ML19341C857
| ML19341C857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341C847 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103040303 | |
| Download: ML19341C857 (4) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0. 39 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-66 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
. OHIO EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT N0.1 DOCKET N0. 50-334 INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 17, 1980, Duquesne Light Company proposed changes to the Technical Specificaticns (TSs) appended to Facility Optrating License No. DPR-66 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1.
The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2,1980.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION i
Sy our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident.
Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980.
Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to Duquesne Light Company dated October 9,1980.
In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating raactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined ace.ptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" 1tems, we requested that' licensees amend their TS to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, 'as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1980.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
The licensee's application is in direct response to our request.
Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensce's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.
81080403 0 3
2-i EVALUATION i
2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements The pressurizer water level indicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are ir 'ortant in a post-accident situation.
Adequate emergency power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components. The licensee has the requisite emergency power supplied.
The licensee.has proposed adequate TSs which provide for a 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration and actions in the event of component inoperabili ty. We have reviewed these proposed TSs and find that the emergency power supplies are reasonably ensured for post-accident functioning of the subject components and are thus acceptable.
.2.1.3.a Direct Indication of Valve Position The licensee has provided a direct indication of power-operated relief valve 1
(PORV) and safety valve position in the control room and direct indication of flow downsteam of the PORV and safety valves in the control room.
These indications are a diagnostic aid for the plant operater and provide no automatic action.
The licensee has provided TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirement; thus, the TSs are acceptable a
and they meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Cooling The licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling.
This instrument, a sub-cooling meter, receives and processes data from existing plant instrumentation.
We previously reviewed this system in our. Safety Evaluation dated October 9, 1980.
The licensee submitted TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirement and actions to be taken in the event of
,~
component inoperability. We conclude that TSs are acceptable as they meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.1. 4 Diverse Containment Isolation The licensee has modified the containment isolation system so that' diverse parameters will be sensed to ensure automatic isolation of non-essential systems under postulated ac'cident conditions. We have reviewed this system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation dated October 9,1980.
The modification is such that it does not result in the automatic loss of conta.inment isolation after the containment isolation signal is reset.
Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate operator action.
The TSs submitted by the licensee list each affected containment isolation valvc and provide for the appropriate surveillance and actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
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. 2.1.7.a Auto Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Systens The licensee has provided for the automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow on loss of normal feedwater flow. The auto-initiation signals used by the licensee are steam generator-level and safety injection. We have previously reviewed the design and installation of this system as part of our Lessons Learned fategory "A program.
The circuits are designed to be testable and the design retains the capability of manual actuation frem the control room even in the event of failure of the auto-initiating circuitry. The TSs submitted by the licensee list the appropriate components, describe the tests and provide for proper test frequency.
The TSs contain appropriate actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
2.1.7.b Auxiliary Feedwater Flow ' Indication The, licensee has installed auxiliary feedwater flow indication that meets our testability and vital power requirements.
We reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated October 9,1980.
The licensee has proposed a TS with 31-day cnannel check and 18-month channel calibration requirements. We find this TS acceptable as it meets the criteria of our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA.
The licensee's application would add one STA to each shift to perform the function of accident assessment.
The individual performing this function will have at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.
Part of the STA duties are related to operating experience review 4
function.
Based on our review, we find the licensee's submittal to satisfy our requirements and is acceptable.
EVALUATION TO SUPPORT LICENSE CONDITIONS 2.1. 4 Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Our letter dated July 2,19.80, ind'icated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a Systems Integrity Measurements Program.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity.to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment.
By letter dated September 17, 1980, the licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly we have included this condition in the license.
i
4 2.1.8.c Iodine Monitoring Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions. By letter dated September 17, 1980, the licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly, we have included this condition in the license.
2.1.3.b Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin Our letter of July 2,1930, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to the determination of subcooling margin; this is a precursor to warn of inadequate core cooling in the event of an acci. dent. Such a condition would require the training of personnel and the generation of procedures to accurately monitor the reactor coolant system sub-cooling margin. By letter dated September 17, 1980, the licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly, we have included this condition in the license.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amenditat does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environnental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because that amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration,' (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: February.ll,1981 9
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