ML19343D339
| ML19343D339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1981 |
| From: | Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FYR-81-66, NUDOCS 8105040307 | |
| Download: ML19343D339 (3) | |
Text
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YANKEE AT0:1C ELECTRIC C0~PANY m}.h 1671 Worcester Road, Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 2.C.2.1 YANKEE FYR 81-66 m
April 27, 1981 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention.
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing
References:
(a) License No. DPR-3 (Docket No. 50-29)
(b) USNRC Letter to YAEC dated February 23, 1981 (c) YAEC Letter to USNRC dated February 7,1977 (WYR 77-11)
(d) YAEC Letter to USNRC dated March 9, 1977 (WYR 77-27, Proposed Change No. 149)
Sub ject :
Additional Information on Appendix J Exemption Request
Dear Sir:
This letter provides the additional information requested by Ref erence (b) to further support our requests in Reference (c) for exemption f rom Appendix J requirements to leak test certain valves. Table 1 summarizes the basis for the exemption requests.
For those lines containing check valves acting as isolation valves (SI V-14, CS-V-621, and CH-V-611), an exemption f rom testing is requested on the basis that these lines will be water filled for 30 days following an accident. These lines are safety related and are required for emergency core cooling; thereby providing a continuous water seal in these penetrations.
In addition, we have reviewed these lines rad conclude that no single active f ailures would cause a loss of the 30-day water supply.
For those manual valves in lines penetrating containment (CH-MOV-522, SC-MOV-551, 552, 553, and 554), an exemption from testing is requested on the basis that these lines remain water filled af ter system operation. These lines are safety grade and cannot become potential atmospheric leakage paths in that a water seal is present and can be maintained for the 30-day post-accident period.
As a result of a reclassification of the steam supply lines to the containment and by your clarification of the exemption criteria f ound in Reference (b), we have chosen to modify the following containment penetration lines to permit Type C testing:
810504O M P
LUnitcd Stct:0 NuclInr.Regulctory Commission.
April 27, 1981 Op;rcting R;cettra Brcnch No. 5 P2ge 2 (1) Containment Air Charge Line (2) Steam Supply to Containment Heaters (3) Service Water Supply to Containment Coolers (4) Component Cooling Water Supply to Containment These modifications will eliminate the need to request a permanent exemption from testing these lines.
In the Containment Air Charge Line, we have installed the necessary block valves and test taps to permit testing of
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valve CA-V-746.
The testing of this valve is now a part of our Type C testing program.
In the three remaining lines listed' above, we intend to procure and 2
install single, automatic isolation valves, and any necessary manual block valves and tsst. taps, to permit Type C testing. The installation should be completed during the 1982 refueling. outage. Therefore, an exemption from Appendix J requirements for these lines is only requested until that time.
A final item that needs NRC attention is the proposed changes to the Yankee Rowe Technical Specifications submitted in Reference (d). These changes were based on the items discussed in Reference (c).
Since these changes are no longer applicable as proposed, they will be modified upon your approval of our exemption request. We will re-submit the appropriate technical specification changea at that time.
We trust this additional information will be catisfactory; however, if you have any additional questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY J. A. Kay Senior Engineer - Licensing 4
a-TABLE 1 Valve
. Function Exemption Basis SI-V-14 HP Safety Injection Both of these emergency core cooling lines are CS-V-621 LP Safety Injection classified Safety Class 2.
These lines are both assured a 30-day water supply by a multiple pump system with multiple water sources (i.e.
Safety Injection Tank, Demineralized Water Storage Tank, Boric Acid Mix Tank, and the Vapor Container Sump). The integrity of these lines is assured by the system function.
CH-V-611 Charging Line to Loop #4 These Safety Class 2 lines supply charging CH-MOV-522 Charging for Isolated Loop water to the main coolant system via the positive displacement charging pumps. A 30-day water supply is assured from the Low Pressure Surge. Tank and the sources described above. Backflow of water through the three-stage reciprocating charging pumps is not possible.
In any event, the operation of one of three pumps will assure that pressure in these lines is maintained in excess of containment atmosphere.
SC-MOV-551 Shutdewn Cooling (OUTBD)TC These Safety Class 1 valves are normally closed SC-MOV-552 Shutdown Cooling (OUTBD)TH during operation and each pair of valves hold SC-MOV-553 Shutdown Cooling (INBD)TC leak tight against main coolant system pressure SC-MOV-554 Shutdown Cooling (INBD)TH of 2000 psi. The shutdown cooling loop remains water filled after system operation.
In lieu of running the pumps, the capability exists to pressurized chis line by maintaining a sufficient over pressure in the Low Pressure Surge Tank (LPST). The LPST is assured a 30-day water supply via the m:1tiple water sources described above.