ML19341C566

Forwards Addl Info Re Containment Isolation Leakage Testing, in Response to NRC 780922 & 1214 Requests.Primary Containment Isolation Valves Will Be Added to Type C Local Leakage Program

ML19341C566
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	02/24/1981
From:	Novarro J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SNRC-534, NUDOCS 8103030756
Download: ML19341C566 (5)

Text

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r LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY

.. Lwawww N SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY RO AD + WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 SNRC-534 February 24, 1981 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

During the course of SER open item meetings, held in your office on September 22, 1978 and December 14, 1978, the results of the Staff's review of the containment isolation system, as described in the Shoreham FSAR Section 6.2 and Response 041.18, was dis-cussed. At that time, it was agreed that we would evaluate and provide additional information in response to staff questions re-garding the local leakage test program for containment isolation valves from systems terminating in the suppression chamber.

Enclosed herewith are ten (10) sets of additional information with respect to SER Confirmatory Item 11 on containment isolation leakage testing in response to those NRC requests.

Very truly yours,

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J. P. Novarro N Project Manager .N

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l SER CONFIRMATORY ITEM 11 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION The following information is provided in response to Staff questions posed during meetings held on September 22, 1978 and December 14, 1978 to discuss the results of the Staff's review of the containment isolation system as described in the Fnoreham FSAR Section 6.2 and Response 041.18.

The main concerns identified during these meetings involved the use of remote manual valves as primary containment isola-tion valves, the premise of the suppression pool serving as a sealing system theraby eliminating the need for local testing, i and the leakage detection program for those closed systems outside containment (second barrier).

This response is limited to the local leakage test program for the isolation valves on penetrations whose associated piping system terminates in the suppression chamber, and in most cases beneath the suppression pool water level. The Shoreham positions with respect to the remote manual concern and the second barrier leakage detection program will be addressed in response to TMI Items II.E.4.2 and III.D.l.l. These positions are currently t

being prepared and will be submitted for the Staff's review by June 1981.

To provide assurance that the requisite leaktight integrity of the isolation valves is maintained, the primary containment i

isolation valves associated with the penetrations listed on Attachment 1 will be added to the Shoreham Type C local leakage test program. These valves will be leakage tested with air irrespective of whether the valve is exposed to air or water leakage. Appropriate test connections will be added to these systems to permit local testing. Attachment 2 lists the penetra-tion number, the primary contaiment isolation valve number, the direction of the leakage being measured relative to accident conditions, and a remarks section to discuss specific test method or justifications.

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ATTACHMENT 1 STAFF PENETRATION LIST TYPE C PROGRAM EXTRACTED FROM AUGUST 1978 TELECON X-8A, B RIIR - Suppression Chamber Sprays X-9A, B,C,D Rl!R - Pump Suction X-10A, B RIIR - Return Lines X-13 HPCI - Turbine Exhaust X-15 HPCI - Pump Suction X-17 RCIC - Turbine Exhaust X-18 RCIC - Vacuum Pump Discharge X-19 RCIC - Pump Suction X-21A, B Core Spray Suction X-41 ,

HPCI - Vacuum Breaker X-42 RCIC - Vacuum Breaker

! X-43 PHR - Vacuum Breaker XS-5 RHR - HPCI XS-6 Suppression Pool Cooling & Cleanup I

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MTACHMENT 2 ADDITIONS TO THE TYPE C TESTING PROGRAM

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PENETRATION DIRECTION

.- NUMBER VALVES (8) TESTED REMAPJS J

X-8A, 10A 1 Ell'MOVOkOA THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2

, IEll'MOV0hlA REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 ,

1 Ell'MOV0h2A REVERSE SEE NOTE 1 X-8B, 10B lEll'MOV0kOB THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2-l

'lEll'MOV0klB REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 t lE11*M070h2B REVERSE SEE NOTE 1 X-9A 1 Ell'M07031A THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 X-9B lEll'MOV031B THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 X-9C 1 Ell *MOV031C THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 X-94 lE11*MOV031D THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2

, X-10A lE21*MOV034A THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 lE21*MOV035A REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 l 1Gll'MOV639 FORWARD 1Gll* CHECK FORWARD 1Ghl*MOV033A FORWARD 1Ghl*MOV033B REVERSE SEE NOTE h lEll'MOV0hkA- REVERSE. SEE NOTE h lEll*MOV045A REVERSE SEE NOTE L

.X-10B lE31*MOV03hB THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2

lE21*MOV0353 REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 i

lE51*MOV036 REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 1Ehl*MOV036 REVERSE SEE NOTE 5

, lEll*RV155 FORWARD SEE NOTE 6 i lEll*MOV0hhB REVERSE SEE NOTE k lEll*MOV0h5B REVERSE SEE NOTE h X-13 1Ehl*MOV0hk THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 lEhl* CHECKS FORWARD SEE NOTE 7 X-15 1Ehl*MOV032 THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 X-17 lE51*MOV0h5 THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2

, . 1E51* CHECKS FORWARD SEE NOTE 7

! X-18 lE51*MOV056 REVERSE SEE NOTE 3 l X-19 lE51*MOV032 THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2

X-21A lE21*MOV031A THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 i X021B lE21*MOV031B THRU BODY SEE NOTE 2 i X kl lEhl*MOV0h9 REVERSE SEE NOTE 5 l X h2 1E51*MOV0b9 REVERSE SEE NOTE 5 X h3, XS-5 lEll'MOVoSSA FORWARD l lEll'MOV055B FORWARD lEll*MOV056A REVERSE SEE NOTE 5

l. lEll*MOV056B REVERSE SEE NOTE 3

{ X h3 1 Ell *RV152A FCRWARD SEE NOTE 6

! 1 Ell *RV152B FORWARD SEE NOTE 6 i lEll*RV157A FORWARD SEE NOTE 6 lEll*RV157B FORWARD SEE NOTE 6 lEll* CHECKS FORWARD XS-6 1Ghl*MOV03hA REVERSE SEE NOTE h I

1Ghl*MOV03hB FORWARD 1

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NOTES:

1. The addition of maintenance block valves and test connections inboard of these primary containment isolation valves would increase the paths for potential leakage and create undesirable operating situations. These globe valves are positioned such that containment pressure tends to unseat the disc. During accident conditions, these lines will be water sealed by the suppression pool thus preventing primary containment atmospheric leakage.

2. ?ressurizing the body of a gate valve is a conservative test method because irrespective of the inboard valve seat, all leakage during the loss-of-coolant-accident must pass thru the outboard valve seat or thru the valve stem packing. The body vent test method measures leakage past both valve seats and the valve stem packing. The valve disc will be thoroughly

. inspected at prescribed periodic intervals to ensure integrity.

3. These primary containment isolation valves are globe valves.

The leak test pressure is under the valve disc, tending to unseat it. Since containment pressure tends to seat the valve disc, the leak test method is more conservative than testing in the forward direction.

4. These primary containment isolation valves are wedge type gate valves equipped with body vent test connections. Reverse testing these valves is a conservative test because the test pressure pushes the disc away from the seating surface used during the loss of coolant accident. The cavity between the seating surfaces is vented and provides a direct measure of the valve leakage.

5. The design requirements of the valve, or the sizing of the valve i

operator, adequately demonstrates that reverse testing these 1

valves provides either equivalent or more conservative test results. The sizing of the valve operator is such that the operator seating force is at least three times the test pressure force when the valve is reverse tested.

6. These relief valves will be removed from the system and leak tested in conjunction with their setpoint verification. Their i

setpoint limits are in excess of 72 psig (1.5 times containment i

design pressure).

7. These check vc1ves prevent the backflow of the suppression pool into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbines. As these valves will be pressurized with water during accident conditions, their respective lines will be filled and pressurized with water prior to perform-ing the air leakage test.

8. All valves are located outside of primary containment.

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