ML19343A620
| ML19343A620 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011190191 | |
| Download: ML19343A620 (6) | |
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[o ne UNITED STATES
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'n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 "'- ' ' ' M g
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as October 28, 1980 E
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Docket No.
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50-249
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'$5 e it, o c3 Commonwealth Edison Company T
xx ATTN:
Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
On April 17, 1978, representatives of CECO advised this office of possible improprieties by the guard contractor in conducting firearms qualifications of guards at Dresden Station.
Information was also provided indicating that a guard supervisor instructed some guards to document patrols which had not been made.
Based on this information, this office conducted an investigation and provided the results to our Headquarters, which refr red the matter to the DSartment of Justice for further investigation and consideration for prosecution.
On September 9, 1980, the Department of Justice advised the NRC that prosecution of the case was declined.
The declination stemmed from a view that the case lacked prosecutive merit because of prompt action to requalify the guards and their successful requalification and because of the pressure to supply suffi-cient guard manpower to Dresden Station. The Department acknowledged that falsification of guard's firearms records in this circumstance could have grave consequences were sabotage or' theft of nuclear materials to occur because of a guard's inability to accurately fire his weapon.
The Department of Justice sent a letter to the guard contractor (Burns Inter-national Security Services) advising of the results of the investigation and
'the decision not to prosecute.
The letter emphasized Burns' responsibility to exercise a greater degree of control and supervision over training personnel.
Burns subsequently replied to the Department of Justice letter outlining actions initiated to prevent recurrence of this situation.-
The message is clear that the Department of Justice declined to prosecute in this instance primarily because of the responsiveness of Commonwealth Ediaon's identifying and correcting the problem, the apparent exigent circumstances of the manpower shortage and inherently, no identifiable harm to the public resulted.
The Department also gave a clear warning that such conduct on the part of Burns will not be tolerated.
8011 pg offf 7
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Commonwealth Edison October 28, 1980 Copies of relevant correspondence are attached for your information. We expect Commonwealth Edison to continue its close and continuing surveillance and auditing of guard force activities, training and documentation provided by the guard contractor to assure compliance with security plan and guard training and qualifications commitments.
Sincerely, G
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fJamesG.Keppler Director
Enclosures:
1.
Letter dated 9/9/80, Greenspun to Cronin 2.
Letter dated 9/19/80, Cronin to Greenspun l
l cc w/encls:
Mr. J. S. Abel, Director of Nuclear Licensing Mr. D. J. Scott, Station Superintendent Central Files V heproduction Unit NRC 20b AEOD Resident Inspector, RIII PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Mr. Dean Hansell, Office of Assistant Attorney General
o Burns Intgrnstlun:1 S:curity Services Inc k
Csrocra'e Off ces Breret.ft Mano. NY 1C510 Tri 914 7621000 James J Cronin President September 19, 1980 Mr. Julian Greenspun Deputy Chief for Litigation United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C.
20530
Dear Mr. Greenspun:
We wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 9, 1980.
We are very pleased to learn of your decision not to prosecute on e
the matter and wish to provide you with some information concerning actions we have initiated since the period o,f time in which the incident occurred.
Our training programs are being supervised to insure physical documentation of all courses attended and training received by all personnel assigned to a nuclear facility.
All records are being audited annually and more often when special classes are required for temporary or interim services to our clients or when they require the addition of more manpower than nor-Our company has mally assigned to the facility.
also created a regional position of Quality As-surance whose job function includes the impartial audit and review of all jobs in the specific geographic area which includes contract compliance as well as regulatory and legislative compliance.
All of these measures are consistent with recom-mendations and observations contained in your September 9 letter.
As a corporation, we share with you the concern and interest in insuring that our personnel are providing protection to our nuclear clients against theft or sabotage which could, of course, jeopardize i
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L' Mr. Julian Greenspun Page 2 September 19, 1980 many thousands of people in large geographic
- - - _ - areas of our country.
You can be assured that our company will be ever diligent in pursuing the goals of Quality Assurance and compliance as set forth by all regulatory bodies and gov-erning agencies.
Sincerely yours, Ja s
. Cronin President i
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LL:JG:GUrpb 46-23-1163 SEP 9 1980 Mr. James J. Cronin Chief Operating Officer Burns International Security Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 400 Brearcliff Manor, New York 10510
Dear NW. Cronin:
This is to inform you that we have concluded our investiga-tion of the alleged falsification of guard firearms qualifications and the falsification of records by'three of your training instruc-tors at Commonwealth Edison Company s Dresden Power Plant during a period of about four months from mid-December 1977, until mid-April 1978.
We have decided not to prosecute.
You should be aware, however, that the FBI's investigation indicated that your training instructors falsified firearcs scores because they were.under a great deal of pressure to get enough guards at the Dresden nuclear plant to bring the guard force to the required strength.
As a security contractor whose purpose is to provide guards to protect nuclear plants against sabotage and theft of nuclear materials, jou should know that a breach of your responsibility, to site security, can result in substantial health as it relates and safety hasards for the general public.
Wu expect that in the future, your company will exercise a greatcr degree of control and supervision over your training per-
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connel so that there will be no doubt that the degree of security 4
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2-ct our nuclear facilities will afford the public a reasonab Sincerely, LAWREllCE LIPPE, Chief General Litigation and Legal Advice Section Criminal Division
. By:
JULIAN GREENSPUN Deputy Chief for Litigation O
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