ML19343C995
| ML19343C995 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343C986 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104090037 | |
| Download: ML19343C995 (2) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-21 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-245 I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated March 20, 1978 and February 26, 1981, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNEco) (the licensee) proposed two enanges to the Techni-cal Specifications for Millstone, Unit 1.
The first change involves a half inch bypass line around an eight inch motor-operated isolation valve, 1-C0-2, to improve the operation of the cleanup demineralizer system by allowing pressure equalization on 1-CU-2 prior to valve operation. The second change to the Millstone, Unit 1 Technical Specifications would revise the present acceptance criterion for the local leak rate testing to be consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors, Section 3/4.6.1, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 2.1 Half Inch Bypass Valve,1-CU-2A This bypass line requires a containment isolation valve (1-CU-2A). This bypass valve will be periodically Type C tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
NNECo reported that the containment isolation valve was in-stalled in the spring of 1978 and in a direction so that LOCA pressure would tend to seat the valve. Also, because of the direction in which the valve is installed Type C leak rate tests will be in the reverse direction and would, therefore, be conservative. The bypass valve and bypass line were Type C tested after installation, and prior to reactor operation. Valve 1-CU-2A met the requirements for containment isolation valves. Accordingly, we find the proposed technical specification changes acceptable.
2.2 Increased Leak Rate Test limit The change would increase the combined Type B and C leak rate test limit from 40% L o to 60% Lp.
L is the maximum allowable leak rate at 43 psig, which t
for Millstone Unit 1,pshall not exceed 1.2 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The allowable operational leak rate, Lto, shall not exceed 75% L. The FSAR off-site dose calculations are based on 5.0 weight percent per dSy leakage. The proposed change does not affect the maximum values of L o or L, which are t
already significantly less than the leak rate assumed in the FSAR off-site dose calculations.
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81040'9008
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! I Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 50.59, the licensee has reviewed the proposed changes and has determined that they do not involve any unreviewed safety j
questiens in that they do not increase the probability ot" occurrence or j
the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment, create a j
possibility for a different type of accident or malfunction, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.
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Based on our review of the proposed changes, we find them to be acceptable, g
Thus, the Technical Specifications should be changed as proposed, except j
that we have changed, with NNECo concurrence, the notations La and Pa to j
LpaWPp for consistency within the Technical Specifications.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action whiv is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be p.epared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted incompliance with the Commissinn's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: March 27,1981
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