ML19341D493
| ML19341D493 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002909 |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1981 |
| From: | Mcphillips J SAFE ENERGY ALLIANCE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103050692 | |
| Download: ML19341D493 (13) | |
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1, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1-4 })
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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APPLICATION OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC S
CORPORATION FOR A SPECIAL NUCLEAR Docket No.
70-9 MATERIAL LICENSE FOR THE ALABAMA S
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NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION PLANT (ANFFP) f TO BE LOCATED NEAR PRATTVILLE, ALABAMA S
MAlio.;
-3 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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OF UNSTIPULATED CONTENTIONS A
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Comes now the Safe Energy Alliance of Central Alab 80)
(SEACA) and in support of its Unstipulated Contentions attached as " Attachment B" to the Stipulation dated February 25, 1981 shows the following with respect to its following' numbered and named contentions:
1.
WASTE SAFETY:
Waste safety is one of the primary concerns of the populace of Central Alabama with respect to Westinghouse's (WEC's) proposed " Alabama Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant" (hereinafter "the Plant").
And certainly nuclear waste material is one of the major problems associated with any nuclear plant of any type.
10 C.F.R. 70. 23 (a) (3) and (4) present ample legal ground.=
to justify the raising of this contention by SEACA.
In order for SEACA or the NRC to adequately assess the waste safety problems of the Plant, it is essential that WEC' '
share with SEACA and the NRC information concerning their manufacturing 4
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process.and equipment.
However, this WEC has so far refused to do.
It's elementary that, in order for a doctor to diagnose a patient's illness, he must be able to see the patient.
Like-wise, wid1 WEC's manuf acturing process, much, much more information is needed and, as of this date, practically no information has been given to SEACA or the NRC.
With respect to 1(a) concerning the sodium silicate process, there is ample specificity and ample surface legitimacy to the contention.
Mindful that the merits of contention need not be proved, SEACA contends that the language of 1(a) certainly raises an issue under 10 CFR 70. 23 (a) (3) that ought to be litigated.
Ditto for contention 1(b) concerning WEC's proposed process for treating liguid waste to form calcium flouride. This substance is certainly one of the most toxic and dangerous anywhere, and just like assault or murder, it needs to be treated very care-fully and contained.
4.
ACCIDENTS:
Accidents undoubtably pose the greatest threat of all to the populace of Central Alabama, and certainly fall within the ambit of 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a) and its various subsections.
It is not mere speculation or idle conjecture for SEACA to state that accidents will occur.
Indeed, WEC itself in Table 5-1 on pages 5-2 to 5-4 of the Environmental Report
(" Report")
sets out a summary of Hypothetical Accidents with Radiological
- Effects, The Table says that a UF6 leak can occur 3 different ways.
The Table also specifies as possible accidents the
UO2 powder spill, the rotary kiln release, the UNH liquid spill, the electrical failure, the water failure, the failure of HVAC, the failure of a single HEPA filter, XX11rMXIXXXXkXXXXEfxMERA ZXIEsMHV a fire in a bank of,HEPA filters, a fire in radioactive wastes,-a fire in the rod inspection / final assembly area and explosion in the sintering furnace.
However, as dangerous as all these accidents can be, it is the last accident, namely
" criticality," almost neatly hidden away at the bottom of the table, which concerns us the most.
Of course the " criticality" accident itself is treated in a stipulated contention number 15.
However, one main concern in SEACA's accidents contention (expressed in 4 (a)) is that WEC practically fails to treat the risk of accidents during transportation.
This is a very real and present risk and if an accident occurred, great harm could befall the general public in the vicinity of the accident.
More-over, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that such an assessment be made.
SEACA's contention 4 (b) is also exceedingly valid.
WEC's Report, in rating the probability of accidents, tosses around such terms as " credible," " incredible," and " remotely possible,"
yet it provides absolutely no definition of such terms or no basis for using such terms.
Indeed, WEC's Report is devoid of any specificity in this all-important area.
SEACA's contention 4 (c) is also valid and to the point and is supportive of contention 4 (a).
NEPA requires a consideration
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of the consequences of major accidents at a plant facility, and this WEC has wholly failed to do.
5.
HEPA FILTERS:
Subcontention 5(b) has been agreed upon by everyone in the Stipulation but subcontention 5 (a) is equally important.
There is no doubt that harmful particulates of uranium less than 0.3 micrometers will pass through even 99.9% efficient HEPA filters as aerosols and will be extremely dangerous to the health of workers and other members of the general public who will breathe in these particulates.
No doubt the danger is clear.
Proven in many scientific journals is the fact that such particu-lates do cause cancer and other harmful health effects.
Certainly the requirement of 10 C.F.R. 7 0. 23 (a) (3 ) and (4) are met by this proposed contention, as is the specificity requirement.
8.
NEED FOR PLANT:
Subcontention 8 (a) was included at the last moment in the Stipulation, Attachment A.
There is no reason why subcontention 8(b) should not also be included as a valid contention.
Apparently, from previous discussions with WEC representatives, this subcontention makes WEC very uncomfortable.
Perhaps some of their discomfort is related to the fact that SEACA has touched upon a very sensitive spot with WEC, namely that WEC will eventually have to resort to plutonium.
Given the factors described in this contention, namely the 5 year term of the license, the 40 year projected life of the plant, and the 30 year anticipated supply of uranium, and most significantly, the closing down of WEC's mixed oxide plutonium plant in Pennsylvania, there is an exceedingly strong possibility that plutonium will be used at the Plant, either sooner or later.
Certainly the requirements of 10 C.F.R.
- 70. 23 (a) and speci-ficity are met by this contention as well.
9.
RADIATION - DOSE MODELS:
In this contention SEACA has stated a major defect in the radiation dose models described by WEC in its Report.
These dose models simply fail to address the radionuclides, radon gas, certain daughter products of uranium, and the production of plutonium-239 by neutrons captured by uranium-238, all of which will be associated with the normal operation of this plant.
Unquestionably all of these materials pose both immediate and long-term health hazards to workers and neighboring citizens and thus meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 70. 23 (a) (3) and (4).
Ample specificity also exists.
12.
ALTERNATIVE SITES:
In this contention SEACA states that the NRC cannot make the determination of 10 C.F.R. 70. 23 (a) (7) because other sites in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois are ob-viously superior.
SEACA would be willing to amend this contention to state why the other sites are superior, including their closer proximity to raw materials, to markets for the nuclear fuel product, and to WEC's Pittsburgh headquarters.
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Subcontention 8 (b) is also to the point.- Prattville, Alabama
'isn't just too close to a major population area; it is in fact a part of a major population area.
For this reason, given the risks of the plant and its product to the general public, the plant should not be built in Prattville; instead it should be built in an area remote from population.
14.
PROTOTYPE CONSIDERATION:
This contention speaks for itself.
It is very specific in its request for information concerning the two existing plants in Earope.
SEACA fervently believes that harmful health effects will flow from this plant to the general public, and that the public should be informed of these dangers.
Although WEC contends that this is a discovery contention, they should have no good objection to producing to us the in-formation concerning the two plants which they claim are pro-totypes in Europe.
The concerns of 10 C.F.R. 7 0. 23 (a) are met by this contention.
17.
ALABAMA AS AN AGREEMENT STATE According to SS-8 of the Application, source materials and by-product materials will be regulated by the State of Alabama as "an Agreement State. "
SEACA believes the State of Alabama is untrained and un-l prepared to handle these materials and is assuming an enormous risk for the citizens of Alabama, which risk it is incapable of handling.
This is contrary to the guidelines of 10 C.F.R.
S 70. 23(a) (3) and (4).
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l 18.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS WEC is vague, perhaps deliberately so, in its use of the term " usual lines of organizational authority."
It would require little effort, supposedly, for WEC to define this term, and considering the health hazards that can flow from lack of organ-ization, it is important that WEC define this term.
A failure to define this term would be in conflict with 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a).
There should be ample specificity in this contention.
Everyone, WEC included, knows what SEACA is talking about here.
19.
ALARA AS INVALID STANDARD This contention gets to the heart of many of SEACA's ob-jections.
With the ALARA standard, all that WEC has to do to get around other NRC standards is state that a particular radia-tion limit is "as low as reasonably achievable."
When SEACA says that the ALARA standard is " invalid, in-accurate, and much too subjective" everyone should know what SEACA is talking about.
This contention does not lack specificity, and it is a direct challenge to 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a).
20.
DRY PROCESS UNWORKABLE COMBINATION It is absolutely essential that this particular contention be litigated.
The " dry process" to be used by WEC at the plant is at the very center of SEACA's concern about the plant.
Surely, both SEACA and the NRC need to carefully scrutinize this process and without such scrutiny dangerous aspects of the process may be overlooked, much to the detriment of the general populace of Alabama.
21.
NOTIFICATION AND TRACKING REQUIREMENTS This contention speaks for itself; however, suffice it to say that WEC should comply with these stringent new notification and tracking requirements for hazardous waste materials promulgated by the E.P.A.
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.
If WEC would simply sign a Stipulation to this effect, SEACA would probably be satisfied.
22.
SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS:
This contention also speaks for itself, but suffice it to say that this contention is specific enough and addresses a very real and present danger.
The synergistic effect of paper mill wastes and radioactive discharge could be devastating.
25.
EMERGENCY BULLETIN BOARD:
This contention is very specific; it also makes a great deal of sense that, in order to guarantee communication, there should be one central bulletin board containing all messages which employees are required to check and sign in on every day.
Also, any changes should be posted in conspicuous wording and coloring.
The corcerns of 10 C.F.R. 70. 23 (a) are addressed here.
27.
SOUTHERN BUILDING CODE:
This contention is obviously meritorious and there should be sufficient specificity.
10 C.F.R. 70.23(a) is at stake here; surely the building is too weak to withstand a nuclear criticality explosion.
28.
NEUTRON ISOLATION STRUCTURE:
This contention WEC was originally willing to agree to, but the NRC staff nixed it.
WEC and the NRC staff may contend that the neutron isolation structure is not designed to contain-neutrons; however, in a sense, through its isolation function, it does indeed contain (in the sense of cutting down) the neutrons which are emitted.
Again there is a danger of the special nuclear material going critical-here which must be dealt with.
29.
DEGRADATION OF SNM:
This contention is very basic; in fact the whole degradation process itsei' 1 very basic.
It is very important that U-235 be properly de, ni into uranium as source material and, without any information this subject, there is no assurance that it will be done at all.
10 C.F.R. 70.23 is addressed here.
34.
PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY:
This contention is brief and speaks for itself.
Personnel dosimeters are key instruments for protecting the health and safety of plant workers, as required by 10 C.F.R.
- 70. 23 (a).
35.
URANIUM CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR:
This contention is specific and extremely relevant.
WEC seeks an exemption from normal uranium concentration levels in the air and simply should not get in, given the dangers of even low level radiation to plant workers.
. 37.
AIR SAMPLES ANALYSIS This contention raises a very real and present danger, namely that an instantaneous high level spike could not be detected instantaneously, especially since there is no continuous recording of radioactive airborne effluents to unrestricted areas.
Surely ther: is sufficient specificity here and the con: erns of 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a) have been addressed.
38.
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF SOLID WASTE MATERIALS This contention speaks for itself, is sufficiently specific, and raises sufficient legal grounds under 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a).
39.
BETA-GAMA EXPOSURE LIMITS This contention is short and to the point.
However, it raises a very real and present danger, is specific, and is worthy of being admitted as a valid contention.
41.
" AVERAGE" DOSE EQUIVALENT This contention speaks for itself and is grounded in concerns raised in 10 C.F.R. 70. 23 (a) (3) and (4).
45.
EXEMPTION - NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT - RESPIRATORY EQUIPMENT 46.
EXEMPTION - CAUTION SIGNS 47.
EXEMPTION - WASTE DISPOSAL REQUIREMENT 48.
EXEMPTION - CRITICALITY ACCIDENT REQUIREMENTS These 4 exemption contentions state succintly enough, in and of themselves, why the particular exemptions should not be granted.
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SEACA believes.that the requirements which these contentions seek to exempt themselves from are good and normal requirements which pose no undue burden for WEC.
Each of these contentions is sufficiently specific and each raiser contentions within the ambit of 10 C.F.R. 70.23(a).
Respectfully submitted, SAFE ENERGY ALLIANCE OF CENTRAL ALABAMA, INC.
By Lb, 44/V///w JMlian L. McPhil' lips, fr.
P.O.
Box 64 Montgomery, Alabama 36101 Counsel for SEACA Dated:
February 25, 1981 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served copies of the foregoing upon the following named and addressed individuals on.this the.
I day of February, 1981.
See Attachment A for names of people served.
0 N-9)W w
Juligh L. McPhillips, Jr/
ATTACHMENT A John F. Wolf,'Esq., Chairman Ms. Cathalynn'Donelson Atomic Safety and Licensing Bd.
855 Park Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Montgomery, Alabama 36106 3409 Shepherd Street Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015 Dr. Ira L. Myers State Health Officer Dr. Harry Foreman, Member State of Alabama Atomic Safety and Licensing Bd.
Department of Public Health Box 395, Mayo State Office Bldg.
University of Minnesota Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 Atomic Safety and Licensing Bd. Panel Dr. Martin J.
Steindler, Member U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Bd.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Argonne National Laboratory 9700 South Cass Avenue Docketing & Service Section Argonne, Illinois 60439 Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Eckort, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott 42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
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9 Donald R. Marcucci, Esq.
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g Westinghouse Electric Corp.
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P.O.
Box 355 f
MAR 2 lg g g y 'y Pittsburgh, Pa.
15230 Oftce ergg,
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
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Office of the Executive Legal Dircctor D'
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C.
20555
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