ML19343C348
| ML19343C348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1972 |
| From: | Hartley F CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| AO-72-03, AO-72-3, CYH-2221, NUDOCS 8103100497 | |
| Download: ML19343C348 (1) | |
Text
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1 October 13, 1972 ib j.F ec: n i fhdu#8 CYH-2221 v'-Ifg th T; !.-) U. S. Atomic Energy C5iinission G. hp" ! jff), Washington, D. C. 20545 ~ ATTENTION: Director, Directorate of Licensing 0071 61972 2~M ,M e - il t .n
REFERENCE:
Provisional License No. DPR-14 (g b. C. Q, A 'f Docket No. 50-213 f. s ' '4, Q% y y Abnormal Occurrence 72-3 ~
Dear Sir:
As defined by Technical Specifications for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Section 5.3, the following incident involving malfunction of a reactor containment isolation trip valve is reported as Abnormal Occurrence 72-3. The reactor coolant letdown piping is provided with three parallel automatically operated isolation valves which prevent release of fission products from the reactor containment during accident conditions. All three letdown isolation valves were verified to be functioning properly during the June 1972 refueling interval surveillance test of all contain-ment isolatien trip va..es. A functional check during the plant shutdown of 9/21/72, confinned the operability of all three valves. During a sub-sequent functional check of the letdown isolation trip valves on 10/5/72, letdown valve LD-A0V-204 would not close on signal from the main control board switch. The trip valve was checked locally by removing its air supply and the valve operability was confirmed. Further investigation revealed air leakage past the solenoid valve in the air supply line to the trip valve. The solenoid and valve were air cleaned and the valve air supply recon-nected to the trip valve. The trip valve was then successfully actuated from the main control board switch. The Plant Operations Review Comittee reviewed the occurrence and recomended a program of more frequent checks of the operability of this l valve untii its reliability can be assured. Very truly yours, u a s. . W. rtley Plant Superintendent cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director r-{; g Region 1, Directorate of Regulatory Operations 7/G3/00 # 9}}