the high range?
8 Q.
Yes.
9 A.
I don' t know, at this particular time, what I 10 thought about what had ca us ed it, except we had one hell of a 11 problem, or were going to have one.
12 Trying to -- you know, sitting back with 20/20
{-}
13 hindsight and knowing everything we know today, you say, why 14 didn't you recognize that.
Again, you have to experience it 15 to appreciate it.
You can sit up here and go through the 16 testim 7ny and everything and Monday night quarterback and say, 17 gee, you should have recognized tha t.
You can't.
No wa y.
la You can't.
You can't take people down and fight a fire in 19 the same si tua tion that existed in the ac tual conditions.
20 BY MR. CRAIG:
21 Q.
Concerning your early morning inc r ea se in this 22
)
source range nuclear instrumenta tion and intermedial nuclear 23 instrumentation, you told the IE investigato rs again in your 24 May 9,
'79, testimony that the source range indication really 25 bothered George Kunder.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES w
- u. s. Logan J4 1
Did you observe the nuclear instrumenta tion between
()
'2 six and 6:45?
Now, referring to this NSAC chart again, we 3
are looking here at these high levels and the source, which
()
4 is the blue.
5 A.
I can' t recall actually looking at them.
As I 6
recall the situation, we h ad had a spike or an increase at 7
the same time that we had received a report of a low boron 8
f rom' the primary coolant, an analysis that we had running.
9 Those two, I think, co r res pond ed about the same tim e, if I'm 10 not mistaken.
th't time, of course, was tha t we had 11 The concern at a
12 d ilut ed the primary coolant.
In retrospect we hadn't, but 13 that was the inference then; that we had diluted the primary
(}
14 coolant boron concentration.
15 Q.
Did you believe that the reactor was or could return 16 to criticality?
17 A.
At that pa r ticular time, I can' t tell you what I 18 tho ug ht.
I don't believe I thought that we were going 19 critical.
We had -- first of all, we had several 20 abnormalities that were going on.
The thing was generating 21-heat obviously because it was -- the pumps were secured, so r-22 the decay heat was coming in there.
(>S 23 The low boron condensation I didn' t und e r s ta nd.
I 24 didn't see how we could have diluted it, in my own mind, 25 pertaining to the RWST, which was borated around two thousand TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log &n 35 1
epm.
The facts j ust didn' t j ive.
It was an abnormal O(_/
2 sampling situation because you didn' t have stuff being 3
circulated.
I don't know what I thought right at the moment, i
w 4
you know.
5 But we started injecting, I believe, at tha t tim e,
6 just because that was the indication we had; had a low boron, 7
so we took the precautionary measures.
8 I don't think, at that time, I felt we were going 9
critical, however.
10 Q.
In your interview befo re the subcommittee of the 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Environment and Public Works, 12 Oc tober 15, 1979, yo u sta te on pag e ten, and I'll quote, "The
(~ )
13 count rate coming up. was because we were -- in fact, we had a 14 bubble in the -- wha t we were seeing was leaking neutrons."
15
~4ere you aware, on 3-28-79, that you were seeing 16 leakage neutrons?
17 A.
No.
That is 20/20 hindsight, trying to ex plain tha t.
18 Q.
In Mr. Flint's testimony on June 30, 1979, he states 19 that he drew the conclusion that the nuclear instrumentation 20 indications were not a criticality but were a change in the 21 leakage fluxion resulting from a portion of uncovery of the 22 core.
He says he discussed this with Mr. Rodgers, and Mr.
{}
23 Rodgers told him he would discuss this wi th Met Ed management.
24 Did you discuss John Flint's conclusion with Lee 25 Rodgers on the day of the accident?
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
v.
a.
Logan Jb 1
A.
No, I didn't.
()
2 r,Y MR. MOSELEY:
3 Q.
Or with anyone?
(]}
4 A.
No.
I don' t remember when John showed up, frankly.
5 Do you remember?
6 BY MR. CRAIG:
7 Q.
It was --
8 MR. MOSELEY:
About ten.
9 BY MR. CRAIG:
10 Q.
Nine co 10 time frame.
11 A.
This occurred back around six or seven.
12 Q.
Tha t's right.
(S 13 A.
I d id no t -- I don't recall having any conversation U
'14 with John that day.
In fact, I don't really recall seeing 15 John that day now.
I may have.
16 Lee Rodgers was in there, I remember seeing him.
17 But Lee was, again, mostly talking with Gary Miller.
I had 18 no conversation on that particular subject with Lee.
19 Q.
You have stated tha t you didn't have any discussions 20 concerning the apparent return to criticality or increase in 21 count rates with respect to voiding on the day of the 22 accident.
23 A.
Restate tha t, please.
o 24 Q.
I believe you have just told us that you didn't have 25 any discussions which related the increase in count rates and TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcgtn 37 1
the nuclear instrumentation with the possibility of voiding p/
2 in the core; is that correct?
3 A.
I don't know if I had any conversations.
I don't
()
4 recall discussing it with John Flint.
Kunder, I think, 5
raised the issue when we had the count ra te increase, 6
combined with this low boron concentration.
Whether I 7,
discussed anything with him at this particular time, I can't 8
recall.
9 I don' t think, as I say, in my own mind, I f el t we 10 were critical, however.
11 Q.
Do you recall any discussions with Miller, Zewe, 12 Herbein, Chwastyk, or anyone else, at any time, on the day of
(])
13 the accident, concerning the nuclear instrumentation behavior 14 in the morn,ing?
15 A.
Right now I don' t recall.
I may have, when Miller 16 showed up, told him that -- I don't know.
Just in telling 17 him what events, as I remembered them, when he arrived, I may 18 have mentioned it.
I don't know.
19 SY MR. MOSELEY:
20 Q.
I'm a little bit confused.
Wnat did you and Kunder 21 discuss in regard t o --
(]}
22 A.
As I recall, we received, at about the time of the 23 count ra te increase, a report from a boron concentration that
{)
24 had been run earlier, had been drawn earlier, from the 25 primary coolant.
And that report was a low boron TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J. B[ Logan 38
)
I 1
concentration.
I don't know what the value was, but it was O
2 significantly lower than what it should have beene 3
Q.
And that was what you discussed with Kunder?
4 A.
I remember that coming up, but I can't remember wha t J
5 we said except that, as I recall, if we were not inj ec ting,
6 then we reinitiated inj ec tion.
7 Q.
And your conclusions, even though you weren' t 8
concerned that the reactor was going critical, was that you 9
were having a boron dilution?
10 A.
No, that was the inference, because I think George 11 felt that.
I couldn't quite agree with that, but the sa fest 12 thing is to go ahead and inj ec t.
()
13 Q.
What did you believe was happening?
14 A.
At this particular tim e, I don' t know.
As I say, 15 there was a lot of abnormalities going on, as far as the 16 plant was not in a normal configuration.
At that pa r t1c ula r 17 time, I don't know what I thought.
I'm sure I did not feel 18 we were going critical.
19 BY MR. CRAIG :
20 Q.
There was a subsequent boron sample which is even 21 lower than the first one, as I recall.
(])
22 A.
I think that's true.
I believe the r e wa s.
23 Q.
Did you draw any conclusion --
[]}
24 A.
Well, you have to realize we were not circulating 25 water.
So the sample that you get can be suspect.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcg an 39 1
BY MR. MOSELEY:
()
2 Q.
But the nuclear instrumenta tion is not subject to 3
the same problem.
()
4 A.
No, but the nuclear instrumentation that it's 5
subject to, to a lot of heat or other things, can give you 6
some erroneous indications.
7 Q.
Did you believe there was that much heat in the area 8
of that instr um en ta tion?
9 A.
I don' t know what I believed at this par ticular tim e,
10 frankly.
11 BY MR. CRAIG:
12 Q.
Was the count range behavior passed on to the NRC on
(])
13 3-28-79?
14 A.
I did no t pass it on.
I don' t know if it was or not.
15 Q.
In your opinion, should it have been, on the day of 16 the accident, repo rted to the NRC?
17 A.
I think they should have been told everything that 18 went on when they got there.
19,
BY MR. MOSELEY:
20 Q.
What about before they arrived?
21 A.
Certainly if -- I'm tr ying to remember when we 22
{}
actually established communications on a continuous basis 23 with them.
24 Q.
It was near eight o' clock.
)
25 A.
Yeah.
Anythin3 that went on, I think we should have, TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logcn 40 1
and I think we did, tell them.
This occurred at what time
()
2 again?
Seven?
3 BY MR. C RAIG :
()
4 Q.
Thic is at seven o' clock.
So it's befo re seven
'S o' clock.
6 A.
At that time, I think we did have communication with I
7 them.
What I'm saying -- when I say af ter they got there, 8
when we got in contact with them.
9 Q.
To your knowledge, was that information withheld 10 from the NRC on 3-28-797 11 A.
Not to my knowledge.
l 12 Q.
here you aware of any monitoring of the computer 13
[}
printout of core exit thermocouples durirg the day, March 28?
14 A.
I did no t see anybody monitoring them.
If Ivan was 15 there, I'm sure he would have monitored them.
I did not see 16 him doing it, though.
But I know he was involved in getting 17 the other readings, so I assume he wo uld have looked at them.
18 Q.
Did you participa te in or overhear any discussions 19 about these computet readings on the day of the accident?
20 A.
Not of the computer readings per se, as I recall.
21 The only conversat'.an or indication that anyone was taking 22 the thermocouple readings was, as I say, when Ivan walked 23 through the control room and spoke to Miller.
24 BY MR. MOSELEY:
25 Q.
Do you recall who was present when Porter told TAYLOE ASSOCIATES i
J.
B.
Logcn 41 1
Miller of nis findings?
()
2 A.
Well, certainly I was there.
I can' t tell you the 3
time that it occurred.
I just remember Porter walking
()
4 through tue control room, in back of the control pa n el,
5 betwe en that and the uprights, saying something over that to, P
6 I think it was, Miller.
7 At that particular time, in the control room, though, 8
I think who would have been in there was Zewe, Mike Ross, t
9 Seelinger -- let me rephrase tha t.
10 Seelinger had been in the control room, but I don't i
11 know if he was there at tha t pa r ticular time or not because 12 he was sent, at some time, over back to unit one.
()
13 Dubeil may have been over there, Kunder was in there.
14 When I say in the control room, whether they were right in 15 the control room or in the superviso r's of fice, I don' t know.
16 But these people had been milling around at sometime in that 17 space.
18 Q.
But you don' t specifically recall who was there at 19 the moment this discussion took place?
20 A.
I couldn' t tell you just who was standing there.
21 BY MR. C RAIG:
22 Q.
Can you remember what was discussed by Ivan Porter
{}
1 23 concerning the thermocouple?
i 24 A.
As I recall, he said there was some high readings,
)
25 and I don't remember if he fully gave a reading, but he said TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
v.
a.
Logan se 1
some high readings and some low readings, a nd the inference I
'])
(
2 drew from that is that they were suspect in both cases.
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
(']
4 Q.
Did Porter make such a statement they were 5
unreliable or should be ignored or whatever?
6 A.
I don' t recall him saying that.
I don' t recall him 7
saying that.
He may have or he may not.
It's j ust that my 8
impression of either the way he said it, or if he did --
9 maybe he did say it -- it was questionable.
He may have.
10 SY MR. CRAIG:
11 Q.
Did yo u, in fact, that day, discuss any of the core 12 exit thermocouple readings taken by the instrument mechanisms?
13 These are the ones that were in the cable spreading room with f3V 14 Kunder, Rodgers, Flint, Herbein, Miller, 15 Zewe.
16 A.
I didn' t, no.
17 Q.
Did you overhear any discussions concerning these 18 measurements, with the exception of Ivan Porter?
19 A.
I can' t cecall hearing them.
I may have.
I just 20 don't recall.
21 BY MR. GAMBLE:
22 Q.
Can you recall in substance or exactly, if you know, 23 what kind of response Mr. Miller gave to M r. Porter when he 24 presented him with this information?
(
25 A.
I am trying to remember if Miller was the one 1
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logan 43 1
standing there.
I think it was, because Miller had to be
()
2 there by that time.
And I don' t remember if he said anything 3
to'Ivan or not, or whether he was digesting it.
I j ust don' t
()
4 remember.
5 Q.
Is it your impression Mr. Porter had just come from 6
taking these readings?
F 7
A.
Yeah.
He came up like from the outside, through the i
8 door and around this panel, and my impression was he had just l
9 com e up f r om -- I forget the name.
t 10 BY MR. CRAIG:
L 11 Q.
Cable spread room.
12 A.
I'm getting conf used, you know, with this plant and
(])
13 that plant up there.-
14 Q.
Was anybody with Porter when he came up?
i 15 A.
I don't recall.
I just remember Ivan being there.
16 BY MR. GAMBLE:
17 Q.
Did he have any of these readings written down?
i 18 A.
I didn't see them.
He was j ust -- he j ust said 19 something, and he kept going, and I don' t know if ne was 20 going' to go wri te them down or get something else or what.
21 Q.
He didn't hand anything to Mr. Miller or anything?
22 A.
He may have.
I don't remember that, though.
[}
23 SY MR. MOSELEY:
24 Q.
You don' t remember him re ferring to a piece of paper 25 he had in his hand?
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logcn 44 1
A.
That doesn't stick in my mind.
He may have.
()
2 BY MR. CRAIG:
3 Q.
To the best of your knowledge, was the core exit
()
4 thermocouple information passed on to the NRC on 3-28-79?
5 A.
I don' t know.
6 Q.
Did you discuss with anyone the need to communicate 7
the possibility of such high temperatures to the NRC?
8 A.
Did I discuss it?
9 Q.
Yes.
10 A.
No.
11 Q.
Were there any discussions that you know of 12 concerning the need to communicate the possibility of these 13 kinds of temperatures?
[}
14 A.
I know of no conversation that took place.
15 Q.
In your opinion, should the temperature have been 16 re po rted to the NRC?
17 A.
I think the indications that we had should have, and 18 I would be surprised if they were not.
I think, at the same 19 time, i f we felt they were suspect, that in fo rmation -- tha t 20 impression would have been conveyed also.
21 Q.
And -- okay.
22 To your knowledge, was this information withheld 23 from the NRC on 3-28-797 24 A.
No t to my knowledge.
25 BY MR. MOSELEY:
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcgan 45 1
Q.
You just answered a question, when you responded on
()
2 repo r ting.
Is this what you would have said if we would have 3
asked you on March 27, or has it changed?
()
4 A.
No, my feelings are that any information that we had 5
should be provided.
If any information wasn't given, I'm 6
sure it was either hindsight or it was felt tha t i t wa sn ' t 7
germane.
8 You know, I mean if you find a light bulb missing 9
from something you say, gee, is that important?
Decause 10 there are so many tht.gs that are im po r tan t.
11 These conversations that you are asking me, when I 12 say I am not aware of them, I reiterate at tha t pa r ticua r
(])
13 time a lot of these conversations -- I was involv ed in trying 14 to get the accident plan going, and I am sure that a lot of 15 these took place, and I'm sure a lot of this informatioa was 16 conveyed.
l 17 I will have to men tion, though, as Miller I'm sure 18 has pointed out to you, communications were a problem.
And 19 you say, well, why didn' t you tel'. him then?
Well, Miller 20 was on that phone like the phone grew out of his ear, with 21 rarious peo pl e.
22 8Y MR. MOSELEY:
[}
23 Q.
Do you recall who he had conversations wi th?
24 A.
He was with Herbein probably 80 percent of the time,
)
25 I would say.
He was on the phone with Arnold, I'm sure, the TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
a.
o.
Logan so 1
NRC.
()
2 Q.
You overheard -- was he talking on the speaker box,
3 for instance?'
(])
4 A.
Well, a lot of times he would be in the supe rviso r's 4
5 office.
I go in there to tell him some statements we had,
6 and he would be on there with Jack.
Sometimes it would be on 7
the speaker, sometimes it wouldn' t.
8 Jack would be calling over the -- Jack had a radio 9
in the car, and he was coming back part of this time, I think, 10 from Philadelpt.ia.
I believe he was at tha t time.
And he 11 would be on the radio, and he would call in through the --
12 Q.
Dian' t he come back by helicopter from Philadelphia?
13 A.
You may be right.
I may be getting some of this
)
14 mixed up.
At various times, when he would be driving, he 15 would be on the --
i 16 Q.
This may have been some day other than the 28th?
17 A.
It may have been.
I do recall, during that period, t
18 too, he would be on the phone wi th Jack.
I woLld say 19 probably 80 percent of the calls were with Jack.
20 We had a limited number of phones, as you know, in 21 there.
As I recall, I think Rodgers, in order to get i
22 info rmation from Lynchburg, Lynchburg called his home, I O
23 believe, or one of his associate's homes in the local area, 24 and he, i.a turn, relayed it through some other means in to us.
25 the point,I'm getting at is the communications were 1
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J. D. Log an 47 1
a problem.
So if you say, well, gee, why didn't he tell the
()
2 NRC, well, at this particular instant there may have not been 3
a phone, or there may have been other things considered more
()
4 im po rtan t to tell them at this particular moment.
5 BY MR. C RAIG:
6 Q.
Some Metropolitan Edison employees have testified an 7
order was given in the af ternoon of 3-28-79 not to start 8
electrical equipment inside containment.
Did you hear this 9
o rder?
10 A.
'797 11 Q.
The day of the accident.
12 A.
I recall that.
Now, whether I heard the order or
({)
13 not, I recall that information being issued, not to start 14 anything in there, but I don' t remember if it, was that day or 15 not.
16 I remember we were concerned about starting anything 17 that woald produce an electrical spark.
When that occurred, 18 I don' t remember whe ther it was that day or not.
19 BY MR. HOEFLING:
20 Q.
Where would you have gotten tha t information from?
21 A.
From the control room.
22 Q.
From Miller or people in the control room?
23 A.
People in the control room.
I may have heard the 24 word passed or been talking with the shif t supe. visor, 25 control room operator, something like that.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logan 48 1
BY MR. CRAIG:
r 2
Q.
Were you involved in or did you overhear any 3
conversations concerning the advisability of not star ting
()
4 electrical equipment inside containment on the day of the 5
acciden t?
6 A.
I can't remember what day it was, but I do remember 7
the conversation.
8 BY MR. MOSELEY:
9 Q.
You recall this order was given because of concern 10 for hyd rogen --
11 A.
Yeah.
12 Q.
-- and sparking potential?
(])
13 BY MR. HOEF LING :
4 14 Q.
You were present at the site on the 29th and the 15 30th?
16 A.
Uh-huh.
17 Q.
During what hours would you have been there on the 18 29th?
19 A.
Actually it was the 28th.
I get the days mixed up.
20 I was there till about noon on the 29th, as I recall.
And 21 then I came back, I think, around midnight, or something like 22 that.
23 I was there fo r about 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> initially, and then I 24 went home for six or eight hours, or something like that, and O
25 came back. That time frame.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J. B.
Log an 49 1
Q.
You came back late in the evening of the 29th and r~
(_)
2 stayed into the night of the 30th, is that the way you recall 3
i t?
()
4 A.
I think that's true.
I wouldn' t swear to it, but I 5
think that's true.
6 BY MR. MOSELEY:
1 7
Q.
Do you recall what your work schedule was on the 8
30th?
Do you recall whether you had worked through the 9
evening of the 29th until the morning of the 30th?
10 A.
I can't tell you.
11 BY MR. CRAIG:
12 Q.
Was the presence of hydrogen containment and high
(]}
13 concentration in the primary system discussed on 3-28-79?
14 A.
I don' t think on 3-28 tha t it wa s.
I don't thin k.
15 Q.
Again referring to this NSAC equipment system action 16 matrix, we are looking at the reactor coolant system pressure.
17 Sometime around 11:30 there was a change in the system to 18 depressure the system, and system pressure was decreased.
19 And a little bit before two o' clock, as we understand, we now 20 know there was a pressure spike, and shcrtly af ter that Gary 21 Miller went to the lieutenant governor's of fice.
22
[}
Now, at approximately 3:10 the block valve was shut.
23 Can you tell us why the block valve was shut shortly a f ter 24 three o' clock on the day of the accident?
25 A.
I didn' t -- as I say, at the time I wasn't involved TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log an 50 1
in this, and anything I tell you is going to be f rom what I
()
2 neard subsequent to tha t, but --
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
()
4 Q.
At 3:10 in the afternoon you were in charge; isn't 5
that correct?
6 A.
Whenever Gary left.
The period of time he left, yes.
7 This is three o' clock?
8 BY MR. CRAIG:
9 Q.
Right.
And Miller left sometime previously.
10 A.
I can't tell you right now why we did it.
11 Q.
Can you recall if, after Gary Miller left to brief 12 the lieutenant governor, there was a decision to change the
(])
13 status of the primary plant?
,14 A.
The only decision -- I mean the only decision to d o 15 it would have come from Jack, i f Ga ry wa sn ' t there.
16 M R. MOSELEY:
Jack and Gary were together.
17 THE WITNESS:
Right.
I don' t recall any decision 18 chang ing f rom what orders he had left when he went to the 19 governor's office.
20 I'm trying to remember, though, if we had been told 21 to keep it at a certain pressure.
22 BY MR. CRAIG:
)
23 Q.
As you can see, the pressure starts to increase and --
24 A.
And there is a cycle here opened.
(v-)
25 Q.
And actually increases some four hundred po und s,
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Log cn 51
'l a pproxima tely.
m k-)
2 A.
I don' t know the range -- I can' t remember the range 3
we were told to keep.
O
\\_e 4
BY MR. MOSELEY:
5 Q.
Let's go back, if we could, Mr. Logan, j ust for one 6
thing.
Going back to an order not to opera te equipment, on 7
March 28, was an order given to not take any actions without 8
approval f rom the management group that was in charge?
9 A.
I don' t remember tha t, no r would I think that tha t 10 type of thing would have been given.
I think, more or less, 11 whatever orders Gary lef t would be to keep this situation --
12 if something happens, you know, to protect the plant or any
()
13 releases or anything.
I'm sure he would have said to ta ke 14 whatever action is necessary, but I can't remember just 15 exactly what orders were left.
16 Q.
I'm really going to another area and not 17 concentrating on this time period.
This cculd have been in 18 any time period during the time where some order or direction 19 might have been given; don' t do anything to the plant without 20 orders f rom the management g roup.
I was wondering if such an 21 order was given.
(]}
22 A.
I was not aware of that at the time.
It seemed like, 23 in the back of my mind, Gary had receiv ed some direction like 24 tha t, but I ' m no t -- tha t would be hearsay.
)
25 Q.
Again, I'm thinking of what we re f err ed to as the TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logcn 52 1
think tank, or Miller,- or who would have been in charge.
It p) k-2 would have been instructions to the operators to no t do 3
anything.
D)
(_
4 In other wo rds, in normal si tua tions, as I 5
understand the operations at the plants I have visited, the 6
operators take actions promptly to correct situations that 7
respond to alarms.
They don't ask anyone, what should I do.
8 A.
Tha t's true.
9 Q.
I'm wondering 1f that was the situation you were in 10 on this day; some order was given to the operators, don' t 11 react to anything, don' t take any action on your own 12 initiative.
Pass information along to others and let them
()
13 make the decisions of what actions to ta ke.
Was such an 14 order given?
15 A.
I did not hear such an order given.
As I say, later 16 on I understood that Miller put up the wo rd that, for 17 instance, they wer a no t to secure high pressure inj ection 18 unless he told them to.
19 But I do no t recall such a blanket order being given.
i 20 It may have.
21 (Recess)
()
22, BY MR. C RAIG:
23 Q.
Sho rtly af ter 1: 50, were you aware of the a
24 containment building isolation and SFAS initiation signals
)
25 and the subsequent actions taken to recover from these, such l
I 907$@@ h$$@@84788.
- u. n.
Logan d3 1
as restoration of intermedial cooling?
(])
2 A.
Are you referring to the time when the pressure 3
spike --
(v~T 4
Q.
- Yes, 5
A.
Not at that particular time.
To let you know what I 6
was aware of, when this pressure spike occurred, we had -- we 7
were operating something -- I forget whether we were starting 8
a pump or cycling the EMOV or what, but this was some 9
operation that generated the spark.
10 At that time this noise, kind of a boom, or actually 11 a metallic kind of sound, was heard in the control room.
I 12 recall asking what was that, and somebody mentioned it was 13 the ventilation' damper or something.
14 BY MR. MOSELCY:
15
'Q.
Where were you located at tha t time?
16 A.
Same place.
In the af ter part of the control room.
17 Not in the shift superviso r's of fice, but somewhere, say, 18 near the corner of the bench board there at the a f ter end.
19 BY.4R.
CRAIG:
20 Q.
And yo u we r en' t awa r e, d ur ing this time frame or 21 shortly thereaf ter, that you had gotten the containment 22 building isolation and SFAS ini tia tion?
23 A.
I wasn't until quite some time later, and it may 24 have been days later when I found out that somebody was aware 25 that the spray pumps had come on and somebody turned them of f.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES m
y m
,-y
' J. B.
Log an 54 1
I found out subsequent to that.
()
2 BY MR. MOSELEY:
-3 Q.
And you didn' t notice all the alarms that were
()
4 associated with all this action, since the SFAS had been 5
reset and all the alarms that come on at three psi, as well 6
as the four psi, came on, as well as the others?
7 A.
No.
Have you been up on the control room up there?
8 Q.
Yes.
9 A.
Not all the alarms were on.
10 Q.
But a large number came on at 'this period of time.
i 11 A.
When you have something -- there is over five 12 hundred alarms up there, and say 400 go off and you get a few
(])
13 more, and these were coming off all the time.
To answer your 14 question, no.
15
'Q.
But the SFAS is a longer one tha t I think people 16 with an operator's license would think sort of important, and 17 I would perhaps guess some might jump out at you.
But they 18 didn't to you?
19 A.
No.
Nothing struck me as being abnormal.
20 BY MR. CRAIG:
21 Q.
Joe Chwastyk has testified to this investigative 22
)
group that shortly af ter the pressure spike actions were 23 taken to ensure containment, isolction valves and, in fa c t,
24 fg closed steam generator pressures were checked and that he
.U 25 direc ted someone to inspect the containment structure.
Did TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.. B.
Lcgan 55 1
you direct that any of these actions be taken?
O i
2 A.
No.
j 3
Q.
Were you aware on 3-28 that these actions were being
(
4 taken?
5 A.
No.
6 Q.
Was containment integrity or the possibility of the 7
lack of it-discussed on the af ternoon of 3-28-79?
I 8
A.
No t wi tn me 9
Q.
In the af ternoon, shortly af ter the spike, Chwastyk 10 has testified that he directed ' operators to preferentially 11 make up to the loops, via the 16 valves, and try and refill 12 the loops.
Did you direct this action to be taken?
()
13 A.
No, I did not.
14 Q.
Were you aware that it was being done?
15 A.
No, I was not.
I 16 Q.
Joe Chwastyk has also testified he calculated the 17 amount of water being inj ected in to the primary system on the 18 af ternoon of 3-28-79, and at this point in time it was 19 approximately 20 thousand gallons, and he s tar ted to see the 20 loop fill.
Did you direct tha t this calculation be madei 21 A.
No, I don't recall the calculation.
(]}
22 Q.
Were you awate of a 20 thousand gallon figure, or 23 any figure anybody came up with, concerning how much water
}
24 had been put in to the plant?
25 A.
I think -- what time was this?
i
)
__q TAWLOS.Q$GQCESTES
J.
B.
Logcn 56 1
Q.
In the a f ternoon.
It was before the reactor coolant
()
2 pump was started in the evening.
3 A.
I don't specifically recall any calculations being
()
4 done at that particular tim e.
At some time we were observing 5
the level in the RWST, so we would have previously had a feel 6
fo r how much wa te r wa s going.
But the actual fig ur e, I don' t 7
remember in my mind.
8 But we wanted to ensure that we maintained the 9
supply of the RWST, and I recall a discussion going on 10 between Ross and -- I fo'rget whe the r it was Miller or 11 somebody else -- on getting water f rom unit one's RWST over 12 just in case we needed it.
(}
13 Now, when that occurred, I'm not qui te sure.
14 BY MR. MOSELEY:
15 Q.
During the af ternoon, were you observing or was it 16 being reported to you progress in seeing the teapot come down, 17 the hot leg temperature come down and cold leg temperature go 18 up?
Were you observing this or was this being repo r t ed to 19 you?
20-A.
No.
As I say, I should mention, shortly after the 21 time Miller got there, I was essentially taken out of the l
22 direct line of operation of the plant, or monitoring of the 23 plant, and put on strictly the implements tion of the 24 emergency plan.
So whether I may have been aware of it just 25 by overhearing something, I was not directly involv ed in j
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
a.
m.
Logan by 1
either giving orders or receiving reports.
(])
2 Q.
But this time frame is during the time tha t Mr.
3 Miller was yone, when you, I believe, were in charge as
(])
4 emergency director; is that correct?
5 A.
During his absence, yes.
6 Q.
And during tha t time were you not aware of others 7
monitoring these temperatures or you were not told of any 8
prog ress that was being made in causing these to converge?
9 A.
I'm sure that I was aware that we were -- any 10 monitoring that we were doing.
I can't recall right now of 11 progress in converging the temperatures, specifically right 12 now, no.
13 Q.
No r we r e yo u awa r e of the e f fo r ts to switch throw
)
14 frons preferable to the B-1 l eg, as opposed to the other, in 15 order to brin 3 the temperatures closer together, which was an 16 indication of refilling the loops?
17 A.
Right now I don' t know.
18 BY MR. CRAIG :
19 Q.
Can you explain, it yo u we r e in charge of all these 20 actions after Miller left to brief the lieutenant governor, l
t l
21 befo re he got back, how they could have ha ppen ed, who would 22 have directed they be done and you not know about it?
l 23 A.
I am saying if they were done, I'm sure I knew about 24 it, but I just don' t recall.
O 25 Q.
Mr. Seelinger has testified he concluded on the TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
s.
Leg &n 58 1
morning -- the date of the accident that the core had been at
({)
2 least partially uncovered.
Were you aware of this conclusion?
3 A.
At what time?
()
4 Q.
On the day of the accident, any time on the day of 5
the accident.
6 A.
I don' t know when I became aware or talked with 7
anybody that had drawn that conclusion.
I don't know if it 8
was the same day or not, discussing it with Lee Rodgers.
I 9
don't remember what day it was.
10 BY MR. HOEFLINC:
11 Q.
Were you working with Seelinger in the morning 12 between eight and ten?
13 A.
Seelinger came into unit one.
I can't remember when 14 he left, but he was in the control room working with us, yes.
15 Q.
What was he doing between eight and ten?
, 16 A.
He was assisting Gary.
As you know, Seelinger had a 17 license in both unit one and two and had been the 18 superintendent of the technical support for unit two before 19 he went over to unit one.
So he was familiar with unit two.
20 And he and Miller were -- he was assisting Miller, I guess, 21 in analyzing and trying to figure out wh a t --
22 Q.
So you perceived his role in assisting Miller in 23 analyzing plant conditions and corrective action?
24 A.
Tha t's right.
25 Q.
Okay.
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Legrn 59 1
BY MR. CRAIG:
)
2 Q.
Mr. Seelinger has testified that his belief that the 3
core was partially uncovered was based solely on the
()
4 containment radiation means.
Did you come to this same 5
conclusien the day of the accident?
6 A.
See, I don' t know when I came to that conclusion, L
7 but sometime during the period of the accident.
I don't j
8 remember if it was that day or not.
9 Q.
And again was the possibility of core uncovery to 10 any extent, partial or otherwise, discussed on 3-28-79, to 11 your knowledge?
12 A.
With me?
(])
13 Q.
With you or did you overhear any other discussions?
14 A.
As I say, I don't know when I discussed this with 15 Rodgers, whether it was the day of the accident or not.
But 16 at some time there was a conversation with Rodgers as far as 17 uncovering the core.
18 BY MR. GAMBLE:
19 Q.
Just you and Rodgers or anybody else?
20 A.
Just he and I.
There may have been other 21 conver sa tion.
That's the only one I recall.
22 BY MR. CRAIG:
{}
23 Q.
Why did Seelinger come to un it two control room on 24
.the af ternoon of 3-28-79?
This would have been --
25 A.
In the morning.
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J. B.
Logan 60 1
Q.
After Gary Miller left, Seelinger returned to unit
()
2 two control room.
i 3
A.
I don't know.
()
4 Q.
You didn' t direct that he return or request him?
5 A.
I don't recall asking him.
6 BY MR. HOEFLING:
7 Q.
Do you recall his being there in the afternoon?
8 A.
No, but he could have been.
We had an awful ~ lot of 9
people in there.
10 BY MR. CRAIG :
11 Q.
Mr. Ross has stated that he wa s no t satisfied with 12 the control of activities af ter Miller left to brief the
(])
13 lieutenant governo r.-
Did he express his concern to you?
14 A.
No.
t 15 Q.
Were you aware --
16 MR. MOSELEY: Did you nod?
17 PHE WITNESS:
No, he did not express.
18 BY MR. CRAIG:
19 Q.
Were you aware that Ross called Seelinger to come to i
20 unit two control room to try to restore the o rder over 21 activities that were going on in un i t two control room?
22 A.
No.
No, I wasn't.
l 24 Q.
Going back to the morning time and your interface
)
25 with Mr. Seelinger, we have talk ed to Mr. Seelinger this week,
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J. B.
Leg an 61 1
and he has -told us of his activities in the morning being (m
(_)
2 related to implementation of the emergency plan, which sounds 3
a good deal like what you have described to us as you were
()
4 doing.
Wha t wa s yo ur interface with Mr. Seelinger?
5 A.
I don't recall Jim being really involved in the 6
Miller had told me to take charge 'of the 7
emergency plan and to implement it.
8 Now, I don' t remember Jim getting involved in it.
9 He could have.
My impression was that he and Gary were 10 discussing what had occurred and what actions should be ta ken.
11 Q.
Would you describe the principal participants in 12 operational decisions to be Miller, Ross and Seelinger and
({}
13 Rodgers?
14 A.
In the early phases, yes, and Herbein.
15 Q.
Well, early phases would be, what, prior to Miller's 16 departure?
17 A.
Yes.
18 Q.
Were those the principal actors?
Would you like to 19 take one of those people out?
20 A.
Well, at some time Jim left and went ever to un i t 21 one.
22 Q.
About ten o' clock.
{)
23 A.
As I say, I'm trying to remember back.
So then --
24 and Ross was over there.
Ross wa s put in charge of the 25 direct operation of the plant at the time Miller came in, I
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J. B.
Lcg an 62 1
when he split up who was to do what.
Well, Kunder was in O( /
2 there, of course.
3 Q.
Well then, maybe if I ask you would you describe O(_/
4 your interface with Seelinger and what you observed to be 5
Seelinger's interface with Miller in the morning time frame?
6 A.
I~ don' t recall interfacing with Seelinger.
Mine was 7
basically reporting to Miller the status of the 8
implementation of the emergency plan.
And, as I say, my 9
' impression was that Seelinger was assisting Miller in the 10 accident itself, controlling the accident itself.
11 Q.
You mean -- when you say controlling the accident, 12 you mean plant operating decisions?
.({)
13 A.
Tha t's right.
In either analyzing what had happened 14 or what to do to get out of the situation.
15 Q.
But it was the plant operator's decisions, rather 16 than radiation monitoring or notification of people, or 17 things of that nature?
18 A.
les.
I don't recall Jim getting in to the 19 implementation of the emergency plan at all.
20 BY MR. G AMB LE:
21 Q.
Were you, in your implementation of the emergency
(]}
22 plan, checking to make sure the emergency plan was being 23 commenced?
24 A.
Yeah.
The emergency plan requires a lot of
[}
4 25 different actions by different people.
Ma k i ng phone calls, TAYLOE ASSOC 8ATES
J.
B.
Log an 63 1
for instance, initiating teams that take the readings, and 2
things of that nature.
Ge tting readings back from the te ams 3
that go out and take readings, things of that nature.
()
4 My function was to try to ensure tha t that was 5
happening, calls were being made, that the proper people were 6
being briefed, called, and tha t the readings were being ta ken 7
and, in fact, these reports were being made known.
8 Q.
Were you getting each of these specific actions or 9
did they kind of happen and you were checking to make sure 10 they didn' t happen?
11 A.
Well, there was a checkof f of things that 12 automatically nappened, but my function was to see if they
(])
13 weren' t happening that somebody was taking some action to see 14 they happen.
We had some engineers in there, and I can't 15 remember which onas.
16 Kunder was involved and, sometimes a pe riod of time W
17.
would be involved, a nd somebody would come in a nd relieve i
18 them, and they would move to something el se.
19 Q.
But you are quite certain Mr. Seelinger wasn't 20 directing any of these items that you were later checking on?
21 A.
I don't recall him doing that, frankly.
I just
()
22 don't.
23 BY MR. CRAIG :
24 Q.
On t7e day of the accident, what wa s yo ur pe rc eptio n 25 of the flow of information and data and r ecommenda tions from TAYLOS ASSOCIATES.
J.
B.
Lcg an 64 1
the operators in to this think tank group we have discussed?
I) 2 A.
I really would be hard pressed to give you an 3
evaluation of that, because I was not involved, and I really
()
4 don' t know except wha t I was told.
5 Q.
When you were in charge in the a f ternoon, were you 6
receiving information or data or any recommendations up from 7
the operators themselves?
8 A.
Well, I'm sure I was receiving any reports of any 9
information that was occurring, but I can't tell you what it 10 was now.
11 BY MR. MOSELEY:
12 Q.
Didn' t you tell us earlier you weren' t aware of x (])
13 Chwastyk's actions and the things he was doing in the 14 afternoon?
15 A.
As far as allocating losses and stuff.
16 Q.
And switching flow paths.
17 A.
Unless we had been told to do that.
I can' t 18 remember right now what we were told to do when Miller lef t.
19 If he told us to do that, we were doing it.
20 Q.
Wouldn't you have been aware if Miller had left i
21 specific instructions?
{
[}
22 A.
Yes.
I ' nt just telling you I don' t remember.
23 Q.
Again, I would like you, if you could, to give us 24 your percer. tion of the flow of info rmation, data,
25 recommendations, orders -- not erders but data within the TAYLOE ASSOCI ATES
J. B.
Logan 65 1
think tank.
(%
(_/
2 A.
Nell, let me again tell you I did no t pa r ticipa te in 3
the think tank as a member, as far as the operation of the
()
4 plant went.
I would report to Miller the actions that were 5
ccmpleted or being taken, or any information that we had from 6
the emergency plan implemen ta tio n.
7 Now, Miller was in conversation, as I say, the 8
entire time, either on the phone or with the peo ple in the 9
control room, in and out, stuff like this, and I would be in 10 at times, but I can't tell you whe ther the flow of 11 information was good or bad.
12 BY MR. HOEFLING:
- { )
13 Q.
Did Miller call you into his of fice when he wanted 14 to speak eith you or did you go in when you felt you had 15 something he might need?
16 A.
I would go in when I felt I had something.
17 Q.
Was he accessible?
18 A.
Oh, yeah.
Well, when you could get through the 19 stuff.
If there was something I f elt was very impo rtant tha t 20 he know, like if there were readings that I felt he should 21 know right then, then I would in te r r upt wha teve r he was doing.
22
)
But he was certainly busy.
23 Q.
Wa s he -- wha t wa s Mr. Rodgers doing at this time?
p 24 A.
He's an adviser to Miller.
As you know, he is a B&W --
%)
25 he was a B&W on-the-si te repr esen ta tive, and he was providing s
TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Logen 66 1
advice, r ecommenda tions, I'm sure, to Miller.
()
2 Q.
Mr. Miller was relying on Mr. Radgers, then?
3 A.
I'm sure he was accepting his information.
I think
()
4 he has a lot of confidence in Mr. Rodgers.
5 BY MR. CRAIG:
6 Q.
During the think tank --
7 A.
Plus, let m' j ust add one thing.
Mr. Rodgers also e
8 was getting in fo rmation from Lynchburg and providing the 9
corporate recommendations from B&W.
10 BY MR. MOSELEY:
11 Q.
Could you tell us what led you to conclude he was 12 getting this info rma tion?
(}
13 A.
Some of this pe rha ps is hindsight, but I think he s
14 has stated that he was getting in fo rma tion from --
15 Q.
Shadell?
16 A.
a phone arrangement that came to the house,
17 either his house or Rodgers' house, and then in to a phone 18 that was in the back.
19 Q.
You weren' t aware, on March 28, of any specific fe ed bac 20 that came back through that chain?
21 A.
I don' t recall, on the 28th, of being aware of tha t, jq 22 no.
Subsequently we put up -- we set a phone back there,
%)
23 specifically fo r B&W.
But at som e time I recall having a 24 conversa tion -- I don't know if it was the 28th or not 25 when they did call from their headquar ters at Lynchburg.
?
TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lcgen 67 1
Q.
Would this have been in the af ternoon concerning the
(
2 restarting of the fuel pump itself, the late afternoon?
3 A.
Sometime, yes.
I did not talk to them during that
()
4 period of time but Rodgers had, because I recall they came up 5
with some recommendation about time frames on starting it, 6
and if it didn' t, securing it and restarting it.
7 Q.
This would be the wait time between attempts?
8 A.
Yes.
And I know that he had been in conversation 9
with them, because he said they were very adamant about 10 wa i ting -- I f o rg e t wha t it was -- five minutes, or 15 11 minutes, between starts.
12 BY MR. CRAIG:
- (])
13 Q.
During the think tank meetings, can you describe --
14 I realize again you weren't there for a lot of them.
Would 15 you descrioe tne flow of info rmation, the gave and ta ke, or 16 was everybody talking at once?
Would I have to outshout 17 somebody else, were people intimidated to talk?
What was it 18 like in there?
19 A.
I did no t really participate in any ones where such 20 shouting matches occurred.
The information of the ones that 21 I was privy to, certainly info rmatien was pr esented, ideas 22 were freely given, accepted, weigheC, evaluated, a nd action
{)
23 was taken based on basically Miller's decisions or as 24 influenced by Herbein, or this type of thing.
25 Q.
Both Miller and Kunder have stated while they were T
T;AYLOE ASSOCIATES
J.
B.
Lugin 68 1
at the lieutenant governor's of fice on the 28th they
()
2 telephoned back to the site.
This is in the afternoon.
Did 3
you talk with either of them by telephone when they were-(])
4 calling?
5 A.
In the back of my mind, I think I talked to Miller,
6 but I couldn't swear, nor could I remember what the 7
conversa tion was.
8 Q.
Do you remember anybody else that would have talked 9
to him?
Did somebody come in to you and say, Miller says 10 this, or Kunder says that, or they want to know this?
L 11 A.
I don't remember.
12 Q.
On the day of the accident, did you make o r we re yo u
~13 aware of any other employee of Metropolitan Edison or GPU who 14 made calculations as to the extent of fuel failure based on 15 da ta from the containment dome r.onitor or other instruments?
16 A.
On the day of the accident?
I can' t honestly say I 17 do.
18 Q.
Since the TMI accident, have you been influenced, 19 either directly or indirectly, to change any of your 20 recollections?
21 A.
Would you restate that?
22 Q.
Since the day of the accident, have you been g
%)
23 in fluenc ed, either directly or indirectly, to change any of 24 your recollections concerning the accid en t?
25 A.
I haven't been influenced.
If you mean somebody TAYLOZ ASSOCIATES
\\
J.
B.
Loc tn 69 1
trying to influence me, no.
Nobody has done that.
()
2 Now, as you progress over a period of over almost 3
two years, you hear so much conversation, par ticipa te in
()
4 meetings like this with agents, such as yourself, where 5
information that comes out and in your mind you say, yeah, I 6
remember that.
Maybe you don' t.
7 So that's why I say when I say that I remember 8
somett ing, a lot of times I'm not -
you know, did it 9
actually -- did I remember seeing that at the time it 10 occurred or from something somebody said.
11 In that context, some things may have clarified in 12 my mind.
I don' t think I changed anything.
{])
13 Now, as far as when I remember seeing this or did I 14 see that, that may have changed because of something somebody 15 said.
I say, yeah, I remember that.
But that's difficult.
16 And nobody has tried to influence me in anything I said.
17 BY MR. G AMB LE:
18 Q.
Mr. Log an, a little while ago we asked a couple of 19 questions about Mr. Seelinger's presence in unit two in the 20 afternoon of March 28, and you indicated you weren' t aware of 21 him being present in the a f ternoon.
Are you saying now that 22 you just don't remember or was your memory in such a po si tion 2'3 you are saying he de finitely wasn' t there?
24 A.
No, I don' t remember him being there.
Jim was sent e qEL 25 over to unit aser sometime during the day.
Part of the
'N TAYLOS ASSOCIATES
i J.
B.
Logan 70 1
emergency plan was to establish a separate office, and I have
(])
2 forgotten the terminology now that we used up there.
And I
.3 believe Jim was sent over there to take charge of that office.
({])
4 Now, whether he came back after tha t, I don' t recall.
5 It wouldn't have been unusual for me to see him.
I was not j
6 aware, however, that Ross had called him.
7 Rose was, more or less, in charge as the senior 8
shift supervisor la unit two, and I am surprised if they was 9
having trouble -- one, he didn't say anything to me.
But I 10 am also surprised he couldn't handle it himself, if he wa s 11 having trouble with people.
Because Ross is a very dynamic 12 individual, and it just surprises me.
efg 13 Q.
So it is possible Mr. Seelinger was in in the U
14 af ternoon and you just can't remember?
15 A.
R ig ht.
The number of people that cycled in and out 16 of there was fantastic.
17 MR. CRAIG: Well, that concludes the in te rv iew.
18 We would like to thank you for coming and talki ng to 19 us.
We will provide you with a copy of this transcript, via 20 Mr. Wilson, so you can look for corrections.
And we would 21 ask that you provide those corrections to us as quickly as 22 possible.
23 THE WITNESS: Okay.
24 (Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m.
the taking of the 25 deposition was concluded.)
l TAYLOE ASSOCIATES
7, J.
B.-LogLn i
T 1:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY : COMMISSION O
\\~E 2-3 This is :to cer tify that~ the attached proceedings:
hy 4
before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
5 Metropolitan Edison Company'(TMI II), deposi tion 1of' Joseph
~6' Bailey Logan, 7
Date of' Proceeding: October 16, 1980 8
Docket No.:
9
-Place of Proceeding: Surry, Virginia 4
10 were. held as herein appears, and that this is the 11
' ORIGINAL _ transcript thereof for the filesiof the 12 Commission.
(
- 13 14 Carol F.
To riello 15 Official Reporter (typed) 16 17
[AM
~
Official Reporter (signature) 18 f
19 i
20 21 22
, [)
23 24 25 TAYLOC ASSOCIATES
-s
4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Corrections to the October 16, 1980, Interview of Joseph B. Logan:
i Page Line Change To Read IS' ta he y,, a g e we V,,, ci i
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