ML19343D446
| ML19343D446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1980 |
| From: | Reilly M PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040505 | |
| Download: ML19343D446 (24) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
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NUCtEAR REcUtATORY COMMISSION 3,
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(~J) 4 In the matter of:
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5 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY 9
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Room 202, Federal Building d
228 Walnut Street n
9 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania ioy 10 Wednesday, October 1, 1980 z
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12 INTERVIEW OF MARGARET REILLY
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14 APPEARANCES:
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15 NORMAN MOSELEY, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, d
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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JOHN CRAIG, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, d
17 i Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
N 18 l E
TERRY HARPSTER, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5
Office of Inspection & Enforcement.
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i DAVID GAMBLE, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 20[
office of Inspector & Auditor.
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21 RICHARD HCEFLING, ESO., U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission, Office of Executive Legal Director.
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2 MR. GAMBLE:
This interview is being conducted as a 3
Portion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation i
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4 into the information exchange between Metropolitan Edison s
5 Company and the NRC on March 28th, 1979.
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6l At this time, if you would raise your right hand.
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Whereupon, C
8 8i MARGARET REILLY n
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9 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was Y
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BY MR. GAMBLE:
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O Please state your full name for the record.
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My name is Margaret A.
for Agnes, Reilly.
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What is your current position?
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My current position is Chief of the Division of e
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17 Environmental Radiation, Bureau of Radiation Protection, 5
18 l Pennsylvania Departrent of Environmental Resources.
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O Is this the same position you held on March 28th, 1979?
5 20 j A
Yes.
21l BY MR. MOSELEY:
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22l Q
Ms. Reilly, on March 28th, it was perceived by the O
23 i plant staff that shortly following the automatic shutdown of i
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the reactor, that the raactor was returning to criticality as
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5 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 To your knowledge, on March 28th, was this information
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2 provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
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Not to my knowledge, that it was coming back.
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Q This is early in the morning, but before 6:00, yes.
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A Not to my knowledge.
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Should this information have been passed on to the sj 8
Commonwealth?
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That it was returning to criticality after he stuck O
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Yes.
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Yeah, that would be kind of interesting.
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Why do you feel this information was not passed on A
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I have no idea.
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Do you feel this information was withheld?
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Depends on what you call withheld.
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was a pretty hairy situation.
I know what our place was like; I c
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20 before they called us, they still hadn't gotten around to calling 21 us, so it could be the matter of they didn't remember to tell 22 us, they didn't think -- or they didn't think we could use the
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information, or whatever.
24 I'm not saying that they withheld it.
I'm not saying
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that they forgot.
I don't know.
It's all speculation, if it t
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happened.
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Q Do you feel that the utility didn't recognize or s
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A Could be.
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-Q Do you feel that the utility's communication systems N
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were inadequate?
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I'd welcome them to the club, then.
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Q Well, in asking that particular question -- excuse me, d
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No, that's all right.
Go ahead.
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In asking that particular question, I had in mind a
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I had in mind a system to
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bring together information that is candidate for passing on
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and some evaluative process of, "Yes, we should report that, no, z
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we shouldn't report that," and for this or that reason.
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Okay.
For considering it's a year and a half later, I
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an awful lot of people have gone to school in the meantime, I x
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would say it's inadequate.
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But on March 28, you didn't have that feeling?
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No.
We had nothing to go by up to that point.
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if there's one thing the accident did, it's give us some
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opportunity to see what it is we are supposed to be dealing with.
22 23 That's what I mean by having gone to school.
The people realize i
3 24 stuff now that you really couldn't foresee then.
You don't
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BY MR. HOEFLING:
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Q But on March 28th, you felt that you were getting 3
the information from the site you needed?
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Yeah.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q Do you believe that other organizations within the d
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other organization'would understand what it would mean.
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Going to another specific, the reactor coolant pumps
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I don't know that I got it, but I know there were 5
5 18 notes to the effect that there were voids in the system, that 5
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there was something about -- some information come through to 5
1 20 the effect --
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Do you want to refer to this?
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(Witness examining document.)
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- There was something some place about, "We are goinq 24 j to shut the pump down to avoid cavitation," but I don' t knew if 25j that's written.
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Did you have a perception on e
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amount of voiding that existed in the loops?
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A I think it was on the -- I knew on the 28th, there rj 8
was words to the effect that there were voids in the system.
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The thing is, I'm not a nuclear engineer.
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We knew things were not wonderful.
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Okay.
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Q Do you feel that this information, that is the fact E
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of the amount of voiding and its effect on primary coolant 7:
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pump operation, do you feel that should have been passed on to E
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A It should have been passed to the state, yes, and I E
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you have voids in the system, you have to kill the pump to O
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You know, to that extent.
b 23 Now to the extent of how big this void was physically, 24 you know, in terms of the bottom line being the core is uncovered, 25 we didn't have that information, or that didn't sink in.
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wasn't said in those words,-or wasn't understood, whatever.
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2 It's one of my key points-before the action, was if the core is 3
uncovered, you have necessarily big trouble, and to that point
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out, and if I had known that on the 28th, you'd still'have a' R
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wrecking crew still trying to get me off the~ wall, to be perfectly s
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honest.
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Try it.
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Why do you feel this information wasn't passed on to P
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Okay.
The framework of your question is indeed a 25j fact.
Assuming that that was the case, I have no idea why it 1
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made.
I cannot certify to you that each and every person who O)
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' get that from the Rogovin report, which was sort of s
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news to me at the time.
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Do I feel it was withheld?
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tenor about it.
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Okay.
Do you feel that this withholding was a 5
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on to the state?
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I have no idea.
That would be speculation on my part.
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And when you say you believe it was withheld, do you 5
1 20 l believe that to be synonymous with it wasn't provided?
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Right.
We didn't get it, but I don't know why we 3
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Okay.
Do you feel that the utility perhaps, or in fact, 24 saw no need to pass this information to you?
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A That's a possibility.
A lot of these are wandering
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out of 'the room on conjecture.
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minds.
All'I know is what I read in the papers, sometimes.
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Yeah.
Less and less as time goes by.
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I-f they had, I don' t know who or why, again, because 1
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Another factor, the electromatic relief valve had 10 been stuck open for a period in excess of two hours.
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At the time, no, I don't think so.
That's the PORV?
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Pressurizer.
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Mr. Dornsife has told us that he was aware of this,-
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17 but you weren't involved in those conversations?
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Not really.
I was almost working in another orbit.
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20 l stumbling down, saying, "What's the raddation rate in Steelton,"
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Actually the first day I had very little dealings I
22 with the plant.
Af ter -- I think it u : curred sort of early in
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I'm lucky at least I could
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tell that it was day or night outside.
We learned a few lessons e-k-)
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Clocks, tape recorders.
Yes, we went to 3
school.
Go ahead.
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Another factor, the HPI, the high pressure injection,.
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had been secured early or immediately following the accident, N
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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
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I don't have knowledge of it.
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Dornsife might have known it, or whatever.
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But you have no recollection of it?
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I didn't talk to anybody on it.
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Do you think this information should have been passed z
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2 15 A
Yes.
I think to some extent we should have been asking a=
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Do you feel dtbs was withheld?
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Again we are in the realm of conjecture.
We didn't i
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get it and I have no idea -- I don' t have -- let's see, get it 5
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know why not.
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Okay.
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I ought to have an acronym for that answer.
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Q You may.
However, I'm trying to eliminate the
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we should record your views on particular things.
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did or did not recognize and adequately evaluate this information?
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In retrospect, in forming an opinion from what I have sj 8
read in the Rogovin report and some other stuff, I think they Jd 9
just didn't recognize what they had.
The net effect is they I
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were destroying the plant, and I don't think you do that Ej 11 consciously.
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Q Let me see if I can get a generic answer here, rather E
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If it was passed to someone else, I don't know who or I
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Standard answer.
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Okay.
Then I won 't ask you that question for all the I
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20 l, on March 28th, the indicated reactor coolant I
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system temperature, specifically hotlegs, were of a magnitude of I
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22 j 700-800* Fahre nheit.
23 To your knowledge, was this information provided to 24 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on March 28th?
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It may have been.
As I indicated before, I had very a
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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dialog with the plant myself.
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So you have no specific knowledge of whether this was 3
or was not?
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I don't have any : specific recollection of what parcels e
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What is written here on these three E
6 sheets from Dornsife, I don' t know that this is all that came R
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There could have been more that just wasn't written Ej 8
down.
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Q But you have no recollection?
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I don't have any personal recollection.
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We will run through some specifics,.just to make sure.
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To your knowledge, was this information i
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It may have been, but I don't have personal knowledge w=
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There was a serious inventory deficiency which existed 5_
18 in the reactor coolant system.
Was this information passed on?
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Inventory deficiency?
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Primary coolant water deficiency.
21 A
Oh, water volume.
I don't have personal knowledge of 22
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it having been passed on.
23 Q
Should this information have been passed on?
3 24 i A
Yes.
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And this would have been your view if I had asked you j
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1l on March-28?
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Yeah.
Right.
If you're short of water, you have some 3
problems.
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Q Excuse me.
You said you had no personal knowledge of N
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it being passedcon?
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A It wasn't' passed to me, and it may have gone to someone sj 8,
else, and I don't know if it did or not.
Maybe a year ago I d
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would have known, but-I don't any more.
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So you don't have second-hand knowledge even that it El 11 '
went to someone-else?
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No.
I could have had -- maybe someone did tell me,
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even remember what I got for Christmas last year, so you know 2
15 what you are dealing with.
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Let me go back and pick up a couple of things I forgot 19 ;
to ask a question on.
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20 l Going back to the temperatures of 700-800*, and you 21 have already testified about your knowledge on that, so let me 22
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ask you the question, should this information have been passed on?
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A Yes.
24 Q
Again that's your-view, that would have been your 25j view if I'd asked you on March 272 8
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A Hotleg and coldleg temperatures have a lot to do with
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at the computer terminals down below 'the control room, and those i
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measurements, local measurements, indicated possible temperatures R
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in excess of 2000* Fahrenheit.
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To your knowledge, was this information passed on?
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Not that I know of.
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Is that, "No, it wasn't," or you just don't know one
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I don't know.
I think if someone would have known
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15 the course of one of these, I think the number 2000 would have 16 j
stuck pretty well.
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O Should that-information have been passed on?
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Yes.
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on the 28th of March, I think it would have been nice 21 to be --
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Okay.
Do you feel this information was withheld?
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And again you are equating withheld with where it
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wasn't provided?
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I think they thought maybe we wouldn' t know how to use 3
it, maybe.
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At approximately 1:50 p.m.,
on March 28th, the Unit 2 3
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Psig, and then sharply decreased.
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7 To your knowledge on March 28, was this information s
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provided to the Commonwealth?
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No.
And if memory serves, they.aidn't recognize it as Y
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I think we didn't know it.
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Some did and some didn't.
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The bit about somebody saying, "Oh, gee, look at the l
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This was not given to the state on March 28th in the-
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Correct.
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19 to some of the other things that your recollection was more --
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Fomething like that, I think I would have snatched 21 onto that one.
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Q Again, should this information have been passed on?
23 A
Yes.
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Q Both if I had asked you on March 28th and today?
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0 Your view is the same.
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Do you feel this was withheld -- and let ma ask you 2
3 in this case, something that would be more than just simply
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4 failing to tell?
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A I dan't think so.
Maybe I suffer from a problem.
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don't think that stuff was withheld, that information was with-R 7
held from'us, but it was a matter of -- we had a certain onus M
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to ask for stuff, I think, and we learned a lot about how to dd 9
manage a few problems along those lines since then.
But there Y
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Of course, we 5
2 15 are again suffering from hindsight.
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You think they would have provided the information?
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I think so.
Maybe I'm crazy, but I think they would E
5 18 have.
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I wasn't sufficiently specific.
I meanc to say they 1
20 would have volunteered this information.
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I think if we had asked, they would have.
Maybe I'm --
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the thing is I can't really judge.
I have no way of judging 22 23 '
whether they deliberately withheld
.n a malicious way the rg 24 l information.
That's -- I wasn't -- I couldn't look at them V
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while someone could have been asking for this information.
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have no way of knowing.
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Well, then, would you characterize it as that the 3
utility was answering any specific question, you had no problem
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4 with getting the response to any specific question you asked?
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A I don' t think we asked enough cuestions.
We were sort E'
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Then would you characterize the quality of the sj 8
information that was volunteered -- and by quality, I really mean dd 9
quantity and quality as well.
I just don't know how to phrase it i
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I think we could have used more volume, a greater a
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I have 5
13 talked to several people who were getting bits and pieces of what
{ 14 was going -- the information flowing out of there, and people 2 15 who were away from it or were not involved in it eventually w= j 16 could sit back and say, " Good grief, the core is uncovered." A d 17 It's one thing to be sitting out in Chicago making z i I 18 that diagnosis, and another thing to be sitting either at the E h 19 plant or 19 miles away. Your thoughts are -- your thought n 20 patterns are quite different. 21 So I don't know whether -- if information was not I ) 22 l provided, I don' t know whether it was because it was withheld 23 ' in a malicious way or because they didn't know that we could use p., 24l it, or if they recognized it at the time, that they recognized \\~/ i 25j they had a problem. 0l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC. r .v,,. r-
I l 18 i [ I think perhaps we had a communications problem, too, j i (s) in that we should have been hooked in better with, say, the 2 3 station superintendent, The people I tended to talk to -- now () 4l I can't remember offhand who Dornsife was talking to -- but e 5 the people I tended to talk to were the health physics types E a 1 N 6! who were perhaps one generation removed from thermocouple readings I i { 7 and all that. a r n So what information that I got from them, I was 8 8! 9 essentially satisfied at the time with it. i 10 l 0 Then I could characterize that as the survey data, f 4 I ,5 11 ' the health physics, all the health physics stuff, your belief is i d 12 ; that that was volunteered, by and large? z 5 l () ,s 13 A Yeah. And they began to have background trouble = E 14 l down there, they couldn't use their counter when they wanted d I w i 15 to verify some of the offsite airborne iodine measurements, E g' 16 which the offsite measurements suggested that there was fairly 1. p 17 ' low concentrations of iodine. They wanted to establish whether E 4 E 18 ! in fact this was the case. So they sent several of those canisterg I { 19 j the cartridges, by helicopter up to Holy Spirit, and we got one 5 4 20l of our people to run over there, and we jellied them and, you 21 ; know, I've been dealing with these guys for a while. I never had; I r'\\ 22k reason to suspect they were pulling a fast one. (__/ g 23 Q I think you may have answered the cuestion I was 3 (^g 24l about to ask, but let me ask it specifically. You have no s/ 25j reason to think that information was willfully withheld? I 4 AL.DERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
I 19 1l A Yes. ( 2 0 -- from the s tate on March 2 8th. Is that your view? 3 A Yeah. Essentially it was my' feeling earlier on, () 4 and maybe it's wrong, but that's the feeling I had.. g 5 O So whatever information wasn't passed on, there may 6-6 have been a variety of reasons which would include that maybe E 7 they didn't think you were interested in it, or -- s j 8 A They forgot to tell'us, or they didn't realize it d d 9l was a problem. Y l 10 0 Okay. Any others that we could add to that list? z = i j 11 l A Not really. I think it sort of characterizer the u y 12 situation. = .() = 13 0 Okay. Mr. Gerushy has testified and, in fact, it 14 appears on this note which he had taken, that there.was a 10-R E l 2 15 per hour calculation made at Goldsboro. E j 16 A A' projection, yes. A d 17, Q For Goldsboro. Were you aware of this on March 28th? 5 5 18 A Yeah, that was very early. That was on the order of 5 19 j 7:30, quarter to 8:00 in the morning. I 20 l O Are there any other records, documents or any other 21 f material that might bear on the information that was exchanged {} 22 h with you, you or any other members of BRP, about this, other 23 ' than this note that I have in my hand? (~'/ 24j A I have the distinct recollection at one time I wrote S \\- j some of this stuff down, especially having to do with some of 25j! ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
20 i their offsite measurements around that time and all that, but I -- 7(q-) that's some of the -- 2 3 0 Ue were given a draft of.a letter to Mr. Bruce () 4 London. It doesn't have a -- being a draft, it doesn't have who e 5 it's from. N 8 6 (Laughter.) e i 7 Is this the write-up that you're referring to? 8 A (Witness examining document.) J d 9 No, it was notes I had scribbled down, and somewhere Y E 10 between -- I had some very sketchy stuff, I think on Wednesday i 5 5 11 and I think on Friday but somehow or other I lost control of <a 4 12 them. I know at one time about early in the morning on Friday, 5 () 3 13 I was writing with a pencil like this, I'm going to kill a fed, 5 A 14 and I kicked a vase across the room. But I don't know where E l E 15 that stuff got to, because I was -- you know,.it becane obvious 5 a. 16 that -- and one should have known ahead of time this stuff tends 'A \\ d 17 l to be investigated. I thought, "I want to scarf this stuff up." w i I 5 18 I couldn't find it. I may have thrown it away. I don't know = l E 19 what. A 20 l This handwriting in here is Dornsife's. l i 21 l 0 So your statement on the other material is that if h (]} 22 l you still have it, you don't know where it is? l 23 l A Right. And I suspect I don't have it, because I l 24 looked around for it quite a bit. (]} i 1 25j Q One of the things we are particularly trying to nail c h ) ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
I 21 1 down with as much specificity as we could was the timing of i I () 2 the initial report and when the -- 3 A When the plant called us, you mean? l () 4 0 Yes, when you were first told of the 10-R per hour s 5 prediction, and also when you were specifically told, " Hey, it's 0 j 6 not a good prediction. We've got some readings that" R 8 7 A Okay, I got into the office, I think, around 25 after M j 8 7:00, and Gerusky was already there. Later I asked him how d d 9 did he know to get in, and he said, "You called me, dummy." So, I 10 you know, that gives you an idea. E l l 11 So I think my gut feeling on that is it was around B g 12 between 7: 30 and quarter of 8 :00, probably closer to 7:30. I l 9 l (N-} E 13, keep having the feeling that we had tweaked -- the utility had ~ E j j 14 ' told us that, and we had tweaked PEMA, and the decision was made 2 15 to turn it off before 8:00 o' clock, and things quieted down, and 5 y 16 I went and called Agriculture. W i 6 17 [ Q Mr. Dornsife made reference to perhaps a log that 5 i 5 18 ' PEMA may have. Do you believe that their logs might be more W { 19 l precise on the timing of these things? n 20 A Yeah, it could be. 21 O And you wo11d have called them directly, promptly, l l 22 i immediately upon hearing this? 23 A I remember talking to Williamson. I don't know -- l C_rdc)Williamson is the deputy. Gre? I remember talking to him at 24 - O,. 4 l ~ " Hey, 25 least once. I don' t know whether I called him to say, i 4 k' a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
22 1 get your ears on," or I talked to him later, saying, " Forget'it." C1 2 i I remember talking to Williamson. I could have also talked to Dick Lammison, who is the operations. officer,- 3 4 0 - Well, do you recall that as soon 'as -- at least you i e 5 l were you were aware of this prediction, that almost the first ~ \\ n 3 6 i next thing that was done was to call them? e g R 7 I'm trying to say if we go to their logs, how much -7 3 8 earlier -- e. d-d 9, A If they're saying 10-R, you know, we tend to be a f E 10 little on the conservative side, but if somebody says 10-R, and i= we know it's going to take some time to get the forces together 2 11 ?. j 12 to move people, so you might as well start getting your organiza-5 n) d 13 j tions up during the time it. takes to verify, which is why we said (_ E j pv tcuM j 14 j to PEMA, " Tweak, you ara counting. Get ready, we will be back g i E 15 to you as soon as we have something to indicate whether this is j 16 1 real or not." A y 17, BY MR. GAMBLE: 5 e E 18 0 So if a PEMA log indicated a specific time they received ? ? 19, notification from you, would that mean you received it within M 20 ! five minutes? l 21 A Yeah, within a short time. I came in and I saw -- I 3 (]) 22 l remember walking into Gerusky's office and hearing him repeat 1 23j the words they had just moved it into a general emergency. That's 1 (]) 24j a hard way to greet the day, you know. 25j I went back to my office and got the map together and 1 a" ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
23 I some other odds and ends, and I threw it in the floor in his 2 office, and around that time they were -- this was like just 3 after 7:30. O 4, a Sim11er1y, efter you got the word ehee le wee en g 5 erroneous reading or whatever, that it was off, did you also 8 1 j 6l call PEMA immediately after that? R 7 A Within a short -- very shortly thereafter. n 5, 8 0 So again if their log indicated when you called them,
- J y
9 you would have heard just before? ? .-g 10 A Yeah. 5 II BY MR. MOSELEY: is y 12 0 Where is the PEMA office? Is it in the same building 5 /] g 13 you are in? w 5 I4 A No, it's in the Transportation Safety Building, which C 15 is at the corner of Commonwealth and Forester Street. It's j 16 about a five-minute walk across the hill. x h I7 ! O I'm wondering if you could give us a name. Perhaps E 3 18 while we are here, we could go over and talk to -- c.4e h I9,l A Talk to-G Williamson or Dick Lammison. They have n 20 since changed directors, but I didn' t have any dealings with 21 I the past director, voice contact during the thing, anyway. I ]. 22) Q Going back to our specifics that we were going i 23 ' through before, I just have, I think, one more. O 24 l George Kunder, the superintendent of Technical D 1 25) Support for Met Ed, told the Senate Special Investigation that i i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
24 j he and others had been concerned that the core had been 2 uncovered for a period of hours after 6:45 a.m. 3 To your knowledge, was this information provided to you 4 or to the BRP? e 5 A Not to my knowledge, because as I indicated before, ~ i N s 6 had I known that, you'd have a wrecking crew still trying to get e i { 7 me off the wall. .n 5 8 0 And to your knowledge, no other organizations within u dd 9 the state were told? Y E 10 A Correct. Same caveat there. E 5 11 Q Ms. Reilly, can you recall other information which <h d 12 should have been passed on to you or the BRP, but was not on E i () h 13 March 28th? E y 14 A I can't think of anything offhand. The thing that 5 2 15 sort of interests -- that I think about a bit in retrospect is 5 g 16 in one of the Commission's great gripes about the whole thing, i g' 17 i or trying to explain their situation was that they had a rough 5 I E 18 time getting contact with the plant, and from about 25 after i 5 19 7:00 on the 28th, and for about two weeks thereafter, we had n 20 l an open line with the plant, and they could have asked us and 21 could have found out, but it seemed all Bethesda was interested (]) 22 in was milk data. They get very upset when I tell them to call 1 i l 23 ' later, because they got me up off the floor, which was the only []} 24 place to sleep in those days. 25 : But I can't -- I think you probably had everything. b l} ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. l.
1 25 1 0 Going back to the 10-R per hour projection, do you (3 kJ 2 recall what specifically the site told you which caused you to 3 go back from the alert or evacuation? () 4 A It was to the effect that they had sent teams over s 5 there, and they couldn't find any plume anywhere, no evidence of A 6l anything. In retrospect, I thought that was probably right, R R 7 because there wasn't enough pressure in the containment to get sj 8 up to that kind of dose projection. That projection was built dd 9 on having a design pressure in the containment, with whatever the icg 10 rate reading was up in the dome monitor. You take the dome El 11 monitor at one speed.2 percent per day and crank it out, but a d 12 that's assuming you have XDX psi in there, which they didn't ({) l ') have at that time. So that sort of explained why it wasn't there. j 14 0 Were you told that the survey had been made in Goldsborco E E 15 or were you told that the survey had been made onsite? j 16 A It was across the river. I don' t know that it was A d 17 l Goldsboro, because actually the wind direction was out of 30', 5 E 18 which doesn't really nail Goldsboro. It's more that space 5 19 l between Goldsboro and Yorkhaven. n 20 Q But it was your understanding on March 28th it was 21 an offsite reading as opposed to an onsite? I 22 I A My understanding was it was an offsite reading, and s 23 I they had gotten the teams over there using helicopters, because {} you couldn't have driven the distance in that period. It takes 24 1 25j you the better part of an hour to get across the river. 0 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
26 1 BY MR. GAMBLE: () 2 Q Did you receive that report, or was that somebody 3 else? () 4I A I think I got it, and I think it was Dick Dubeal. g 5 BY MR. HARPSTER: 0 6 0 Did you get your stuffed albatross for Christmas? R R 7 A There have been people out looking for those. Is sj 8j the bird extinct? U d 9 BY MR. MOSELEY: io 10 0 I don't think so. I think it's still arourd. E j 11 A A goony bird would do. a j 12 MR. MOSELEY: That completes our interview, Ms. = 13 Reilly. I want to thank you very much for your time and (]) h 14 patience. None of us enjoy re-plowing this ground, but hopefully $j 15 weuwill be able to come up with something. Thank you. = j 16 (Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the interview w 17 I was adjourned.) 5 5 18 5 E 19 Xb 20 21 22 gg ~ 23 24 I (2) 25 i h ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
J7 O acetrxa arcutarOar cO e41ss:cs This is c certify tha: the attached proceedings before the 0 in the =atter of: 21ETROPOLITA'i EDISO?i CO1GANY TIII, UNIT 2
- D a t e c.JERVIEU OF MARGARh"'ef, /, if 9D IN REILLY
?rcceeding: i Decket !!u=b er : Place of ?rcceeding: // w [ m hq. G' ~ were held as herein appears, and tha: this is the criginal transcrip: therecf for the file cf the Cc==issicr.., i Ann 2.' L,, i / Official Reporter (Typed) ' O / Official Repceter (Signature) O h a ./ O, ~ J P00RORSE
~ A I' 7 _ r.-=,
- W COMMONWEALTil OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES "g
w. Post Office Box 2063 - s.' IIarrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 {JT October 14, 1980 (717) 787-3479 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Division of Reactor Operation Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Moseley:
This refers to the transcript of my October 1,1980 interview regarding the USNRC investigation into the information exchange between Metropolitan Edison Company and NRC on March 28, 1979. t l Enclosed is a copy each of pages 21, 22, and 23 of that transcript with corrections. Please call if questions arise. Thank you. SApeerely, u-M0 p MRGARE . REILLY, Chief Division of Environmental Fadiation Bureau of Radiation Protection Enclosure ! O V
I i 21 ^ ] i I 13 down with as much specificity as we could was the timing of i i 2] the initial report and when the -- i 3$ A When the plant called us, you mean? , w 4 0 Yes, when you were first told of the 10-R per hour g 5 prediction, and also when you were specifically told, " Hey, it's s j 6j not a good prediction. We've got some readings that" I R } 7 A Okay, I got into the office, I think, around 25 after j a 1 j 8 7:00, and Gerusky was already there. Later I asked him how j 9 did he know to get in, tad he said, "You called me, dummy." So, ! i 10, you know, that gives yca an idea. i z i -j 11 i So I think my gut feeling on that is it was around j a e f 12 between 7: 30 and quarter of 8 00, probably closer to 7:30. I ) E E 13 keep having the feeling that we had tweaked -- the utility had i = j 14 told us that, and we had tweaked PEMA, and the decision was made ! N 15 to turn it off before B:00 o' clock, and things quieted down, and ' r 6 i i y 16 I went and called Agriculture. j ^ e d 17 ! O Mr. Dornsife made reference to perhaps a log that x= E 18 PEMA may have. Do you be'lieve that their logs might be more a 19 I, precise on the timing of these things? t n ? 20 l A Yeah, it could be. 21f O And you would have called them directly, promptly, )1 22 - immediately upon hearing this? i 23 A I remember talking to Williamson. I dcn't know -- ) (hthlb l 24 Geeg Williamson is the deputy. I remember talking to him at i I 25 13ast once. I don't know whether I called him to say, " Hey, ) d ) %l ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
"C 0 1 3 j h 'L. 22 t 1 get your ears on," or I talked to him later, saying, " Forget it." 'il l 2 1 I remember talking to Williamson. s I could have 4-1 l 3i also talked to Dick Lammisc: h , who is the operations officer. sw 41 Q Well, do you recal.t that as soon as -- at least you i e 5 were you were aware of this prediction, E that almost the first n 3 6 next thing that was done was to call them? e -n 7 i I'm trying to say if we go to their logs, how much 8) carlier -- n a 9 A If they're saying 10-R, you knew, we tend to be a i E to little on the conservative side, but i if somebody says 10-R, and = 2 11, we know it's going to take some time to get the forces together a f 12 to move people, so you might as well start getting your 'organiza, ) 5 F s 13 I tions up during the time it takes to verify, which is why we said 'i! YCOR 800dTI$h A. 14 to PEMA, " Tweak, y^" = w un m.g. Get ready, we will be back l t= i 15 to you as soon as we have something to indicate whether this is l a= 16 3 real or not." 4 g 17 BY MR. GAMBLE: 18 O So if a PEMA log indicated a specific time they received -c 19 l notification from you, would that mean you received it n i within 20i five minutes? i e 21 )i A Yeah, within a short time. I came in and I saw -- I 22 remember walking into Gerusky's office and hearing him repeat l 23, the werds they had just moved it into a general emergency. l That's: 24 a hard way to greet the day, you knew. 25 I went back to my office and got the map tcgether and
e, i I 23 l Ij some other odds and ends, and I threw it in the floor in his l I 2' office, and around that time they were -- this was like just C 3g after 7:30. l [4 Q Similarly, after you got the word that it was an 3 / 5; erroneous reading or whatever, that it was o ff, did you also l {6 call PEMA immediately after that? 7-I A I Within a short -- very shortly thereaf te-i e c 8> Q So again if their log indicated when you called them, i y. j !g d 12 9 (,O z, you would have heard just before? f,., @ ! 10 A Yeah. i = i jWD ll j BY MR. MOSELEY: j Ij 12} Q Where is the PEMA office? Is it in the same building c = ). j \\ 13 you are in? W = f 14 A No, it's in the Transportation Safety Building, which t = l [ 15 is at the corner of Commonwealth and Forester Street. It's E i j 16 about a five-minute walk across the hill. i A i I7 t Q O I'm wondering if you could give us a name. Perhaps i i .= 5 18 while we are here, we could go over and talk to -- 5 OR.h t te I9 I A Talk to Geeg Williamson er Dick Lammison. They have n 'O I since changed directors, but I didn't have any dealings with i 21 i the past director, voice contact during the thine, anyway. ) 22 O Going back to our specifics that we were going 23 : through before, I just have, I think, one more. '4 George Kunder, the superint,endent of Technical 25 Support for Met Ed, tcld the Senate Spec,ial Investigation that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC. - _ - -}}