ML19343D445
| ML19343D445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1980 |
| From: | Dieckamp H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040504 | |
| Download: ML19343D445 (31) | |
Text
-
f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION THREE MILE ISLAND O
INVESTIGATION l
WITNESS:
HERMAN M. DIECKAMP t
General Public Utilities 100 Interpace Highway Parsippany, New Jersey Friday, September 12, 1980 1:00 p.m.
i A P P E A R A N C E S:
t l
MORMAN C. MOSELEY
(
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
l TERRY HARPSTER Nuclear Regulatory Commission ERNEST BLAKE, ESQ.
l Metropolitan Edison Company 1
Adlerson Reporting 300 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20024 (202) 554-2345
%IO504050Y
l
^
i I
2 1
H E R M A N M.
D I E C K A M A,
sworn:
)
2 MR. HARPSTER:
The purpose of this 3
investigation is to further investigate flow of
()
4 information on March 28th, 1979 with regard to the 5
accident at Three Mile Island.
6
.MR.
MOSELEY:
Mr. Dieckamp.
You are 7
represented here by Mr. Blake who is Metropolitan 8
Edison's counsel.
'Is it your desire that he be 9
present?
10 THE WITNESS:
- Yes, it is.
11
- 1 R. MOSELEY:
Mr. Dieckamp on May 9. you 12 stated in a mailgram to Congressman Udall that there
.:J()
13 is no evidence that anyone interoreted the pressure 14 spike and the spray initiation in terms of key 15 reactor core damage a '- the time of the soike nor 16 that anyone withheld any information.
With whon did 17 you confer prior to making this statement?
18 THE WITNESS:
In the time period between 19 March the 28th and May the 9th I spent a 20 considerable amount of time at the site interacting 21 with many of the people directly involved on the day 22 of the accident in investigations after the accident 23 and in continuing efforts up to the date of that 24 mailgram.
That statement constituted my 25 understanding of the state of knowledge that I had
Dieckomp 3
1 derived from these many interactions during that
()
2 time period.
3 MR.
MCSELEY:
Were you aware at the time
()
4 the statement was made what had been done to confirm 5
the validity of the statement?
6
'THE WITNESS:
What I was aware of was 7
the interviews that the co'mpany personnel had made 8
of a number of the members of the operating staff.
9 I was also aware of'the narrative that Gary Miller 10 and a number of the plant staff that were present 11 during the early hours of the accident ma'd e a few 12 weeks after March 28th.
That statement by Gary L(T 13 Miller s u b's e q u e n t ly became part of his testimony J
14 betore the Kemmeny Commission.
I personally had l
t 15 reviewed Gary Miller's aummary and the transcript of l
16-a number of the interviews that the company hsd done 17 with plant personnel in the process of outting 18 together my testimony before the Mart Subcommittee 19 on, I think the date was April 2 3,. 1979, I had also 20 personally sat in on a number of review sessions 21 with our own investigating team trying to recteate l
l 22
'the conditions that followed the accident and trying O
23 to seek out the explanations of what had hapoened.
l 24 While I can't take credit of what some peoole right 25 describe as an exhaustive investigation necessary to i
Diockamp 4
1 provide absolute verification of the statement that
()
2 I made in the mailgram to Congressman Udall, I feel 3
that I had a considerable degree of awareness of the
()
4 available information.
I was also present at the 5
time in the control room during the visit of 6
Congressman Udall and members of his committee and 7
staff, I think, on the day before M a y. 4he-9 t h and 8
was personally present when statements were made by 9
the plant staff describing the observation of the 10 pressure pulse and the immediately ensuing actions.
11 MR. MOSELEY:
Were you aware at the time 12 the statement was made that both Chawastyk and
(()
11 Mehler attributed the spike to hydrogen?
14 THE WITNESS:
I'm not as of today aware 15 that both Mehler and Chawastyk attributed the soike ch N b.we d h sbhr
- Y 16 to hydr' ogen it any wclitee t e s t4aony.
I was at that 17 time unaware of any statement by them to that effect 18 and if such statements exist that are dated Drior to 19 May 9th, 79, I would very much apareciate seeing 20 them.
21 MR. MOSELEY:
I'm not aware of any l
22 written statements that they have made.
{}
23 THE WITNESS:
Well, sir, your question i
24 stated a fact in it as a condition.
Did it not?
25 MR MOSELEY:
I-don't believe so.
Dieckomp 5
1 THE WITNESS:
Nould you read back the
()
2 question please?
3 (The refer' red-to question read back by
()
4 the court repo rte r) 5 MR. MOSELEY:
And have you responded to 6
that question?
7 THE WITNESS:
I have responded to that 8
question.
9 MR. MOSELEY:
Nould you read the response 10 for me please.
11 (Answer to above referred-to question 12 read back by the court reporter)
I 13 MR. MOSELEY:
Mr. Dieckamp, do you now
! f{
14 consider tne statement to be accurate?
15 THE WITNESS:
I still consider the 16 statement that I made on May 9th to be accurate.
17 MR. MOSELEY:
The statement which says 18 that there is no evidence that anyone interpreted, 19 you believe that to be true?
20 THE WITNESS:
That no one interpreted 21 the spike in terms of core damage.
Is that the 1
22 exact phrasing?
23 MR. MOSELEY:
That's correct and the 1
24 spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage.
n v
25 THE WITNESS:
I have seen nothing to l
i 1
t
.,m
Diockamp q
1 date.
I have specifically seen nothing to date that
()
2 causes me to believe that that statement was 3
inaccurate as of the day of the accident.
f]
4 M R.- MOSELEY:
As of the date you made the 5
statement?
6 THE WITNESS:
No, I said read the 7
statement again that I made, please.
'W h a t did I say?
8
'MR.
MOSELEY:
Well, you said the 9
statement was true as of the date of the accident 1, 0 but I believe you made the statement on way 9th.
I 11 just don't want the record to be confused.
12 THE WITNESS:
Let us direct ourselves to
(
13 my statement and what is it again?
tvould you read 14 it.
15 MR. BLAME:
The statement that was made 16 on May 9th.
17 MR.
MOSELEY:
There is no evidence that 18 anyone interpreted the pressure spike and spray i
19 initiation in terms of reactor core damage at the 20 time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any 21 Information.
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22 THE WITNESS:
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1 MR. MOSELEY:
I guess I misunderstood
(])
2 what ~
had said before.
you 3
THE PITNESS:
Well, I didn't mean to be
()
4 contentious.
I just want to be sure we know what 5
we're talking about.
6 MR. MOSELEY:
Mr.
Dieckamp, are you now 7
satisfied that the information exchanged within the 8
Met Ed/GPU group during March 23th, 1979 was 9
minimally acceptable?
10
- 4 R. BLAKE:
Nould you repeat that 11 question.
12 MR. MOSCLEY:
Are you satisfied that the 13 information exchanged within the Mec Ed/Go'J grouc
{)
14 during March 23th, 1979 was minimally acceptable?
15 THE WITNESS:
I'm troubled by the 16 judgmental inference in the question about minimally I think it's impossible to look 17 acceptable.
I l
13 back at the accident and not feel that somehow.ae 19 totality of communications could have or should have 20 been better but I hasten to add that we're dealing 21 with an absolute first e *> e n t and for the people that 22 were directly involved it's very difficult "or ne to s
23 know exactly what should have been the emphasis that 24 they should place on devoting their attention to 25 dealing with the immediate problems that they faced
Diockomp
~
8 1
versus devoting their attention to maximizing the
()
2 degree of communication outside the plant.
I don't 3
think I -- as I say, I don't have in my nind an
()
4 absolute measure of what was or was not minimally 5
acceptable.
I have no trouble feeling, however, 6
that communications should have been better.
7 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, the question was 8
intended to be broad enough to include both 9
communications between people who were on site as 10 well as those communications -- communications by 11 those people with others.
12 THE WITNESS :
I'll apply my comment -- my
(
13 answer to both categories.
14 MR. MOSELEY:
Nere you aware, Mr.
l l
15 Dieckamp, on
, March 28th of the serious concerns that 16 individuals within Met Ed/GPU had about the olant?
17 THE WITNESS:
My awareness on March 29th 18 resulted first from a phone call from Walter Creitz 19 at I think a few minutes before nine o' clock on the 20 morning of March the 28th.
My next degree of l
L 21 awareness came about as a result of attending the 22 press conference of Governor scranton in the Caoital
{}
23 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, at, I think, in the 24 order of 10:30 to 11:30 in the morning.
My next
)
25 level of awareness came about as a result of a i
Diockamp o
1 chance encounter with Herbein, Miller and George
()
2 Kunder on the steps of the Pennsylvania 9 tate
~,
Capital as they were on their way to a meeting with
(])
4 Lieutenant Governer Scranton.
My next awareness on 5
the 28th came, I think, in a phone call with Bob 6
hrnold in the early evening after I had returned to 7
I don't recall that at any time I 8
gained the impression of extreme danger.
I don't 9
recall that-at any time I gained r'--
today with MY 10 hindsight I would characterize as an adequate 11 understanding of the state of the plant.
12 MR. MOSELEY:
Did you have in these
{}
13 conversations that you've described, did you receive the feeling of or expression of serious concern 14 a
15 on the part of these individuals with whom you 16 talked?
17 THE WITNESS:
Well, when I when Creitz l
l 18 told me about the problem in the morning, he made 19 reference to cecasior.c of fuel failure.
I have 20 testified to that before, I'm sure, in both NRC 21 Kemmeny and Rogovin depositions.
I must say or I 22 will say again that one of my reactions was of 23 concern about that !
- erpretation because I said 24 that suggests that the emergency core cooling systen
. f-d\\s
- 25 did not function because I was sufficiently. yeu
Dieckamp 10 1
kee",
knowledgeable about the licensing criteria to
-()
2 know that that was the definition of th'e design 3
basis for the emergency core cooling system.
To the
(])
4 extent that I accepted the comments about fuel 5
failure my mind related to loss of mechanical 5
integrity, cracking, perhaps sone swelling or 7
cracking, what have you.
Creitz conveyed to me some 1
8 comments about teams making radiation surveys, 9
however, that they were not finding anything off 10 site.
The Scranton press conference reaffirmed the i
11 absence of any off-site measurements.
The chance
~
12 encounter with Herbein, Miller and Kunder was a very
. ({}
13 brief one during which I expressed my concern that bkws 14' these th ree -f+44es-s h o u l d simultaneously leave the 15 plant.
However, I don't recall getting from them a 16 feeling of extreme danger or extreme difficulty.
I 17 think I rather got the feeling from then that while 13 there were problems, things were stable.
I did not 19 reach the conclusion that the thing for me to do was 20 to go to the plant.
Perhaps I should have.
On the 21 cther hand, I felt that my own knowledge of the 22 specifics of the plant systems and the ooerating 23 procedures and the like was such that I would i
24 probably be more of an encumbrance than a help if I x.
25 were to show up in the control room so I proceeded l
l I
i
~..
Dieckemp 11 1
to go home.
()
2 When I got home and heard from Bob Arnold 3
I don't have a good recollection of the sense of
(])
4 that conversation.
Again, I don't have a feeling 5
that -- of anything very specific.
I think by that 6
time -- well, what I do recall is that 90b conveyed 7
to me his efforts with Jack Herbein to a r r i v e 'a t the 8
decision to repressurize the system so as to be able 9
to restart a primary cooling pump.
I don't think I 10 was aware of, at that point, at all, of the extreme 11 degree of undercooling and high temperatures in the 12 outlet leg o'f the plants or of measured thermocouple lj{}
13 temperatures or any of those kinds of more 14 significant measures of the degree of distress that 15 the plant had experienced.
I think after then 16 hearing from Bob that forced convection cooling had i
17 been reestablished my feeling was one of 18 considerable uncertainty about just what had 19 happened and why but a feeling that despite that 20 uncertainty things had been brought to a stable l
21 condition where the cooling was more positively 22 assured.
23 MR. MOSELEY:
To the extent that oeoole 24 were concerned about the cooling condition, suoer
'.0' 25 heat, the voiding in the loops and those kinds of
~
Diockamp 12 1
things, to the extent they were concerned about this
()
2 is this the type of information that you believe you 3
should have been informed of during the day?
()
4 THE WITNESS:
I have first of all, 5
let me say that I don't think I was informed of 6
those kinds of pieces of information.
I 7
subsequently on several occasions and I think in 8
testimony and I'm fairly sure in testimony before 9
the McCormick Committee back, I think, in May of 79 10 stated that I thought that one of the learnings from 11 the accident was that the plant and the managements 12 and also state authorities and regulatory
.({')
13 authorities should put in place a crearranged 14 checklist.o f critical parameters that would indicate 15 more clearly the state of a plant so that energency 16 communications would nct be somehow limited by the 17 degree to which people thought about all of the 18 critical parameters -i n - t c r me; rather, there would.be l
19 a checklist available that people would tend to go I
l 20 down and thereby add assurance that these critical l
21 indicators of plant status were conveyed.
- Now, 22 whether I should have been told during the day, it's 23 hard ~ for me to say I should not have been told.
I 24 don't think I would contend that.
At the same time, g~y LJ
(
~
25 I was operating in the belief that the plant staff l
Diockomp 13 1
was in charge, the plant staff was in the direct
()'
' 2 loop of communicating with the state and with the 3
3RC, that I was not specifically in that loop and
(])
4 that I did not consider myself sufficiently 5
knowledgeable about the details of the plant to take 6
on a real direct supervisory role; and so, on that 7
basis I did not insist that that kind of information 8
be given to me for the same sort of reasons that I i
9 did not conclude that it would be appropriate for me l'0 to go to the plant.
Now, perhaps if I had had 11 thr6 ugh one channel or another a greater awareness 12 of'the exact state of affairs at the plant I would
- {}
13 have made the decision.to go but my knowledge durinq 14 the 28th did not get me to the point of fieling that l
l 15 I as an individual would be more of a contributor
-16 than a burden if present at the clant site.
17 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, let me explain that 18 one of the things that is a part of our charter in i
19 this effort 19 to try to identify wherein things may i
20 not have been done as well as any of us may have 21 liked in terms of transfer of information and so we 22 expect to be a part of our findings specific 23 recommendations for implementation.
Some of these 24 recommendations may turn out to be new rules for l
25 reporting to make it more clear the tyoe of
'~ -
l l
Dieckamp 14 1
information that should be reported, to whom it
(])
2 should be reported and how it should be reported and 3
part of our inquiry I think is asking you to look at
(])
4 yourself in your own organization to see if there 5
are areas that not only you can learn from but other it's a lesson S
utilities might learn so that's 7
learned as a part of our inquiry here.
8 THE WITNESS:
I subscribe heartily to 9
that objective and, as I say, I think that one of 10 the things that one must learn
's that.there is a_
11 need to provide a higher level of assurance that 12 those early emergency communications contain eert-of I
13 the basic minimum number of bits of information
({}
14 necessary to categorize or to convey a "ense of l
l 15 exactly how severe the situation is.
I've had that 16 feeling in terms also of the initial communication 17 between the plant staff and Gary Miller at five 19 o' clock in the morning.
While I have I don't an attempt to recreate tha 19 think I've ever seen a 20 content of that conversation, somehow.I'm led to i
21 believe that it must have not conveyed enough l
l 22 specific awareness of the olant condition to have 23 elicited the maximum response that it should have.
24 MR. MOSELEY:
Do you believe'that vital 25 information was either withheld or otherwise not l
Diockomp 15 1
communicated from the site to offsite vet Ed o r G P'I
()
2 groups?
You just mentioned one particular point in 3
time.
Could you address yourself to other p o r t i o n's
(])
4 of the day?
5 THE WITNESS:
I have no reason to 6
believe that anyone consciously chose, decided or 7
ordered the withholding of information.
I have no 3
knowledge of any of that sort of thing.
I have no 9
awareness of any.
I have been I guess reassured by 10 the findings of Kemmeny and Rogovin that in my mind 11-state fairly clearly that there was no conscious i
12 effort to withhold information.
I've seen no 13 evidence of any withholding.
I think after the fact
{}
14 one can always raise the question shouldn't so and 15 so shculd have'said such and such.
Again, I think 16 that gets to be a very difficult judgment 17
- particularly when one also recognizes the judgments 18 that individuals had to would have had to make or 19 potentially have had to make in the allocation of 20 their attention between the plant and communicating 21 with the outside world.
In fact, in preparation for 22 this deposition today, I read the company's early 23 interview with Brian Mehler in which he makes a 24 considerable point about the distraction of trying-(
.J 25 to talk to people on the phone.
'J o w, I guess the l
'~
I l
Diockamp 14 1
learning to come of that is that we're going to have
(])
2 to figure out how to not divert attention from 3
handling the problem while at the same time having
(])
4 the ability to convey enough information offsite so 5
that others can properly take the right kinds of 6
action.
S+e7 I don't in any way argue about the 7'
need for'the state agencies, the emergency planning 8
agencies, the local governments. the NRC, all of 9
those groups to be as fully informed as oossible.
I 10 have trouble suggesting, though, that their needs 11 would take. precedence over operating the plant or 12 trying to control the plant.
What-we're going to j )
13 have to do.is make sure that we can satisfy both of 14 those needs as we go forward and I think the concent 15 of some sort of a prearranged, pre-understood 16 checklist of critical parameters and some prior 17 awareness on the part of the recioient of that data 1
18 as to what it meant could be a useful way to get 19 there so that the information transfer didn't 20 require a long meandering conversation to try to 21 elicit a state of understanding.
I wandered from 22 your question, getting back to it, I have no feeling
{}
23 whatsoever, no evidence whatsoever that anyone i
24 consciously withheld information.
25 MR. MOSELEY:
Mr. Dieckamp, has there
Diockonp 17 1
been any inquiry or investigation within Met Ed/GPU
-({)
2 into the cause or causes into the failure of Miller 3
and/or Herbein to fully inform their superiors as to
(])
4 the conditions of TMI-2 on March.29th?
5 THE WITNESS:
I know of no investigation 5
that we have made which attempts to determine 7
exactly what Miller, told Herbein and.what Merbein 8
told Creitz and to attempt to ascertain why the 9
conversation or the information transfer was limited
- 10 to those amounts.
-T h s t ' s my c r. e w e r, 11 MR. MOSELEY:
Is such an investigation 12 planned?
13 THE WITNESS:
None that I'm aware of.
](
14 MR. MOSSLEY:
Do you know wh/?
l 15 THE WITNESS:
My own reaction to the 15 implications of that question is that I tnink that l
17 we know the basic elements of any inadequacies of 18 communication and that our attention is better 19 directed at putting in place the kinds of m.echanisms 20 and procedures to insure that those kinds of 21 deficiencies are not present should there ever be l
22 another occasion.
Again, it'has not been an l
l 23 assumption of ours and we hav.e not seen evidence to 24 indicate to us that those communication channels
~
25 were limited by a reluctance of any individual to I
Diockomp in 1
communicate; that rather the conmunication
)
2 difficulties arose from people's slowness in 3
ach'ieving a full awareness of the importance of what
(])
4 was happening and again our aporoach is to look at 5
solving that problem in the future.
6 MR. MOSELEY:
Mr. Arnold, when we s t u'd y, I 7'
interviewed t'; last week spoke of a 4
8 believe he termed it, which has resulted in some 9
modifications an'a rather broad spectrum to include 10 the area of information exchanged and he's indicated 11 that he would provide us copies of that.
Are you 12 aware of any other documentation that might speak to
-f}
13 reviews, conclusions or I guess reviews and 14 conclusions in this area?
15 THE WITNESS:
Of communications?
16 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes.
17 THE WITNESS:
I don't know the soecific 18 study that Cob Arnold is referring to.
I night know 19 it if I saw it or if I knew what it was.
20 MR. MOSELEY:
He didn't give it a title 21 so I can't refer you to it.
22 THE WITNESS:
I see.
He didn't associate g3U 23 it with any particular group or anything but I'n not 24 aware of any other I guess I wasn't aware of any, O
25 as a matter of fact.
Now that doesn't mean that we
Diockomp 19 1
let me rephrase that.
)
2 We certainly in the process of redoing i
3 all the emergency planning and in reviewing our own
(]
4 impressions or conclusions relative to learnings 5
from the accident have devoted effort to the S
question of communications both inside and offsite 7
and I think those are reflected in our revised 8
emergency plans and our revised communications olans 9
and the like.
10 MR. MOSELEY:
On March 2Rth and before,
^
11 did you beileve. that a corporate licensee had a 12 strong obligation to keep NRC fully inforned on a 13 timely basis of any and all information which might 14 effect the safety of the plant?
15 T9E WITNESS:
Yes.
16 MR. MOSELEY:
Nhat instructions had been 17 provided to the various levels of supervision and 18 done to the workers to implenent this obligation?
19 THE WITNESS:
I can't personall" identify 20 specific. pieces of paper or policy statements or the 21 like that I might have issued on that subject.
I 22 don't know of any that I issued on that subject.
I 23 know that in my own dealings with the nuclear staffs 24 of the company and on most occasions when I would he I U 25 informed of some problem one of my first questions
Diockcmp 20 1
would be have we informed the NRCl I'm virtually
()
2 certain when I spoke with Creitz on the morning of 3
March the 28th, my question was have we informed the i
()
4 NRC.
My general attitude has always been that we 5
are working in a fish bowl.
There can never be any 6
secrets.
The sooner we communicate, the less 7
suspect our operations will be and that we just neep 8
to operate in a way that reflects complete ooenness.
9 I also felt that it was a way to attempt to 10 establish and maintain credibility with the 11 regulatory agencies.
12 Now, I would have to say to you that I h) 13 never had occasion to think in terms of a situation 14 like March 29th, 79 and an attempt to codify what i
15 should we tell the NRC when and I think the staff 16 felt that the information contained in the emergency 17 plans and tech specs and so forth constituted their 18 obligations to communicate.
I've not heard anybody 19 say that we didn't have an obligation to communicate 20 beyond that but at the same t iti a I.think. they had 21 reason to feel that once they discharged those 22 responsibilities they had at least done the basic 23 things that were required.
I think our deficiency 24 and the deficiency of the industry and the 97C too
)
25 was to not recognize the extent of the required i
Diockemp 21 1
communications in an event like March 29th, 79 but
)
2 in terms of me personally and in terms c# an 3
attitude that I felt that I tried to radiate, there
(])
4 was no question in my mind of our obligation to keen 5
the regulatory agencies and the state organizations 6
informed.
In fact my general attitude was that we sw 7
c h o uld add-o n the side of informing early or 8
informing even if it might not meet the letter of 9
the definition of a reportable incident or something 10 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or something because, again, I felt 11 to establish ~a feeling of openness,with the 12' regulatory agencies was a part of credibility.
({}
13 MR. MOSELEY:
The final question, Mr.
14 Dieckamp, do you have any knowledge that certinent 15 information was withheld from the NRC on the day of 16 March 28th, 1979?
17 THE WITNESS:
I have no knowledge that 18 any information was withheld on March 29th or any 1
19 other date.
That doesn"t mean that you and I can 20 today identify information that all of us wish we 21 had communicated but that word " withheld
- has a 22 definite meaning to me and I know of ne information 23 that was withheld.
)
24 MR. MARPSTER:
Let me ask you one 25 question, Mr. Dieckamp that's somewhat a puzzlenent
Diockamp
??
i 1
to me after going over all this information fer j
])
2 several months now.
Why do you think it is after, 3
say, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> into the accident in the plant that the
(])
4 plant staff could not understand the state of 5
conditions that existed up to that time that they 6
didn't seek outside assistance from your own 7
technical support staffs?
One of my puzzlements 8
aside from the communications with us or the state 9
is the fact that your staff made little attempt to 10 get help from your own technical support groups and 11 I guess that's a mystery to me.
12 THE WITNESS:
Well, I think we ought to
{}
13 back up.in that there was considerable discussion 14 with B & W throughout the day through the 3 & W reos I
15 in the plant back to Lynchburg and the like so it 16 isn't as though.the staff had or sought no outside 17 assistance.
18 MR. HARPSTER:
I guess I would 19 characterize that as not a lot of discussions with l
20 the B & W representatives from our understanding to 21 date, that B & W's main channel of communication 22 other than one or two phone calls which were 23 connected off site was to Bob Arnold and they were 24 in fact as interested as anybody in finding out what 25 was going on in the plant.
They were having the
Diockcmp
?3 1
same problem.everybody else was in getting
()
2 information and trying'to make recommendations.
3 THE WITNESS:
I'm not aware of the exact
()
4 balance of the communications.
I guess I was under 5
the impression that back through John Flint and the 6
other fellow, that was the primary 9 & W 7
representative at the site --
8 MR. HARPSTER:
Lee Rogers.
that 9
THE WITNESS:
Yes, Lee Rogers 10 there was a feeling that B & W was knowing what was 11 g o ir13 on and were involved.
I think if we go beyond 12 th a t',
again, I think one has to look hard at just 13 what was the communication's bottleneck.
They 14 encountered extreme difficulties in having open 15 telephone lines or keeping open telephone lines or 16 being abic to reach people.
As a third piece of 17 that, I would have to say to you that at the time of 18 the accident, the staff that we identify as being 19 located in Parsippany and under Bob Arnold was 20 devoting itself dominantly to new construction and 21 did not~have a deep rapport with the plant ooerating 22 staff.
There was not strong ties there.
That was 23 something that Mr. Arnold and I had under discussion 24 for some time as to how to increase the Parsiopany L.)
25 staff so as to enable more direct support of the
Dieckemp 24 1
operating plants and thus the building of the kind
)
2 of communications and technical rep an? racoort I 3
think that leads to good communications.
I think
()
4 these problems are probably all tied together and I 5
.think the thing that those of us that were not in 6
the control room bsve a hard time visualizing is the 7
degree to which people were just absolutely captive 8
to the conditions that they were trying to cooe with 9
and first of all didn't fully understand them and 10 secondly didn't have a feeling of time to engage in 11 a lot of discussion with others.
I don't have any l'2 trouble agreeing with you that they very likely
,()
13 would have been better off had they sought more 14 outside consultation but again I'm not sure that I 15 can completely appreciate the you k n e ::, the i
16 stress and the real-time environnent that they were 17 operating in.
You '< n e u, t h e-r e are a lot of things 18 about the accident that I don't understand in terms 19 of people's behavior and people's lack of 20 understanding, thct cac being the l e a s t -- o f y
21 eer-ns.
--Ya>u-knc u,
I'm jue-t it's hard tc nct be pg 22 wHr to not have difficulty after the fact in l
V 23 understanding why some of the gross indicators 24 didn't seem to get recognized or didn't seem to i
s 25 register or didn't seem to lead to what would socear
Di ekamp 25 1
to be the appropriate responses.
I've been troubled
()
2 by that.
I think in my own mind that the difficulty 3
goes back to a what I would characterize as an-(])
4 industry presumption that the plants needed 5
operators and that all the thinking had been done 6
and all we needed to do was to instruct operators to 7
follow procedures.
The basic thing ther -- one of 8
the fundamentals I think of the accident is'that the 9
people encountered conditions that their orocedures 10 did not anticipate unambiguously or fully and in 11 r.eality what we're saying today is we're criticizing 12 the people-whom, by the way, we had drilled very
{])
13 heavily into the discipline of adhering to 14-p r o c e d,u r e s.
We today tend to criticize them because 15 they did not have the intellectual capacity or the 16 intestinal fortitude to step back and say, hey, ny 17
- gosh, I'm dealing with something the procedures 18 don't even recognize, I should abandon the 19 procedures and go on my own.
That's sort of what 20 we're asking them to do and in the timeframe, in the 21 state of affairs, they didn't do that so I say the 22 problem is that we may have armed these pecole with Os.
23 considerable amount of training and a lot of 24 psocedures but unfortunately we didn't arm them with 25 enough fundamental knowledge of the basic
~~ ~
- Diockomp 26 Sb 1
ingredients of reactor safety that they were able to
)
2 in a short time period diagnose their way th ro ug h.
3 ccapletely unchartered ground and decide that they
(])
4 should go on their own.
I think that's something to 5
think about when one thinks about this-accident or 6
other possible accidents.
Are we that confident ch'racterized 7
that we have these systems so fully a
8 that we can rely upon mechanical response to 9
procedures?
I think that's one of the fundamental 10 questions to think about.
I 11 I'm sorry, I don't know exactly why they l
12 did.'t call on more people.
I wish they had but I i
- j()
13 think the reason they didn't is because they lacked d'pth in fundamentals.
They were chosen 14 sufficient e
15 as operators.
They were chosen for managing 16 maintenance.
They were Jhosen for a lot of things 17 and to the degree they were trained in safety and 1
I 18 some of the basics of safety they certainly were not L
19 the kind of people that you would think of as deep 20 analytical fundamental phenomenological safety l
l 21 people.
That wasn't their training.
I think Gary i
22 Miller found himself faced with conditions that he 23 just wasn't able to sort out and synthesize into l
24 some basic conclusions.
It was so strange, so j
25 apparently random that it just didn't make any sense 1
L.
Diockamp
??
I to him so they kept doing the things that they
)
2 thought they were supposed to do and I've talked to 3
Gary about it and I know how frustrated he feels
(])
4 about th a t'.
5 MR. HARPSTER:
Thank you.
6 MR. MOSELEY:-
Thank you very much, Mr.
7 Dieckam We appreciate your time and we do hone 8
that we will be able to bring this investigation to 9
an end and we would likewise hope this will be the 10 last one.
11 (There is a discussion off'the record) 12.
(Whereupon, the proceedings are 13 concluded) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
([)
23 24
'~
25
?
r l
l 1
C._._ E._ _ R_ _ T_ _.I_
__F__.I_._ C_ _ A_.T___E_
2 3
I, fie l e n Dohogne, a Certified Shorthand g'
4 Reporter and Notary Dublic of the State of New I
1 5
Jersay, do hereby certify that prior to the l
6 commencement of the examination the witness and/or 7
w'itnesses were sworn by me to testify the truth, the l
8 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
9 I do further certify that the foregoing is a 10 true and accurate computer-aided transcript of the 11 testimony as taken stenographically by and before me 12 at the time, place and on the date hereinbefore set 13 forth.
\\
14 I do further certify that I am neither of 15 counsel nor attorney for any party in this action 16 and that I am not interested in the event nor 17 outcome of this litigation.
18 l
1 19
___d 20
__Public of the 9ta of New.Tersey Notary 21 22 My commission expires December 3,
1999 f
23 l
24 Dated:
) _.
l 25 l
l g
e Herman Dieckamp Prnomt GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES 100 Interpace Parkway CORPORATION Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 (O
Wnter's Direct Del Number
~/
201-263-6030 October 7, 1980 Mr. Norman C. Moseley Director Division of Reactor 'perations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
Dear Mr. Moseley:
Please make the following changes to the transcript of my September 12 statement to the Three Mile Island Investiga-tion.
j Page Line
(
/4 7
Delete the
/4 16 Delete in any written testimony and replace with at the time of the statement.
/
V6 22,23, Delete - answer is confused.
l 24,25 Replace with - At the time of my May 9 l
statement, I am unaware that anyone on l
March 28 interpretad the pressure spike and spray initiation in terms of core damage.
i J'9 9
Delete a t$
10 Insert what after hindsight 9
19 Delete occasions of v9 25 Delete,you
'0 1
Delete know,
-10 14 Change fellas to read fellows 2
18 Delete in terms
. (2) 1 l
~14 12 Delete sort of
'f 5 15 Delete should l
l i
Jersey Central Power & Light Company / Metropohtan Edison Company /Pennsylvan:a E!ectnc Company
i d October 7, 1980 16 6
Delete See, Ad7 10 Delete That's my answer..
ud0 l-Should, read - would be, "have we informed the NRC?"
v21' 7
Change air to err t24 2
Delete rep and 44 15 Delete you know, Q4 20,21.
Delete You know, 94 17 Delete that one being the least of'my concerns. You know, I'm just.
,/
Delete to not be w4 22 Delete or
- 35 7
Delete The' basic thing that 25 19
-Delete sort of Nf6 1
Insert so after safety If there are any questions, please contact me o ^ Mr. Blake.
Ver E
ly yours s.
NMM H. Diec amp-f
+
1da l:
cc:
Mr.
E.
Blake 1
, ~.
O