ML19341C936
| ML19341C936 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1981 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341C937 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103040569 | |
| Download: ML19341C936 (6) | |
Text
h590 01_
w. --_.
UNITED STATES OF AMERfCA h
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER % LIGHT CO.
)
Docket No. 50-219
)
(Oyster Creek.'luclear Generating
)
I;ation)
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF LICENSE I.
The Jersey Central Power and Light Company (licensee) is the holder of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 which authorizes the operation of the Oystar Creek Nuclear Generating Station at steady state reactor power levels not in excess of 1930 megawatts thermal (rated power).
Tne facility con:f sts of a boiling water reactor located at the licensee's site in Ocean County, New Jersey.
II.
During a routine shutdown of Browns Ferry ljnit No. 3 on June 28, 1980, 76 of 185 control rods failed to fully insert in response to a manual scram from approximately 30% power. All rods were subsequently inserted within 15 minutes and no reactor damage or hazard to the pubite occurred. However,
~
the event did cause an in-depth review of the current SWR Control Rod Drive Systems which indentified design deficiencies requiring both short and long-term corrective measures. These measures are set forth in the Generic Safety Evaluation Report - BWR SCRAM DISCHARGE SYSTEM, dated December 1,1980, prepred by the NRC staff. One of the deficiencies identified was a failure mode of the control air system, which can conceivable cause an inability to scram l
\\
810304gg(pf
)
2590 01.
the control rods.
Sustained low pressure in the control air system could P
result in complete or partial opening of multiple scram outlet valves before opening of the scram inlet valves, causing the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) to fill rapidly, thus leaving a relatively short time for the operator to take corrective action before scram capability is icst.
It appears that an event of this general type (but with no adverse consequencesi actually occurred
~
at th'e Quad Cities Unit I reactor on January 3,1977.
IE Bulletin 80-17 (Sepplement S) requires an imnediate manual scram when low pressure occurs in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) air system or when other indications occur, such as multiple rod drift alarms or a marked change in the number of control rods that are at high temperature.
Beginning on December 1,1980, protection was also provided by continuous monitoring of cne SDV as required by IE Bulletin 80-17 (Supplement 1).
However, since only a short time could be available for the operator to successfully initiate a reactor scram, a question remains as to the adequacy of equipment and procedures. This continuous monitoring system and operator response provide important protection against water accumulation in the SDV headers under slov fill conditions; however it does not address completely all the potential loss of air events.
In addition, a human factors evaluation determined that reliance on the operator to successfully carry out a manual scram within a limited time frame may not be assured. Therefore', in the short term in order to provide prompt added protection for credible degraded air conditions in Ei:R control air supply systems, it is necessary that an automatic system be operable to initiate control red insertion ky rapidly dumping the control air system header if the air pressure decreases below a prescribed value.
The NRC staff is developing revised design and safety criteria for a lona term solution to this problem.
pN 01 III.
The Generic. Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of December 1,1980, recommended that '.his automatic air header dump system be installed within two montar. As a result of questio'ns as to whether a reliable system could be installed within two months, the staff continued to review this require-ment. We have performed a more detailed risk assessment which has shown a lower probability for the loss.of scram capability due to a loss of air than our original estimate. We have also reevaluated the human factors involved in carrying' out thr. requirements of IE Bulletin 80-17 (Supplement 3) which requires a manual scram of the reactor on alarms related to the loss of air pressure in,the air system. These alams provide some added assurance that the operatcr can trip the reactor before the scram discharge volume fills.
As a result of these analyses I have detemined that the public health, safety and interest require that the automatic air dump system be in operation within 90 days of the date of this Ordir and that operation during this
~
period does not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.
'i have further detemined based on staff evaluations of installed air
[t systems, and on staff discussions with industry repres'entatives that a 90-day period will allow adequate time for design, procurement, fabrication, installation, and testing for an automatic. air dump system of the type prescribed in this Order.
y J
e-9
5 0-01
_4 As discussed above, although (1) the failure of the control air system is a low probability event, (2) the actions already required provide a significant measure of assurance that such an event will not occur and (3) the criteri for a long term fix are currently being developed, I have determined that the public health and safety require the additicnal measures prescribed by this Order and their implementation on this short time s chedule.
However, in view of the imediacy of the need for tnis system, the system being mandated by this Order is not being made subject to the requirements of Appendices A and B to 10 CFR Part 50.
IV.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, including Sections 103 and 1611, and the Cornission's rules and ngulations in 10 CFR Parts,2 and 50, IT IS ORDERED THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDI*.TELY, Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 is hereby amended to add the followir.g p rovi sions:
(1)
An automatic system shall be operable to initiate control rod insertion on low pressure in the control air header, which meets the following criteria:
(a) The system shall automatically initiate control rod insertion at 10 psi or greater above scram outlet valve opening pressure; (b) The system shall not degrade the existing safety systems (e.g.,
(c) The system shall allow for scram reset; (d) The design shall consider the potential for inadvertent or unnecessary scrams;
,
--== -
===== sum -
-== -
mum i
0 7510:1
- (el Any required p:wer svpply should not be subject to av fat,1ure mode which could also initiate the degraded-air conditions, unless it can be demonstrated that an au'matic scram will oc:ur promptly because of the failum. rode of the power supply; (f) The system is not subject to the require.v_nts of Appendices A and B ofl0 CFP,50; (g) Tnere shall be a documented independent design review of the system; (h)
Before the system is declared operable, a documented pre-op,erational test of the system will be su::essfully completed; and (i) The. system shall be functionally tested at each Unit shutdown, but need not be tested more than once each 90 days.
(2) After April 9,1951, the Autcmatic Dump System as described above shall be cperable in all modes other than shutdym and refueling or the unit shall be placed in a cold shutdown conditi:n within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> unless system operability is restored.
e I
~~
-........-,n....
'755 b 1 ~
Y.
u..
1
~
The licensee or any person whose interests may be affected by. this Order 1ay request a hearing within 20 days of the date f publication of this Order in the Federal Register. Any request for a hearing will not stay the effective date of this Order.
Any request for a hearing shall be addressed t$ the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S.
Nucle ~ar Regu[atory.Cor=ission, Washington, D. C.
20555. A copy of the re:'.'est :hould also be sene to the Executive Legal director, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
20555.
If a person other thai $
the licensee requests.a hearing, thac persen shall set forth with particularity the nature of their interest and the canre-f n ht.ich such incerest may be affected by this. Order.
VI.
If a hearing is held concerning this Order, the issue to be considered at the hearing shall be:
Whether the licensee should be required to have the automatic
.x system required by Section IV to be operable by April 9,1981.
Operation of the facility on terms consistent with this Order is not stayed by the pendency of any proceedings on the Order.
FDR THE NUCL.AR REGULATORY COMMISSION V kf/. ten ut, Director I
arrei G. :.y Division of dicensing.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated: JMJARY 9 1931 Sethesda, Maryland
-